Oral evidence: Offshore helicopter safety, HC 992Monday 17 March 2014
Oral evidence, 17 March 2014.
Witnesses
Robert Goodwill MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Transport, and Tricia Hayes, Director of Aviation, Department for Transport, gave evidence.
Chair
Good afternoon, Minister, and welcome to the Select Committee. Would you tell us who you are, and perhaps your colleague would introduce herself as well, just for our records?
Mr Goodwill
For the record, I am Robert Goodwill, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department for Transport with responsibility for aviation. I am joined by Tricia Hayes.
Tricia Hayes
I am director of aviation at the Department for Transport.
Chair
Do you want to make any opening statement, Minister?
Mr Goodwill
Could I make a brief opening statement to express sympathy with the families and friends of those who were killed in some of the accidents we have been discussing, in particular to express regret at the fact there has been quite a long delay, for legal reasons, in fully investigating the April 2009 crash? I know it has been very difficult for the families involved not getting the answers they wanted more quickly.
Chair
There have been five major offshore helicopter crashes in four years. What can you and the Department do to reassure offshore workers that their safety is paramount?
Mr Goodwill
In terms of aviation, I think standards of safety are higher in that industry than for any other form of transport. Any accident that takes place gets a lot of publicity. Therefore, often the perception of risk involved in aviation is greater than the actual risk. For example, it is interesting to look at the risk factors of various forms of transport. For offshore helicopters, there are 15.2 fatalities per billion passenger kilometres, which is five times the level for cars, but seven times less than the level for motorcycles. Indeed, if you look at UK airline operations, they are 50,000 times safer; in fact, I do not think we have had a fatality since the Kegworth crash in the UK. But there is a perception among many of the travelling public, not least the Secretary of State himself, that people are nervous about flying. I think it needs to be put into context. Yes, there is greater risk flying in non-fixed-wing aircraft in a very hostile environment, but, putting that in the context of other forms of transport, it is certainly not as dangerous as walking, or riding a bicycle. We need to make sure people understand the actual levels of risk, but there is no reason whatsoever for any complacency. We need to follow up any actions that are recommended, and make sure everything that can be done is done to ensure the safety of the passengers and crew on those flights.
Chair
Do you think the regulation we have is effective? In particular, do you think that EASA’s role is one that strengthens safety or slows down decision taking?
Mr Goodwill
The role of EASA is slightly different from that of the CAA, given that they are involved in the certification of aircraft, as I think you just heard in the last evidence session. When I asked the CAA whether there was anything it might need to do where it had worries about safety that it would be prevented from doing by EASA, the answer came back very clearly, “No. We can take action where necessary if we need to ground aircraft or change operating practices.” I think the two work very well together, and any concerns that people might have had that they were compromising the levels of security and safety in the UK because of the operation of EASA are unfounded. One should also look at the fact that many British citizens travel by helicopter or fixed-wing craft in other EU countries. The general effect on the safety of the entire European travelling public has been very positive. There are some European Union countries—I will not list them at this moment—whose safety record and standards may not be quite the same as the gold standard that I think has been set by the CAA.
Chair
Sometimes it is claimed that EASA is lowering those gold-plated standards in relation to the UK, not Europe as a whole. Is that something you would agree with?
Mr Goodwill
We certainly had that argument put forward by BALPA when we discussed flight time limitations and pilots’ flying hours. The advice I have had from the CAA, who are primarily concerned with safety and would not wish to see it compromised at all, is that there has been no diminution in safety standards because of the operation of EASA. There is nothing that the CAA might wish to do that they have been prevented from doing because of the operations of EASA.
Graham Stringer
How do you square that with the fact that EASA are not implementing a significant number of recommendations from the AAIB?
Mr Goodwill
The UK has a well-established leadership role within EASA, especially on helicopter safety issues, and there is clear recognition that both the UK and Norway can bring much to the table in those terms. We are well represented as a country in all EASA’s rule-making processes, and working hard to improve the pace and productivity of this process. Indeed, EASA’s management board is currently chaired by a senior official from the CAA. Although it is true that the CAA’s February report identified a number of areas where it was thought action was needed by EASA to respond to previous accident investigation reports, the CAA is in regular contact with EASA on resolving any outstanding issues. This includes a number of face-to-face meetings with the relevant experts within the EASA organisation. I am encouraged that EASA has recognised the need to respond quickly. EASA has made a written commitment to provide an initial position on each of the recommendations no later than 7 April, and they have just repeated that undertaking. EASA can move to take action, but there is nothing to prevent the CAA from moving more quickly and taking action, should they deem it necessary. I do not know whether Tricia wants to add anything.
Tricia Hayes
There is a danger of this afternoon becoming a list of people who have had a meeting with Patrick Ky.
Mr Goodwill
I have had one.
Tricia Hayes
We have also recently had a meeting with Patrick Ky. It is clear from those conversations that EASA is committed not just to responding to the recommendations in the CAA report but to tracking each of them individually through to a definitive conclusion. We have had that commitment from him personally. More widely, we are very heavily engaged with EASA. As you heard in the previous session, we are the single most represented country in the rule-making process, so our strategy for making EASA work more quickly is to work within the system.
Graham Stringer
But involvement is not sufficient, is it, Minister? I think you were a member of this Committee when it produced a report saying that EASA was not fit for purpose in its early days. Do you really believe what you have just read out to this Committee—that there has been sufficient improvement, even though the evidence, despite all this involvement, is that they are not implementing recommendations from the Air Accidents Investigation Branch?
Mr Goodwill
I suppose that, if I was to make any criticism of EASA, it would be that any organisation that involves a large number of member states tends to act more slowly than the CAA, for example, which can take action immediately. If there were ever an instance where we had to ground a fleet, the CAA would take action, but if longer-term action needed to be taken at European-wide level EASA is the body to do that. It is absolutely true that at the start we were very concerned that EASA did not have the personnel; it could not attract the expertise. There was all sorts of confusion about the location of its headquarters, and that meant it had difficulty recruiting people. Many of the problems that we identified then are now not such important issues, but I repeat that the British public travel by a variety of means in a whole variety of different countries. Therefore, the overall impact on the safety of British citizens travelling, particularly in some of the eastern or southern European countries, has been very positive. The CAA, which is the gold standard in terms of aviation safety, is, first, very engaged with EASA in putting forward recommendations and engaging with them, but, secondly, it can take action if and where necessary to ensure that we do not compromise safety.
Graham Stringer
Isn’t that just Eurospeak for acknowledging the reality that there have been lowest common denominator safety standards? You did not name the countries in your first answer, but you are doing so now. The air safety standards in southern Europe and in some parts of eastern Europe are lower than those in this country. The reason for the slowness and the lack of response is that standards are being reduced in northern European countries and the United Kingdom to bring people up. It is Eurospeak to talk about the safety of all European citizens, is it not, because some standards are being brought up, but our standards are not being kept up and we are not responding to recommendations following serious accidents?
Mr Goodwill
I specifically raised this issue with the CAA when we were discussing the flight time limitations. It certainly could not be described as a case of the lowest common denominator, but there was a situation where there were different rules in different countries and there was some need for compromise to ensure that those standards could be agreed. When I asked the CAA whether there were any instances where they felt that in that situation safety was being compromised, they said no. In fact, they went to great lengths to explain why in that case having three pilots on the flight deck for very long flights was not a necessary recommendation. If it ever came to my attention that we were compromising safety because EASA was applying diluted rules, I would certainly ensure the CAA took steps to ensure that the UK dealt with that, because it is a minimum standard, not one that we cannot improve and take action on at short notice. In terms of the helicopter fleet in the North sea, it is important that the CAA can take swift action if they identify a particular problem and ensure that we do not have to move at the speed of EASA, which, for understandable reasons, can be a more bureaucratic process than the CAA’s action. Tricia is nodding.
Tricia Hayes
I am.
Graham Stringer
I do not want to go back through the history of this Committee’s reports, but you are right; eventually, the CAA said they were satisfied, but that was after behind-doors compromises, was it not, when the Government said they were not satisfied with the original safety regulations? It is just another indication that we are not getting the standard of safety in this country that we should be getting. Another piece of evidence is that the CAA have been accused of light-touch regulation. Is it not possible that that is a response to EASA’s slowness and a reduction of our standards, as southern Europe’s standards are brought up to speed?
Mr Goodwill
All the advice I have is that that is not the case. I know that for many it would be very easy, maybe for more political reasons, to criticise anything that was based at European level, but the CAA is one of the most respected safety regulators in the world. In terms of the regulation in the UK, some of the industry complains that the CAA gold-plate regulations are too prescriptive; other parts of the industry feel that more detailed regulation and oversight is required. I suggest that means the CAA is getting the balance about right. In terms of EASA, I believe that the CAA have all the powers they need to act over and above the EASA standards. Therefore, we do not need to be concerned about UK citizens on UK flights or UK helicopters. However, we can be heartened by the fact that, if somebody books a flight with another airline from a different country, the standards will have been brought up to at least the European minimum, which in many cases is far superior to some of the standards that have been commonplace, until fairly recently, in some other countries.
Chair
Last week, the sheriff principal found that cutting corners on safety maintenance may have contributed to the April 2009 Peterhead crash. That does not suggest too much regulation, does it? Does it suggest too little regulation? What lessons have you taken from that finding?
Mr Goodwill
I spent an hour this morning reading the fatal accident inquiry. I would recommend that everyone read it, because it shows how mistakes were made in the way that an aircraft’s gearbox faults were spotted and monitored. I do not know whether you are aware of the situation, but the gearbox in a helicopter is the key component. It is put under very great stress, and a lot is done to ensure that the gearbox itself can be monitored, including the use of magnetic plugs to pick up any fragments of metal. A number of problems were identified, the first being that a scrap of metal that was discovered was not correctly identified as coming from the epicyclic gears of the helicopter, and it was assumed to be metal from a different place. Secondly, there were also issues in terms of how the maintenance schedule was organised, and how telephone calls were made that should have been put in writing so there could be no confusion. Therefore, I believe it was not a problem of regulation so much as a problem that the regulations were not being applied. It is mentioned in the report that to an extent there was a tick-box mentality, which should not have been allowed to prevail. Lessons have been learned from that. Indeed, helicopters are now fitted with enhanced monitoring devices, including HUMS—the health and usage monitoring system—with funding from the offshore oil companies themselves to ensure that it is installed, so that vibrations from gearboxes and rotor drives can be picked up at a very early stage. The card that is taken out of the helicopter when it lands can be analysed to ensure these are picked up very early indeed. Lessons were learned from that, but, reading the report, my impression is that this was not a fault of under-regulation; it was a fault in application of the regulations, and some mistakes were made, as identified by the fatal accident inquiry inspector.
Tricia Hayes
Perhaps I may add a quick comment and relate it back to the question about EASA. It reflects on where EASA is in its life history. EASA is still a relatively new organisation, and it spent its first decade getting the rule book in place. We are now in a position where the job of putting in place the regulatory framework is essentially done, and EASA is now turning its attention to the broader issues around compliance and organisational culture. As the Minister rightly says, one of the lessons from this particular accident is that, no matter what the rule book says, the right organisational culture and incentives for people who work in organisations need to be in place, so it is very welcome that EASA has got past the first phase of its work and can now look at these broader issues.
Chair
Why has it taken five years to produce that report? The crash happened five years ago.
Mr Goodwill
The reason is that there was very real consideration of a prosecution being brought. Indeed, the sheriff principal’s report focused very much on whether the fault was due to a defect in a component, which would have been the responsibility of the manufacturer. This was viewed to be unlikely given the length of service of the helicopter. I think it had done 3,600 hours of operation, and the likelihood of an epicyclic gear failing decreases over time. In the report they said that it had reached the asymptote, but because the component was not recovered there was no way they could determine whether or not it was defective. The other potential cause of the failure would have been spalling in the roller bearings on that epicyclic assembly. That is where the fragment of metal had come from. I think the inspector ruled that, on the balance of probabilities, it was down to spalling, but that is not the level of proof needed to bring any prosecution.
Chair
Why did it take four or five years to do that?
Mr Goodwill
Investigations of this type generally take a number of years. The typical length of time for the Air Accidents Investigation Branch to carry out its work fully is 18 months. I stand to be corrected, but as I understand it, the further delays were down to lawyers and prosecutors determining whether a case could be brought. I agree that it is an unacceptable time for the families to wait, particularly as in the end no prosecution proved to be viable. The reasons for the failure were pretty apparent quite soon after the accident, and the investigation branch brought forward recommendations to prevent that type of failure from happening again, so we did not have to wait for the full report six years later before action could be taken.
Chair
When recommendations are made to improve safety, whether they come from the Air Accidents Investigation Branch or the Civil Aviation Authority, whose responsibility is it to ensure that they are implemented? Is anybody responsible? Is the Minister responsible? Are you responsible, Minister?
Mr Goodwill
Ultimately, as Minister I suspect that I am responsible for almost everything, but the responsibility for ensuring that compliance is properly carried out is a CAA responsibility. Responsibility for acting within the regulations is that of the operators themselves who may employ subcontract maintenance staff, in which case that responsibility is passed on to them. This is the most regulated sector of the transport industry, and responsibility is very much in the CAA’s remit. Indeed, they have six operatives working in the North sea to ensure that there is full compliance and that the standards of aircrew are maintained.
Chair
Would you see it as your responsibility to ask what has happened to recommendations on safety? We have had a session this afternoon and we heard accounts, sometimes long ones, of the whole process involved in looking at safety recommendations, whether it be the CAA, EASA or relationships between the two, but there does not seem to be any very clear vision of somebody being responsible for seeing what happens to a specific recommendation, particularly when it has been accepted as a reasonable one. It seems to get lost somewhere in the sea of time. Would you see it as your responsibility to follow that up, or would you just leave it to the CAA?
Mr Goodwill
There are a number of recommendations, particularly about the buoyancy of aircraft, the ease of escape from aircraft that have ditched and the type of rebreathing equipment or oxygen equipment that can be provided to people in the helicopter, as well as the training that passengers receive before they fly out to the North sea. I have heard criticism that when they do the training exercise they are sitting near the window and they know how to get out, but if they are in the middle of the aircraft it is much more difficult. It is the case, sadly, that in the most recent accident, in August 2013, as the aircraft landed in the sea on its approach to Sumburgh, the fatalities occurred in the water or inside the cabin; they were not as a direct result of the crash. If there are any suggestions that the recommendations made were not being fully taken forward, as Minister I would be bringing together the interested parties to ensure that we did what we could to make sure safety was not compromised. In that regard, we need to rely on the expert advice of the CAA, who are experienced in these things, and also talk to the trade unions who represent the operatives who fly in the helicopters, and who may have anxiety about some of the safety procedures and requirements and bring those through their union reps.
Karen Lumley
Minister, are you confident that enough is being done to reassure our oil and gas workers that the helicopter fleet is safe?
Mr Goodwill
Having flown out to a North sea rig on a helicopter myself, it is quite an anxious flight compared with some of the normal aviation one could do, so I can understand people being anxious, particularly reading about the accidents that have happened. We need to make sure that people’s concerns are addressed. In terms of the passengers themselves, the concerns are about the ability to escape from the aircraft, the flotation of the aircraft and the facilities available to allow people to survive as they are escaping. If I felt that the recommendations that came forward were not adequate, I would be asking some serious questions of the CAA, and I would expect Members of Parliament, not least this Committee, to be raising serious questions with myself and the Secretary of State. There is no way we can compromise safety, and if recommendations are made, we need to make sure we act on them.
Karen Lumley
If Scotland votes for independence later this year, what will happen to the regulation of the oil industry in Scotland?
Mr Goodwill
I suspect that, in the interim, the CAA would carry out their role before the Scots set up their own equivalent of the CAA. I would be very surprised if they could set up one as good as our CAA. Presumably, at some point they would have to try to rejoin the European Union and become a member of EASA as well, but we are speculating. In the unlikely situation that Scotland were to make the big mistake of voting for independence and there was a request for help from the new Scottish Administration, I would certainly feel it was our responsibility to extend the services of the CAA in the interim, not least because some of my constituents from Whitby work in the North sea oil industry and would need to be equally confident that they were being protected.
Graham Stringer
In the previous session we failed to get a good explanation as to why safety was improving with Norwegian helicopters and our safety record was getting worse. Does the Department have a view on why those statistics are going in opposite directions?
Mr Goodwill
I have thought long and hard about this. I know you have just had evidence that there were no specific issues that may have impinged upon the difference. Mention was made of whistleblowing and the opportunity for people to report instances. That is something the CAA are working on, to ensure people can feed in anything, so if somebody working on a gearbox maintenance contract was not happy with something they could feed that into the CAA. The Norwegians certainly have a review procedure that we would seek to emulate, which was the other point. Given that the aircraft are, by and large, the same, and that many of the people flying them are Brits, or people with similar training, I suspect that some of it just comes down to statistical probability. You may recall that in London we had six cyclists killed in 10 days—a very short time—last year, but the total number of fatalities in London over the whole year was the same. I am inclined to think there is a degree of statistical effect; these are very unusual instances and you can get glitches, but if there is anything the Committee can glean from the way the Norwegian authorities approach this, I look forward to reading the report. As I understand it, and I have asked these questions, there is nothing specific that the Norwegians do that we do in terms of the aircraft they fly, the personnel and the conditions they fly in that would indicate a reason for the difference in the level of instances that have occurred.
Graham Stringer
We will do our best of course, but do you think there should be a full public inquiry, as the trade unions and many of the relatives want?
Mr Goodwill
No, and there are a number of good reasons for that. The first reason is that, having read the full report of the fatal accident inquiry regarding the accident in 2009 with the Super Puma when 16 people lost their lives, I am not sure what, if anything, any public inquiry could add to the degree of technical and engineering evidence and the report. I believe we have a very good system of air accident investigation. Looking at these accidents, there is no common thread. Some of the accidents were due to mechanical failure, some were due to lightning, and some were due to operational issues in terms of very poor flying conditions, and planes colliding with the sea or other objects. I do not think there is any common theme. It is all very well to call for public inquiries, but in my experience a public inquiry is the best way to delay things, the best way to make sure nothing happens quickly and the best way to spend an awful lot of money without finding out an awful lot more. I would reject a public inquiry. Politicians often say, “We must have a public inquiry,” but looking back on previous public inquiries, they have often meant big delays in getting something done. If we have lessons to learn, there is nothing more important than that we look quickly at the specific accident on its own to see what lessons can be learned and what action needs to be taken. I do not believe that a public inquiry would be the right way forward.
Martin Vickers
We heard earlier from CAA representatives. When questioned about financial pressures on the organisation, it was reassuring that they said front-line staff would not be affected, but, as we all know, front-line staff need back-room support. are you 100% reassured that the CAA can operate fully with 120 fewer staff?
Mr Goodwill
I am certainly not 100% reassured, because part of my job is to keep asking the question, “Are you still able to do your job with the resources you are given?” What they say is reassuring. I heard the points they made with regard to some of the licensing procedures, which have been more automated, and some of the back-room savings they can make. I am reassured by the fact that they made the point that there will be no reduction in the number of front-line staff operating in the North sea as pilots monitoring the situation. I was pleased to hear what they said—they took the view that it would not impinge on their front-line operations—but I will continue to ask the questions you would wish me to ask to ensure there is no reduction or dilution in the work they do.
Martin Vickers
That is reassuring, but it poses the question: why did the CAA take on those 120 staff in the first place if it is a well-managed organisation? Those people did not just appear; they must have been there to do a particular function. Are you wholly satisfied that one particular aspect of the work will not suffer?
Mr Goodwill
Tricia was around then, so she might be able to assist.
Tricia Hayes
The nature of the task evolves, and admin functions have changed with new technology. You always need to reconfigure what the back-room tasks look like and how many people you need to do them. If you wouldn’t mind, this may be an opportunity to build on what the Minister said about how the Department works with the CAA in practice and our ability to influence the CAA. It is important to be clear that the CAA has independence as a statutory authority with an accountable board, but the chair of the board and non-execs are appointed by Ministers. We have a joint safety strategy board where we can make sure that the CAA’s safety performance continues to improve and is being effective in tackling what the data tell us are the most important risks. We have some real machinery that we can use to hold the CAA to account on what it is doing to manage those risks.
Mr Goodwill
As does this Committee.
Martin Vickers
Following on from that, you heard my question to the previous panel about the way the various agencies work together. Minister, are you wholly satisfied that the structure is right and that no improvements could be made?
Mr Goodwill
The way EASA operates is probably still evolving to an extent. Patrick Ky, whom I met, is very keen to ensure that his organisation continues to work to build the sort of reputation that the CAA already has. I do not think it is quite there yet, but given that they now seem to have key personnel in place who would subscribe to that culture, and as the relationship between the various CAAs around the European Union and EASA evolves, I have no reason to believe that it should not be moving in the right direction. The CAA is in a position to take action if it needs to, so we would not be in a situation where we would be held back by EASA. In terms of the certification of aircraft, it would be pointless to have duplication of effort. Like you, Mr Vickers, I have very grave reservations about some aspects of the European Union, but I think that working to ensure aircraft are properly licensed and that their safety is maintained is probably something we can do better together than as individual member states.
Chloe Smith
Minister, thank you very much for coming here today. One thing we have all picked up is that clearly safety comes first. Our previous panel of witnesses were very emphatic on that point. Could you give us your view on how new regulation—new law—that may arise from the CAA’s report and sit upon industry, should be balanced with industry’s arguments in turn? My question is about regional balance; there are different aspects.
Chair
We need to adjourn. We will be back in 10 minutes. Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. On resuming—
Chloe Smith
I will summarise my question extremely quickly. New regulation naturally requires a dialogue with industry. As Minister, no doubt the balancing act of that will fall in part to you, to help mediate it. Could you tell us a little about how you think you would go about that in the light of the new regulation that the CAA proposes? Do you think there may be any regional sensitivities, considering some of the differences in the offshore industry in different parts of the UKCS?
Mr Goodwill
We have been concentrating on problems in Scotland, but I am aware that the southern North sea has gas fields, not far away from the hon. Lady’s constituency. There always has to be a balance between safety and practicality. That is not to say that we should compromise safety. For example, you could make a proposal that you would carry two fewer passengers in each aircraft so that more people are sitting near a window. That would make it safer, but you would have to have more flights, which would increase risk. It has been said that the slightly larger offshore workers have more difficulty getting out of the aircraft. You could suggest that anyone over a certain weight or body mass index should not be allowed to work in the North sea. That is not a road we will be going down, but it illustrates how you always have to make a certain compromise in terms of regulation and safety. In any branch of the transport industry, there will always be pressures in terms of customers, whether that be somebody wanting to buy a low-cost EasyJet ticket to Malaga or an oil company commissioning services to fly out to the North sea. We should be aware that there will always be commercial pressures, but they should not be allowed to compromise safety, which is why we have regulation. The risks may be slightly different in the less stormy seas further south, but we need to make sure that the regulations are fully fit for purpose so that no one could even dream of cutting a corner for financial reasons. Any recommendations that come forward to the CAA that balance practicality and safety are ones we should look at and implement, if at all necessary.
Tricia Hayes
There is a fantastic situation where either you or the safety regulator can have a dialogue with an industry, which enables you to achieve the same safety outcome but in a different way. I think Mark Swan’s evidence is clear that the CAA is very open to having those kinds of conversations. The important thing is that the safety outcome is realised. There is a common interest in realising the safety outcome as cost-effectively as possible, and a serious conversation with the industry can help you get there.
Mr Goodwill
One example where safety has been improved is in relation to weather out at the rig. It used to be the case that the person who was going to be picked up would communicate with the shore and say, “Come and pick us up. It’s not too stormy out here; the wind isn’t blowing too hard.” Now we have automated weather stations on the rigs, so nobody who wants to get home and spend the weekend with their wife and kids can be slightly economical with the weather forecast. Simple things like that—it is pretty obvious that that could happen—can be addressed. We already have suggestions about better lighting of decks on production platforms and exploration rigs, and research into better non-slip aluminium surfaces. Practical things that can be done are the sorts of things we should be implementing as well.
Chair
We have heard concerns that powerful oil and gas companies exert pressure on helicopter operators to reduce their costs, and that could mean cutting corners. Is that something you are aware of, or that you have ever looked at?
Mr Goodwill
I am aware that claims have been made by a number of groups, including those representing workers. It is a risk we should be aware of, because any powerful organisation that is trying to procure services in a cost-effective way will try to drive down price. That should not be allowed to be done at the expense of safety; indeed, that is why we have regulation and why the CAA has people out there. Having said that, I think the portrayal of the oil and gas industry as people who are prepared to cut a corner to save a bob is completely unfounded. Since the Piper Alpha disaster, the safety culture in the North sea has improved by leaps and bounds for very good reasons. Therefore, talking to the oil and gas companies and exploration companies, they do not see safety as something they grudgingly pay for. They realise that there is only one thing more expensive than having good health and safety, and that’s having an accident, which is the last thing they want. The same goes for the operators themselves. They do not want their planes to fall out of the sky and be written off; they do not want their personnel killed or injured in accidents. While there is an image out there that evil oil and gas people are trying to drive down price and drive down safety, I do not have evidence that that is the actuality. If I did, I would certainly be keen to ensure that the CAA took action to stamp on it.
Chair
Has the Department ever looked for evidence in that area?
Mr Goodwill
The CAA will monitor maintenance schedules, flying hours and whether aircraft have flown in unsuitable conditions. If that was happening, they would be the symptoms; you would see corners being cut on maintenance schedules, and other measures being taken by companies to save cost. When one looks at the accident reports, while the one on 1 April 2009 had some aspects of maintenance that were of concern, there was no indication that that was endemic within the company. There were mistakes made, allegedly, by those maintaining the vehicles and, in some cases, things should not have happened, and unfortunately the resultant failure of the gearbox was the outcome.
Tricia Hayes
Another important element in this is the ability of people who have concerns to communicate them confidentially. One thing that the UK has led the way on has been creating a reporting mechanism that requires mandatory reporting of safety concerns in a way that allows it to be confidential and anonymous. If there is a situation where somebody feels they are being put under pressure through contractual terms, or through what is happening on the ground, they can get that information to the regulator in a way that is safe for them. We are delighted that there is going to be a new system of occurrence reporting across the whole of Europe, which will build on the model in the UK.
Chair
Thank you very much. Oral evidence: Offshore helicopter safety, HC 992 21