Oral evidence: The UK’s Development Work in the Middle East, HC 948Tuesday 25 February 2014

Oral evidence, 25 February 2014.

Witnesses

John Ging, Director of Coordination Response Division, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Margot Ellis, Deputy Commissioner General, UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), and Daniel Levy, Director of Middle East and North Africa Programme, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), gave evidence.

Chair

Thank you very much for coming in. I apologise we have kept you waiting but I hope you will appreciate both an important issue and one where we need to hear the answers. At the same time, if I can say at the start, I think some colleagues will probably have to leave by about 12.30. If all of us can perhaps move things along, although I do not want to inhibit you from telling us what you need to say, as that is important. Perhaps, again, for the record, if you could just introduce yourselves.

Margot Ellis

Good morning. My name is Margot Ellis. I am the Deputy Commissioner General of UNRWA.

John Ging

My name is John Ging. I am the Director of Operations for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, out of New York.

Daniel Levy

I am Daniel Levy. I direct the Middle East and North Africa programme for a think-tank here called the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Chair

Thank you very much. Perhaps just very briefly, we are looking at the occupied territories. This Committee has done a report in a previous Parliament, about six years ago, and we are returning to it, partly in the context of the extent to which the Syrian conflict has impacted on it, but also in its own right, given it has been going on, in one form or another, for an awfully long time. Briefly, I wondered if you could give us a view of DFID’s role in the occupied territories and how effective you think it has been. We will have more detailed questions to follow up, so it is just a general feeling of how DFID fits into that process, and how effectively.

Margot Ellis

Thank you very much. Do you mean specifically with regard to the OPT?

Chair

Yes.

Margot Ellis

We appreciate the very generous donations provided to us by DFID that are channelled from British taxpayers. DFID has rightly earned a reputation among its beneficiaries and intermediary agencies as a smart, intelligent donor. I say this from the perspective of one who prior to working for UNRWA, worked for 23 years for USAID, so I think I share. It holds us accountable in the sense that it provides a performance-based budget to us. About a third of the budget that is provided to UNRWA for our operation is performance‑based, so it holds us to account for results. I also think it is good in that it provides predictable, multiyear funding for our operation in the OPT. I think it is important to say what our operation is about. We have a specific mandate. We are a regional organisation. We provide for the needs of Palestine refugees in five fields of operation, so it is not just in the West Bank and Gaza, but also in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. We are serving the needs of 5 million Palestine refugees who need assistance. I am very proud to be working for UNRWA, because we are a developmental and humanitarian agency working in a highly politicised environment. However, thanks to the assistance provided through DFID and other donors, we are able to provide education for 500,000 children—I think we have the largest school system that we run in the Middle East. Last year alone, in terms of Palestine refugees, we catered to 10 million patient visits at our 139 clinics that we run. We run a very successful microfinance programme and, over the last 20 years, we have lent more than $300 million in small loans up to $1,000 to promote the self-reliance and resilience of Palestine refugees in our five fields of operation. We also have a Relief and Social Services programme that caters to the needs of the most vulnerable, where we provide food and cash assistance. I think it is important to note that, although we are a humanitarian agency, the reason that we exist, our mandate and our continued existence is because of the failure of political actors to come to a just and durable solution to the Palestine—

Chair

I was going to say: what you are describing is the sort of things that a functioning government should be providing.

Margot Ellis

Exactly. We are a quasi-governmental agency in that sense, because, typically, a government would provide the types of service that we provide; however, in terms of our financing, we do not have a tax base, so we do not enjoy that. In terms of providing a sense of stability in the region and promoting the socioeconomic conditions of Palestine refugees who can promote their own resilience, I think we are an important stabilising force in the region.

Daniel Levy

Thank you for inviting me. I think there is a donor consensus in terms of how one approaches the Occupied Palestinian Territories in this situation, which DFID is part of. Within that, DFID is a significant donor and a respected donor, and is considered a smart donor. The way I would frame it is to think of the role most in terms of keeping options open. Looking at this conflict, I am not convinced—and I think 20 years is the period of time since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority—that you can make such a powerful argument that state-building is succeeding, because state-building requires the withdrawal of the occupying power, and that has not happened through the 20 years of the Oslo process. What you have seen, however, is the maintenance of an environment in which the possibility of a political, negotiated solution still exists. I think that is quite an achievement. There will be criticism from both sides as to the price paid for that. Palestinian voices will say, “You are buying our quiet and, absent donor dependency, we could have a more assertive strategy to achieve freedom.” Israelis will say, “You are sustaining an authority that continues to do things that we are unhappy with and that may cut against a peaceful solution.” I think, in your visit, you will find a more trenchant criticism coming from Palestinian civil society, and I think that the Israeli establishment consensus—and especially the security establishment consensus—would baulk at the idea and would be very nervous of the idea of not having a Palestinian Authority there and not having Palestinian security forces there. For all the criticism, I think Israel continues to almost always transfer tax revenues. Israel could collapse the PA if it wanted. The signature achievement is that this is an environment where, yes, there is violence, there is suffering and there is deprivation, all of which could be prevented and should be, but it is limited conflict and it is limited violence. The window to negotiations is kept open by the kinds of things that UNRWA is doing, by poverty alleviation and by Palestinians being on a PA salary sheet, whether in the West Bank or in Gaza. If you look around the rest of the region, that perhaps begins to look like a more significant achievement than it might otherwise be considered to be, and DFID has been very important in that.

John Ging

I think my colleagues have set out it very well. I would just say that it is all about human development. The Middle East is a very beautiful place. The problem is that the people have difficulty in living together and finding solutions to do so. We should not be distracted by those political failures from our obligation to focus on what else we can do to help with human development, because it is through the development of human beings, starting with education but also the creation of a prospect for a future that is hopeful of economic wellbeing and so forth, that that will lay the foundation for the solutions that are needed to resolve this conflict. There is no easy way of resolving those complexities and it has defied solution for a long time. However, as I said, when we look at the investment—and this is why we all so very much appreciate how DFID has been one of the largest investors in human development, in the human beings, in the Middle East through the programming and its cross-sectoral programming—as Daniel has said, it would be much worse if we did not have that investment and commitment down through the years. We point to the work that UNRWA and others are doing to show that it is not a hopeless situation. However difficult it might be, it is not hopeless, and that is what we would encourage you to continue to do: to stay invested, to stay committed and to stay with the people.

Fabian Hamilton

In September 2013, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact published a report on DFID’s funding to UNRWA, and concluded that DFID was able to achieve a significant impact on the lives of Palestinian refugees through its support to UNRWA. However, ICAI also found that “there is a cumbersome management structure; there is little formal participation in governance by beneficiaries; and reform is driven from the top by UNRWA management staff.” My question is addressed to Margot Ellis: between 2012 and 2015, DFID is providing $106.5 million to UNRWA, yet ICAI, as I have said, recently found that there is this “cumbersome management structure” and “little formal participation.” How would you respond and how did you respond to that criticism?

Margot Ellis

Thank you for the comment. I think we have taken the recommendations of the report to heart, and the most discrete thing that we are focusing on, in partnership with DFID, is how we approach our medium-term strategy. Our next six-year strategy covers the period 2016-2021, and we are working in close partnership with DFID. There are specific resources that have been committed by DFID to help us in this process to ensure that it is a very consultative process. It is not just UNRWA staff developing a strategy for Palestine refugees for the six-year period, but making sure that there is adequate consultation with, ultimately, the beneficiaries—the refugees themselves. DFID is funding a planning officer—that individual is on board right now—to strengthen our capacity to plan and to consult. They are also providing us technical assistance for the poverty strategy, with a specific focus on beneficiary engagement and strengthening the evaluation function. I think we are operationalising the recommendations and, moving forward, we agree with the recommendations. At the end of the day, we want a strategy that is forward-leaning and beneficial to Palestine refugees, but also one that addresses the concerns of donors as well as the countries that host the refugees.

Fabian Hamilton

Was ICAI’s contribution helpful to you? It is never nice to receive that kind of criticism, but if it is genuine and it helps you to do your job better, then it might be beneficial.

Margot Ellis

It was. I think, overall, the report was very positive. The bottom line of the report was that this is a good investment of British taxpayer money. UNRWA and DFID are learning organisations, so there is always room for improvement, and that is why we appreciate the assistance provided by DFID being performance-based. It sets some standards for us, especially on our reform-related activities. We have a very holistic process in the area of education reform, as well as health-sector reform. It sets a bar for us against which we have to meet some standards in terms of how to improve our delivery system. I will just give you an example of the type of indicator that we are working on and that is a benchmark or an indicator for DFID: patient consultations—how many patients a doctor sees a day. This is one of the things that we are trying to reform as part of our health reform programme in order to improve the quality of care. Prior to the start of the programme, the average physician would see 101 patients per day; we brought it down to 88 patients per day. This is one of the things that we are working in partnership with DFID on. There is always room for improvement. We like the fact that DFID comes to us with specific recommendations on how to improve.

Mr McCann

Good morning. In the years 2011-2015, DFID will provide £122 million in direct funding to the Palestinian Authority through the World Bank. Do you think that is a good idea?

Daniel Levy

Do you mean the “through the World Bank” or the £122 million?

Mr McCann

The direct funding and whether or not it is a good idea—direct to the Palestinian Authority.

Daniel Levy

For me, it goes back to this question of what the overall goal here is. We have more or less four choices: one would be to acknowledge that this is not a development question. You cannot build a state under occupation. We have tried to for 20 years. We have to roll our sleeves up and make some of the political hard choices that have, taking the approach that we have currently taken, in a way, made it easier to avoid. Then one can go one of two ways with that. One can either say, “We are throwing good money after bad until Israel ends the occupation, if the two-state model is the one we pursue.” Therefore, what leverage do we have with the Israelis? Those who follow the debates in the Israeli press closely will see that it is not offers of greater partnership from Europe that grab the Israelis’ attention; it is threats of sanctioning from Europe that get the attention of Israelis. I will be brief but I think it is the only way I can fairly approach your question. You have this stream of Israeli centrist politicians—those more embracing of two states, from the leader of the opposition to Minister Livni, who you may be familiar with, to former Prime Ministers Olmert and Barak—saying, “If we do not make peace, the world will impose costs on us and we will become a pariah,” presumably assuming that the Israeli public will respond if that starts to happen. That is around how one uses leverage with Israel. A second alternative is to say, “This is not a development. This is not worth supporting the PA. Let’s go along with what, apparently, Israel is intending to do after almost 50 years of being in these territories. It is Israeli. There is not going to be space for a Palestinian state. There are hundreds of thousands of Israeli settlers beyond the Green Line. Why invest in an alternative quasi-state structure for 20 years? Let’s say to the Israelis, ‘We accept it. This is yours. It is your responsibility.’” Some people may feel less comfortable with Palestinians there not having full rights; some people may be more okay with that, but it is up to you. If there is then, as former Israeli prime ministers have suggested, an anti‑apartheid campaign, which is what former PMs Barak and Olmert talked about, we will have to decide how to relate to that. It is a kind of, “Get on with it. We are pulling back from this.” I think there are only two other options, if one does not want to go down that path. One is you continue to do what you have been doing, and look at this not as 20 years of failure but as 20 years of keeping an option alive, which is why you will be pulled into a blame game when you visit. Both sides will try to say to you, “That side is doing this; that side is doing that.” There is an asymmetry of power, which is the headline that one cannot avoid acknowledging. There is international law that comes into play. There is an occupying power and occupied people. Both sides, however, want to maintain this option at the moment. The political strategy of the Israeli and Palestinian leadership is to say, “This is the least bad option. Let’s still have a degree of Palestinian self-governance and let’s try to not let this spiral out of control.”

Mr McCann

I can maybe add another bit in to perhaps speed up the process. In terms of the integrity of DFID—

Peter Luff

Sorry; was there a fourth strand?

Daniel Levy

Very briefly, the fourth option: I think there are some ways in which you can tie the two together. Making some of this assistance more politically meaningful relates to things in Area C and East Jerusalem, and I think DFID is beginning to do some of those things. They have to keep it at a level that can allow you to do everything else, but a little more leaning in that direction would be useful.

Mr McCann

To be clear, this is about DFID’s integrity. Margot and John can come in here. DFID is about poverty alleviation, and we supply direct budgets to support a range of countries through our bilateral programmes. We have also withdrawn budget support when governments have, in our opinion, misbehaved. When it comes to the Palestinian Authority and that £122 million of direct support, whilst President Abbas says that he opposes violence, we have received irrefutable evidence that he honours individuals who are convicted terrorists who have killed Israelis, that he is paying prisoners’ families from budget support on a sliding scale, depending upon how heinous the crime is, and that the money is used through education to demonise Jewish people. In another set of circumstances, then, it is difficult not to imagine that the British Government, through DFID, would withdraw budget support. The question is: are we in different territory here? Is it just because of the political issues on the ground that we are continuing? Do you believe that the money is being well spent?

John Ging

If I might, Daniel has set out very well the political challenge and the political dilemmas of political leadership, but let us now come down to what has been decided and what we are trying to make work. From our perspective, we would say that DFID is making absolutely the right choice to invest, as it is directing its investment through, in this instance, the Palestinian Authority. It is also correct that that must be challenged in terms of the integrity—the issues that you highlight need to be addressed. I would suggest that the prisoners who are in prison are paying the price of their crime; their families should not be paying a price for the sins of their parents. If it is a poverty-alleviation programme, then, it should be on the basis of the need of the children and whoever else are the dependants or in need, irrespective of the crimes of their parents. The issue of education—

Mr McCann

Can I just stop you, because this is really important? Nobody in our society would accept a salary being paid to the family of someone convicted of a crime, whether a rapist or a murderer or whatever. The point is that the state then looks after them in terms of the welfare provisions that are put in place. Nobody is arguing about that, but this is specifically about individuals being paid a salary, or their family being paid a salary, whilst they are in prison, and they get more money, depending upon how serious the crime is.

John Ging

Again, there should be accountability around how your money is paid out. What I am saying is that, from a humanitarian perspective, the global standard is that we assess need and we address the needs. That should be the standard against which the Palestinian Authority, if it is using your funds under a programme of poverty alleviation, should have to account for the use of that money. I do not think we are having any difference of view on that. In terms of the education programme, again there has to be accountability within the education programme on both sides of this conflict to ensure that education is not a tool of socialisation that radicalises, incites or enhances animosity or division. Education is supposed to develop, to be positive and to create understanding and tolerance and so forth. I know that my colleagues in UNRWA are very actively promoting human rights through their education programme. Are the textbooks on either side ideal? No, they are not, and there have been many studies on this. Again, let us hold the leadership to account. The children are vulnerable to influence through the education system, and this is the future. Again, we would absolutely agree that there should be a high bar of accountability, but let us not look at it in isolation. There are two parties in this conflict, and let us address it in a way that ensures that the education that the kids are getting on both sides is the education that will create a better understanding and higher levels of tolerance. One also has to accept and acknowledge that there will be nationalism and a historical perspective. There will be national pride and so forth, which is also part of the education system in any country.

Mr McCann

The thing is that we do not provide any money to the Israeli Government. We provide it to the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Perhaps Margot wants to comment in terms of taking it a bit further. In terms of money being spent appropriately or inappropriately, or not on poverty alleviation, how do we hold the Palestinian Authority to account? Can you give examples of how that is being done on the back of John’s comments?

Margot Ellis

Thank you very much. A few comments: I first want to take a step back and get back to Daniel’s comment—especially when you come out and meet with leaders—about the urgency of the assistance programme as well as the urgency of coming to a political solution. I worked earlier in the region, dating back to 1999. I regularly went to the West Bank and Gaza, and I return regularly now, of course. In terms of what we risk right now, you have a dying generation of Palestinian businessmen in Gaza who still believe in a two‑state solution. Why do I say it is a dying generation? It is because Palestinians and Israelis do not know each other anymore. When I previously worked on the OPT portfolio, I lived in Tel Aviv, so I often had occasion to dine with Israelis. Inevitably, they would say, “You are working with the Palestinians?” and look aghast at me. I can confidently say that, within 10 minutes, everyone around the table would realise, “My father has a Palestinian business partner,” or “I went to school with a Palestinian.” Every Israeli around the table had some type of personal connection with a Palestinian, but I cannot say that today, because Palestinians only know Israelis as soldiers, and Israelis only know Palestinians as terrorists or, in the past, as suicide bombers. That personal connection is no longer there. There is a ticking time bomb for the potential for a two-state solution, because the people-to-people connection is not there. You talk about the DFID programme and its focus on poverty alleviation. If you look at the statistics in the West Bank and Gaza, they are not like they were 10 years ago. If you were to look at those statistics alone, it would probably warrant DFID investing, beside the connection with stability which I tried to make before. More than 70% of the population of Gaza is now dependent on humanitarian assistance. Go back to 2000: only 10% was. Why? Because of the manmade situation of a manmade blockade. Recent statistics: 57% of the population in the Gaza strip is food-insecure right now, and that is with the food assistance that is provided whether by the WFP or UNRWA. There is another 14% in the Gaza strip that are vulnerable to food insecurity.

Mr McCann

I think that is going into a different subject. I was just trying to hone in on the Palestinian Authority and whether you feel that that money is making a difference and is working.

Daniel Levy

Could I just address that directly for a moment? I am quite sensitive to anti-Semitic stereotypes, and I think it is something that has to be taken on. You are right: you do not fund the Israeli education system, so whatever one might find there is not pertinent to this conversation. What is pertinent, and what makes this a very distinct kind of funding pool, is that we are not in a post-conflict peace, truth and reconciliation phase between Israelis and Palestinians. We are deep in the conflict, and the driving narrative on both sides is still a deeply destructive one. Does that mean that one should not take a microscope to what is being taught? It does not, but it also means that one cannot de-Palestinianise what the Palestinian Authority does, because that is not going to serve anyone. The idea that you could have, at this stage in the conflict, a Palestinian Authority that does not treat its prisoners in a certain way, I do not think can exist with the reality we are in. If you asked the Northern Ireland warring parties to disavow the people of violence at the wrong moment in that process, one would have undermined that process. I think it is a real challenge for international donors and for support for the PA, but one has to understand that we are bringing, in some respects, post-conflict tools to bear in a space that is still deeply in conflict. We de-Palestinianise the PA at our own peril, because the less credibility and legitimacy we impose on it vis-à-vis its own public, the less useful it is, to be honest, for the main purpose it is designed for, which is to be a vehicle for making a peace deal. I cannot be more sympathetic to the place your question is coming from and I cannot be more cautioning of where one might go if one takes that logic too far.

Mr McCann

I have not got any other questions. I just want to make this point for the record: this is about being honest with the British people about how their money is being spent. That is what it is about; whether it is correct or not is a different matter. The way you have answered the question is that you have expressed what we are trying to achieve.

Daniel Levy

Except, on the money, as I understand it, there has never been a “gotcha” moment of DFID money going to a textbook that has been found to—

Chair

We will obviously pursue this with other witnesses and when we are there. I think Mr McCann is raising perfectly good questions that we need to answer, but you are also giving some very good arguments to put it in context, which are genuinely really helpful.

Chris White

On a slightly different topic, we have been told that, since the blockade of Gaza began, 60% of Gaza’s businesses have closed down. Do you regard the blockade as a constraint on the Palestinian economy? Could also answer whether it is going to be possible to lift the blockade whilst, at the same time, satisfying Israeli security needs?

John Ging

I will just kick off this one. Building on what Margot has said, prior to the blockade—and it is sometimes forgotten that the blockade was imposed when Gilad Shalit was kidnapped, but it was not lifted when Gilad Shalit was released. The blockade has had the most devastatingly destructive impact on the Gaza strip. As Margot has said, it is not just economic in its impact, but it is the linkage that is the foundation of the cooperation between the business sector in Gaza and the business sector in Israel. What the blockade has done systematically is disempowered and impoverished the business community, who were in a mutually productive relationship with its partners on the Israeli side. They were creating employment in the Gaza strip predicated on those good relationships. They were providing a situation where the youth of Gaza had to make a choice: if you worked in a business that was affiliated and working through that partnership, you could not be involved in violence because, again, all of the network was set up. The security clearances and the vetting—all of these things—ensured that there was a high level of integrity around compliance with security standards and so forth. Yet when the blockade was put in place, what we saw in parallel was the development of a tunnel economy through Egypt. Those who controlled the tunnel economy were the people who had the guns in their hands and who had their focus on violence, rather than on peace, peaceful coexistence, and mutual economic engagement and reinforcement. So, absolutely, the blockade of Gaza needs to be looked at from the point of view of breaking that link Margot was talking about between the economic base in Israel and the economic base in Gaza and all the consequences that then flow from that, which are entirely negative. Can Israel secure its borders while having trade flowing? Yes, they have shown that they can do it. They do it every day. There are humanitarian supplies going into Gaza and, let us be clear, if flour, milk, bread and so forth can cross into Gaza, so too can commercial goods. Is there a risk attached to this? Absolutely. Those who do not want the business links between Israel and Gaza within the Gaza strip will and do target those crossing points. Closing those crossing points is a victory for them, so, again, that is the equation that is there. It is not an easy issue, but the bottom line is that the consequences are not just devastating from a humanitarian perspective, in terms of the impoverishment of the people of the Gaza strip; it is the impoverishment of those relationships that are the foundation for the stabilisation, the development of the peace and the coexistence that we saw as the foundation of Europe after the second world war. The economic links were seen to be the key to stability and progress.

Chris White

Can I just ask you to clarify that? Are you saying that the security situation, or the severity of the security situation, would be lower if the blockade was removed?

John Ging

I am saying two things: one is that there is no future, in many of our views, for a peaceful relationship between the peoples of Palestine and Israel unless there are economic links that are mutually productive and self-reinforcing.

Chris White

So just to go back, would the security situation be a lower risk if the blockade was removed?

John Ging

The security situation could continue to deteriorate as long as we continue in this direction. There is no question about that—none whatsoever. Does that mean that it will be easy? No, because in Palestine, as in Israel, there are those who are opposed to a peaceful resolution to this conflict. They believe in conflict and have done for decades. Those who believe in conflict are succeeding when the reaction is to blockade 1.5 million people.

Chris White

For the record, I will not ask my question for the third time.

Margot Ellis

I think the best thing that Israel could do for its own security is to allow exports. Right now, as of 2010, Israel starting to improve the import regime into the Gaza strip. But imports going into the Gaza strip are still at 40% of pre-2007 levels. On exports going out of the Gaza strip, we are talking about fewer than 200 trucks a year. It is less than 2% of what was agreed on and what was experienced pre-2007. So what you have done is you have strangulated the economy in the Gaza strip. What is particularly surprising is that the Dutch Government recently donated a scanner for Kerem Shalom—the one remaining crossing point to the Gaza strip—for exports, to allow safe export. The Israelis refused to use this scanner; ask them why. The Israelis have turned the Gaza strip into a dependent, consumption-led economy. The Palestinian people are very entrepreneurial. Let the economy thrive the way it did before. There were exports to Europe and to the United States—textiles, furniture exports, horticultural products. Allow an economic recovery and that is the best investment that Israel can have in its own security. Having an impoverished, marginalised population in Gaza is the worst thing to have at Israel's doorstep in terms of promoting insecurity.

Fabian Hamilton

Surely the Egyptians bear some responsibility too.

Daniel Levy

What worries me about this situation is that you add to the pool of those with an ideological interest in maintaining the conflict those who develop a commercial interest in maintaining the conflict. I think the trajectory of what has happened with Gaza has done exactly that, with the tunnel economy, et cetera. Now, the way I see things right now is there is this back‑and‑forth. There is not going to be a perfect security solution. Of course, not all of the Gaza policy is to do with security. My tendency is to read the Israeli management of the Gaza situation as trying to balance three things: what I guess one might call hard security—genuinely what goes in and out and what can be used—number one. Number two is making sure that the situation is not so desperate that Hamas, the governing authority in Gaza, actually cannot control the more radical factions—and the Israelis understand that. They deal with Hamas. This may not be a direct negotiation but there is a ceasefire and when it is reached, it is reached with Hamas. If the American Secretary of State has to speak to who is then the Egyptian president to secure a ceasefire because they are both in dialogue with the respective warring parties, that is what they do. The third thing they are trying to balance is a political intentionality right now, which is to push Gaza on to Egypt. I think the Egyptian position is to push Gaza back on to Israel. So you also now have this dynamic between Israel and Egypt as to where Gaza’s hinterland is? Is it pointed towards the West Bank and two states, or is it pointed towards Egypt? It does not seem that either side particularly want themselves to be that hinterland. The Israelis sometimes get concerned when the Egyptians are clamping down too much on what can get in and out of Gaza. The bottom line is that it is a political call. Yes, the situation in Gaza, in terms of lifting many of the provisions of the blockade, can be significantly improved without what I believe and what the people I talk to—many Israeli security professionals—consider to be undue or excessive risks to Israeli security.

Chair

Obviously Gaza is the extreme one, but there are problems on the West Bank as well in terms of the economic linkages. I am going to bring in Peter Luff.

Peter Luff

On one of the practical questions of how we actually help the Palestinians, SodaStream—Israeli investment in the occupied territory: good or bad?

Daniel Levy

You do not mean as a product.

Peter Luff

No, Scarlett Johansson tells us that. I mean as a role model for helping Palestinians into employment.

Daniel Levy

I cannot put myself in the place of a Palestinian, but I think most people would baulk at the idea that benevolent occupation is a path to Palestinian enfranchisement, fulfilment of rights and even a better life over time, because I do not think that has been the case. All the studies show that the biggest impediment to Palestinian economic progress is not the absence of an Israeli-run SodaStream factory that can employ some tens of Palestinians or not; it is the inability to control their own resources, their own land, the 60% of territory that is Area C that they do not have access to, their own external border arrangements and crossings, who they import from and export to, and the fact that it is a captive market tied to an Israeli market with an order of magnitude of 18 times, or 15 times, greater GDP per capita than the Palestinian market. Are there Palestinians employed in the construction of settlements, in settlement factories, in settlement agricultural lands, who take home their pay packet as a consequence of working in that settlement entity? Yes, there are. Do they and their family personally benefit? Yes. Is this a long-term strategy or even a medium-term strategy that Palestinians can rally around as a way of fulfilling their potential? I do not think anyone would make that argument.

Margot Ellis

It is also the question—there is a lot of discussion now around peace talks—about the future of the Jordan Valley. Israelis, of course, want to control it, citing security concerns. But if the Jordan Valley were ceded in some way to Israel, basically the potential economic viability of a Palestinian state is completely undermined. That would be the bread basket of a future Palestine.

Chair

If you had a genuine peace settlement and a two-state solution, it is quite possible that Israelis would invest in a factory in the Palestinian territories.

Daniel Levy

With Jordan and Egypt, you have special industrial zones with special trade arrangements with the US, where Israeli and Jordanian, or Israeli and Egyptian, business people work together. That sadly does not apply until we have a Palestinian state.

Peter Luff

So are people like Christian Aid right to call for a boycott on products from Israeli settlements?

Daniel Levy

I think it is absolutely legitimate to say that there is a distinction between the Israel that we recognise in the 1967 lines and what goes on as Israeli activity beyond those 1967 lines. When Europe signs trade agreements, it is signing them with Israel; it is not recognising the occupation as part of the entity it is signing trade agreements with. I think labelling, therefore, is absolutely legitimate. I make the case with Israelis that if you do not want Israel to be boycotted, allow consumers to distinguish and to say, “I want to buy Israeli, but I do not want to buy that.” Each individual’s choice of conscience as a consumer as to whether they buy a product or not is their choice and it is facilitated by drawing that distinction.

Peter Luff

I have a slightly different question on the impact of DFID’s money on Palestinian welfare. We have been told by the Palestine Solidarity Campaign that DFID may be inadvertently supporting the disinvestment of Palestinian life in Area C by providing healthcare and education in areas A and B to serve the population of Area C. It is quite complex, but the point is an important one. Are we actually doing harm inadvertently?

Daniel Levy

I will say one sentence and then I will shut up. I imagine if you meet with Palestinian civil society groups, you will hear this critique, which is that Israel remains the occupying power. It is a bizarre occupying power, because it is relieved of its duties as an occupying power by virtue of aid donations to the Palestinian authority. When I first lived in Israel, one of the strongest arguments for those who then advocated two states and making peace was the economic costs. Almost all of those economic costs are now shouldered by the British taxpayer and other taxpayers around the world, which takes me back to those choices. So, it is more than just the Area C thing that the Palestinian Solidarity Campaign points out. There is an entire logic here which says, “You are subsidising the occupation.” There is a very powerful counter-logic that says that we are keeping open the possibility of Israelis and Palestinians coming to terms in a less violent environment with a peaceful negotiation by maintaining some kind of stability and poverty alleviation. Those are the counterpoints in that debate.

Peter Luff

And what is your view?

Daniel Levy

My view is that as long as HMG policy and consensus here is about a negotiated two‑state outcome, what you are doing makes sense. As long as there is a degree of Palestinian and Israeli buy-in to that, that is legitimate as well. I would be a little more forward-leaning, as I said, on the Area C East Jerusalem stuff.

Chair

Just coming back to the Area C issues, you have to get a permit to develop there. They do not seem to be issued very often and they seem to be difficult. Very often, even after that, the structures are demolished. Have you had any particular impact of that on your own work? In other words, have you been denied permits or, alternatively, have you made investments that have subsequently been demolished, which would bring into question the original investment?

Margot Ellis

We are impacted in the sense that Palestine refugees are living in Area C. First of all, 60% of the land area of the West Bank is in Area C. But, unfortunately, between state lines and areas within Area C that are allocated for settlement activity or public roads, 70% of that body of land is not available for Palestinian settlement. We have 19 camps in the West Bank, and five of them are in Area C. We are affected—not so much directly UNRWA as an organisation, but because of our role in protecting Palestinian refugees—by the home demolitions. There were 663 home demolitions in the last year. We are talking about 1,100 Palestinians, about 35% of whom were displaced this last year. The lack of ability to secure permits and settlement expansion inevitably leads to further displacement of Palestinians in Area C.

Chair

Have your own buildings been removed or lost?

Margot Ellis

Not our buildings. However, if a cistern is removed and demolished that is owned or used by a Palestinian refugee, it undermines the economic livelihood of a community. One good example is the Bedouin community. With the expansion of the Ma'ale Adumim settlement, which is a very large settlement on the outskirts of Jerusalem with potential further expansions, one of the groups to be further displaced is the Bedouin community—these are Bedouins who were displaced earlier from the Negev. We are working with 2,300 Bedouins who are under threat of forcible displacement, who not only would need to move, but their traditional source of livelihood—herding—would be destroyed forever. So, we work with Palestine refugees who are affected by home demolitions and potential threats to their livelihood.

Chair

That effectively means that Israel can take action that leads to economic damage, which the international community then finishes up paying compensation for, not the Israeli authorities. Is that right?

Margot Ellis

Yes.

John Ging

We recorded last year, in 2013, 122 projects funded by donors that have been demolished. Temporary shelters, support structures for livestock, and water and sanitation facilities directly funded by donors had been demolished as part of this campaign of demolishments that have taken place over the past year.

Chair

And no compensation has been paid for those.

John Ging

No, and the ICRC on their part—the Red Cross—have suspended all support in this regard. They no longer give shelter support to those who have had their homes demolished, because of the confiscation and destruction of that support. So they have stopped their programme.

Chair

Do you think the UK—DFID—should do that?

John Ging

No, I think what we have to do is find a solution where there is respect for these programmes, because they are only providing the very basic support that people need to protect them from the elements and give them basic human dignity such as water and sanitation facilities.

Mr McCann

If you look back at history—I do not claim to be an expert by any manner or means—you can see different parts where layers and layers of compromises have led to even bigger problems that we have to face today in terms of attempting to get to a two-state solution. Perhaps, Margot, we can have a look at UNRWA’s role in that, because the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees states that persons who have acquired a new nationality shall no longer be considered as refugees. Yet UNRWA’s definition of Palestinians refugees includes those who have acquired new nationalities. How can you justify that?

Margot Ellis

We are also talking about the question of descendants. We have a clear mandate that was given us by the UN General Assembly and its members. It was to provide protection and assistance to Palestine refugees. There is a specific definition of what Palestine refugees are: those who were living in British Mandate Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948 who lost both their homes and livelihood. I will first address the whole question of the descendants. The reason we continue to support descendants of these originally displaced persons is because of a lack of a political solution. We have been criticised in the Israeli press that, unlike UNHCR, we are perpetuating the problem by providing assistance to subsequent generations of Palestinians. Actually, in any protracted refugee situation, such as when the UNHCR deals with non-Palestinians, they would support subsequent generations that are displaced. I will give you a couple of examples: Afghan refugees who have been displaced for a long period in Pakistan; Burmese refugees displaced in Thailand; and Bhutanese refugees in Nepal. That inter-generational transfer of refugee status is not unique to Palestine refugees. The second part of the question was—

Mr McCann

It was about UNRWA’s definition of Palestinian refugees including those who have acquired new nationalities.

Margot Ellis

There has never been a question of refugee status as far as the determination is concerned. For UNRWA, its provision of services is not determined by whether someone has that refugee status or not. That is what we are focused on.

Mr McCann

You say that it is a lack of a political solution that is making these issues continue, but your definition of Palestine refugees also includes those who were born and continue to reside in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Given that definition, the total number of refugees is close to 5 million. ICAI highlighted that that number continues to rise and, therefore, by counting those individuals as refugees, it becomes an even bigger problem numerically. The problem is that it makes a political solution even more difficult to accommodate. It is a classic catch-22 position where UNRWA’s existence and its definition of Palestinian refugees is creating obstacles to a political solution, is it not?

Margot Ellis

No, because if UNRWA were to go away today or tomorrow, the refugee problem would not go away.

Mr McCann

It is not UNRWA; it is the definition of refugees that is the issue, is it not?

Margot Ellis

The definition is a universal definition. Even if, as I said, UNRWA were to go away, and UNHCR were to be responsible for Palestine refugees—

Mr McCann

But, Margot, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees states that persons who acquire a new nationality shall no longer be considered as refugees. You have got a different definition.

John Ging

But what is their new nationality? Which country? Will the United Kingdom take those who are in camps in Lebanon, in Syria, and in Jordon? Will they take them in and give them a new nationality, or the United States?

Mr McCann

Your argument is that this is an established definition. It is not. I am quoting the 1951 Convention that states that you acquire a new nationality. So if a child is born in another country, they still have the ability to be a Palestinian refugee?

John Ging

If the country gives them the nationality. But the refugees—the Palestinians—living in Lebanon, for example, have absolutely no rights, no status, in Lebanon, other than their Palestinian refugee status.

Chair

Is there not another problem where, if all these people are displaced, because they were displaced, they would have the right to return to Israel in the event of a two‑state solution, in which case Israel would not be able to exist in its present state?

Daniel Levy

I can speak from the perspective of someone who was a negotiator on behalf of the Israeli Government in Taba and just prior to that, which is well over a decade ago. My experience—and I do not think this is exclusively my experience—is that this has not been the sticking point in negotiations. There is, amongst the PLO leadership, an understanding that the choice to pursue—this is not an UNRWA position; this is me simply sharing my experience—from 1988 a two‑state national rights approach impacted on and has a consequence for how one approaches the refugee issue in negotiations. Now, do you go out to the Palestinian public and say, “We have not secured our land yet; we have not secured Jerusalem yet; we have not secured sovereignty yet. But here is the good news: we've already given up on your rights as refugees as you perceive them.” Probably no negotiator would go about doing it like that. Have they sent hints at the times when negotiations looked promising? Has that conversation, which will not be a simple conversation—I do not want to pretend that it will be—begun to bubble up and be addressed differently? The preponderance of evidence is that is has, and that you have seen a shift in that conversation. I think the longer this goes on, the longer Palestinians say, “Well, we are not going to get a sovereign real state anyway, so why concede this as well?”, the more that will assert itself among Palestinians.

Chair

The straightforward counter is: if a two‑state solution arrived, basically these people would become Palestinians living in the West Bank. They would not go back to Israel. Probably, that would be negotiated away as part of a package.

Daniel Levy

Exactly. One would find the language and provisions, but that is absolutely the bottom line.

Sir Tony Cunningham

Changing the subject, do you agree that donors should support projects to bring Palestinians into contact with their Israeli peers, and why do you think such projects have received so little support up to now?

Daniel Levy

I do not know that they have received so little support. Am I, in principle, opposed to Israelis and Palestinians coming into contact more? No.

Sir Tony Cunningham

The reason I ask is that DFID have said that their bilateral programme in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is not currently funding projects involving Israeli/Palestinian joint working.

Daniel Levy

There have been 20 years of attempts to put together what were called people-to-people programmes. In the 1994 agreement, you had a clause, and there was even a state given leadership in shepherding this—Norway—in supporting people-to-people programmes. An entire infrastructure was put into place. My concern at DFID using that funding is that I do not think those programmes have particularly proven themselves, which does not mean that there are not individual programmes—I know that some are touched on in DFID’s work—that do fantastic work. They do do fantastic work, but there is such an asymmetry in this situation. Regarding the very interaction and who you can bring from the Palestinian side into an engagement on people-to-people programmes—whether because of security clearance or permits or language access—my fear is that we will end up bringing elites together. Does that mean we should challenge ourselves to do better programmes? I am sure that that is the case. My tendency is to think that that is better left to philanthropic foundations and other funders for those kind of projects, rather than to development assistance. Given Israel’s GDP per capita and its standing economically, is that the thing that one should be spending money on? That would be a very personal take on that issue.

Sir Tony Cunningham

Should donors such as DFID cooperate with Mashav, and how might such a cooperation work?

Daniel Levy

I would draw a distinction between cooperating with Mashav, which is the Israeli development agency, and the Israeli foreign ministry on matters related to the territories and Palestinians, which I think would be a bad idea, versus consideration of working with Mashav on global development projects. The German Government is en masse in Israel right now, and they have just signed a cooperation programme with Mashav. In that respect, I think one would look, on a case-by-case basis, at whether a particular Mashav project adds value, whether carrying the Mashav label adds value to a DFID project, and judge it on that merit.

Sir Tony Cunningham

So, it depends on the project.

Chair

Just a final question to John Ging. Were you in the room for the first panel?

John Ging

Part of it; not all of it.

Chair

On the issue of Syria and the role of OCHA in that, we obviously had a whole discussion about inaccessibility and how it is constantly changing. Is there a role for OCHA in monitoring this? Some suggested a monthly report. Is there a role for OCHA in negotiating access, whether in government areas or opposition areas? Just exactly what is OCHA doing and what do you think OCHA could do in that context?

John Ging

Valerie Amos herself is leading on this. There is a high level group of member states who are having influence over the different parties on the ground to negotiate access at the operational level. This has been something that we have been pursuing at every level, with every means and mechanism that we have, because getting access is our number one priority. There are 242,000 people besieged. You probably heard that this morning. There are 3 million people beyond our regular reach, who we know are in humanitarian need. And there are 7 million in the places where there are those 3 million who we know are in need who, again, are very vulnerable. In terms of the overall number of people in need in Syria, which is approximately 9 million, we are not having access to those who are in most need, either at all, for those that are in besieged communities, or those who are hard to reach, which is the 3 million that I mentioned. So it is top priority. It preoccupies the leadership of OCHA on a daily basis to try to negotiate. Valerie Amos herself updates the Security Council on the detail of what we are doing, what we are not able to do, what we should be able to do, what we are trying to do, where the breakdown is and so forth. As you recall, on 2 October, we got a presidential statement from the Security Council unanimously directing that the parties to this conflict respect international humanitarian law, starting with free and unimpeded access. That did not translate into the result that we needed on the ground over the last couple of months. That is why, this past Saturday, the Security Council, again, unanimously adopted, this time, a resolution on access. We are now hoping that that will influence the parties. It comes down to using all the routes. The whole question of crossing international borders has been very controversial. But in this resolution, that has now been spelt out as also a route that has to be opened up. Because, again, just trying to cross conflict lines, which are the places where it is most dangerous and difficult, is just not feasible, operationally or practically speaking. Our number one preoccupation in coordination is to support our sister humanitarian agencies to get the access to the people and to use all the mechanisms.

Chair

Does that mean you either publish it or it is accessible information on an ongoing basis?

John Ging

Absolutely, and the updates to the Security Council are also made public.

Chair

Just a final point on the consequence of that resolution: do you see that opening up any more negotiating or opportunities? Russia and China are now on board. Is that likely to lead to—

John Ging

Yes, it is a clear step-change. We have had three years of conflict. It is only since October that we have had consensus in the Council by those who have major influence over the parties on the ground. Now there is a consensus, what we find is that all member states who have influence on all sides are actually genuinely using that influence to try to move the parties to do what they are obliged to do under international law. Unfortunately, until now, the parties on the ground have not responded in accordance with their responsibility and obligations. That is why they have stepped it up from a presidential statement to a resolution, and the Secretary General has been asked to report back in 30 days on progress, because this is life and death. 5,000 people are being killed every month in Syria. The level of humanitarian suffering is absolutely appalling and quite unprecedented. Again, this is a shame on us all that we are not able to help these impoverished people in their time of need.

Chair

We share your sense of shame and frustration. I obviously appreciate that you are very much in the middle of it. You have been in the middle of it for an awful long time and your reports out of Gaza at the worst times were very much appreciated. They were very forthright and very helpful. Also, can I say that you will appreciate that the Committee, first of all, is embarking on this inquiry? You can tell there are differences of view in terms of background within the Committee, but it is really, really helpful for us to get informed opinion along the lines you have given to us. I certainly have found it really valuable. I hope our Committee will be able to find a useful contribution. We may not be able to agree on everything, but I hope we can find things on the basis of the evidence and information we have that add constructively. At the end of the day, for us, it is about how we can help the UK Government to do whatever it is doing most effectively in terms of its contribution to make the international community work together well. Your evidence is extremely helpful and very valuable to us. We very much appreciate it.

John Ging

Thank you very much. Oral evidence: The UK’s Development Work in The Middle East, HC 948 2