Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 25 March 2014

Oral evidence, 25 March 2014.

Witness

Noman Benotman, Quilliam President, gave evidence.

Chair

I welcome our second witness, Mr Noman Benotman—I hope that I have pronounced that right—who is the president of Quilliam. Thank you very much indeed for coming along. It is much appreciated. My first question is: do you think it was a failure of intelligence that the west did not see how strong the post-revolution Islamic movement would be?

Noman Benotman

I am not sure it is a failure of intelligence; maybe it is the flaw of the situation, or new challenges just appearing in Libya. It is beyond the capacity and capability of any intelligence agency in the world to predict the future. Before the intervention, I think that most of the reports of the intelligence alliances were perfect, relative to the situation in Libya at the time.

Chair

What about the wider region? Do you think we should have anticipated what was going on there?

Noman Benotman

Yes. It is all about anticipation. I think maybe some assumptions were wrong, when we perhaps ignored certain groups of Libyans—social groups belonging to certain tribes, which were at the hard core of the regime’s structure. They have been marginalised or excluded until today from the political process, so maybe they paved the way for other groups to act, despite their not sharing the same ideology. I am talking about terrorist groups or radical armed groups coming in from the region. My assessment is that 25% to 30% of Libyan society has been marginalised, either by certain attitudes or political legislation, including the well-known unpopular political isolation law. That means that you give the terrorist groups, radical groups or other groups who are not interested in seeing a new democratic Libya the perfect environment to control. It is as simple as that.

Mr Baron

May I press you on that, if you do not mind, Mr Benotman? What we see of Libya now is that there are large swathes of the country that have no security and that Libya has no control over, particularly in the south. We also see militias still fully armed to the teeth; there seems to be no coherent plan to disarm them. We know what happened to the African mercenaries in Mali. There seems to have been very little post-conflict planning, or even assessment of the situation after the change in regime. Do you share that view? Do you not think those questions should have been asked, if not the answers supplied?

Noman Benotman

Basically, I think this is the most important question, because we have to start from somewhere, and if we need to start from somewhere, it is security and stability. I agree with you that there is total failure when it comes to security sector reform or disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, for one reason. It is not that the Libyan Government—all the newly established entities—are not incapable of handling this issue; they do not know exactly how to do it. They have no experience whatsoever of this new challenge in Libya. If you ask me my opinion, I would blame the international community rather than the Libyan Government, quite frankly, because there is what I call unfinished business. The legitimate legal ground comes from the UN resolution, which was favoured by most Libyans, and not just by Benghazi, which was mentioned earlier. Her Majesty’s Government militarily intervened in Libya to protect the people of Benghazi. I would say it was to protect the Libyan people, and not just Benghazi. Benghazi was the birthplace of the revolution. I strongly blame the international community for the unfinished business. They thought the collapse of the Gaddafi regime would be the end, and they would just need to wait for the Libyans to build a new democratic political system. That is not going to be the case without serious efforts from the international community, maybe based on a new model of engaging Libyans.

Mr Baron

It was quite clear, certainly in the British Parliament, that part of the intention of our intervention was regime change. The Prime Minister said on 21 March 2011 that there was “no future for the people of Libya with Colonel Gaddafi in charge”, so we knew regime change was on the agenda. What should have happened with the British planning, or the international community’s planning? Do you think that if we knew the consequences, we would have changed our approach to the military intervention and what followed afterwards? In other words, what could the international community have done about the aftermath that they have not done?

Noman Benotman

First, allow me to disagree with your analysis that the Prime Minister’s decision was based on regime change. I don’t think that was the case. It was just to implement the UN resolution to protect Libyans from being massacred. It was not regime change.

Mr Baron

I am quoting the Prime Minister, who said “there is no future for the people of Libya with Colonel Gaddafi in charge.” Let us put the motives to one side. What should the west have done differently, with the benefit of hindsight, when it came to planning for the aftermath, assuming that the regime change plan followed its course?

Noman Benotman

As you mentioned, there were no sound, practical, post-conflict plans to fix Libya. There were papers here and there and suggestions, but they were too academic. That is why it was a total failure. Most of the efforts now taking place in Libya are either coming from the EU or are bilateral efforts, but they are not going to lead us anywhere. Basically, they reinforce the chaotic situation in Libya and reinforce the militias. I wish that after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime there had been a more powerful UN taskforce in Libya, not like the one we have now. You know about those famous cards—the yellow card and the red card? That is exactly what you need.

Mr Baron

Something like we have in Cyprus, for example?

Noman Benotman

Or Yemen. I always wonder why we don’t have a UN taskforce like the one we have in Yemen, which has been given the privilege of blacklisting people if they appear in the future as an obstacle to the democratic transition in Yemen. Why do we not have the same model in Libya?

Mike Gapes

Can I take you to what is happening today? We recently published a report on instability and extremism in north and west Africa. Some of us went to Mali, and we have looked at other countries in the region. It is clear that a lot of instability and extremism has come out of Libya, partly through tribal and other links, and gone into other states to the south. It has gone as far as Mali, which clearly has no border with Libya. I am interested in what is happening today in the south of Libya. Do the central Government have any influence there? Who has control in the south? Is there a wider threat coming out of it, with al-Qaeda-linked groups and others leading to threats to neighbouring states?

Noman Benotman

To begin with, the central Government is still a concept. Not only in the southern part of the country—namely, Sabha—but in many suburbs and neighbourhoods in Tripoli, the central Government has no authority whatever. Everywhere you go, you have to negotiate with the local militias and the local councils. We have 107 local councils with 107 military councils attached—that means mini-Governments. That means practically that we have about 107 Governments governing Libya.

Mike Gapes

I will withdraw the word “central”, because clearly that was an error.

Noman Benotman

Yes, and if you ask me, I do not think that the south belongs to Libya anymore, quite frankly. If you show our kids the map, we say, “This is Libya and that is how it looks,” but I will give you a crystal clear practical example: if you go from Sabha, which is the main town in the south, all the way towards Brak, I believe that the area between is the most dangerous place in the Sahel region.

Mike Gapes

How many kilometres are we talking about?

Noman Benotman

Maybe 200 km, all the way down the south towards Niger. Just recently Iyad Ag Ghaly, the leader of Ansar Dine in Mali, created a version of his group from Niger, and all of them are now based in Libya. In the last investigation we did there, we found that 700 people from Niger have been placed in Libya for training and whatever they need as a clone of the Malian Ansar Dine. That is a small example. If you talk about criminal activities, there are organised crimes linked with the tribes and terrorist groups, including the notorious leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and all those kinds of groups. I am sure that it is now obvious that I will say that the In Amenas attack took place from Libya, not Mali.

Mike Gapes

So there are clear links between the groups there and the al-Qaeda franchise or model, and it is an ungoverned space.

Noman Benotman

Yes, absolutely it is an ungoverned space. The entire south of Libya is an ungoverned space, not just Sabha. We have different issues. We have ethnic conflicts there and criminal activities. By the way, that was even before the revolution, but now, because of the absence of security forces or government, it has increased. Libya has started to be a very valuable space for all criminal activities: tobacco, cocaine, heroin—you name it, everything. It also includes small arms and terrorism.

Mike Gapes

So no one has control, and there are lots of different groups.

Noman Benotman

Yes.

Mike Gapes

Are they in discrete areas, or are they in combat and fighting each other?

Noman Benotman

No, not now. I think now everybody has settled in particular places, but from time to time there is conflict between tribes, because that is the only way in which they can generate income. They control main spots on the border, including with Chad, and they were never going to give them up. It is a combination of tribes and criminal organisations, but usually they are very good at coming up with a gentlemen’s agreement, including Mokhtar Belmokhtar himself. He had a fight I think six months ago in the northern part of Niger towards the Libyan borders with certain local tribes, and after a few weeks, they managed to come to an agreement, with everybody carrying on their own business without any conflicts.

Mr Roy

Can you tell us what other parts of Libya the militia control?

Noman Benotman

Basically the entire country, because of the absence of the national military. We have 250,000 revolutionaries, as they call themselves, registered officially; that is 250,000 out of the entire population of 6 million. That is it: they are in charge. On my way to Parliament in the morning, we found that a very embarrassing video tape has been released in the media all over Libya. It appears that the Chairman of the Parliament, Mr Abusahmain, who is also the President, was arrested by one of the leaders of the militias in a suburb of Tripoli and humiliated and interrogated unofficially. So it is not just the Prime Minister, but even he who is supposed to be the President—incidentally, he is the Chief of Staff as well.

Mr Roy

Internally, what grass-roots support do the militias enjoy? If they have support, do they deliver services on welfare or whatever to ordinary people?

Noman Benotman

Usually, most of the population are unarmed and most Libyans do not want to be part of any militias. Most Libyans would hate to be part of the military service or the security service and just like to live their own life, but you have tens of thousands of militias that are well armed and well organised and know how to control certain places. By the way, this analysis comes from counter-insurgency. What we have in Libya now is not just terrorism; maybe in the future we will witness insurgency. You have to understand exactly who is providing routine to the public. It is not the Government; it is the militias. That is the main problem. They are now in charge of routine, which is worse than weak Government. The militias provide routine in certain places in the country, in a Hezbollah style.

Mr Roy

Externally, what outside support are the militias receiving in terms of either weaponry or financial support? Do they need any more weapons than they actually have?

Noman Benotman

The issue, according to a lot of intelligence reports, is that it goes both ways. The militias are involved in selling weapons. They obtain new weapons as well. I am sure you are aware of the recent UN report, which found that Libyan weapons were involved in 12 different countries.

Mr Roy

And what about financial support? I know that finance buys weapons, but what about straight financial support? Are they receiving financial support from outside the country?

Noman Benotman

Some of them, because they have been accepted as legitimate entities, which is really funny, because I think that happened in Lebanon only, and now in Libya the central Government support the people who conspire to topple it. So the Government are supporting the people who are planning to destroy them. It happened before in Lebanon under Rashid Karami and now in Libya. Most of them force the Government, because they have the guns, and they are the people who control the streets. They force the Government, just to keep them happy and to make sure their salary every single month is in their bank accounts. Some of them receive cash. We have a very famous story: Mr Ali Zeidan was forced to deliver 900 million Libyan dinars, cash, to Benghazi militias—they insisted it should be cash. By the way, I think the criminal activity—it is a very long story—is their main source of income. Most of them are involved in criminal activities. That is how they can maintain their existence.

Mark Hendrick

Mr Benotman, you have described a fairly stark picture of the state of Libyans and of security. From what you say, there is no real national army or state security. What you have, essentially, is a country made up of dozens of militias that all provide their own local security to people. I have two quick questions. First, do you believe that the constitution that is being developed will be respected in Libya? Secondly, how should the Libyan Government go about trying to disarm those militias? Can you find them political roles? Is it about just waving a cheque book and trying to bribe them? Or is there a way of reaching out to Islamic extremists in a way that gives hope for the future? Is there a way that a coherent Libya, governed democratically, can emerge at some time in the future?

Noman Benotman

Regarding the constitution, the Government and the Congress—the mood they are in; their mindset—I think they get it completely wrong. They think a constitution is just like legislation. I do not believe in that. When you have a post-conflict situation, it is all about agreement. Now, the real Libyan society has appeared after 42 years of a dictatorship. Gaddafi used security as a model of governance, not just for protection. That was the model of governance. So now, there are all the differences. By the way, there is not something necessarily in that. I strongly believe there is something positive, but it needs someone smart who believes in democracy to regulate it. When it comes to the constitution, you cannot force ethnic groups anywhere in the country. They have legitimate claims on certain issues, including language. You cannot force them: “We are the majority, you are the minority.”

Mark Hendrick

On that point, what if the constitution said that all languages should be respected, but the main language is Arabic, and different religions should be respected, in a way that the Egyptian constitution really did not live up to?

Noman Benotman

Quite frankly, I do not care about the results. I am more focused on the process itself—just to make everybody happy. For me, it is okay if they accept all the languages or only one—I don’t care—but what concerns me is how we get to that result, because that is the sort of conflict, which we might call structural, that will explode after a few years. Unfortunately, we did not see any wise people who were aware of this. The constitution is not about legislation or forcing people or who has more votes; it is about agreement. That is why three months is a disaster. No one can come up with a draft in three months. It needs at least three years just to give people time to relax and to approach each other and to communicate and to explain points of view. I do not care what kind of constitution we have. If it comes to the issue of federalism, that’s it, because of a lack of experience in how to engage in sensitive debate. In September, there will be a referendum in Scotland. This is in the United Kingdom! This is not a small country somewhere. It is happening in a very civilised way. The problem, however, is when people think that a model of governance is a conspiracy theory to split the Government and the state itself, but federalism is just a model of governance. People need help, which is where the international community—perhaps Her Majesty’s Government—can come in to explain these kind of important issues to people and to help them to get together to talk about serious issues in a healthy way and to come up with conclusions. They need time. People can perhaps come up with constitutional declarations or just use the old constitution for three years until we have had the proper time to come up with a well-accepted constitution from all social groups.

Mark Hendrick

Are you saying that it is not possible to have any coherent central Government and that, if the militias choose to get do so, it will take three years of sitting around a table to create some form of constitution? In the meantime, however, they are perfectly happy running drugs and running lots of other businesses in a way they are unlikely to want to do this.

Noman Benotman

Regarding the militia issues, we have to be clear about two different things. We have real, genuine fighters. They fought against the regime and they sacrificed everything. There were a few thousand—perhaps 15,000 or 20,000. I strongly believe that they should be respected. There is no way on earth that you can say, “Thank you very much; now you can go home.” That is not going to happen, and it is also unfair. For many of them, if they received the right training and good care, they could become a positive power for the future of Libya. The problem is with the rest of the militias. Most of them had no real stake in the revolution itself when it happened and a lot are involved in criminal activities. A new development is a very radical extremist group that wants to take Libya to a different sphere, capitalising on the revolution of the people. When it happened in Benghazi on 15 February, it was all about freedom and about not liberalism, but well-accepted universal values. That is what happened. I do not think that the Government can do that without a real—I am going to use this term very carefully—political intervention from the international community.

Andrew Rosindell

Looking back to UK policy towards Libya in the 1990s and beyond, do you feel that it was consistent and rational? Did it have any significant impact on the situation in Libya today?

Noman Benotman

Do you mean during Gaddafi’s period and under the Jamahiriya system?

Andrew Rosindell

Yes.

Noman Benotman

I strongly believe—people used to ignore this—that a major part of our problems now are to do with the Jamahiriya system, because people think it is very simple when you talk about Gaddafi—“Gaddafi died. This is Gaddafi’s problem.” Gaddafi was just one individual. He created a system that he named Jamahiriya, which was a very weird political creature, and we are still suffering from its effects. One of the main problems now, whether it is the international community or the Libyans themselves, is that people do not understand that they have to destruct that system and come up with a new one, with all the challenges that that involves. The legacy of Jamahiriya is still there and will remain. It will cause many problems. It needs real work from the international community. Unlike the leaders themselves, I do not believe that they can do it alone. They need real help from the international community to destruct and get rid of the Jamahiriya legacy and its legacy in Libya and to come up with a new democratic system. If you call it the Gaddafi legacy, I’ll call it the Jamahiriya legacy.

Andrew Rosindell

I am really referring to the policy of the British Government to come to an agreement—consensus—with Gaddafi to prevent further conflict between him and the western nations. Do you not feel that our Government and perhaps other Governments were naive in going down that route—that we should not have been quite as accommodating to him and his regime as we were?

Noman Benotman

I don’t think so. If you are referring to Tony Blair in particular, I think he was very smart. He managed successfully to convince Gaddafi and his regime to behave, and a lot of things were achieved in that period. No one could have predicted at the time that the Arab Spring was going to happen. No one could have imagined that they would wake up one morning in Tripoli and there would be no Gaddafi and his system there. You have to deal with the status quo. I think Tony Blair was very, very smart. Basically, by doing that, he created a lot of problems—not just him, but Her Majesty’s Government, at the time, when they reached out to a lot of key figures from the regime, including the head of intelligence, Moussa Koussa. You can also talk about Saif, Gaddafi’s son. That created a lot of conflicts within the regime itself. Saif al-Islam was labelled as a stooge or someone who had been corrupted by British values by his father directly. That is the only way—I call it “opening up society”—because you cannot invade Libya with no legal ground. I am sure that at the time you would not get a UN resolution to do that, so what is the alternative? It is to open up the society, and I believe that at the time it bore fruit. I think Gaddafi was, if you’ll excuse my language, stupid at the time, because he did not capitalise on that. He thought he could get away with it again and again and again, with his old attitude and old style, so he did not seize the moment or the chance given to him by the international community, led successfully by Her Majesty’s Government, to open up the society and start to modernise Libya and gradually make a radical reform.

Andrew Rosindell

But shouldn’t we have done more to insist on reform instead of allowing the Gaddafi regime to continue as it was, letting certain individuals in that regime off the hook and allowing members of the Gaddafi family and the Gaddafi regime to come to London secure in the knowledge that nothing would ever happen to them in terms of their criminal actions?

Noman Benotman

As I told you, Her Majesty’s Government at the time were basically saying, “Okay, every time we have a conflict with Gaddafi, he causes more problems for us. If there is an opportunity to just convince him to behave in order to be accepted, to be part of the international community, and to say to him, ‘The UK is going to help you to do that,’ we might gain more.” I believe strongly in that.

Andrew Rosindell

You think it was possible for a mad dog to behave.

Noman Benotman

To a certain extent, he did behave, and he started to talk about Lockerbie. Who would imagine that Gaddafi would accept the responsibility for Lockerbie? And there was compensation, not just for Lockerbie but for other issues—La Belle in 1986 in Germany and other things. He started to understand exactly that the international community was real, was no joke. There was a little avenue, as I mentioned, open to him, led by the UK at the time: “If you want to behave, we will accept you as a member of the international community.” Frankly, I don’t think there was anything wrong with that policy. It was very successful. If you take it within that time—that period—it was the only possible thing you could do.

Sir Menzies Campbell

On that theme, there was of course another element in those discussions, which was the question of weapons of mass destruction. Part of the deal—I’m correct, am I not?—was that Gaddafi gave up his ambitions in that regard. May I ask you this? The word “federalism” has been thrown about quite a lot, especially in the last two or three weeks. No doubt you heard Mr Miles’s comments on that. Do you see any possibility or any future for the application of the principle of federalism for Libya, to deal with the disparate elements, both geographical and political, that you have described?

Noman Benotman

Yes indeed; I think it’s one of the scenarios available. If you’re asking me about my opinion—it is not necessarily the Libyans’—I believe that sooner or later the entire region, the entire Middle East, will adopt and readjust to that model of governance: federalism. It won’t just be Libya. It will not be today, but maybe in the next 10 years. I think that is one of the smart models. If it is carefully implemented, it will deliver many people’s demands. People will start to feel free, and they will start to feel that they are in charge of their own destiny and Government. They will feel that they can decide exactly what suits them in any given part of the country. The problem is if people fail to understand that federalism is not separatism and that it is a model of governance. That is a problem, because if people do not understand that, they will think that it is a western imperialistic conspiracy to divide Libya. Because of that lack of understanding and communication, it is starting to push many people in Cyrenaica—I am talking about tribes—to take a more hardcore position. Here, I am afraid, instead of talking about interests, we will start to talk about political positions. If a situation develops in which everybody holds their political position rather than talking about the mutual interest of all Libyans, I think we might go to something worse than federalism: separatism.

Sir Menzies Campbell

And from what you say, do you see federalism as a way of maintaining a cohesive Libya that would otherwise be at risk?

Noman Benotman

My problem with federalism is that it is very expensive.

Sir Menzies Campbell

If there are a lot of politicians?

Noman Benotman

Yes. It is very expensive to run a federal state, and it also needs skills. I have no problem with federalism, but it is about how we get there and why you deny people their rights to talk about it. I don’t care what system we get out of it. In the UK it’s not called federalism—I think it may be something beyond federalism—and it seems to be a very successful model of governance.

Sir Menzies Campbell

You are putting your finger on an interesting political development that I think the Chairman will forbid me to explore any further. Is there a power struggle? Is the removal of Mr Zeidan indicative of a power struggle? You may have answered that question to some extent, but I want to put it to you expressly: is there a power struggle? If there is, who are likely to emerge as the victors? In particular, who will be, if you like, the strong man to emerge?

Noman Benotman

I don’t think there is any place for a strong man in Libya any more, at least for the next 10 years. We might then have a new Napoleon in Libya, like what happened during the French revolution. It is going to take time. Most Libyans no longer accept “the leader.” I don’t think that is going to happen. After the struggle over power, this is our main disaster. You asked me briefly to analyse exactly why we have this situation in Libya, and I am going to say that it is because the people we trusted and elected to lead us in this transition period stopped focusing on the political process that would have paved the way for a general election and a constitution so that we could have a normal life like everyone else. They stopped doing that and got involved in something else, which was a struggle over power. That is why the political process stopped. It is a disaster now. A significant bloc of tribes or regions in Libya reached the conclusion that they should stop and terminate the political process, which is how we see it now. The efforts and conflicts we now see are because a significant proportion of Libyan society has decided to use all accessible tools and means to stop and terminate the political process. One of their problems—I don’t share their point of view—is that they think the so-called political process now is going to make Libya more like an Islamic state led by radical Islamists. That is what they think, and I care about that because people, especially political stakeholders, usually act based on their perceptions. They want to stop the political process, and the other bloc of stakeholders thinks that it is to their advantage so they are working very hard, and even fighting, to make sure that the new Libya will serve their agendas and maintain the power they gained over the past two years.

Ann Clwyd

What do you think of the so-called political isolation law?

Noman Benotman

I am against that completely. Zero: I think it is a disaster, because I believe in law. If you have any problem against any person, just take him to court and if he has been proved guilty, lock him up in jail, even for the rest of his life. But if not, you cannot use political tricks to marginalise a huge proportion of Libyan society. So I am completely against the law.

Ann Clwyd

It is a threat then to Libya’s democracy in the future.

Noman Benotman

Yes, and I think it is part of our problems now. This is one of the tools or means used by the certain bloc of people to deny their rivals their rights to be part of the future of Libya because they think they are going to fail in the long term to compete with them politically or in a democratic way.

Ann Clwyd

And how comprehensive is it likely to be? How many people will it affect?

Noman Benotman

If you look at the bureaucratic system of the civil service, I think it has been destroyed. Every single person who has been employed during Colonel Gaddafi’s period, which was called Jamahiriya, is vulnerable to be sacked or marginalised because of that law.

Ann Clwyd

What would you say about the rule of law in Libya now? Is it robust? Does it mean that somebody like Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and other members of the regime will get a fair trail in your estimation?

Noman Benotman

First, there is no Libya. I do not believe in that. The legal justice system has gone. I am not going to lie to you. I am not aware of anywhere in the world where this has happened: when someone managed to kidnap the Prime Minister and the second day he went to Parliament itself and some Members of the Parliament organised a conference for him, and he said he was proud to do that. He said in the presence of Members of Parliament, “I am the one who arrested the Prime Minister and I am proud of that.” What kind of law are we talking about here? I am so sorry: it’s like Jesus and guns; it’s the wild west. Forget it. Talking about Saif al-Islam, I don’t know, but I think now it is very difficult to have a fair trial, for him to be there. If you ask me, it might fail. I am sure the entire Libyan population are against this, because most Libyans, or at least the vast majority of Libyans, want to see him stand before a court in Libya itself, but I think for me the ICC is better.

Ann Clwyd

Would you say that there is such a thing as press freedom in Libya now?

Noman Benotman

The attacks every week or every two weeks against either personnel or TV channels speak for themselves, but if you talk about the space, that is one of the main achievements offered by the revolution. No Libyans in my generation would have dreamed of this kind of freedom. It is obvious. It is just that we have some other groups—tribal militias, not just radical ideological groups. Or ideological groups, sometimes when they get upset with any media firm or reporters or newspapers or whatever, they use violent tools and means to make themselves clear or to deliver their messages. If you talk about the space, I think it is one of the most positive achievements in the Libyan revolution.

Chair

Mr Benotman, that completes our questions. Thank you very much for coming along. You have been particularly helpful to us. Examination of Witness

Witness

Sir Dominic Asquith KCMG, former UK Ambassador to Libya, and Chairman of the Libyan British Business Council, gave evidence.

Chair

For the benefit of members of the public, our witness now is Sir Dominic Asquith, former UK ambassador to Libya and chairman of the Libyan British Business Council. Sir Dominic, welcome to this sitting. It is very good to see you here. If I remember rightly, we last met sitting in a café in Tripoli, and since then you have had quite a rollercoaster ride. Can we start with whether you feel the security situation makes it very difficult for diplomats to operate in Libya at the moment?

Sir Dominic Asquith

Unquestionably so. I am trying to get to Libya on Sunday and trying to find an airline that will fly me there. Yes, it does make it difficult, not only for diplomats—I am no longer a diplomat; I should make that clear—but for business. To encourage business of whatever size to take the risk and devote the effort to operate in Libya is not an easy task. It is a reflection not just of the security on the ground—indeed, security on the ground probably fluctuates in terms of the effect it has on decisions about whether to visit Libya—but, more importantly and in the long term, the decision-making process in the Government and whether there is a stable and coherent political structure that can take decisions and implement them without them being countermanded.

Chair

We see some evidence that British interests in Libya are being targeted. Have you detected that? Do you think that that reflects a grass-roots sentiment about Britain, or is it just rogue elements picking on whatever they can?

Sir Dominic Asquith

I have not detected a particular focus on British commercial interests. If you look at the foreign nationalities who have suffered, I have noticed that it is spread quite widely across people including Italians, French, Americans and so on. I have not detected on the ground a particular focus on British nationals, nor have I detected in a broader business capacity that there is any animus against British commerce.

Chair

How is the British business angle going in Libya at the moment? Is that why you are trying to get back there at the weekend?

Sir Dominic Asquith

There is a variety of reasons to want to go back there. The business instinct here, the British business calculation, is inevitably based on the return on the effort and the risk that they would run in going to Libya—risk in the broadest sense, not just to life but to their investment, whatever it may be. At the moment, that equation does not look hugely attractive to British business.

Sir John Stanley

Sir Dominic, when we saw you in Tripoli, although there were plenty of people walking around with Kalashnikovs, we were able to walk around ourselves to a degree in Tripoli. I remember that in our discussions with you and your senior military advisers there, you were all reasonably optimistic that after the military intervention, the situation and the security situation in Libya would stabilise and then gradually improve. Can you tell us why the reality has been so very different from your expectations at the time we saw you?

Sir Dominic Asquith

My recollection is that we saw each other in January 2012, which was about two months after a transitional Government had been appointed. The focus was on the Executive and the legislature sorting out their problem in terms of who was taking decisions and who would implement them. It was also focused, inevitably, on a raft of security issues, which included the demobilisation of the militias and the incorporation of those demobilised into either regular security forces or more productive parts of the economy. There was also a heavy focus even then on the next stage of the political transition, which was elections in July. The jury was out on how the Executive, the Parliament and the legislature would resolve their competition and how effective the Executive would be in taking decisions and implementing them, specifically on the economic and security agendas. The hope was that those issues would be resolved positively. They were not, and that is the reason why it has continued, in security terms, to become unstable. I strongly believe that insecurity in Libya is a factor of political paralysis, rather than an issue that is there in its own right. If you want to resolve the security issues, you have to deal with the political structures—correcting the political structures.

Mr Baron

Do you think the British Government properly assessed the consequences of intervention, and if not, why not?

Sir Dominic Asquith

I must plead a little bit of exculpation on this one, in that I was not involved in that process and therefore I only saw it from the outside at the time, and retrospectively. My personal assessment is that we sought to learn many lessons from Iraq, specifically what in Iraq was called phase 4—the post-conflict period—to ensure that we did not fall into the same mistakes that we committed in Iraq. I arrived at the end of August 2011, and what was happening in that period was trying to build the capacity of the transitional national council to deal, after Gaddafi had been toppled, with how to govern Libya at that stage. There were international teams, including, as I recall, from the Department for International Development, working in Benghazi with the transitional national council about what a series of Government programmes would look like for that transitional national council when it became responsible not just for the eastern part of the country but for the whole country. There were financing mechanisms being put in place. The temporary financing mechanism was there precisely in order to provide the financial wherewithal to the transitional national council before it had access to Government revenues—before it became, effectively, the Government.

Mr Baron

Forgive me, but these plans might have been afoot and there might have been detailed plans, but the evidence on the ground after Gaddafi was removed is somewhat different. There seemed to be no plan to disarm the militias and no thought given to the enormous expanse to the south and the issue of security control. We met a senior figure within the Algerian Government who said that regional security has been made 50 times worse because of the removal of Gaddafi. There seems to have been no thought about the African mercenaries that were in Gaddafi’s charge, and very little proper assessment of the strength of Islamic radicalism and the important role that that was going to play post-revolution. There seems to be a whole series of questions that were not even asked, let alone planned for. Is one being too critical?

Sir Dominic Asquith

To be utterly honest, because I was not part of the process, I do not know what questions were asked between March and September.

Mr Baron

I am not asking what questions—I am not looking at your knowledge of it. I want your assessment, Sir Dominic. Do you think these questions were asked? If so, what is your take on the assessment, if any?

Sir Dominic Asquith

I am in no doubt that the questions were asked and that, to the best of our and other international partners’ ability, we tried to find answers. The answers were predicated on the Libyan authorities—the Government—taking the lead role. In August 2011, if you recall, in Paris, the international community’s responsibility for helping the future Libyan Government to tackle all those questions that you asked was handed to the United Nations; the international partners, bilaterally, were going to help the United Nations and the international institutions—in the case of finance, the World Bank and the IMF—to help the Libyans to resolve that question. Bear in mind that at that time there was an understandable sensitivity in the international community not to be too directive or too prominent on the ground in Libya, partly for historical reasons to do with Iraq, of course, but partly because the reading was that that reflected the desire of the future rulers of Libya and the people. So what one could do directively as an outside power was limited. The focus of attention therefore was on providing the Libyan authorities with the capacity and the capability to deal with those questions.

Mr Baron

What has gone wrong, then? You suggest that these questions were asked but were predicated on the belief that there would be a Libyan Government in place, supported by the international community, to see through the solutions, but we now know that that has simply not happened. So what went wrong?

Sir Dominic Asquith

There was a lack of executive capability, in political terms—

Mr Baron

Within the UN?

Sir Dominic Asquith

No, among the Libyan authorities—and bureaucratic capability in the Ministries, to implement decisions if decisions were taken; but decisions were not taken. I lost count of the number of times I was asked by Libyans—Libyan political leaders—for help in knowing what help was needed. The key debate in that period of 2011-2012 was how directive the international community should be, as individual states or in the form of international institutions—the UN, the World Bank, the IMF—in telling the Libyan Government what they needed; and how much it should, on the contrary, wait to be approached by the Libyan Government for the sort of help that we thought it needed. I should be honest: that was a debate that we—I, personally—engaged in quite vigorously with the United Nations.

Mr Baron

Finally, Sir Dominic, with the benefit of hindsight, do you think it was somewhat naïve of us to expect a Libyan transitional Government to step into what was essentially a void, despite the best intentions of the UN in dealing with these problems?

Sir Dominic Asquith

That is a really difficult judgment call. I think on balance it was certainly hopeful, but not naïve. It was not a huge problem to solve. Libya had resources, it had a small population, and it had none of the sectarian problems that existed either in Egypt or, obviously, in Iraq; so it was not a hugely difficult problem to solve, for the local authorities.

Mike Gapes

Can I take you to where we are now? What is your assessment of the current strength of Islamist groups in Libya, both politically and in terms of their ability, either militarily or in terrorist actions, to carry out activities in the state?

Sir Dominic Asquith

In the latter case, terrorist activity, there was certainly an al-Qaeda capability in-country by the time I left in the middle of 2012, and I assume it is still there. The degree to which it had developed a desire and a capability to commit acts in Libya was open to debate. In terms of the militias—the home-grown Libyan militia capability—I think it is fair to say that the balance of force between regional, tribal and Islamist influences is fairly even. The ability of any one militia to cause disruption exists, so you will see at various times different agendas being fought for, literally, by militias loyal to that particular agenda. At times it will be regional, at times very local, and at times it will have an Islamist tinge, but even in the last case—for example, in the case of the city of Misrata—there is a variety of militias, not all of which are Islamist, so you will have competition even at the local level. In terms of the weight of Islamist politics or political Islam, my personal impression—it was certainly true by the time I left—is that it was not dominant by any means. My sense the last time I was there, which was the end of September, was that political Islam, again, was not the dominant force in the politics of Libya.

Mike Gapes

But they do have people within the elected Congress.

Sir Dominic Asquith

Unquestionably so, and they were playing a very active part in the past few months over the question of whether there would be a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister.

Mike Gapes

From what you have heard—obviously we had the other two witnesses beforehand—and in your own assessment, how can and how should the Libyan Government, as far as that exists, go about trying to disarm the militia groups?

Sir Dominic Asquith

There probably has to be an indirect approach to this one: do not tackle it as a technical, security issue—in other words, by confronting them head-on with security force—but take away the incentive for militias to go on existing. Personally, and it is an argument that I have put forward fairly frequently, I suspect that the best way of doing that is to decentralise decision making and budgets to local level, creating both the sense that life is getting better—things are being done, your school and hospital are getting better, your road is being improved—and to give people throughout Libya a stake in political unity inside Libya. Therefore, there would not be a requirement to have your armed militia defending your specific interest.

Mike Gapes

Will that take years or decades?

Sir Dominic Asquith

It could take certainly a small number of years, possibly even months. If you had the effective devolution of decisions and money to the local level, you might be surprised by how the Libyan population—as they surprised us very often—make it clear that they have lost their patience with the militia leaders.

Mike Gapes

Would that include reaching out to militia groups that were Islamist, as well as to other groups that are more tribal or, for want of a better word—I know it is the wrong word—secular?

Sir Dominic Asquith

The politics have to be inclusive, yes. That means including people with whom you have personal difficulties. If they reflect reality in the society in which they are operating, then you have to include them. In the same way, when you have the discussion over the constitution or the national dialogue, you have to have a full discussion about all the possibilities, however much you may personally not be in favour of particular options.

Sandra Osborne

Would it therefore be fair to assume that you do not think that the policy of political isolation is a good idea?

Sir Dominic Asquith

I looked through the consequences of de-Ba’athification in Iraq, Personally, I think that there are better ways of dealing with the problems that societies, such as in Libya and Iraq, have with transitional justice. A blanket exclusion of a certain type of person from political, commercial or social activity tends to create more problems than it solves.

Sandra Osborne

Why do you think the Prime Minister was sacked: was it just about the Morning Glory incident, or were other factors involved? Which elements will benefit from his departure?

Sir Dominic Asquith

A variety of people had been trying to get rid of him, as you well know, for some months before. I suspect that the Morning Glory presented an opportunity for those who wanted to get rid of him. Who will benefit? It depends on how the political forces manage to agree on who replaces him. That is still to reveal itself. It may well be that the Defence Minister stays on throughout the whole transition period—who knows? It also depends on what happens at the next elections, and whether they are elections just for a new Parliament or for a President at the same time. It is a well known, often-debated factor that the political Islamists would prefer the retention of the current system in which the Parliament appoints the President, because they reckon that they would do less well were there to be a direct presidential election. That thought is taken as a conclusion from the results of the elections to the constitutional commission, where the Islamists did not do very well.

Chair

Sir Dominic, you probably heard this question put to previous witnesses: do you feel that any legacy issues remain outstanding?

Sir Dominic Asquith

It was very high among my priorities as ambassador to ensure that the three legacy issues of Lockerbie, WPC Fletcher and the IRA were dealt with and focused on by the Libyan authorities. I reckon we made good progress on the first two, and, as I understand it, good co-operation over Lockerbie continues. Before I left as ambassador, the Prime Minister at the time, al-Keib, came to visit, and he met WPC Fletcher’s family and laid a wreath at her memorial. Again, I think that there was an openness and willingness to help us to get to the heart of both those two legacy issues. In the case of the IRA victims, we made less progress, and to be honest I do not know where that has reached since I left.

Chair

In which case you are not in a position to comment if I press you on it. The Constitutional Commission is about to start its work. Do you have any optimism? Do you think it is going to end up with a constitution that protects women and ethnic minorities?

Sir Dominic Asquith

I am worried about it, principally because of the time frame. Again, it was a subject of debate, even in my time, over how to pace and structure the constitutional process. As an aside, I was keen that the Libyans should, with UN help, bring in as much outside expertise and experience on constitution making, including the Venice Commission, as they could and that they should not rush the fences on the constitution. The degree to which it will protect those specific rights, freedoms and the role of women, but also the nature of the state, the relationship between the Government and its people, will be directly dependent upon adopting the right process, with sufficient time, sufficient consultation and sufficient public education about the questions that they are dealing with. It is too early to come to a judgment. I hope that they recognise that the process, as much as the text, is key in what emerges as the constitutional solution. If that is one piece of advice from outside, I would hope that we, collectively from outside, will focus our advice to those charged with the responsibility of drafting the constitution to take due account of that.

Chair

Do you think it is a help that Libya essentially has a single religion?

Sir Dominic Asquith

Yes, unquestionably.

Rory Stewart

One of the striking things in our 2012 visit was that there was a note of certain optimism about the ability to deal with the militias. Both the UK embassy and the EU were very pleased that on 17 February, 300,000 people had celebrated in the square and there was no gunfire. Is there any sense about why we were a little bit over-optimistic about the militia situation, what happened over the last few years and what lessons we might draw from the way that our political analysis is done?

Sir Dominic Asquith

I would not exaggerate the optimism we felt about handling the militias. We knew DDR was going to be a real problem. We knew that disbandment and reintegration would present a real challenge, given the vested interests, both political, ideological and regional, and the paucity of capacity inside Government to deal with the process of integrating free spirits in a security system.

Rory Stewart

Oddly at the time for the Committee, when we took the more cynical, pessimistic view, there was a bit of push-back from the embassy and the EU saying that maybe the situation was not quite as gloomy as we thought. They kept referring to what happened on 17 February.

Sir Dominic Asquith

If that is your recollection, I accept it. I would go back to my answer to an earlier question. In January, we were still two months into a new Government. In December, I had made available to the Minister of the Interior our police adviser to help him to structure the disarmament and reintegration of the militias into the police forces. It was still reasonable to work on the assumption that the Government—the Executive—was committed to that objective and that with assistance we could help it achieve that.

Rory Stewart

One of your colleagues on the Libyan British Business Council suggested that France has a much more significant diplomatic presence on the ground in Libya. Is that your experience and could you explain why France might have a more significant presence than Britain?

Sir Dominic Asquith

I can’t comment on what French diplomatic presence at the moment is. Certainly, by the time I left, our diplomatic presence was greater than that of the French, and our diplomatic access and activity was greater than that of the French across all the areas we were operating in. So it was security. It was civil society. It was education, training and health care. In a lot of the key focus areas, we were very active in trying to develop solutions for the Libyans to work with. The only area where I think we were less prominent than the French after June, for good reasons, was in Benghazi. The French retained a presence there. We tried to retain a presence, but after the attack on my convoy it was difficult to justify a presence there.

Rory Stewart

Finally, do you see federalism as being part of the political future of Libya?

Sir Dominic Asquith

I don’t know what federalism means in this context and I don’t think Libyans know what it means in this context. Some form of decentralisation of budgets and of decision making is probably inevitable and sensible.

Ann Clwyd

You were in Iraq and you know how long the battle was to draw up the constitution there. In theory, that constitution was going to protect women. How can you ensure that, once you have drawn up the constitution, people cannot amend it to the detriment of what you are trying to achieve? For instance, in Iraq, I understand from talking to two Iraqi women MPs last week that there is now a proposal for a new law to allow men to marry children aged eight. In drawing up a new constitution, how can one protect against people messing around with the constitution once it has been agreed?

Sir Dominic Asquith

You can’t, but I think the best answer I can give to that is through working with civil society. One of the major differences between Libya and Iraq that struck me was the energy and pervasiveness of civil society organisations in Libya. At the forefront, in no small part thanks to what the British Government was doing, were civil society organisations that focused on the role of women. Time and again, they were helpful correctives to the political class and the militia leaders and what those two were trying to do. I can’t give you any guarantees, as you know well, about preserving the constitution, but I think perhaps you should reinforce in your minds the importance of maintaining those activities and the programmes that we have with civil society in Libya.

Sir Menzies Campbell

Would you add the application of the rule of law to the involvement of civic society for the objectives you have been discussing? Can you also say what your judgment was about the quality of the judicial system while you were ambassador, and what your judgment of the quality of the judicial system is now, when you are concerned about trade and commerce, which of course depend upon the notion that promises once made are kept?

Sir Dominic Asquith

The judicial system when I was there was struggling hard. The courts were working spasmodically, irregularly and not very effectively. Of course, it was at the heart of the tension between the International Criminal Court and the Iraqis about who would have jurisdiction over the trial of Saif. It was fragile and for that reason, again, was an area of effort and activity on our part. We had a direct interest in so far as the legacy issues were in the portfolio of the Ministry of Justice. Are they robust enough to sustain attack or influence from interest groups or militias? No, not any more than the political institutions are. My understanding is that the current Minister of Justice, who came in after I left, understands well and clearly the importance of an effective and independent judiciary. If you have a champion there, you need to work with him. In terms of the judicial institutions protecting the rights of commercial companies, there is no guarantee; any Government can overturn the contract and decisions that were taken. In terms of legacy issues on the commercial side, by the time I left, there were still 11,000 contracts outstanding from the previous regime, over which there had been no arbitration procedure, no judicial decision about whether to continue with them, whether they had been corrupt, or whatever. This made dealing in commercial terms in a regulatory framework extremely perilous and difficult. I suspect that will continue for some time, particularly in a context where they are also trying to come to terms with the degree to which Islamic financing will be the framework in which they operate.

Sir Menzies Campbell

In your present capacity, what advice do you give to British companies or individuals who approach?

Sir Dominic Asquith

Be very careful about the terms in which your contract is drawn up; when the payments come; who you are making an agreement with; probity transparency—all those issues which are highly perilous in the current context. Perfectly capable people manage to do business, but you take care.

Sir Menzies Campbell

And you take a greater risk than you would in a more regulatory framework?

Sir Dominic Asquith

You do, because the regulatory structures have not been put in place and those that are there are not effectively implemented.

Sir Menzies Campbell

Are they often tribal in origin?

Sir Dominic Asquith

No, not the commercial regulatory structures, but if you want to do business, just as in many parts of that part of the Middle East, you will probably need to persuade a number of people.

Chair

Sir Dominic, thank you very much indeed. That completes our questions. We very much appreciate your taking the time to come and see us and we wish you well in your efforts to get a flight back to Libya. Oral evidence: Developments in Libya, HC 1157 26