Oral evidence: The UK and the Sahel, HC 555

Oral evidence, 20 October 2026.

Witnesses

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde, Patrice Ahouansou and Marc Regnault de la Mothe.

Chair

I begin the evidence session of the International Development Committee today on our inquiry into the UK and the Sahel. This is the first witness session, which is a hybrid session partly here in the Committee room and partly virtually. Can I ask our witnesses to introduce themselves, and begin with you, Abdouraouf?

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

Thanks a lot, Chair. My name is Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde. I am the Regional Bureau Director of UNHCR based in Dakar, Senegal, covering west and central Africa. Thanks for the opportunity.

Patrice Ahouansou

Good afternoon, Chair. My name is Patrice Ahouansou. I am a UNHCR representative in Chad. Thank you. Marc Regnault de la Mothe: Good afternoon. My name is Marc Regnault de la Mothe. I am Senior Regional Representation Adviser for the Western Central African Bureau of WFP based in Dakar.

Chair

I am going to ask my colleague Monica Harding to begin the questions.

Monica Harding

Hello, everyone. I will start with you, Abdouraouf. Can you set out the scale of humanitarian need across the Sahel?

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

Thanks for the question. I will start by giving the statistics. It is about 20 million individuals trapped in forced displacement, 4 million refugees and asylum seekers, 14 million IDPs across the region, mainly from the central Sahel, coastal countries of Gulf of Guinea, Togo, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. The Lake Chad basin is where unfortunately we are seeing a warring trend because of the resumption of attack of non-state armed groups and the spill-over towards Cameroon, Niger, Chad—the whole Lake Chad basin region. Then, of course, countries like Chad; we are lucky to have the representative Patrice with us. Then, the Central African Republic region, as well as Congo-DRC, with the whole complexity that we all know when it comes to Congo-DRC: Ebola, malaria, cholera, as well as the conflict in the eastern parts of the country. Out of those statistics, it is important to mention that it is about 82% of women and children trapped in that displacement. The average duration of displacement in the region is around 15 or 20 years. You will agree with me that this is an element that indicates that displacement in the region goes far beyond the humanitarian portfolio. The internal and external aspects make it very compelling: border intervention, social cohesion, the pressure on the local communities, pressure on the host Government and pressure on the whole asylum system. As we respond to the needs of this displaced population in the host communities, it is important to ensure that those member states keep their obligations when it comes to asylum and access to international protection. This is maybe just another statistic, but there is a lot of struggle when it comes to young people’s access to education: 62% of the total population of refugee children of the age to go to school are out of school. This is a challenge. All this is happening in the context where we see political instability, pressure from the climate change effects and economic hardship and food insecurity. It is not easy in that region, if I can put it in one word.

Monica Harding

The figures that you are giving us are huge and astonishing. It is quite difficult, I think, to see it in any context. I guess my question to you is: where do you see this going?

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

I think the trajectory will depend on how we act now. This is why I feel so privileged to be in front of this august Committee to thank FCDO and the UK for the support that they have given to that region, not only in Chad but beyond Chad. This is the moment. I feel like this is a tipping point where we all need to come together and understand the baseline, the data that we have, and the need for us to work hand in hand. We cannot continue to work in isolation, the humanitarian actors on one side, development entities on the other side, and Government trying whatever they can to respond to the needs. Local communities sometimes feel abandoned because they do not see the support that they require. The private sector also needs to understand that there is a space for them to be present in a practical manner to support all this effort. To answer your question, it is a simple one, but difficult. If we do not act now, then unfortunately the situation will be a bit complicated; 90% of the displacement is happening within the region. You can see it through the IDP figure that I have just shared with you. We have few individuals who are compelled to go further away from the region. My fear is that if we do not act sufficiently to address the need, then we will see more and more people leaving these border areas, trying to reach places where they believe that they can get access to many other opportunities.

Monica Harding

Can I also put to you that we asked a senior director from the Foreign Office why there were cuts to aid and development in the Sahel. His answer to the question was, for example, the French have put in a lot of money to the Sahel for a long period of time and nothing has worked. It was almost as if to say nothing will ever work. My question to you is: what has not worked so far and what is different now? How should it work?

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

I think if you look at the way that we were responding to the needs in the Sahel—let me just take Sahel, for instance, because I was UNHCR representative in Burkina Faso in 2021, so I saw it for myself. The level of resources that we had to deal with 1 million IDPs, when I compare it with the level of resources that we have been entrusted with in 2026, I think it is day and night. The numbers have increased, meaning that we cannot continue to only respond to the needs of those who are fleeing. It is important to look at how we stabilise. For us, maybe this is where we need to understand each other when it comes to stabilisation, working with local communities, bringing back agency to those communities, the displaced and the host communities. Sometimes we tend to forget that the first responders are the communities. How do we restore agency to those communities? How do we rebuild the local systems? Those are the things that I see today. A month ago, I was in Mali and Burkina Faso, and I was pleased to see how communities themselves are reinventing new ways of addressing the challenges they are confronted with. We need to listen to the communities. This is why data is so important. This is one of the areas in which FCDO is supporting us a lot to understand through the data the need, the pattern, and see exactly how can we then influence the intervention. I think we cannot continue doing things that are not yielding results. This is a time where we need to reinvent a new way of engaging in the Sahel and across the region. Thanks a lot.

Monica Harding

Thank you. This is a question to you, Patrice. It is good to see you.

Patrice Ahouansou

It is good to see you again.

Monica Harding

How easy is regional co-ordination across the Sahelian states? How easy is regional co-ordination across the Sahel and across the various states?

Patrice Ahouansou

Thank you, Chair, and thank you, Madam, for this question. I will first of all start with the co‑ordination within Chad and then the co-ordination between Chad and the Sahel countries in terms of activities and cross-border response. Chad, as you know, is facing multiple crises: conflict in neighbouring countries, security conflict, armed conflict, security issues, climate crises, and food insecurity. I am sure Marc will talk more about food insecurity. Of course, all this triggers forced displacement. What is important here is how this forced displacement is provoking human shock—let’s say three levels of shocks. We have the human shock, we have the demographic shocks, and we have also the territorial shocks. With the human shock, we are seeing refugees, IDPs, host communities in very dire situations, and women and girls paying a heavy price. Many of them, especially the children, are sacrificing their childhood because the circumstances of the conflict are putting them in a situation where they have to be head of household—a role they are not supposed to play at their age. Demographic shock is because we are seeing refugees, IDPs and returnees representing the majority in most of the areas; for instance, the Sudanese refugees in the eastern part of Chad. One in three people in the eastern part of Chad is a refugee—one in three. This shows you the shock in terms of demography and also in terms of territory. The territorial setting that was pre-existing before the conflict has changed in a context where decentralisation has been actioned by the Chadian Government, but this needs to take into account the presence of the refugees in order to have a proper administrative set-up. These are the three levels of shocks. Facing this, we need to co-ordinate better with the different neighbouring countries. For instance, co-ordination between Chad and Sudan is through cross-border activities to ensure that we are not only providing for refugees but the capacity is also extended to the internally displaced people within Sudan. The inaction in Sudan will trigger more displacement into Chad. That is why there is this co-ordination between the two teams, agencies, NGOs, as well as local authorities to make sure that the cross-border response can be provided. Between Chad, Cameroon and Central African Republic—

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

Nigeria.

Patrice Ahouansou

—also Nigeria. Between Chad and Nigeria, what we put in place is, first of all, thanks to FCDO, the protection monitoring, because once again it all comes down to data. To better co-ordinate, you need data to understand the trend of the movement and to understand also the cross-border movement in order to be able to do cross-border analysis. We have also this co-ordination in place between Chad and Nigeria. This helps us to assess the situation in the places of origin of Nigerian refugees living in Chad. What is the situation in the places of origin? We are doing this thanks to the data collection and data analysis, the tool that FCDO is supporting. We are co-ordinating also at that level. It is the same thing with Central African Republic, where we have more than 140,000 refugees from Central African Republic living in Chad. Right now, we are discussing how to support their return. In the midst of this situation, we have also, let’s say, a pocket of hope in terms of return. This is what CAR and all the stakeholders in Central African Republic are doing in all this development pool to see what investment can be made in CAR so that return is sustainable. We have tools to analyse, to understand the priorities in the places of origin. There are some key priority projects but, once again, it comes to implementation of this project to make sure that when people return they do not come back, that the reintegration is effective and the return is sustainable. Co-ordination with all these countries is essential. Most important is also the co-ordination within Chad. We are today at the crossroads where some of the mistakes made collectively in 2003 should not be made any more. I think this is the narrative that we all have. We all agree that for the first crisis of Sudan in 2003 there has not been proper development investment, in refugee hosting areas. How do we correct that? It should be, first of all, through co-ordination from the start, under the leadership of the Government. For the first time, the Government, the UN agencies, the NGOs, the diplomatic representation, all the donors, sit together and agree on a co-ordination model. All this is to make sure that the Government are taking leadership. We are there as UN agencies and NGOs to support the implementation of the new model of co-ordination. This co-ordination is being done through the line ministries, so that refugees, host communities and IDPs are integrated in the national development plan and in the provincial development plan. This is the way we are co-ordinating at all levels.

Monica Harding

That is very helpful. Thank you, Patrice. Abdouraouf, to come back to you, and you touched on this already, with 24 million people estimated to need humanitarian assistance and protection in the region this year but only 8.2 million prioritised by UN agencies for urgent support, what are the risks of leaving those needs unmet?

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

We see it already happening with the cuts—the reduction of humanitarian funding that we have experienced in the region. There was a 50% reduction of humanitarian funding in 2025. When it comes to development support, ODA, a reduction close to approximately 70% across the region. The first point is that we can only see the aggravation of what I was mentioning—the access to education. We see it becoming difficult for children to continue to have access to the education system. Then, the other dimension I can also mention is when it comes to registration. We do not have the capacity, and Governments also do not have the capacity, to register individuals in the national database. This is one of the risks that I also see. On the pathway towards solution agenda, if we are not investing—because this is not aid, this is investment—how do we make it happen? As one of my colleagues used to say, there is no humanitarian solution to humanitarian problems. For us, this is a call that we have reached a limit in terms of the current model, where we systematically repeat the same humanitarian aid. Something new that needs to come, in addition to what we used to do, is the investment, by opening space to international financial institutions. This is what we are doing, working closely with the World Bank, African Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, and working also with some foundations like Mastercard Foundation. Mastercard Foundation is helping us a lot, working and structuring our engagement when it comes to localisation, working with the communities. We have received some support since last year to build the capacity of close to 300 local organisations led by women in that region. I think, definitely, if the cuts remain where they are, we will only see a very bad situation. The situation would be very bad, not only for the communities and the individuals, but also for the receiving countries.

Monica Harding

Thank you. When I was in the camps on the Chad-Sudan border, we were very interested in the women and girls and the violence that they had experienced, but it was felt there was nobody there to ask the questions because the resources were so stretched. It was impossible to go after atrocity prevention or accountability because there was no one to ask the questions of the women. I think that probably puts into what you are saying. Can I come to you, please, Marc? Could you outline the operational difficulties of only receiving short-term reactive funding from international partners? Marc Regnault de la Mothe: Yes. Good afternoon and thank you again for the opportunity to intervene today. First, foremost, maybe let me focus on the food insecurity in the Sahel. We have 9.7 million people who are facing food insecurity in 2026 in the Sahel. The drivers of food insecurity have already been mentioned by my colleagues, which I salute. We have a combination of conflict, of displacement, of climate change, and of economic pressures. It is both severe and structural at the same time. The needs are great. Again, in Sahel, 9.7 million people are in food insecurity, and the resources are reducing. We also have longer-term trends. We have population growth. We have climate change, which is going to impact the Sahel in particular because there is a 1.5° difference in average temperatures that are forecasted for the Sahel. We also have El Niño. El Niño is forecasted to be quite severe in the next season, the first half of 2027. In the whole of the west and central African region, 6 million more people are going to experience food insecurity because of El Niño. These are additional challenges. We have also the impact of the Hormuz strait crisis of the Middle East. Why? There is an increase in food prices, an increase in fuel prices and an increase in all the inputs that are needed to sustain food production. The other factor that you mentioned, and thank you for the question, is the decreased investment from donors. How do we face this? We have to prioritise. The prioritisation means assisting those who are most vulnerable and trying to assist them as well with doable solutions. I wanted to come to that, to say that it is not all doom and gloom because there are solutions. There are possibilities to invest for the UK, for donors, in longer-term solutions. For example, in the resilience programme that we have across the Sahel, called the integrated resilience programme, we managed in the last years to restore more than 300,000 hectares of degraded land, assisting a cumulative number of 8 million people across the Sahel. This has a lot of impact in the long term. It helps to avoid and to reduce humanitarian needs. It helps to reduce migration. It helps to reduce coping mechanisms. It also helps to support human capital because there is not only land restoration and the green coverage, which is coming back to the degraded lands of the Sahel, but also children going back to school. There are also social protection systems that are being put in place again. There is a place for investment, and there is a place for making sure that families and communities want to stay where they are. If they have livelihood opportunities, they will not need to migrate. They will not need to be displaced.

Chair

Marc, can I ask you to outline the prioritisation challenges for the World Food Programme as a result of reduced funding? Marc Regnault de la Mothe: Yes. It is a great challenge because we have needs that are very substantial, and the reduced funding that we are receiving obliges us to cut down on many programmes that are vital for people. I am not speaking only about humanitarian assistance or about nutrition programmes. Another figure that we did not mention is that there are more than 10 million children who are malnourished in the region. That is another programme that we have to reduce. We have to reduce the number of people we are assisting, assisting 4 million fewer people than we were planning to. These are big, substantial cuts that have an impact and that basically make it so that the negative coping strategies that have been mentioned by my colleagues, unfortunately, also come back in these communities where we had to cut and we are not able to assist any more. As I was saying, 4 million fewer people whom we can assist across the Sahel is quite an impact. Of course, it is very difficult to face it. We face it by prioritising the resources and making sure that we have more impact on the most acute needs. We do so also by working together as agencies. With the UNHCR we conduct joint assessments. We target the resources to the same refugees, the same IDPs, not only with open-ended and endless assistance, but with durable solutions based on vulnerability. This is extremely important because it also helps us to reduce costs, to have cost efficiencies and co-ordination, and work together to make sure that every dollar, every pound, every euro is invested in the best possible way, because we know the resources are less. We have to make sure that they are directed to long-term solutions to national systems and to co-ordinated actions that reassure voters and those that provide the funding that their funding and their assistance is used in the best possible way. We do more with less resources, and we try to do better in a more concentrated and a more efficient way.

Chair

That still means you cannot cover everyone. Marc Regnault de la Mothe: No, we cannot. We can do cost efficiency as much as we want, but if the funding is too reduced, there is only so much that cost efficiency can do. There are also needs that have to be met, and the needs are effectively very important. The reduction in funding has an impact. We cannot hide that.

Chair

Are there other organisations that have any capacity to pick up the shortfall from your reduction in funding?

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

This is difficult because we all live in the same situation. NGOs, local structures and UN entities—we are all confronted with the same challenge. Even host countries as well, country of origin—as Patrice was explaining in the context of the CAR—countries of return, countries of origin, countries of destination. It is a difficult moment for us all. As I was saying, this is not the time and there is not the luxury for any one of us to work in isolation. We need to understand exactly what the opportunities are, what the resources are and what the goals are. Based on trust and co-ordination, and in a well co-ordinated manner, how can we yield the impact of the reduced resources that we have? As Marc was saying, there is the example of Burkina Faso where, together with WFP and UNICEF, we have set up what we call the emergency response team, where we join up together with OCHA. In case there is a displacement quickly, we can mutualise and then respond to the needs. We cannot expect other entities to come up and take the shock. We are all living through the same realities. This is a difficult moment for the humanitarian community.

Chair

Marc, how do you predict that local populations will cope in the coming months and years without access to the food they require? Marc Regnault de la Mothe: The coping mechanisms can be quite severe, and one of them is migration. Nobody wants to migrate from their communities if their livelihood is assured and if they have land to till and food to eat. When people do not have food, they do not have solutions to solve their problems. They need to pull the children out of school. They need to look for livelihoods elsewhere. They need to migrate. That is one impact that, of course, we are all concerned with. That is one of the main coping strategies that, unfortunately, people have to take. The other ones I mentioned are cutting on their children’s education, cutting on health expenses, cutting on investments, sometimes decapitalising—meaning selling your goats, selling your seeds, consuming your seeds, not being able to invest in your future anymore. When you cannot invest in your future, life looks bleak and you need to look for a better life elsewhere. That is one of the drivers of displacement. That is one of the drivers of food insecurity. With the medium and longer-term trends of climate change, of El Niño, of conflicts, and of higher food and fuel prices, the situation is not looking good. There is also a hopeful solution, which is to make sure that the engagement of the UK and other donors remains, that the resources are pooled in the sense that the successful programmes and successful resilience solutions are that the Governments together convene and decide where the best investments are for their funding and where they make the most impact. One important thing is the long-term commitment and to make sure that funding for these programmes that are long term is there and is sustained. This is essential if we want to have some of these gains that I was mentioning, because the intermittent funding that changes year to year and that only gives temporary solutions to problems is not going to solve the issue, especially if there is less. We need long-term commitment and joining forces with the other members of the international community is essential. Thank you.

Chair

You have mentioned El Niño, and there are predictions of severe dry conditions as a result between November this year and January next year. Do you have contingency plans in place for that? Marc Regnault de la Mothe: Yes, there are contingency plans for El Niño, and maybe one thing that we should mention is that it is not only dry spells and dry weather; it is also too much rain. When the land is not ready and is degraded, instead of being a positive factor for agricultural production, the rain becomes a danger. It creates floods; it washes away whatever remains of the fertile land that is there. That is why these resilience and land restoration interventions are so essential. In terms of El Niño contingency, yes, the contingency plans are there to assist more people, but the contingency plans also need to be funded. There will be an augmented intervention, but the augmented intervention can only take place if the funding is there to support it.

Chair

Patrice, does the UNHCR have contingency plans for these El Niño events?

Patrice Ahouansou

Our contingency planning is based on, for instance in Chad, the displacement from Sudan and the displacement within Chad, especially in the lake region where we have more than 250,000 internally displaced people. For us, once again, what is important is what role the Government are playing in all this in putting together the contingency plan. This comes to the shift that we are operating as well. In the past, we would see all UN actors and NGOs sitting and working on the contingency planning without much Government leadership. This has completely changed. The Government is taking the lead. We are supporting them to finalise the contingency. This is exactly what we did for the Sudan situation, and the same thing for the IDPs, internally displaced people, in the lake region, to make sure that the solution from the start is not only a language that we are speaking as a UN agency or NGOs, but that the Government also are speaking the same language. How the displacement areas are targeted for government projects, for instance, is a conversation that we are having in Chad, and WFP and UNHCR are playing a critical role in terms of resilience programmes in the eastern part through the initiative that we call Haguina: WFP, UNHCR and IOM joining together to make sure that the lands that are degraded are regenerated and accessible for agriculture. Once again, doing this means that we cannot only rely on humanitarian funds. That is why we are doing our best to make sure that all the key donors—the UK being one of the key donors—can also see the ability or the capacity to use the development fund as well as the climate fund in those areas, in order that, first of all, we can scale up all these initiatives, and also have a tangible impact for more people. At the end of the day, what we want is to break the dependency on humanitarian aid. To be able to do it, we need to value all the capacities that refugees are coming with, all the capacities that IDPs have, and invest in those capacities so that they can take care of themselves in the future. We are also changing the model, the way we are operating. This can only be sustainable if humanitarian funds, development funds and climate funds are accessible.

Dr Sam Rushworth

Could we carry on talking about displacement for a minute? Abdouraouf, could you share with us how displacement across the multiple countries in the region is going to complicate the work of UNHCR?

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

I can give you a concrete example. I remember when I was assuming this function of regional bureau director for west and central Africa in Dakar. That was in July 2023. In the first days of assuming this function, we were hearing news about refoulement at the border between Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso. The refoulement was also taking place in a very tense relationship between those countries. You will recall the shift between the three Sahelian countries and the regional economic body, ECOWAS. Then later, of course, they have created the Alliance des États du Sahel. As I was saying, the displacement pattern in the region is that you see people being displaced first as IDP, then after as refugees, then they come back as a returnee. If they do not find opportunity to settle, what happens? They go again as IDP, then they cross again as refugees. If they are tired, then they decide maybe it is not worth staying here; I have to go. How do we address solution opportunities and improvement of the protection environment? We can only do it through humanitarian diplomacy and regional co-operation. This is what we have done between the Sahelian countries and the Gulf of Guinea countries by establishing what we call the Lomé dialogue. The Lomé dialogue has enabled us to invite all these countries in Lomé—countries like Burkina Faso, sitting in the same room just like here with Côte d’Ivoire, Togo and Ghana and, despite the political division, agree to discuss how best they can improve the protection of the civilians and collaborate to maintain the minimum principle in terms of engagement with the civilian population. I am proud to say, after two or three years of sustained engagement with that humanitarian diplomacy, a month ago we met again in Lomé, and we were able to sign a tripartite agreement between Burkina Faso-Togo, Burkina Faso-Benin and Burkina Faso-Ghana. Burkina Faso-Côte d’Ivoire we were not able to sign because there are still some elements that we are dealing with. It is a process, wanting to be patient, and then hopefully that signature will take place before the end of the year. That gives you the complexity that comes with the border engagement within a very complex political environment.

Dr Sam Rushworth

To follow up on that, to test my understanding, what I am hearing is obviously that there is conflict in the region, but that possibly one of the biggest drivers of displacement is actually people returning to discover that their home, their land, is inhabited by somebody else, that they have no livelihood to go back to, and therefore they are becoming displaced for a second or third time. Is that correct?

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

Absolutely correct. That is why we say that return is not just a cross-border movement. Return requires investment. Return requires people to have opportunity to have access to services. If children were in a displacement, but at least they were going to school, you ask them to go back and there is no school. They will not stay. They will go. They will leave again. How do we make all this return much more sustainable? It is through investment. In the region, this is what we are trying to do with our partners like WFP, UNICEF and others, of course understanding that with the reduced humanitarian resources that we are all confronted with, we need to create space and opportunities for much more development opportunities, much more development financing and much more investment coming from the private sector. We cannot do it alone. This is where I think that the UK is uniquely placed. When I see the way that you engage in Chad with the Government, with the UN system, with the NGOs, with the other donors, I think we need that kind of capacity. I also talk about the data. Data will underpin the way that we understand all this pattern complexity, so that we can all come together and understand how we can best push the pathway towards solution.

Dr Sam Rushworth

To some extent, I guess that the challenges are around having robust enough legal systems, land registration, mediation between people who are in conflict at a local level. To depart from that question a little, how many forcibly displaced people do you estimate will attempt to then just leave the Sahel and travel to Europe?

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

We have some data. When I look at what happened at the border between Sudan and Chad last year, we have an estimate of 12,000 to 13,000 who have left Chad and then went to Libya. Then we have also some indication in terms of estimates of how many Sudanese have also left to Tunisia. I think that number has increased maybe six or seven times. Then we know that there are some Sudanese in Chad who are also living and trying to transit through Lake Chad, reaching Agadez as well. Then last week during the executive committee meeting with the Cameroonian authorities, they told us that they are now seeing Sudanese leaving Chad and coming to Cameroon as well.

Dr Sam Rushworth

It is becoming a wider and wider area. They are getting further away.

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

Absolutely. This is why stabilisation is key. How do we stabilise those people close to their country of origin?

Dr Sam Rushworth

Are you expecting the numbers of refugees fleeing further north into Europe to increase, or do you feel that you are seeing the reverse, that some of the programmes are starting to work?

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

If you look at some of the data that have been collected, you will have the impression that it is reducing. I would say their routes are just changing. Their routes are dynamic. If there is more control on one route, then people would just look at other alternatives. By the time we catch up and then understand the data there, maybe it is too late, you see? I am saying that the only way we can address it, as Marc was saying, is investment within local communities, giving opportunities in terms of jobs and access to social services. We can only do it if we work closely by aligning our intervention with the national priorities. Government leadership is key. We cannot do it without Governments. How do we make it happen in those regions?

Dr Sam Rushworth

Thank you. Patrice, how many more refugees from Sudan could Chad accommodate?

Patrice Ahouansou

How many more?

Dr Sam Rushworth

Yes.

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

Be careful.

Patrice Ahouansou

It is difficult to give you an exact number, but the only thing I can say is that the population of refugees in Chad has tripled. It has tripled. Before the ongoing conflict in Sudan, because the conflict is still ongoing, unfortunately, we were talking about 400,000 Sudanese refugees.

Dr Sam Rushworth

Sudanese.

Patrice Ahouansou

Sudanese. Only Sudanese refugees.

Dr Sam Rushworth

On top of that, you have Central African Republic and others, yes.

Patrice Ahouansou

Yes. Now, from 400,000, we are talking about 1.3 million Sudanese refugees.

Dr Sam Rushworth

Okay.

Patrice Ahouansou

That is from 15 April to date. On top of that, we have the Central African refugees. We have the Nigerian refugees. All these bring the number of refugees to 1.5 million.

Dr Sam Rushworth

Yes.

Patrice Ahouansou

Something that is important to highlight is the solidarity—despite all the internal or domestic issues that Chad might have—and the generosity that the country, not only the Government but also the people, are demonstrating. I will tell you a story. This year, in January, when our high commissioner visited Chad, he met the head of state. One of the issues that the head of state raised was, “We know that there might be a spill-over of the conflict from Sudan to Chad. No matter what will happen, we will not close our border”. That was the message from the head of state. For us, it is reassuring that, despite the situation, Chad says the border will still be open. This has been translated concretely in the asylum law.

Dr Sam Rushworth

Chad is dealing with quite a rapid population growth from three different sides. Could you share with us how refugees are included in service provision in Chad?

Patrice Ahouansou

How are refugees included? Right now, what we are working on together with authorities and all the UN agencies is to prioritise three areas where inclusion should be effective: water, health, education. There has been a lot of progress, but we need to do more. Chad cannot do more alone. Chad will do more thanks to international solidarity. For instance, for education, all the refugees are using Chadian schools. All the refugees are using Chadian curriculums.

Dr Sam Rushworth

I was going to ask you that. Are they living predominantly in camps or are they just integrating? Are they mixing into the population?

Patrice Ahouansou

We have both. We have those in camps. We have those living in villages as well, with the host communities. This is the first level of inclusion. In terms of services, we have refugees and Chadians going to the same school. Even if the school is in a village or the school is in a camp, we have host communities coming to the camp and using the same facilities.

Dr Sam Rushworth

Integration, yes.

Patrice Ahouansou

All the schools are recognised as Chadian schools, using Chadian curriculum, using refugee teachers and Chadian teachers. Refugees come with a lot of capacities, and there are many teachers among the refugee community. Using the same teachers, the same curriculum is one level, but the next level would be how the teachers, in order to make this inclusion effective, are given a contract. Not necessarily as civil servants, but contractually they are being paid by the Chadian Government. This is another level.

Dr Sam Rushworth

Refugee teachers?

Patrice Ahouansou

Yes, refugee teachers. It is not the case here, but the dialogue has started with the authorities to see how this can be effective. The legislation is very conducive, but this has to be accompanied not only by us, but also by the international donors. This is the same thing for health. The same health centres are used by refugees in host communities. A water system—

Dr Sam Rushworth

Does that create any tensions in the local community?

Patrice Ahouansou

If we do not do that, it will create tension. Without sharing, having one system—because the idea is to have one system for all—if you have two parallel systems, it will bring tension. Do not forget that we are also in areas where there has not been enough development investment. Thanks to humanitarian funding, we are putting services in place but these services have to benefit both the refugees and host communities.

Dr Sam Rushworth

Is there a sense that because you are choosing to integrate, and those refugees by and large come with skills and talents and they are working and serving, the communities that receive the refugees have benefited from having refugees living amongst them?

Patrice Ahouansou

There is a huge benefit from having them. You will even see some heads of village saying, “Okay, I want refugees to be hosted in my village”.

Dr Sam Rushworth

Oh, really? The villagers are actually saying, “Please bring some to us”?

Patrice Ahouansou

They can see the dividend of bringing refugees. Once again, this can only be sustainable if we invest in the system. Not only should we invest in individuals, we should invest in services, in systems, so that the systems are unique, and invest also in the territories. You remember I was talking about the territorial shock that the influence is bringing. How do we invest in territories to ensure that we are talking about one area—we are not talking a refugee camp and village, but we are talking about one geographic unit, where there is connection between the city and the village, and there is a connection between the village and the camp. This is the model we are promoting, and this cannot be done only with the budgetary space from Chad, because this is a country that is hit by multiple crises and I do not think they have enough budgetary space to do this huge investment. That is why international solidarity remains essential, so that the inclusion can be more efficient and effective for all the population.

Dr Sam Rushworth

It sounds like an interesting model. I have a final question, Chair. I am wondering about the replicability of that model elsewhere, because what you are describing seems a relatively unique example of how to actually build a good relationship between host and refugee. Did you want to come in on that?

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

Yes, this is exactly what we are trying to do across the region, with WFP, with UNICEF, with our colleagues from DCO. If I take the example of the central Sahel, Marc, you will recall another flagship that we have developed jointly with those authorities. It is about energy, the food security system, the education system, the cross-border dynamics, and the nexus approach, to name just a few of them. This is exactly the same pattern, and this is why I think this is the only way where, as UN entities, we believe that we can demonstrate our added value in this complex environment. We need to come together; we need to put our heads together and make sure that we understand where the challenges are and what the opportunities are. As I was saying, one of the levers is the localisation agenda, working with the communities, because they are the most impacted by all these situations, and then, as we do it, ensuring that the Government remain in the co-ordination and at the centre of this initiative. This requires policy reforms; it requires a space for international financial institutions. When we engage with African Development Bank and World Bank, it is not money coming to UNHCR but money put at the disposal of the authorities so that they have the required capacity to invest in the long-term prospect. This is the only way stabilisation will become a reality in that region.

Tracy Gilbert

This is a slight change of topic. I was going to move on to engagement with international actors. I will come to you first, Abdouraouf. Do countries such as China, Turkey and Russia approach development and humanitarian partnerships differently across the Sahel than western nations do?

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

I will use an example of engagement with some of the countries that you just mentioned. In the Central African Republic, I have seen this is the first time that China, for instance, has shown interest in being part of what Patrice was describing as a return hub or development hub, but through private sector engagement—not money coming from the Foreign Office or a development corporation. This is one of the concrete examples I can see where China in the region has indicated that they can be part of that private sector solution agenda.

Tracy Gilbert

Thank you. Patrice, in terms of future development, is it possible to undertake effective development programming at such a time when there is so much instability and insecurity across the Sahel?

Patrice Ahouansou

Today, in those areas affected by displacement or those areas also receiving forcibly displaced people, we already have development projects. We already have development projects, be it in infrastructure, roads, energy, telecommunications, to ensure that the environment is conducive for other partners to feel comfortable to invest in those areas. That is one thing. The second thing is that in those displacement areas, the profile of the refugees or the IDPs encourage investment also because they are not only recipients of humanitarian aid. They should not be seen only as recipients of humanitarian aid, because these are people who come with a lot of capacities. How do we invest in those areas to maximise the potential that they have? For instance, in Chad, we have in the refugee community about 1,000 health workers—doctors, midwives, nurses—and more than 1,000 lawyers who are working as lawyers in Sudan. Who needs opportunity? More than 2,000 teachers and entrepreneurs. How do we support them to register their business? These areas should not only be seen as displacement areas; they should be seen as investment areas. How do we invest there? That is why my answer to you is, yes, we should invest in those areas, helping refugees to value, first of all, their capacities and competencies, helping them to establish small businesses, to exercise as lawyers. This is the only way they can contribute to the local economy, as taxpayers, and give back also to the community that has hosted them. We cannot do it without the private sector. We need the private sector for such engagement so that the investment in the business model is well thought out.

Tracy Gilbert

Thank you. Can I come back to Abdouraouf again? What are the challenges in undertaking development programming in countries with poor human rights records?

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

For us, it is clear that there is no development if there is no respect for human rights as well. We cannot separate development from human rights. Development should yield tangible results in the improvement of the enjoyment of the human rights of the individuals. This is part of the conversation that we are having with most of the member states in the region that I am covering. We cannot separate the two. As a protection lead agency, the work that we do somehow contributes to improve the environment of the protection, meaning the environment for the people to really enjoy their human rights. This is the work that we are doing as we engage with most of these Governments in the region.

Tracy Gilbert

You were indicating you wanted to come in there, Marc. Marc Regnault de la Mothe: Yes. I just wanted to come in again on the access. The UK has been key and strategic in supporting access negotiations in the Sahel region by convening other donors and Governments to make sure that we have continued access to communities. This is also important when we speak about the humanitarian access through UNHAS, the common humanitarian air services that WFP is managing, and that supports the whole humanitarian community in so many isolated areas that the UK has also been part of and can continue funding, because access continues to be a challenge. That is one point that I wanted to raise. Not only through funding but also through engagement and humanitarian diplomacy we really encourage the UK to continue playing that role. I also wanted to stress more on the social cohesion. Absolutely, the results that have already been outlined are there. The interventions, resilience and joint innovations do increase social cohesion. One last point I wanted to make that is important to correct in a way is that it is not a choice between humanitarian and development funding. Both are important; humanitarian for the short-term, development and resilience for the longer term. We are not advocating for one or the other because both are part of the solution.

Monica Harding

Can I just come back on other state actors? Given the cuts from the US, UK and Germany to aid in the Sahel, that has opened up a space that you talked of before and that Tracy was talking of, where Russia and China might move in. Are you seeing that very deliberately? Are you seeing that in the work that you do and in the countries where you are working?

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

Not really. What I see is that member states are coming to us and then asking how, collectively, can we look for other financing opportunities. They are not talking about funding, but financing opportunities. This is true; the rumoured dialogue is something that I will just share with you. As of next year, these are the conversations that we are going to have with those countries. What is key for them is the resilience of the communities and of the national institutions in these complex environments, and they are looking at diversification of financing opportunities. This is why across the region, for the past two years, we are really engaging with this event that is called a roundtable with the private sector. We did one in Lagos, Nigeria just recently with FCDO. I think it was in February this year. There is another one coming in Chad on 24-25 November, and we have also organised one in central Africa. That gives an indication that we are also trying to see how we can play a catalytic role, so we support the Government to look at the financing opportunity. Of course, when you have the World Bank, there are the windows for host communities and the IDA, and the windows for host communities and refugees, it is there. The African Development Bank, for instance, in Chad, has been supporting us with some resilience funding as well. We need to multiply, diversify and increase such opportunity. I am also happy to see entities like BMZ in Chad financing some resilience activities, but these need to be put at scale across the region. It is not just one country. As I was saying, displacement is regional and comes with the cross-border reality, and we need to make sure that, as Marc was saying, as we save lives we do not forget the solution opportunity, but solutions come with investment.

Chair

To bring our session to a close, I just want to ask each of you a short question about data collection and the monitoring that you do in relation to your work. Starting with you, Patrice, how does that work? How do you collect data and monitor what is happening?

Patrice Ahouansou

We have many sets of data that we collect, to understand the population trend. We do it through local partners. We also do it through communities directly, refugees and close communities, to understand the trend of movement. There is also a set of data that we collect directly to measure impact of the activities. We do it also through studies, through universities. Finally, we collect a set of data with the Government. This is key because the idea is to make sure that the data we collect with the Government is integrated in the Government system so that when the planning is being done by the Government, it first disperses or excludes population. They are already in the data. We are using key criteria. Ultimately, it is to have, for instance, refugees and IDPs in the Government’s social registry, because this is the way to make sure that all the safety net programmes the Government are implementing can target refugees, host communities and all our forcibly displaced people.

Chair

Marc, what do you think could be done to better monitor emerging risks so that predictive actions can be taken? Do you think there is something that can be done in that regard? Marc Regnault de la Mothe: Yes. We have a system called the IPC, which is the system that collects data on food security, and this is done jointly with FAO, Governments and NGOs. There is a national consensus that draws on the data collected in the field. There is a single set of drivers, and an overall figure that comes out is agreed upon by everybody, including donors. Funding for this IPC system is paramount, because it allows not only the WFP but everybody to monitor the trend yearly and according to the agricultural seasons. There is a series that can be used to see how the trend is going and where the trend is going. It also allows to make predictions, and this has been done. If we look at the forecast for the next month through Agrimet, with UK funding, there are funding windows that have been used to predict meteorological data that allows us to understand, for example, the impact of El Niño in the next month. So, there are systems that can be supported to make sure that we continue monitoring food security and the impact of future shocks.

Chair

Thank you. Finally, Abdouraouf, do you think that UNHCR has enough access to data on issues like displacement, gender-based violence and other humanitarian need?

Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde

No, I think there are certainly some efforts to be sustained, but when you look at the type, quantity and quality of the data we have collected, at least from my position as a regional director, I have found it very useful to facilitate a dialogue with a wider range of actors, member states, other UN entities and international financial institutions. We use all this data to underpin the partnership and move towards what I was referring to as a solution pathway. I think we can be proud of what we have done so far. We also have a centre established with the World Bank that helps us to look at the socioeconomic data that could be collected as we look at the inclusion within national plans. I think that, yes, we are quite happy with what we have, but certainly there is room for improvement. Thanks a lot.

Chair

Thank you to each of you for your evidence this afternoon. It is greatly appreciated. We will move now to our second panel that is going to join us. Thank you, gentlemen. Examination of witnesses

Witnesses

Vanessa Willems and Yann Faivre.

Chair

Welcome to our second panel of witnesses on our first day of our inquiry into the UK and the Sahel. Our witnesses are joining us virtually and I would like both Vanessa and Yann to introduce themselves for the purpose of the record. Vanessa, let us will start with you.

Vanessa Willems

Hello, and thank you so much for this invitation. My name is Vanessa Willems. I am the Advocacy and Policy Adviser for FONGA, the forum at regional level for west and central Africa. It is nice to meet you.

Yann Faivre

Hello. It is nice to meet you. Thank you for your invitation. I am Yann Faivre. I am the Executive Director for the Danish Refugee Council for west Africa, north Africa and Latin America. I am based in Dakar for several years. This is where we have our regional operations.

Chair

Thank you. I will begin, Vanessa, by asking you about the fact that humanitarian access is increasingly constrained by both insecurity and Government-imposed restrictions. Of these, what do you believe presents the greatest practical obstacle to delivering assistance in central Sahel?

Vanessa Willems

Thank you for this question. My answer is it depends on what country we are talking about. Recently, we have received a report from two organisations that are members of the forum, and they documented over 200 incidents that took place in 2025 of impeding access on the ground. What we see is that in Burkina Faso, for example, it is mostly security that is impeding humanitarian access, whereas in a country like Niger it is bureaucratic and administrative impediments that are the primary cause of challenges that actors on the ground are facing to access people in need. In Mali the balance is a bit more even between the two category types of incidents. Would you like me to go into more details on this?

Chair

You have touched on some specifics. If you are able to give us a general impression of the situation, that would be helpful.

Vanessa Willems

Okay, thank you. So, what incidents are we talking about? If you are talking about Burkina Faso, for example, a recent example that we faced in 2026 is the Banque des Dépôts du Trésor; a rough translation would be treasury bank. We have been asked by the authorities to put the money meant to support the humanitarian response projects within the treasury bank. What we see is that this measure, which is not necessarily at odds with humanitarian principles, the way and rapidity that it was implemented led to significant challenges for the humanitarian actors on the ground. For example, we did not have access to liquidity quickly enough. We did not see our payments being done quickly enough so that slowed down the purchase of different items. We did not see the payments to humanitarian staff taking place quickly enough, so that led to other significant challenges. All that slowed down the humanitarian response. In a context like Niger, the challenges we are facing are more like the authorisation to access the grants that are delivered by the authorities. They are either slowed down or for the most part there are delays in providing those authorisations, but sometimes we are also facing refusal. That is national NGOs that report those challenges, and it is with the exemptions for customs and so on. The administrative process is too slow and the documents that need to be provided by the authorities are too slow. That also leads to some challenges for them justifying their expenses with the donors. In Mali, a recent example that has taken our attention has been the 10% tax that the authorities wanted to impose on the humanitarian response. It required a lot of conversation between the authorities and the humanitarian community, and it led to an exemption that was provided by the authorities a few months back. I think what those examples tell us is that within the speech of the authorities we are witnessing an increase in their desire to express their sovereignty. They want to have more leadership and oversight on the humanitarian response, and they want the humanitarian response to be more aligned with their national priorities. To be very clear, NGOs on the ground do not have any issues with sovereignty of state. We respect that, but the way the reforms are taken and being implemented, the measures that are being adopted, can lead to significant operational challenges on the ground, just as I described with the BDT, as we call it, the treasury bank. This also teaches us something very important: that dialogue is key to keep the trust between the actors. We need a sustained dialogue. We need to build trust with those actors and be solution-oriented. We need to be supported in building that trust and dialogue space. You may ask what this means for an actor such as the UK. I think the way you can support us is by helping us to create that space. To give you a very specific example that will be coming very soon on the table, you may be aware that the authorities of the central Sahel, AES authorities, hosted a humanitarian forum back in August 2026. During that forum, they took a resolution to develop a humanitarian policy. As humanitarian actors, we see this humanitarian policy for the AES countries as an opportunity to engage and dialogue with them. We see this as an opportunity to put measures in the policy that could, for example, facilitate cross-border humanitarian responses. We also see it is equally important that we are part of the discussions and that we are being consulted in the process to set up those policies so we can raise any concerns or suggestions to make sure that the humanitarian response is as fluid and effective as possible. More generally speaking, humanitarian diplomacy is definitely a way that an actor such as the UK could support us on the field. We need your support to keep the dialogue with the authorities to help resolve solutions. There are maybe four points I could share with you about the way the humanitarian diplomacy should be conducted, and this is based on a recent experience. First, what we see is that when you mention diplomacy conducted by diplomatic actors, it is co-ordinated. It is more efficient when it is co-ordinated among them. A recent example of that would be in Chad, where the authorities also decided to put on the table—or they floated around, let’s say it that way—this idea of putting a tax on the humanitarian response. We received strong support from the donors; they put down on paper their position on that and shared it with the authorities. They co-ordinated among themselves what their responses would be and that was extremely helpful. Another point that we have in mind is humanitarian diplomacy is the most effective when it is co-ordinated, discussed and grounded in the operational realities of the field actors. What does it mean? It means that before your representatives go on to the field and engage with the authorities, you could have conversations, pre-briefings, with the NGOs that are operating on the ground, and receive reports from us to support your engagement with the authorities. The third thing that we have witnessed and observed is that humanitarian diplomacy is also most efficient when it is driven and guided by humanitarian principles. The fourth point to keep in mind with humanitarian diplomacy is that it is helpful to have diplomatic actors supporting us, but we have to keep in mind that the vast majority of access issues are resourced by humanitarian actors operating themselves on the ground; their direct engagement with different actors direct on the ground. What we need to do is keep investing in the collective capacity to do so, supporting the forums at country level. Thank you so much for that question. Please let me know if I need to clarify any points.

Chair

The only point I wanted to raise is in terms of diplomatic actors in the wider setting. Are there other actors, such as Russia and China, for example, who might want different outcomes, and therefore their diplomatic actions with the host Governments might be different from ours?

Vanessa Willems

It is an interesting question. When an actor such as the FONGA reach out to different diplomatic actors across the world to support, we do assess how they can be supportive. I do not have a specific response about China or Russia, but we have identified other stakeholders across the region where we need their support; for example, Turkey. We do know that they are selling drones—they are probably not the only ones—to the authorities across the three central Sahel countries. Those drones are then used after for military purposes, but they represent an increasing challenge for our teams on the ground. We are worried about the incidents that they can represent against the humanitarian community, although it is collateral damage and they are never a direct target. We are worried about that. We are worried as well for the impact it can have, obviously, on the protection of civilians. You mentioned diplomacy and engagement with stakeholders such as Turkey. It is essential to make sure that they are aware of the risk that when they sell those warfare instruments to the authorities, they make sure that they put everything in place to safeguard the protection of the civilians and the aid workers on the ground. I know it is not exactly the stakeholder you were aiming for, but it is just to say that when we engage and we look at support, we also look at a different set of stakeholders, not just European ones. We also look at the diplomatic actors within the region. An interesting lesson we took away from the political transition in Niger back in 2023 was the influence on access that actors such as ECOWAS or even Togo or Benin had on our capacity to respond on the ground. We do try to have engagement directly with them. Our relationship today I would not say is as strong as we have with actors such as the UK or the European Union, but we are definitely building those relationships with them. I think that is also where you could have a role, to help us build those relationships and promoting IHL and the importance of humanitarian access with them as well. Thank you.

Chair

Thank you. Yann, can I ask you how the UK can ensure that its security and counter-terrorism partnerships in the Sahel do not undermine perceptions of humanitarian neutrality or put aid workers at greater risk?

Yann Faivre

Thank you for this question. It is quite a big question. Those activities are definitely very sensitive to the context in which we are operating. I would say that definitely we can connect the implementation of some stabilisation plans and the counter-violence, counter-terrorist activities in some areas, and the difference we feel from the population or even from the authorities or their groups, the way they see and accept us and the way they consider humanitarian workers. It can definitely under some circumstances put at risk the humanitarian workers or the totality of our programme in some cases. To answer your question, the key point here is really to ensure that those programmes are made in a way that preserve the neutrality and independence of the humanitarian workers and humanitarian action in general. There is a clear need for co-ordination from those programmes with the humanitarian actors to be able to assess the risk that one is generating for the other. Although they are necessary in some contexts and can be part of a global solution, there is a need to make sure that the three operations can be implemented conjunctly, otherwise to consider that maybe those activities be implemented in a more sequential manner.

Monica Harding

Can I start with you, Vanessa, and then come to Yann? In the context of funding cuts to the Sahel, what programmes or interventions are most critical to protect from further cuts?

Vanessa Willems

Thank you for that question. It is a tough one. I think it is not so much about what one you should protect; it is more about what approach you should adopt to keep supporting the humanitarian response in-country. One guiding principle that we should have in mind is that the response must be a needs-based response. How do we define the needs? We need to have assessments that are conducted in an independent manner on the ground to assess those needs, but also in a way that includes the communities that are directly impacted by the conflict or the climate change that resolve any humanitarian needs. We need them to be involved in identifying the needs, prioritising the needs and ideally into the design of the response as well. I think that is the key principle to have in mind when you think about what should be preserved. It is an approach. What you need as well is to make sure that the funding that you provide allows flexibility for the response, for the very simple fact that the needs we assess today might not be the exact same as the needs that we will find on the ground tomorrow. When you have a displacement of thousands of people from one day to the next, the needs are obviously changing from one day to the next. So, we need a flexible funding mechanism. We also need to have a funding mechanism that allows a multi-sector response and a multi-year response so we can address also some of the causes of the humanitarian needs and build the resilience of the population for tomorrow. Yann, maybe you have some elements you would like to share on this as well.

Yann Faivre

Yes. You highlighted the principles to be respected in general. I have a couple of points of a more specific dimension. The cuts, of course, have been impacting the very vulnerable population, and the most at-risk groups in society. In addition to all the principles that Vanessa just shared, I would say that there is certainly an importance for us, and for the UK as well, to focus on the IDPs, particularly in remote and insecure areas, and to keep focusing on the host communities. There is a particular issue in Sahel, if we speak about central Sahel or Chad, where we are having IDPs and refugees in host communities that are potentially poorer than the people they host. It is very much the case in Chad, and that could generate further destabilisation around the initial area of crisis. Women, girls and children are being extremely affected because, of course, some programmes in some areas were totally cut. I am speaking in particular about the GBV, the gender-based violence programming, that has been totally forgotten in some areas. They need to be kept at the centre of attention as well. It is definitely people with disabilities and older people who are usually the most vulnerable. Finally, there is a particular look and intention to keep on the question of the returnees and people going back to communities. We have seen in some countries in Sahel in particular some precipitation—some high speed in some returnees returning not really in a sustainable way. There is some attention to be paid there as well.

Monica Harding

Thank you. How are the reductions in international aid affecting local society organisations in the Sahel to deliver services and respond to communities’ needs? What impact do the aid cuts have on the work you are doing? Vanessa, do you want to take that one?

Vanessa Willems

I do not know if I want to start or if Yann wants to start with the impact it had on the—

Yann Faivre

I can start with the impact it had on our organisation. I do not know if you want to share some elements that are common with the other humanitarian organisations in the region. The impact has been extremely important and is still important. We feel it. We have been reducing our workforce worldwide in the last three years by 25%. In some areas, we have been cutting down the activities, not on the basis of the end of the needs or achieved sustainability, but just on the basis of the reduction of the funds or even sometimes the disappearance of those funds. The impact has been very important. It has been very important for communities where we suddenly had to leave them on their own in some areas of the continent. We had to close down offices because the access was pretty much connected to the proximity and then to give up in some geographies in Burkina Faso in particular and in Mali as well. We have been at the same time preparing ourselves to make sure that we could have a strong impact and continue to accompany the key population that we were engaged with in the past few years. We did engage a lot in a localisation agenda. We hear very often that the localisation is going with cost reduction and so on. Finally, what we saw mainly that was of great interest—we were already involved in localisation before for some local acceptance and local context analysis dimensions—is that since the cuts we were going faster on some sustainability agendas with the local actors than we would go without. We have been working a lot on creating spaces for local actors; not spaces of funding only but making sure that they were participating more obviously to the humanitarian agenda, to the programming and the design of our interventions. You certainly heard about the Sahel regional fund that we created in the region, created in collaboration with FCDO. This fund is now serving some windows of funding exclusively reserved for local actors in central Sahel and Chad. Local organisations are members of the board, piloting and participating in the co-ordination of the fund. That is some of the impacts that the cuts have had. There has been what we used to call the prioritisation. I am not very comfortable with speaking about prioritisation because the message is always the same: that we have been getting done what was not a priority, which is not the case. We have been making prioritisation among choices that we did before that were already priorities because the region is extremely sensitive, weak and exposed to conflict or climate change or displacement. We work also on the migration agenda at Dakar. We have to make choices among elements that were of equal priorities, and the choices were very much driven by the way that the funding is now, for a big part, addressed to the humanitarian community. We have already targeted geographies, very narrow targeting of geographies, so some choices have been made more on this basis rather than on a needs basis that Vanessa was putting forward a few minutes ago. That is mainly how the funds have been impacting the work of DRC and how DRC is supporting its targeted beneficiaries in Niger.

Vanessa Willems

Beyond what you just said as well, what came to my mind while you were talking was the impact in the protection sector and the local, community-based organisations that are engaged in the response. What was interesting to note shortly after the massive and abrupt cut that took place in 2025 is that local organisations that had been trained and empowered to provide a humanitarian response to address the protection needs, including of women and girls on the field, were, in the first time, still capable to provide that response. What was strongly impacted quite quickly was the referral mechanism towards the protection services provided by other stakeholders on the ground. A year down the road, the picture is evolving slightly. I heard reports of a women and girls-led organisation in countries such as Burkina Faso being particularly impacted by the funding cuts and in a more difficult position to provide their response. Overall, if you look at the protection sector, a recent note that was published by the regional protection working group that is based in Dakar identified a severe reduction of the amount of humanitarian workers that are engaged in the humanitarian response. I am trying to look at the number for central Sahel. What we have seen is that they had 310 organisations supporting the response in 2024, and this came down to 232 in 2025. That is a reduction by nearly a quarter of the amount of stakeholders providing a protection response within a single year. That is indeed a dreadful impact that we have witnessed on the field.

Dr Sam Rushworth

Yann, how effective is the Sahel regional fund at meeting both the medium and longer-term humanitarian needs in the region?

Yann Faivre

I think on the Sahel regional fund, and it is not only my voice bringing it, I would say that we had a lot of involvement from the FONGA with us. The Sahel regional fund is led by a collective of civil NGOs and INGOs together, under the presidency of one of them. The feedback we have from the assessments and the partners is that the efficiency of the Sahel regional fund is at a high level, that the delays in dealing with some calls and problems, the reactivity in terms of some emerging crisis—I am having in mind the cholera warning in Chad not such a long time ago—the way the good donorship principles that were particularly committed to at the Grand Bargain are respected. So, generally I would say that we see the Sahel regional fund as extremely efficient in the way it takes care and responds to the needs of the partners, international and national. I see a Sahel regional fund that is extremely effective in the trust building, as Vanessa was mentioning, with the authorities in this part of the world. There is a co-ownership from the different Governments we see in Niger and Burkina. We are very often extremely surprised to see the interest that those Administrations are positioning on the Sahel regional fund. The efficiency in terms of immediate financial numbers is that the Sahel regional fund is functioning with only 12% management costs, which is extremely limited in the industry, so the part of the funding going directly for implementation is high. The efficiency can be considered as definitely there as well. There is also a secondary effect in terms of efficiency of the Sahel regional fund. The secondary effect is to enrich and bring more diversity in the segment of the pooled funds. The fact that in some areas you have more than one pooled fund operating, and that it generates some competition, some common interests, some exchanges and some joint rounding processes, make the performance increase. In terms of indirect efficiency, I would keep in mind that this Sahel regional fund being—not such a new player because it has existed for four or five years—a new architectural bridge in the funding landscape generates a lot of benefits on other sides as well.

Dr Sam Rushworth

Thank you, Yann. That chimes with what we have heard: 90% of beneficiaries report satisfaction with assistance received through the Sahel regional fund. Are there any lessons that you think the FCDO could draw from this model of delivery?

Yann Faivre

Yes, the 90% is, as you said, very high and we are extremely satisfied with that. I will say that there are certainly some good lessons that the FCDO can take, and I am sure that the team in Dakar took note of some of them. The SRF is providing real evidence that locally led action can be scaled responsibly when accompanied by strong governance and appropriate risk sharing. So, that is the demonstration that we can do. The SRF is demonstrating that early implication of local actors in the funding mechanism is possible, and that actually it can provide a lot of contextual relevance. It provides sustainability in the concept. It gives us a meaningful voice to most of those local actors that are finding in the SRF a very interesting and original space and forum to express themselves.

Dr Sam Rushworth

Thank you. You moved on to where I was going to move the conversation, so well done, which is around the 25% of the fund that supports local partners. In context such as the Sahel, this is obviously important because they have a reach beyond many of the larger international NGOs. Vanessa, I will ask you this question. How meaningful do you think that that transfer of power is in practice? In the use of the fund to support local actors, are you seeing any practice-based examples of where that funding is able to use grassroots voices, be more locally designed, be more responsive, and have better reach?

Vanessa Willems

Thank you. We see the SRF as an essential tool to meet the engagement of the Grand Bargain, but also to meet the engagement of Tom Fletcher within the Humanitarian Reset, where he says that the response should be as local as possible and as international as needed. A tool such as the SRF provides the opportunity for fixing the money, the way it goes. It helps local actors to have not only a word to say within the governance, the way the fund is identifying the needs, setting the priorities and designing the response, but it also helps them beyond that to build their own capacities to provide the mentoring that they need to keep responding. Beyond the 25%, I think one element that is important is the second person support costs that are cascaded to the national partners on the ground. This is essential, because we tend to think that because we go local it is going to be cheaper, but the reality on the field is that local organisations also need support costs. They need to have offices, access to internet, a security management framework to satisfy the security of their own staff, and so on. I think this system is essential. The beauty of it as well, beyond the main envelope, is the catalytic envelopes that are available and that allow funding for NGO forums on the ground, and the collective engagement that they have, but also the way it provides funding for innovation, such as the barometer, for example. It is a project that was led from the regional level and is a tool that allows us to assess the progress that we have made on the localisation agenda since the Grand Bargain was adopted in 2016.

Dr Sam Rushworth

Thank you. I am just going to look to the Chair. We have two more questions, and I am conscious of the importance of 21 and 22.

Chair

Yes. Can you shorten them?

Dr Sam Rushworth

Yes. Just quick answer these, because we have some other important questions to ask. I am going to jump straight to 20. The fund operates across Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad, but displacement, food insecurity and conflict often cross national borders. How effectively does the regional model address these cross-border challenges?

Yann Faivre

Just a small additional element to your previous question, indeed 25% of the SRF is dedicated to the local window and can be accessed directly by local actors, but the international window is as well aiming at consortia that have national partners inside, so they can bring some organisations that are a little bit less strong, to benefit from some experience and start to build that capacity. If you put it all together, it is almost a third of the SRF that ends up being operationalised by local actors. It is 25% directly plus the indirect part through international consortia of 31%. Coming back to your question on how it operates, it was really a key element when the SRF was born. At the time the sum was created five years ago, that called for a regional response to a regional crisis. At the end, we could set up only some country-based reforms that were looking at the crisis one by one. So, we thought that having a regional solution would be complementing those country-based funds and enabling some cross-border activities. It also enables some more agility as well, an evolution of the funding from one country to the other, depending on the evolution of the crisis, taking into consideration the fact that the access in Sahel has never been totally lost. There are some areas that are not accessible at certain times, but some of those are and we want those that were not accessible before to be coming back. The SRF proved to be a good tool as well for consortia to manage that and to be able to focus in another area while an area was not accessible. The SRF has been enhancing this regional approach, while having a regional fund management you need, so that the SRF is managed at the regional level, taking into account regional code, but at the same time is totally embedded in the national context and requirements, so the very local particularities are taken into account and consolidated at regional level. What is very interesting is that the SRF promotes regional advocacy, which is in many countries of the region the only way to realise some advocacy. The SRF, through its regional co-ordination, generates some spaces as well for lessons learnt with international and national actors cross-border from one region—

Dr Sam Rushworth

Thank you, Yann. I am sorry to cut you off. That is interesting and it is a helpful response. I am just conscious that Tracy has a couple of important questions for you as well.

Chair

To conclude our session, Tracy has some questions on women, girls and children.

Tracy Gilbert

How effectively are humanitarian development programmes addressing the underlying economic causes of gender-based violence? Can I come to Yann first on this?

Yann Faivre

Yes, of course. As I mentioned previously, the funding cuts have been seen in some regions in Sahel, impacting gender-based violence programmes. Women and girls are among the most vulnerable and most at risk according to our protection risk assessment, and that is what we need to focus on. I think a geographic approach with the remaining funds is not always taking care of all the needs all across the board. To be very honest, there are some regions today in Sahel where women and girls who are at risk are not benefitting from the support they should be benefitting from and that they were benefitting from before. There have been some forgotten elements in the so-called prioritisation exercise that we had to do to utilise things elsewhere. So, the impact is huge. The support to women-led organisations is probably less visible in Sahel today than it is in some other regions of the world. We know all too well that the conditions of women and girls—and the global indicators of the HEI index I will show you if you like—living in Sahel are among the most difficult currently, and for years, in the region. So, that is a key issue for us. We keep them systematically at the heart of the protection risk analysis that we implement locally. When it comes to the Sahel gender-based violence, we keep programmes as very important in the areas where we publish the code. We have some protection activities around the region where we monitor the cases of people denied their rights or who are victims of violence. We do not do protection monitoring alone; we usually do it systematically with some response attached through individual protection assistance that we provide. So, all women and girls that we meet along our programmes that are victims of gender-based violence or other type of rights denial, we endeavour to do this positively, but definitely it is not enough.

Vanessa Willems

Just to complete a quick point on the response provided by Yann, the protection monitoring system is one of the severe impacts that we have seen from the funding cuts last year. The monitoring system is clearly jeopardised, and we have increasing difficulty in monitoring the needs in the field. So, if an investment needs to be made and something needs to be protected, it is this monitoring system as well, because without that it is difficult to provide a good response to the needs of the women and girls in the field.

Tracy Gilbert

Thank you. Just on that, Vanessa, how should international donors balance pursuing long-term progress on gender equality with supporting initiatives such as girls’ education that may have greater political acceptance?

Vanessa Willems

That might be more for Yann.

Yann Faivre

We can do both. I can start, Vanessa, if you want to complement. That is a real key issue. The fact that we have an assistance that is getting widely reduced is bringing us most of all to consider and to declare that life-saving is essential. It is true that life-saving is essential and we want to keep all the life-saving elements as a priority and use the funds we have for that. That is very sensitive when it comes to girls and women, and you highlight the access to education, but even before, all the conditions before access to education, the life-saving activities are not fully responding to all the root causes of those issues—economic, social, safety, physical challenges that are concerned. I would connect that with the previous question, thinking that there is a need for keeping a long-term activity and priority connected to the immediate humanitarian funding when it comes to those protection activities, particularly of this target population.

Tracy Gilbert

Thank you. Just to further that a little bit, how are the funding cuts and restrictions on civic space affecting local civic society organisations’ ability to support women and girls, particularly where they are in rural and conflict-affected communities?

Yann Faivre

The question is for me?

Tracy Gilbert

Whoever feels most appropriate to answer is fine.

Yann Faivre

I can share with you—and I am sure, Vanessa, you have that in mind as well—that last week we had communicated for Burkina Faso only the list of 10 local organisations that are closing down due to the funding cuts. We have a lot of small organisations that were extremely instrumental in the way we were answering some of those issues, and women’s organisations are one of those organisations that are usually served by this funding, that are closing, losing their premises and losing dynamics. This is where it is directly affected. A second way of direct implication on this programming is the fact that we have much less frontline staff than we used to have, so in some communities those programmes might not be considered as programmes of use or priority one. We have much less frontline staff and volunteers from our partners as well going from village to village, so our identification capacity is certainly less than it used to be.

Tracy Gilbert

Vanessa, is there anything you wanted to add to that question?

Vanessa Willems

Not to that question, thank you.

Tracy Gilbert

Finally, to you both, could disengaging from development co-operation and response to human rights violations further restrict opportunities for civil society and women’s organisations? I will come to Vanessa first on this one.

Vanessa Willems

I am sorry, could you repeat the question because I did not understand it?

Tracy Gilbert

Okay. Could disengaging from development co-operation and response to human rights violations further restrict the opportunities for civil society and women’s organisations? So, stepping away from certain organisations, how would that land? What would that look like on the ground for women’s organisations?

Vanessa Willems

If we further disengaged, financially and supportive?

Tracy Gilbert

Yes, in response to human rights violations.

Vanessa Willems

I do not have any other evidence than what Yann has already shared. I do not know if you do, Yann.

Yann Faivre

If I understood the question, if the idea is to see how we address human rights violations and what response we can bring across our programming in central Sahel, I would say that most of them, when they are identified and are taken in charge by the teams of DRC or the partners of DRC or the partners of the Sahel regional fund, are dealt with by the authorities. That is usually the way it goes. Basically, I know that very often the question of human rights is needed to be dealt with at a central level, and we need a central commitment, but when it comes to individual cases, most of the time we deal with it with the local authorities at the very local level where the violation occurred, and the response is very often provided by the technical services from the region. I do not know if it responds to your question, but that is the way it takes place in most of our activities.

Tracy Gilbert

Thank you very much.

Chair

I thank you both, Yann and Vanessa, for your time this afternoon in contributing to our inquiry into the UK and the Sahel. I am concluding this evidence session and drawing our meeting to a formal close.