Oral evidence: Administrative scheme for ‘on-the-runs’, HC 1194Wednesday 2 April 2014

Oral evidence, 2 April 2014.

Witness

Peter Sheridan OBE, former Assistant Chief Constable, RUC GC/PSNI, gave evidence.

Chair

We will move straight on. The likelihood is that we will be interrupted by a vote in, perhaps, 10 minutes, so I do apologise for that. We will suspend the Committee for 15 minutes, and then come back. Mr Sheridan, you heard my introduction. Thank you very much for joining us. You have also heard Mr Baxter’s evidence. Are there any comments you would like to make about what you have heard?

Peter Sheridan

Let me clear up a point that Mr Mills asked, first of all, about the confidentiality. Those were my words, and the reason I termed this “confidential” was because there were going to be people’s names listed in it. What I refused to do was to classify it as secret, because, in the police service, you can classify documents as restricted, confidential, secret or top secret. I was utterly clear, as was the Chief Constable at the time, that this was going to be a process where, if people wanted to see it, they could. The Policing Board could have seen the terms of reference, and that was why they were classified as confidential. As to the misunderstanding, I was clear at the time, as was the Chief Constable, that this could have been seen—particularly by the unionist community—as something different, and therefore all our documents were going to be classified in that way, that they could have been open to be seen.

Chair

Mr Baxter knew of the issue of on‑the‑runs, obviously, but he did not know about the political process behind it. Did you know about it?

Peter Sheridan

No. The first time I heard of the administrative scheme was in recent weeks and months, when the press talked about the administrative scheme. I was unaware of an administrative scheme. I think, Chairman, it might be helpful if I just set this out.

Chair

By all means.

Peter Sheridan

Members might then want to ask questions. I was appointed as Head of Crime in February 2006. On 25 May 2006, I was asked to a meeting at the Attorney General’s Office with Kevin McGinty and Sir Alasdair Fraser, now deceased, who was then the Director of Public Prosecutions. There were NIO people there, and there was this discussion about the on‑the‑runs. I do not have all of the documents about what was discussed.

Ian Paisley

Who was there from the NIO, Peter?

Peter Sheridan

I am just reading from a note in my diary at the time. I did not list everybody that was at it, but I am sure that is available. There was a discussion about the on‑the‑runs, and I talked about the potential: could we use joint investigation teams to do it? Could we use current European legislation? There was nothing agreed at that meeting. On 17 October, I travelled to a meeting at Stormont with the Chief Constable[11]. We had a meeting with the Security Minister on national security and hyponatraemia, the deaths of the babies at the time. We updated the Security Minister on the current position of those, and then there was a discussion about the on‑the‑runs and national security, and we were joined by the Secretary of State for a period of time on the national security bit. On 30 November, I attended a meeting with the Chief Constable in Stormont again, and I put people’s initials in, but I think I know who they are. I met with GK, which I think was Gerry Kelly; CM, Carl Muir, who was a Northern Ireland Office official; and LG, Leo Green, who would have been Sinn Féin. We discussed, among other things, AEPs, which are the baton rounds; the transfer of national security, and the OTR issue, and at that meeting I set out our position, the very legal and ethical position that we would take. On 7 December, I had a meeting in my office with solicitor Barra McGrory, and I brought the police legal adviser, David Mercer, with me. There was a discussion about how on‑the‑runs being brought to the notice of the police by the solicitor would take place. There are two letters that I have in my file: one is a letter from the police legal adviser setting out what a scheme would look like in our terms, and a subsequent letter from Barra McGrory saying, effectively, it could not be agreeable. That was the end of it. Both the Chief Constable, Hugh Orde, and I were very clear throughout all of this that there were policing considerations, there were political considerations, and there were public opinion considerations out there. We were going to very firmly stay within the policing considerations, and the political considerations could play no part in the decisions we were making. The issue could only be addressed by the police in a very limited way, by identifying those cases where the reasonable grounds for arrest and questioning could no longer be met against the evidential standards of 2007. We could not predict how many, out of all the people who were listed as on the run, would get letters that said they were not wanted or were wanted. We had no idea until that work was done. The reason why I set out in the terms of reference five grounds where people would continue to be listed as wanted—and they are in your documents you got last night—and five reasons why people should not be listed as wanted is that if somebody was listed as wanted in the late 1970s, that might not stand the test of a case in 2007. Even when I joined the police, when I was a constable in 1978, I could have been told by the then‑sergeant, “Go and arrest X under Section 11 of the Terrorism Act.” That would have been enough, and I would have gone and arrested them. There was a string of cases like O’Hara v Chief Constable where that changed, and the legislation changed from being that a constable just had to suspect to a constable having to have reasonable grounds, so it became stronger in legislation that the individual police officer had to have personal, reasonable grounds, not simply to suspect. That required them to have that information, so if someone was listed as wanted in the file and that was all of the evidence, then that would not stand the test in 2007. At the time, Sean Hoey was released in relation to the Omagh bomb because of lack of continuity of forensic evidence. Again, how forensic evidence was collected in the 1970s and 1980s and even in the 1990s may not have stood the test in 2007, and if it did not, then people should not be listed as wanted. If all of those things were still in place, as was the case in some, then there was no reason why they should not still be listed as wanted. What happened was that I set up the Rapid team, and I delegated responsibility to Mr Baxter. I set out the terms of reference, and it was for people who were wanted by the PSNI for offences pre‑1998 in Northern Ireland. Having set out those terms of reference, my role in it was that once the information came to me—and Mr Baxter would have produced substantial documents for me on each individual to list why somebody should not be listed as wanted; the evidence is lost, or cannot be found, or documentation has been destroyed—on that basis, I would have written to the DPP. The only person that I wrote to about any person who was listed as on the run was the DPP. I did not write to anybody else about any individual in it. The DPP would have written to the Attorney General, but in doing so, he would have written back to me to say, “I have written to the Attorney General in these terms.” In the case of John Downey, the letter that I sent to the DPP[12] said that, firstly, he should not be listed as on the run, because he was not from the jurisdiction, but that, secondly, he was not currently wanted by the PSNI. The letter that the DPP sent back to me, which he sent on to the Attorney General, reflected exactly that. There was no difference in it. The first time I became aware that additional words had been added to the letter—I did not even know there was a letter sent to them—was when the trial happened here, and those additional words were in there. The Northern Ireland Office, as I read it, did try to clarify through my staff officer at the time. They did not name any individuals, but named one of the letters, the one on 11 July, with 10 people, and asked, “Have they been checked, and are they listed as wanted elsewhere?” The staff officer would have spoken to Mr Baxter and his team, and the message came back that the PNC had been checked, and that was all that was given back.

Chair

We will have to suspend for 15 minutes. We will start again at two minutes past four. Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. On resuming—

Chair

It is two minutes past four. Sorry about the interruption. Mr Sheridan, you were just giving us the background to your involvement. Please continue.

Peter Sheridan

I was at the point about the clarification that NIO officials were seeking through my staff officer when they were inquiring about the letter of 11 July. The staff officer would have asked the Rapid review team. Because the position in the team was that they were not prepared to say that Mr Downey was wanted by the Metropolitan Police, my staff officer would have been unaware that he was wanted, so her response goes back to say that the PNC has been checked. She did not say whether he was wanted, or any of them were wanted, by an external force. Unfortunately, in the abuse process, in the judge’s comments, he said that there was nothing done by the PSNI to correct the situation. The answer to why the letter had not been corrected is that we were completely unaware that there was a letter sent and, indeed, that additional bit over and above what I wrote in the letter to the DPP, so we were not aware of it until it happened in the court.

Lady Hermon

Sorry, Mr Sheridan, could you just tell us exactly what words you believe were added?

Peter Sheridan

From the judgment, it says that there was “no outstanding direction for prosecution in Northern Ireland” in relation to him, that there were “no warrants in existence”, and that he was “not wanted in Northern Ireland for arrest, questioning or charge by the police”, and that “The Police Service of Northern Ireland are not aware of any interest in [him] from any other police force in the United Kingdom.”

Lady Hermon

All of those words were additional to the letter[13].

Peter Sheridan

I am reading from the judgment. I do not have the letter. I have never seen the letter and had been unaware of the letter.

Ian Paisley

Did you ask to see the letter?

Peter Sheridan

I did not know there was a letter.

Ian Paisley

When you did subsequently find out during the judgment process and the adjournment, did you ask to see the papers?

Peter Sheridan

The judge said that it became apparent at an early stage in the abuse hearings that there had been no investigation, and he then adjourned and asked both the defence and the prosecution to go and make those further inquiries. Like my colleague, I expected to get a call from somebody either at the Met or via the PSNI to ask me for clarification. In fact, I got a call from the defence solicitor, Gareth Peirce, who asked me whether I would be willing to assist the court in their understanding, and I said, “Of course, I will.” I then contacted the PSNI and I said to the liaison officer, “I want to see the letter that I wrote and the background papers”, and he said, “That is fine.” Then he called me back to say that a solicitor who was doing the disclosure on behalf of the Metropolitan Police said that I was not to get access to the letter that I wrote, or the documents. I have to say I found that completely bizarre, given that I had written the letter, given that it was the PSNI, that somebody in the prosecution from the Metropolitan Police—

Ian Paisley

You were asking them to help the prosecutor.

Peter Sheridan

I was going to see the defence and I wanted to have access to all of the information that I could. I was prepared to help the court in whatever way. I instructed the PSNI officer to go back to the disclosure officer and tell him that, if I did not get access to them, I would alert the defence when they spoke to me. I did not get access to those documents and I spoke to the defence solicitor and I explained that I had to go from my memory, which is some eight years of memory, because I was not given access. She found it incredulous that I was not given access. More than that, she asked me, “Which documents do you want to see? Here is your letter here”, and she showed me my letter that I had written, to help refresh my memory on it. “What other documents do you need to see?” and then I answered whatever questions she had. I did find it strange that the prosecution had never come to me to ask me, because, if they had have come, we would have been able to tell them that we had no knowledge of the letter. We had no knowledge of any additional information that was in that letter over and above what I had written in my letter.

Lady Hermon

So who do you believe added the words?

Peter Sheridan

That would be speculation on my part, other than to say that the Northern Ireland Office staff were talking to my staff officer to try and seek clarification as to whether any of the list of 10 people on the letter that they had were wanted by an external police force. They were asking that question of my staff officer, who would have rung the Rapid review team and asked them the question, but the answer she gets back from the review team is the PNC has been checked and she reflects that back, because she is unaware that John Downey was wanted by the Metropolitan Police. I was unaware that John Downey was wanted by the Metropolitan Police up until his arrest.

Chair

On that point, then, your letter that you remember writing confirmed that he was not wanted by the PSNI. How do we go from that position, then, to the Attorney General deciding that Mr Downey should face trial? Did evidence only come forward after you had written your letter?

Peter Sheridan

No, because ours is just about Northern Ireland. My letter was just about Northern Ireland.

Chair

Surely, though, there is co‑operation between police forces. Gloucestershire and Hereford & Worcester would talk to each other.

Peter Sheridan

Yes, because if you go back to whose responsibility it was to check with the Metropolitan Police—and, as Mr Baxter has outlined, there is a document from the 9 June 2006 meeting where the Attorney General’s Office were to make those checks—in February 2006, according to the judgment, the Attorney General had written to the NIO and said that Mr Downey was wanted for serious criminal offences. There was no mention of Hyde Park in it. So the NIO in my view, had the letter of February 2006[14]. They get my letter a year letter via that route and they are obviously looking at them and wondering, “How do these two things square?” and so they start to seek clarification through my staff officer, I think, but that is only—

Chair

Sorry, can I just clarify this: if one police force is aware of a crime—you were aware of the Hyde Park bombings—how does that go up to the Attorney General to decide on co‑operation between police forces?

Peter Sheridan

I am not sure I understand the question.

Chair

Unless I am missing the point, the PSNI said Mr Downey was not wanted in relation to offences in Northern Ireland.

Peter Sheridan

Yes.

Chair

You do not work in isolation from other police forces, surely.

Peter Sheridan

No, but, in the clarification, the Rapid review team said they had checked the PSNI. The review team knew from very early on that John Downey was wanted by the Metropolitan Police, but, as you have heard from Mr Baxter, he took the view that to alert anybody would potentially pervert the course of justice if it is to say to somebody, “You are wanted by the Metropolitan Police”.

Chair

Am I the only one who finds this extraordinary that those police forces do not speak to each other? I live on the border of Gloucestershire and Hereford & Worcester. PSNI is within the United Kingdom. We are not talking about the Republic of Ireland, and it would have been extraordinary even then.

Ian Paisley

Speaking to each other and speaking to the fugitive is different.

Peter Sheridan

They will have been aware. The review team were aware, from the Police National Computer, that John Downey was wanted by the Metropolitan Police.

Chair

They were aware.

Peter Sheridan

They were aware. The Rapid review team were aware.

Chair

Why was that not reflected in your letter?

Peter Sheridan

Because, as you heard, I was unaware—

Chair

I heard what Mr Baxter’s opinion was. I am asking yours.

Peter Sheridan

Because I was not advised by Mr Baxter that he was wanted, because he took the view that, first of all, the terms of reference were review of persons wanted by the PSNI; secondly, from 9 June 2006 meeting at the Attorney General’s Office, the responsibility and checking with the Metropolitan Police around wanted persons was going to be the Attorney General’s Office; and then, thirdly, he believed—and this is the first time I have heard his evidence on it—that to alert somebody that they were wanted by another police force, knowing that the likelihood is they would stay out of the jurisdiction, could be prejudicial to the case of the Metropolitan Police, who were trying to investigate it.

Chair

Does that give rise to the accusation that this was dealt with in this way in order to trap Mr Downey in to coming back into the jurisdiction?

Peter Sheridan

You would have to ask Mr Baxter whether it was intended that way. I do not think it was intended. I think he took the very straight view that, in any case, there is no issue in telling somebody that they are not wanted, but to alert people that they are wanted, particularly to alert people that they are wanted by another police force for a particular offence, would, in his words, be potentially perverting the course of justice by alerting them that they are wanted.

Naomi Long

Can I ask some questions on this, Peter? It is good to have you with us to give evidence. You have said that they were not wanted by the PSNI, but the PSNI knew they were wanted by the Met. Is that correct—that Mr Downey was?

Peter Sheridan

The review team knew he was wanted.

Naomi Long

Let us explore this. If Mr Downey had walked across the border at some point into Northern Ireland, would the PSNI have had a duty to arrest him, for example, on behalf of the Met?

Peter Sheridan

If that had happened and the police officer who had stopped him had checked the PSNI computer and it flagged up that he was wanted by the Metropolitan Police, if there was enough evidence on the computer to justify in the officer’s own mind that there were grounds for arrest, then of course he could arrest him, or they could have rung the Metropolitan Police and said, “What is the background information?” The officer who is making that arrest would have to have sufficient knowledge, either from the computer or from contact with the Metropolitan Police, to satisfy themselves they could make that arrest.

Naomi Long

Would it be fair to say that, if you are wanted in the UK by a police service and you are in the UK, you would expect that you would be wanted by any police service?

Peter Sheridan

Yes.

Naomi Long

So it would be fair to say that, while he may not have been on the PSNI’s own wanted list, if he was on a wanted list for any police service in Northern Ireland, the public expectation—and, indeed, the PSNI’s expectation—was that, if he came into their jurisdiction, he should be pursued for arrest and could be.

Peter Sheridan

He could be arrested.

Naomi Long

The PSNI, when they wrote to the Attorney General—is that correct?

Peter Sheridan

No, the PSNI wrote to the DPP.

Naomi Long

When the PSNI wrote to the DPP, did you make any reference whatsoever to being aware that he was wanted elsewhere, even though you would have known that?

Peter Sheridan

No, I did not know that and was not aware of it. The review team—Mr Baxter’s team—knew he was wanted but they did not pass that information to me. They gave me the grounds that he was no longer wanted by the PSNI and they stuck to that for all of the reasons that I explained to the Chairman a moment ago. The letter was drafted for me in that way.

Naomi Long

Can I ask a further question? You have said—and Mr Baxter said in his evidence—that to alert someone to the fact that they were wanted by another police service could be to pervert the course of justice. How could that be the case if the only person you thought you were alerting was the DPP? How could you be perverting the course of justice if you notified the Director of Public Prosecutions, which was the only communication that you claimed you had, to the fact that this person was still a wanted individual elsewhere? How does that stack up?

Peter Sheridan

Why would you be telling the DPP in Northern Ireland about somebody who was wanted in London?

Naomi Long

Because you have been asked to say why that person is wanted, and what I am asking—

Peter Sheridan

No, that is not correct.

Naomi Long

I am not asking why you would have done it; I am asking whether you believed it would be perverting the course of justice to pass that on to a law officer.

Peter Sheridan

No, of course it would not.

Naomi Long

In that case, the argument for not passing it on to a law officer seems weak.

Peter Sheridan

No. If you read the terms of reference, the terms of reference for the review team are a review of persons wanted by the PSNI, which is what the review team did. The 9 June meeting said that people who were wanted in the Met would be the role of the Attorney General, so the review team knew that. Why would it pick up any information and write to the DPP in Northern Ireland to say that so and so—?

Naomi Long

Would you personally have had no concerns about the interfaces between various police services and the various organisations who were involved in dealing with these cases? You would have had no concerns or no sense of moral obligation to raise fully what was known within the PSNI in order to ensure that the ball was not dropped by anyone else.

Peter Sheridan

Of course I would have told, if I had have been aware, but I was not aware.

Naomi Long

You do not believe that Operation Rapid officers would have shared that same concern.

Peter Sheridan

I cannot talk for individuals but my role was, if I had have been told, then I would have alerted the DPP of it.

Oliver Colvile

First of all, thank you very much indeed, Mr Sheridan, for coming to see us. I have to say I think this is a primary case of failure of joined‑up government somewhere along the line, but I also want to ask you a very simple question. What is the point of the national crime database, then? Do you have access to it? Does the Metropolitan Police have access to it? Would you not have thought it would be a good idea in which to—both of you—have a look at it and see as to who might appear upon that national crime database?

Peter Sheridan

Yes, and that is what the review team did. The review team knew he was wanted on the Police National Computer database.

Oliver Colvile

But that did not seem to feed into the Northern Ireland Office or, for that matter, into the Home Office either.

Peter Sheridan

You have heard Mr Baxter saying what the role is of the Northern Ireland Office in wanted persons or even in terms of data protection and giving names of people from the Police National Computer to people who are in the Northern Ireland Office or the Home Office.

Oliver Colvile

I have to say I am bemused by the whole process.

Nigel Mills

I have a couple of areas I would like to ask questions about, Mr Sheridan. Could you just talk us through, in the meetings you had with the Chief Constable, Sinn Féin and the NIO at the start of this process, what your understanding was of what was trying to be achieved here?

Peter Sheridan

We were very much aware that, first of all, the legislation had collapsed and the discussions that were happening around that; that the prisoners had been dealt with who had been released; that people who had subsequently been convicted after 1998 would serve no more than two years; that, if people give information about the disappeared, that could not be used in evidence; that decommissioned weapons could not be forensically examined; that the outstanding anomaly was on-the-runs; and that Government were trying to deal with people who were on the run and listed as wanted. The Chief Constable and I were very clear that, if a question was asked, “Is an individual wanted?”, we would review the evidence against that individual, set against 2007 standards, and either continue to list them as wanted or not wanted, and we would then advise the Director of Public Prosecutions. That is what we did.

Nigel Mills

So you did not suspect this was part of a bigger political promise.

Peter Sheridan

I knew there were political considerations but we were very clear that our role was the policing considerations and the limitations that we could deal with it within policing, and we said that time and time again. I know the Chief Constable said it, and I said it, at all of those meetings. There were no other opportunities for us in it. It had to be within the legislation that allowed us to review those people who were listed as on the run.

Nigel Mills

Do you now feel perhaps you were involved in a slightly bigger exercise than you thought you were involved in?

Peter Sheridan

No, I am satisfied that the police have a responsibility to review the evidence. If you list somebody as wanted in 1975, in 2007 is the evidence still there? There is an obligation on the police to ensure that they are up to date on that. I do not have any difficulty in what the police were doing in terms of reviewing the evidence that was in the system against the individuals.

Nigel Mills

Can you perhaps tell us why Mr Barra McGrory, when he wrote back to you, did not accept the proposed outline of this scheme? Maybe if you could give the Committee a copy of that letter, it would be helpful.

Peter Sheridan

I have his letter here. I do not know whether the Committee want to hear from it. I can read, first of all, the letter that went from us via our legal adviser to Mr McGrory. This is dated 8 December 2006. “Dear Barra, Our meeting of yesterday”—that was in my office—“date refers. The following is my understanding of the suggested process. 1) Using the list provided to you, you seek instructions from those named on it”; he would seek instructions from his client. “You write to me on behalf of the individual client asking for confirmation that the client is wanted and, if so, on what basis; i.e. warrant or for interview. I reply to you setting out the date and location of the incidents to be the subject of interview, the basis for the interview and sufficient pre-interview disclosure to allow you to advise your client as to the next step. You carry out such interviews of your client as you deem necessary to assess his wishes. If the client is content and interviews arranged by voluntary attendance or arrest, at the conclusion the investigating officer considers releasing completely, or release and report, or charging, if evidence is available. 6) Taking of DNA and fingerprints: we are still considering this. 7) Interviews will be restricted to the incidents identified at (3) above, unless the client volunteers information about other incidents which are serious enough to merit immediate investigation. I look forward to hearing from you.” On 19 December, Mr McGrory writes back to Mr Mercer, the legal adviser. “Thank you for your letter of 8 December setting out the steps that might be taken to bring about closure in respect of a number of individuals still regarded as wanted by the PSNI. I have had an opportunity of reflecting on this since our discussion. I am concerned that any proposal that requires an arrest and the taking of fingerprints and DNA will fall at the first hurdle. I simply cannot imagine fugitives presenting themselves for interview at the Serious Crime Suite in Antrim or anywhere else on such a basis. I would, therefore, suggest that I could take instructions from each individual identified and convey a response to the allegations to the PSNI, which may then be able to decide that there is little point in keeping a file open or reporting and taking no further action. If interviews are absolutely essential, they can take place under Article 31 of the PACE voluntary attendance, which carries no obligation to take fingerprints or DNA. These interviews can be conducted in the Republic or at a location within the North that is a great deal more conducive to the resolution of this problem than the Antrim Serious Crime Suite. I would hope, however, that the vast majority of cases might be disposed of without the necessity of an interview. I would be grateful if you would please consult with the Chief Constable and ACC Sheridan and let me know if this proposal or some variation of it is acceptable at your end.”

Naomi Long

What was the response to that, Peter?

Peter Sheridan

We did not—that was not the system. The system that we had suggested via the legal adviser was what we were prepared to go with.

Nigel Mills

I just want to square that correspondence with the process we have been talking through. Presumably, people who, when you reviewed your file, you thought there was no evidence worthy of continuing with, you would not have started down the line of interviewing and whatever else. They would have just got the letter that said, “No, we do not want you anymore.” Is that right?

Peter Sheridan

What we would have done is written to the Director of Public Prosecutions and said whatever the result was.

Nigel Mills

So that exchange is more about those who you were not prepared to write to the DPP about.

Peter Sheridan

It was the beginning of a process, because that happens in December 2006, before Operation Rapid is established in February 2007.

Nigel Mills

That seems a lot more thorough in terms of wanting to interview.

Peter Sheridan

That was where our position was, so the only position that we could take then in setting up Operation Rapid was as I have set out in the terms of reference: we will examine each case set against the criteria, what would be expected and would it meet the judicial standard in 2007.

Nigel Mills

Could I just ask you quickly about what happened in the early 2000s? I think some letters were sent out a long way before Operation Rapid, weren’t they? Is that something you have any knowledge of?

Peter Sheridan

I have no knowledge of any of that before.

Lady Hermon

Can I just pick up on two particular issues that concern me greatly? One of them is to do with the Historical Enquiries Team, and it is in the public domain, in the Downey judgment, that your staff officer, Peter, was notified on 23 July 2008[15], a year after Mr Downey had received his letter. Of course, we are repeatedly told that these administrative letters were not an amnesty from prosecution; if fresh evidence came to the fore, then, in fact, they could be arrested. It does suggest in that email—and it is published in paragraph 126 of the Downey judgment—that, in fact, that email did inform your office that HET had “located a crucial piece of evidence in relation to a double murder”, presumably of the two members of the Ulster Defence Regiment, “for which we submitted a review template.” Fresh evidence has come from HET about Mr Downey, a crucial piece of evidence in relation to a double murder. What was the process after your staff officer was notified of that? Why did Mr Downey continue to sleep peacefully in his bed at night?

Peter Sheridan

The HET were established to investigate, so they would have continued their investigation and they may have listed him as wanted, if that is what they want to do. By that stage, however, I was exiting the organisation, so I have no details of what happened. I left at the end of August that year.

Lady Hermon

When you left, presumably this very serious piece of information from HET would have been taken forward by your successor, and your successor, at that stage—just remind the Committee.

Peter Sheridan

ACC Harris, but it would have continued to be taken forward by the HET team. If they had discovered that evidence, their job was to review investigations, so they would have taken that forward. I would have expected that they would have taken it forward.

Lady Hermon

Yes, but did the PSNI co-operate with HET and let them have any additional information?

Peter Sheridan

Yes, they would have done.

Lady Hermon

Would HET have been told, “I am terribly sorry”, or words to this effect, “Mr Downey received a letter on 20 July 2007”? Would HET have known anything about this administrative scheme?

Peter Sheridan

No, I expect not, but they would have been aware from the review team that he had got a letter saying he was not currently wanted by the PSNI from 6 or 7 June 2007, or rather the letter that went to the DPP saying he was not currently wanted by the PSNI.

Lady Hermon

If the administrative letter was not an amnesty and he could have been pursued for further prosecution if fresh evidence came to light, and here we have HET identifying a crucial piece of evidence, then what should have happened?

Peter Sheridan

It has to be clear whether it is new evidence or whether that evidence was in place at the time. This would have been the Head of Crime, Norman Baxter’s role at the time as senior investigating officer. I heard him saying that, if that was new evidence, then of course it could be, but it might be evidence that was already in the system but, I understood, could not be found when the review team did their review. It was a question of whether it was new evidence or already there and simply could not be found.

Lady Hermon

But HET may not have known that there was an administrative letter. Your guess would be that they did not know a letter had gone.

Peter Sheridan

They would not have known.

Lady Hermon

They would not have known that Mr Downey had received a letter on 20 July 2007.

Peter Sheridan

No. I have checked this as late as yesterday with the PSNI. Nobody who I can find in the PSNI—neither the Chief Constable then, Hugh Orde, nor anybody else—knew there were letters going out to individuals. I would assume there had to be some way of communicating with the individuals, whether it was by word of mouth, and, as I understand now, not everybody got letters; some people were told by word of mouth or other ways of telling them. I assume that there had to be some way of communicating the information, but we were not aware of what it was.

Lady Hermon

This was such a well-kept secret that the Chief Constable of the time, and that you, as a serving and very experienced ACC, were not aware of these letters going out from officials.

Peter Sheridan

I knew what I wrote in the letter to the DPP. That is where it stopped. That loop never came back the other way for anybody to say to me, “Here is a letter we are drafting and we are sending out to X”, so we were not aware that there were letters in the system.

Lady Hermon

I will put the same question to you as I did to Mr Baxter: how did you feel when the current Chief Constable, Matt Baggott, when the Downey judgment was published, accepted “full responsibility”? “The Chief Constable of the PSNI accepted full responsibility for the failures by the PSNI”. How did you feel?

Peter Sheridan

I would take a slightly different view from my colleague, simply having been in that position and acted in the Chief Constable’s position at the time. He was responding to a judgment that came out of the court at that time. When you read it, the judge had adjourned it and asked for further investigation, so he was responding—as was the Secretary of State—to a judgment that came out of the court at the time. I am not sure that I would have done it much differently, once I had got a judgment from the court, particularly at that level, a High Court judge, saying this was his judgment. When I read the judgment, I thought it was a very good judgment. It is only when I then start to drill down into the various aspects of it that I find where the judge says that we did nothing to correct the situation; that is correct, but I did not know what the situation was because I was not aware of what was in that letter, that it was any different from what I had said, and that there had been no sensible explanation for the various failings in Operation Rapid. If my colleague had been called and I had been called, maybe we would have been able to inform the judge or help the court come to a different conclusion, if they had have been aware of this. I do not know what the judge’s conclusion would have been if we had been able to explain to him the PSNI never knew there were letters or there was any difference in the letter that I sent to the DPP. The fact is that we were never asked by the prosecution to assist, even though the judge adjourned that case and asked for further information. The only people who asked me were the defence.

Lady Hermon

Do you feel that the judgment would have been a much better and fairer judgment had all of the papers that could have been made available to Mr Justice Sweeney been made available?

Peter Sheridan

I have no idea, Lady Hermon, but I would have wanted the judge to have all available facts. I am not a judge. I do not make judgments. I do not know what the judge would have done. He may have made the same decision. I have no idea.

Lady Hermon

Yes, but do you feel that more information should have been available to Mr Justice Sweeney?

Peter Sheridan

I absolutely feel that the information that I have been able to give you today, which is factual information, should have been given to the judge. The judge should have been given a note of that meeting from 9 June 2006. The judge should have been told the PSNI officers were completely unaware that there were letters going out and that there was additional information put in the letter that went out that was different from the letter that we sent to the DPP.

Lady Hermon

Yes, very significant factors.

Chair

Just on that point, that would not have changed the fact that Mr Downey had the letter.

Peter Sheridan

No.

Chair

But if there had been better communication at the beginning, he may not have got the letter.

Peter Sheridan

There is clearly an issue of communication, and I have to be fair to colleagues in the NIO that I do not think anybody was trying to pull a fast one at the time. When I read the emails about clarification, I can see two different trains of thought. One is from the individual in the NIO who is trying to seek clarification, “Has the PNC computer been checked and have you checked for any other external force?” They are probably doing that because they have the letter from February 2006 from the Attorney General saying he is wanted. My staff officer is completely unaware that he is wanted, because the review team have not told him he is wanted, and neither have the NIO said, “We have a letter here from 2006 to say he was wanted.” The staff officer then asks the review team. There is no further information, other than to say “You can reply back that the PNC has been checked”. That is what she does.

Lady Hermon

I just need to clarify one point—in fact, it was a very significant point made by the Attorney General in response to the urgent question tabled by our Chairman immediately after the Downey case. In the course of his statement, the Attorney General said, “During this process, the Office of the Attorney General operated as the co‑ordinating point because the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland could not and would not communicate directly with the Northern Ireland Office and, therefore, collated the information that was supplied. In fairness to my predecessors”—previous Attorney Generals, obviously—“it is probably right to say that they would have had no independent means to verify whether or not someone was wanted, and reliance for that was placed on the PSNI and its links with other police forces in the other jurisdictions of this country.” Was he mistaken in having that confidence that there was going to be that linkage between the PSNI and other police forces in the United Kingdom?

Peter Sheridan

I can only go on the information that I have. The electronic note of the meeting on 9 June says, “Action: Mr McGinty to confirm with the Metropolitan Police if individuals are wanted, why they are wanted and what evidence exists in relation to the incidents.” That is the information that I had from the meeting on 9 June 2006. I had sent an officer down to that meeting.

Lady Hermon

Mr McGinty, of course, represents the Attorney General’s Office.

Peter Sheridan

Yes.

Lady Hermon

Thank you.

Mr Hepburn

You said that you were unaware that Mr Downey was wanted in London and, if you had been made aware, you would have passed on that information to the Attorney General.

Peter Sheridan

Yes. There is always a danger of reconstructed memory and because of what I know now, of course I would have told the DPP, so I have to caveat that by saying it is fine now, when you know what is happening now, that, if somebody has said to you, “John Downey is wanted”, I would have told them. Knowing the political considerations, I probably would have said to the DPP at the time.

Mr Hepburn

Did your team let you down?

Peter Sheridan

No, I think they operated—

Mr Hepburn

Bearing in mind that the Haass talks and everything have gone to Parliament, do you not think there is a bigger consideration?

Peter Sheridan

They are political considerations. We were clear that we remained within policing considerations, so the terms of reference said a review of people wanted by the PSNI. The 9 June meeting said the Attorney General’s Office will about clarify people wanted by the Met, and you have heard Mr Baxter say that he believed that, by alerting people that they were wanted by another police force, it was tantamount to tipping them off. I think they did what they were asked to do. I guess, with the subsequent inquiries, the quality of the work that was done, I do not know, because I did not look at the quality. The quality of those reviews will be tested at some stage in the future.

Mr Hepburn

Did I hear you right: did you say that you were also unaware that letters were going out to on-the-runs?

Peter Sheridan

I checked with the Chief Constable, Hugh Orde, at the time. He was unaware. I was unaware that there were letters going out.

Mr Hepburn

What do you think the purpose of your judgment was, then? Why would somebody ask you for your judgment if they are not going to pass it on to someone else?

Peter Sheridan

I was absolutely clear that they were trying to deal with on-the-runs. Our part of that process was to review the current evidence about why somebody is listed as on the run. Does it stack up in 2007? If it does, we will alert the DPP that it does; if it does not, we will advise the DPP. The DPP would then advise the Attorney General in London. I have no knowledge of what letters went to the Attorney General, to the Secretary of State or the Northern Ireland Office.

Mr Hepburn

Something that was referred to earlier on: Mr Downey made a number of visits to the UK, didn’t he?

Peter Sheridan

Yes.

Mr Hepburn

How come he was not picked up beforehand?

Peter Sheridan

I have no idea. Again, I left in 2008. I presume that Mr Downey travelled to London and people did not check the PNC because he was not stopped. Not everybody who travels across to the UK gets stopped. Maybe the time he was stopped, somebody had just run the manifest from the aircraft that day through. I do not know.

David Simpson

You are very welcome, indeed, Peter, in the same way as Mr Baxter. Can I just ask you the same question or get clarification on it? I asked Mr Baxter to clarify his opinion, in relation to the NIO, that there was a culture within the NIO not to pursue or prosecute Republicans. Would you be of the same view?

Peter Sheridan

Most of the meetings at the NIO with Gerry Kelly were attended by me and my staff officer. I have to say I was not ever unduly influenced at those meetings by anybody in the NIO to do anything, other than we took names. They did try to prioritise names but some of that was to do with people whose parents were elderly or there were other reasons given, but I did not get a sense that there was pressure on me to do anything other than a proper review of it. Part of that is people in the Northern Ireland Office were utterly clear from the Chief Constable and myself: we will do what is within the limitations of policing around this, or policing considerations. Of course, we are aware of all the political considerations around it, but that is not going to influence what we are doing, the review team’s efforts or the terms of reference in it.

David Simpson

In terms of the involvement of other police officers in the whole project Operation Rapid, did you offer any instructions to them as to what level of confidentiality there would be in relation to that, or the way the work had to be completed?

Peter Sheridan

The only instruction I gave, as your colleague Mr Mills read out, was that Operation Rapid is the operational name for the review of persons certainly as wanted by the PSNI, and it will be listed as confidential. That was it. Most police documents are confidential or restricted. Very little needs to be kept secret in policing, although people may not believe that, so I did not see any reason why these documents or any part of Rapid should be listed as secret. It is confidential because the potential is people’s names will be listed in it.

David Simpson

Another point, if I can move on to the Policing Board a little bit: at any point, did you, as the ACC, speak to the whole of the Policing Board in relation to the scheme? At any point, was a formal briefing offered to the Chair and Vice Chair of the Board?

Peter Sheridan

You can take this whole OTR issue out here now, set it out on its own and look at it outside the context of what was happening. At that time, I ran the public inquiries: the Rosemary Nelson and Billy Wright inquiries; the transfer of national security from the PSNI back to MI5; Denis Donaldson had been murdered in April that year; the Mark Haddock case had come out from the Ombudsman’s office. In all of those cases, I saw it was important to talk to the Chair and the Vice Chair of the Board. Was it a formal briefing? No. Was it a conversation where I was updating them on various aspects? Yes. Did I ever formally brief the full Policing Board? No. I was very much aware, though, that, towards the back end of 2006, having had those meetings with the Attorney General’s Office, we were going to be writing terms of reference and reviewing them, and I would have said probably as little as that. It would not have been that I would have said, “Once I write to the DPP, the DPP will then alert the Attorney General, and the Attorney General will alert the NIO”, because that is not part of policing. “Here is what we will do: we will review the evidence and write to the DPP.” It could have been something as simple as that, but, yes, I would have told the Chair and Vice Chair of the Board because I saw the importance of it and that it could have been misread that this was somehow being done secretly by the police.

David Simpson

Can you clarify just one point again: when were you first aware of the letters?

Peter Sheridan

When the public debate started after the trial, or around the trial time.

David Simpson

As a senior police officer within the PSNI, you were unaware of the existence of the scheme before you became involved with it. Would that be correct?

Peter Sheridan

I never heard the words “administrative scheme” until recently.

David Simpson

Subsequently, you asked police officers involved to treat it with some degree of confidentiality.

Peter Sheridan

Yes, like most of the work that they do.

David Simpson

At no point was it raised by you with the whole of the Policing Board.

Peter Sheridan

No.

David Simpson

No briefing was given to the Policing Board. At no point was there any formal briefing in relation to it and, finally, until the Downey trial, even you were unaware of the letters that were being issued from the NIO. You were unaware of any of those.

Peter Sheridan

No, and the briefing that I did to the Policing Board was to the Chair and Vice Chair. You may recall at that time there was agreement that sensitive issues, rather than being briefed to the whole Board, would be briefed to the Chair and Vice Chair.

David Simpson

It was only the Chair and Vice Chair who were briefed as regards that.

Peter Sheridan

Yes.

Ian Paisley

You are very welcome, Peter. I am going to follow on immediately from David on the Policing Board issues. I sat on the Policing Board during that period of time, from its inauguration through to the end of 2006, and certainly I do not ever recall a briefing. It is good to hear you confirming that. Can I also be clear: was it your view, because it appeared to be the senior police team’s view, that possibly the reason why a briefing would not be given to the Policing Board on sensitive issues was that it leaked like a sieve?

Peter Sheridan

Was that the Board would leak like a sieve?

Ian Paisley

Yes.

Peter Sheridan

There may have been that sort of view. I am not sure how accurate it is. To be fair to the Board, at those times I had detailed conversations with many Board members about very sensitive issues and I am not aware of any leaking from the Board by individual whom I briefed. I was Head of Crime at the time, and I have just read out a list of very sensitive issues that I could have briefed or spoken to members about, not in a public session at the Board but individual members. I could not point to one time when any Board member let me down.

Ian Paisley

In terms of the briefing that you would have given to the Chair and Vice Chair, this was confidential. You would have stressed, I assume, that this was a confidential briefing, or that it was sensitive, and it was up to them how they handled it, but your expectation would have been that they would not have gone out and, to put it in Northern Ireland terms, “blabbed” it to the rest of the Board.

Peter Sheridan

Particularly the public session. It was up to them how much or how little. It was not my job to tell them, but there was a mechanism set up at the time, if you recall, that the Vice Chair and the Chair could be briefed on sensitive issues because there had been some fallout previously where the Board were not told things because, in that sort of public session, it could have leaked out or information been given out publicly. On those sensitive issues, the Chair and Vice Chair would have been briefed.

Ian Paisley

During that briefing which you gave to the Chair and Vice Chair, did what you told them look like an administrative scheme that has now subsequently emerged?

Peter Sheridan

All I would have said is that the police are going to review the individual cases. If we find that somebody is wanted, we will write to the DPP in that way. If we find they are not wanted, we will write to the DPP in that way. I would have kept it within policing considerations.

Ian Paisley

Did the Chair or Vice Chair make any requests about that review?

Peter Sheridan

No, I do not recall anything outside of that. I have to be clear on this: this could be a fairly brief conversation in the list of other things because, at that time, the Board were very interested—

Ian Paisley

There were lots of reviews going on.

Peter Sheridan

National security was a big issue, and the Board would have spent more time, so this issue about on-the-runs might have been this size compared to the other things that were happening at the time.

Ian Paisley

During the course of Mr Baxter’s evidence, he recounted an incident where he had arrested two terrorists, where he was questioning them, and where Gerry Adams was able to find out about this, ring Downing Street, and Downing Street then applied pressure directly to the police to let these villains go. As a senior police officer, how does that make you feel?

Peter Sheridan

Today is the first I am aware of it. Of course, I would imagine any politician or any member of the public would not want politicians interfering in operational policing. That is almost a given right.

Ian Paisley

Let me ask a different way. If you had known that when you were his senior commander, would you have gone ape about it? Would you have picked up the phone to the chief and asked the chief to ring Downing Street and speak to them in his Sailortown language of exactly what he thought?

Peter Sheridan

I do not think I would have had to. I think Hugh Orde, who was then the Chief Constable, would have already been two steps down the road ahead of me.

Ian Paisley

Did that happen, then?

Peter Sheridan

I think, in his evidence, he said it was the Chief Constable’s Office, so I am not aware that the Chief Constable would have known about it.

Ian Paisley

Were there any other cases that you were aware of, of a similar vein, where an official from Government would ring a police officer and say, “This case needs to be dropped”?

Peter Sheridan

It never happened to me.

Ian Paisley

Yes, but are you aware of it?

Peter Sheridan

I could not give you chapter. You hear these conversations or rumours around it, but I am not aware.

Ian Paisley

An official complaint was not brought up from officers to you about this kind of activity.

Peter Sheridan

No. If it had have been, with the Chief Constable at the time, Hugh Orde’s reputation around operational independence or operational responsibility and the crossover with politicians, I think we would have known about it.

Ian Paisley

Given the earlier question and evidence you gave with regard to there being clear lines of demarcation between what you knew, what you were able to tell the DPP, and information other police services across the United Kingdom held, was there a view that, if the Police Service of Northern Ireland had told the Northern Ireland Office what was on the Police National Computer about Mr Downey and his involvement in Hyde Park, and indeed other things that were on the PNC, the NIO people would have tipped off Sinn Féin and the on-the-runs? Is that why you basically kept a very clear line of demarcation here?

Peter Sheridan

First of all, the NIO never asked about an individual in any of those emails. They talked about a letter that had 12 names in it. They did not talk or ask about an individual. There is an issue of whether, if my staff officer had have known, she could have said to a civil servant in the NIO that a named individual is wanted by the Metropolitan Police. Where does that sit with data protection? Where does that sit with potentially prejudicing an investigation? What was the reason that person wanted to know it? What were they going to do with that information? But that did not arise because the staff officer never knew.

Ian Paisley

This was a fluid situation. Your staff officer was being telephoned and engaged in conversation on more than one occasion by someone senior in the Northern Ireland Office, and your staff officer was being asked questions about, “What do you know? Do you have anything else?” It was probably, at times, quite a casual conversation. Were you very clear to your officer that, “If you let them know anything, they will let those so-and-sos know and that will let them off the hook even more”?

Peter Sheridan

I do not think I would have taken that view. Civil servants would just automatically—

Ian Paisley

Was there a fear of this? It was fairly clear from Mr Baxter’s office that you could not trust the NIO as far as you could throw them.

Peter Sheridan

I would just say that I dealt with them in relation to all of the names and all the individuals, and it is not the impression I got. They were very clear where we stood on this, and I think the professionals in the NIO knew where that line was and did not cross that line, certainly with me. When the clarification comes, you are certainly on the border, because they did not name any individuals. They asked, “Has the Police National Computer been checked? Has it been checked that any of the list of 12 are wanted by any other police force?” The answer simply goes back, “Yes, the Police National Computer has been checked”, so the question would be, if the officer had gone back and said, “Yes, and X is wanted by the Met”, first of all, is it legal that the police can do that under data protection; secondly, why would they want to know that? What were they going to do with that information?

Ian Paisley

Mr Baxter has concluded that this process, in his view, was illegal in terms of how it was worked out. They were the words he used. Do you agree with him?

Peter Sheridan

What the police were doing was not illegal.

Ian Paisley

I am talking about the process. I am not accusing the police of operating illegally. I am talking about the process in terms of how it is worked out from his knowledge of the constitution.

Peter Sheridan

I think our safety and security, from the PSNI’s perspective, was to remain within the policing considerations, and I am going to continue to do that because I am here in my representation of my role in the police. Those were policing considerations that we acted lawfully and properly in.

Ian Paisley

Peter, come on. You are a senior police officer. You supply information to the PPS, as you should, and then you find out, years later, that the information you took was taken by Jonathan Powell and others—a civil servant and adviser to the Government—and used to get terrorists off the hook.

Peter Sheridan

What you are asking me to do is to make a judgment as to whether that was legal. I do not know. It is up to lawyers to make that judgment.

Ian Paisley

It is more than that. You have a judgment in front of you, which said that poor Mr Downey, the defendant, was wholly misled, and that he had received an assurance which should have been competent and should have been carefully written, and this poor guy could not rely on that assurance. Pity him, with his blood-soaked hands. Does it not make you outraged that the Government took a lawful situation that you were involved in and turned it on its head to the benefit of people you were trying to bang up—and rightly bang up?

Peter Sheridan

To be clear on this, Mr Downey was innocent. He had not been before the court on any of that, so the policing role in this was to test the evidence at that time, which is what the review team did. What you are reading from in the judgment, it would have been good if the judge had had access to all of the facts and all of the information, and then what would have happened, I do not know.

Ian Paisley

You are confirming that, during the adjournment period in December of last year, no contact was made by the prosecutor to get you and to give that additional evidence, which could now maybe be viewed as new evidence.

Peter Sheridan

I think, more than that, I was refused access to the documents to assist the court when the defence asked me.

Ian Paisley

What does that tell you? Do you think they want to get to the truth in this?

Peter Sheridan

Again, that is a subjective judgment, and I cannot make it.

Ian Paisley

Come on, Peter, I am asking you to give me your opinion on this. I am not asking you to play it so straight.

Peter Sheridan

The only reason I play it so straight is because I am genuinely not sure what was behind all of that. All I can say is that it is bizarre.

Ian Paisley

Peter, come on. You are not sure what is behind it? You have been long enough in this game. You know Northern Ireland like the back of your hand. You have served in some of the most difficult situations and you have arrested some of the most difficult individuals. What do you think is behind it?

Peter Sheridan

I do not know what is behind it.

Lady Hermon

Can I take the liberty of rephrasing that question?

Chair

I think we have probably got to the end of that line.

Lady Hermon

Could I just rephrase the question slightly? Is it a matter of disappointment to you, Mr Sheridan, that the Attorney General chose not to appeal the Downey judgment?

Peter Sheridan

It is a matter of disappointment that we did not have the opportunity to put some of this information in front of the judge, and, if the judge had made the same judgment, maybe the Attorney General may have thought differently. There are a whole lot of maybes in this. I think the Attorney General was making a judgment, like everybody else, on what happened, on the information that was in front of the judge at the time. I have to accept that the Attorney General has read that judgment and has found that there are no grounds for appealing it. I could not disagree with him because I am not that qualified to do it, but I wonder: if all of the information that we have given you today had been with the judge, and the judge still made that, would there have been an opportunity for the Attorney General?

Ian Paisley

There is one question I want to finish on. Does it surprise you, Peter, how incandescent the people of Northern Ireland, who suggest that they were unaware of the existence of this letter scheme, are, from the First Minister down?

Peter Sheridan

When this broke, I was inundated with requests from journalists to do interviews, as you can imagine. I feel extremely sorry for the families, because I heard some of the families of the Hyde Park bombers saying that the police had let them down, and they are utterly bewildered about who was doing what and what was happening. I was conscious that, if I did anything in the media, there would have been sound-bites and it would only add to it. This is the first opportunity we have to give a broader picture. Is this going to help the victims, what I am doing? Probably not. It is probably going to add to the bewilderment and confusion as to what was happening. We continue to talk about victim-centred approaches and thinking about the victims. At some stage, we have to separate this whole past and deal with victims, and deal properly with victims.

Ian Paisley

Are you surprised that the public of Northern Ireland are so outraged by this? Given that you were blindsided to what was happening at one end of the process, can you understand that outrage?

Peter Sheridan

The public of Northern Ireland, having accepted that we are going to let prisoners out, having accepted the most you will ever do, no matter how many murders you have committed before 1998, is two years in jail, having accepted that we are not allowed to forensically examine decommissioned weapons, having accepted that we are not allowed to take information about the disappeared, I guess the public of Northern Ireland will—

Ian Paisley

Were they fair game for it?

Chair

I think the difference being that all those things went through this House of Commons, and the on-the-runs administrative scheme did not. We will move on.

Naomi Long

I just want to clarify something that you said in response to Ian. You said you were not aware, and you do not believe that the Chief Constable was aware, that Downing Street had contacted, through his office, an officer who was investigating a serious crime, to ask them to release the individuals who were being questioned. Did anyone talk to anyone else in the PSNI about these things? Would no one have seen, in the Chief Constable’s Office, that this was a slightly important conversation that had been had, and thought to alert either yourself or the Chief Constable, or would your own officers who were working to you not have thought that this was something they should mention to you?

Peter Sheridan

I think you have heard of the conversation. The call came to somebody in the Chief Constable’s Office, who then spoke to Mr Baxter and he was clear, so they knew already. Because the call came down the ways, it was not as if Mr Baxter got the call and kept it and did not pass it up, so they would have known that already.

Naomi Long

So the Chief Constable did know, because I thought what you had said in answer to what Ian had asked you was that you do not think the Chief Constable did know, because he was precious about the PSNI’s independence.

Peter Sheridan

He was. I do not know. I cannot answer for the Chief Constable, but when Mr Baxter gave his evidence, he said “the Chief Constable’s Office”. If he had meant the Chief Constable, I think he would have said “the Chief Constable.” I do not know whether the Chief Constable did or did not know.

Naomi Long

Do you find it at all strange that he did not mention that conversation to you?

Peter Sheridan

That who did not?

Naomi Long

That Mr Baxter did not mention that conversation to you. Do you find that at all strange?

Peter Sheridan

He probably had already made his point to the senior officer who told him.

Naomi Long

So you do not find it all strange.

Peter Sheridan

I am not sure that he would have told me every conversation and referred—

Naomi Long

No, I would accept that, but I would dare say, if most people got a phone call from Downing Street, it might be slightly more noteworthy than the average conversation that they have.

Peter Sheridan

He did not get it from Downing Street. He got it from the senior officer who had taken the call.

Naomi Long

He knew the genesis of it. He knew it came from Downing Street, because he told us that today.

Peter Sheridan

Yes, but he made his point clear back to them. I do not know, Naomi. I cannot say why he did not tell me or who he was going to tell. He had already made his point to the senior officer and he was clear what he was going to do about it, and it was ignored.

Naomi Long

You described previous attempts to deal with the issue of on-the-runs, and you described the letter exchange with Barra McGrory. Could you just explain very clearly again for us, just to get absolute clarity on this, who specifically asked for Operation Rapid to be set up and for this process to be done by the PSNI, when this was done in 2007? Who were the individuals who were involved?

Peter Sheridan

I go back to the very first meeting, on 25 May 2006. You had the then Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir Alasdair Fraser, Kevin McGinty from the Attorney General’s Office, NIO representatives, and there were others there. I have not listed them but there will be a record of that. This is a journal entry or a notebook entry that I have myself. The discussion then was about on-the-runs and the failure of the process, and whether there were any other things that could be done around it. We were clear that the issue could only be addressed by the police in a limited way. If solicitors asked, “Is my client wanted?”, we could respond that their client was wanted or not wanted, but we would have to go through a process to check that anyone on the list who was wanted in terms of the modern day would still stand the test of time. We would have been happy to do that review and, in fact, those reviews should always have been done along the line. We should always be reviewing people we have listed as wanted: is the evidence still there? Does it still stack up? We should not list people as wanted if the evidence does not justify that. I am quite comfortable that we can do that about any person who is wanted, not just about the on-the-runs.

Naomi Long

When the scheme was set up—Operation Rapid—you were not dealing with individual solicitors making requests, as you have suggested. You were dealing with names being given to you en bloc—is that correct?—by the NIO.

Peter Sheridan

Yes.

Naomi Long

And you said that you had attended meetings where Sinn Féin were present where the NIO gave you those names.

Peter Sheridan

Yes.

Naomi Long

So you were aware of that. Norman Baxter said that he was not aware that that is the situation.

Peter Sheridan

You can see in the terms of reference that I would provide him with the names, so I gave him the names. The discussions with Barra McGrory and that are December 2006, when we were trying to find a way, and the potential was solicitors could write in, but in the main the names came via the NIO and Sinn Féin.

Naomi Long

You were aware of that; Norman Baxter was not aware of that. Did you at any stage ask what would happen to that information when it was passed on to the DPP; how it would be used?

Peter Sheridan

The DPP is a law officer, so I assume it will be treated like every other letter that I write to the DPP.

Naomi Long

You were not curious as to how it would be used or communicated to anyone beyond that.

Peter Sheridan

It was clear that the DPP would write to the Attorney General, but not what happened. The DPP would check his records to see if there was anything in his system, then he would write to the Attorney General.

Naomi Long

When someone from the NIO probed your staff officer for clarification about the information you had sent, were you surprised that the NIO had that information?

Peter Sheridan

I did not know that probing, because those were ordinary, routine correspondence that the staff officer would have dealt with, liaised with the Operation Rapid team and gone back again. As I said, people take it on its own, as if that was the full day’s job that we were doing. I had 1,400 officers under my command. I was running live operations at that time resulting in the arrest of seven people for explosives. On-the-runs was that much of my day, if it came into my day’s work at all. I had delegated responsibility to Norman Baxter, and his team got on with that job.

Naomi Long

Would he have been aware that it was the NIO who were asking for this clarification?

Peter Sheridan

Yes.

Naomi Long

Would that have caused him concern, given that his understanding of the process was that it was being passed to you to be passed to the Attorney General via the DPP?

Peter Sheridan

I think, in his evidence, he said that, so he would have said to my staff officer, “You can respond back that the PNC has been checked.” He did not say, “You can respond back that the PNC has been checked and there are a number of those people who are listed as wanted.”

Naomi Long

When it came to the Downey case, when this went to court, were you surprised that the NIO and the Attorney General did not present the full detail of the scheme, as it was, in terms of the role of the PSNI, in detail, including the limitations on what the PSNI would do and the role of the Attorney General’s Office, which we believe is minuted, that they would do the checks with other police services? Were you were surprised that was not submitted as part of the evidence in the prosecution case?

Peter Sheridan

The only evidence that I got access to was what was in the judgment at the end of it, so I do not know what was presented, but I have consistently said that I would have liked to have the opportunity to have had all of this given to the judge, so that he could take that into account. Those minutes are crucial and I was able to get access to those minutes. When I was asked last week whether I would come to the inquiry, I then began to ask: “I need access to the notes and the background material.” This was eight years ago. So I got access to them. If a disclosure officer was in the PSNI twice or three times, how did they not get access to the documents when I got them?

Naomi Long

In terms of the judgment, the PSNI were judged very harshly in terms of their role in the scheme. Do you feel the PSNI, and Norman Baxter in particular, have been scapegoated in this affair?

Peter Sheridan

Again, we continue to forget about the victims. I have categorically said that I am going to avoid the blame culture—who did what, who did that—because all we are doing is bewildering and complicating for victims this process. I can only give you factually what I have in front of me. Other people can make judgments around it. I am not going to get into making judgments, as you have asked me. It is not my function or role. I feel desperately sorry that people who lost loved ones are listening continually to mixed messages, confusion and what seems incompetence across the board, and we still have not helped them in it.

Naomi Long

I accept that point, but I have to come back to this issue, because I agree with you that the victims have been hurt, but they will not be hurt by us not dealing with and addressing the issues that are there. If all of the information that was pertinent to this case was not presented to the judge, that may have contributed to their pain, so surely that needs to be exposed. Therefore, I am asking: do you feel, first of all, that the fullest information possible was presented to the judge, based on your reading of the judgment and your knowledge of the scheme?

Peter Sheridan

No.

Naomi Long

Do you believe that the PSNI were, therefore, judged more harshly than is fair?

Peter Sheridan

It seems that way when I read “did nothing to correct the situation”, when I see “There has been no sensible explanation for the various failures in Operation Rapid.” That is because they were not asked. The people who were involved in that were not asked, “What is your explanation?”

Naomi Long

My final question: have you asked anyone in the NIO or, indeed, in the Attorney General’s Office why you were not asked?

Peter Sheridan

I do not think it is the role of the NIO or the Attorney General’s Office. I think it is the role of the prosecution. The judge adjourned the hearing and asked both the defence and the prosecution to go away and get further information. What he said was that it became apparent at an early stage in the abuse hearings that there had been no investigation as such instituted by the prosecution into the precise circumstances in which the letter dated 20 July 2007[i] came into being and why it had not been corrected thereafter, and he adjourned it to go and get further information. The people who ring me are the defence.

Oliver Colvile

First of all, I have to say, Mr Sheridan, that I represent a naval military constituency and military-garrison town, and we have a number of people who have been murdered, who were going about doing their job as members of the Armed Forces, which I find incredibly difficult to take on board. I want to ask you this question: do you think that PSNI, and you in particular, were specifically not shared that information about these letters? Would you have done anything different if that had been the case? Do you feel—and I am sorry for using this expression—that there has been political intervention in all this that has perverted the course of justice to make sure that those people who were murdered have not had someone held responsible for this?

Peter Sheridan

Let me take your second question first. If we had been given notification that this letter was going out “and it is going to say this”, then that would have gone to the Rapid team, who would have, right away, seen that it was wrong, because they would have known. They knew. My staff officer, if she had got that letter, would have gone down to Rapid and asked, “Are you happy with this draft? This is going out.” They would have right away—I have no doubt—picked up that it is inaccurate in what it says, but because we never had access to it, we could not do that. What was your first question, again?

Oliver Colvile

It was just generally that I feel there is now a series of victims here whose families have seen their military relatives murdered and, at the end of the day, they have no recourse as far as this is concerned. I was under the impression that you could be tried twice for something. If new evidence ended up coming forward, you could be looked at.

Peter Sheridan

Only if there is new, compelling evidence.

Oliver Colvile

What I want to ask you is: do you think you were deliberately prohibited from having that information shared with you?

Peter Sheridan

No, I think that we had the policing part of it and the policing considerations. We were not going to get involved in the political considerations around that. I do not think I was used, because we were clear what we were doing would be within the law, within ethical considerations for the police, and that is what we did. I do not think people deliberately used us because we were not going to be caught like that.

Oliver Colvile

Why do you think they did not share that information with you about the letters?

Peter Sheridan

Our remit is with the Director of Public Prosecutions, not with the Civil Service and the NIO or anywhere else. If you take an ordinary murder investigation, I would not be writing to the NIO. I write to the Director of Public Prosecutions. That is our route. What happens thereafter is not a matter for the Police Service.

Ian Paisley

During the course of Mr Baxter’s evidence, Mr Simpson asked him a question about the royal prerogative. Are you aware of any details where the royal prerogative has been given?

Peter Sheridan

I was not aware of it until I saw it in the judgment.

Ian Paisley

Have you been able to find subsequently anything, since then?

Peter Sheridan

I have not. I have been more exercised about the information about the PSNI.

Chair

That has been a very useful evidence session, Mr Sheridan. Thank you very much for joining us. Oral evidence: Administrative scheme for ‘on-the-runs’, HC 1194 34 [1] A link to “The Queen ‐v ‐ John Anthony Downey, Judgment: Abuse of Process”, Justice Sweeney, 21 February 2014 can be found here: http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/r-v-downey-abuse-judgment.pdf [2] A link to the Operation Rapid terms of reference can be found here: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/northern-ireland-affairs/Operation-Rapid-Terms-of-Reference.pdf [3] A link to the European Convention on Human Rights can be found here: http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf [4] The minutes of the OTR meeting on 9 June 2006 can be found here: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/northern-ireland-affairs/Minutes-of-the-OTR-meeting-on-6-June-2006-(flag%2017).pdf [5] A link to the report by Norman Baxter to Peter Sheridan dated 10 May 2007 can be found here: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/northern-ireland-affairs/Report-by-Norman-Baxter-to-Peter-Sheridan-10-May-2007%20.pdf [6] A link to the transcript of the oral evidence by Norman Baxter, former Head of the Serious Crime Branch, Police Service of Northern Ireland to the Omagh bomb inquiry of the Northern Ireland Affairs Select Committee on 11 November 2009 can be found here: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmniaf/374/374.pdf [7] A link to the “Report of the Consultative Group on the Past”, 23 January 2009 can be found here: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/victims/docs/consultative_group/cgp_230109_report.pdf [8] A link to the Operation Rapid terms of reference can be found here: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/northern-ireland-affairs/Operation-Rapid-Terms-of-Reference.pdf [9] The minutes of the OTR meeting on 9 June 2006 can be found here: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/northern-ireland-affairs/Minutes-of-the-OTR-meeting-on-6-June-2006-(flag%2017).pdf [10] The minutes of the OTR meeting on 9 June 2006 can be found here: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/northern-ireland-affairs/Minutes-of-the-OTR-meeting-on-6-June-2006-(flag%2017).pdf [11] This meeting and those outlined below are referred to in Lady Hallett’s report (page 59): http://www.hallettreview.org/filestore/uploads/2014/07/HallettReviewPrintReady.pdf [12] Peter Sheridan’s letter to the Department of the Director of Public Prosecutions (6 June 2007) can be found here: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/northern-ireland-affairs/Peter-Sheridan%e2%80%99s-letter-to-the-Department-of-the-Director-of-Public-Prosecutions-(6-June-2007)%20.pdf [13] A link to the letter from the Northern Ireland office to Mr John Downey of July 2007 is provided here: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/northern-ireland-affairs/Cover-letter-from-NIO-to-Gerry-Kelly-and-John-Downey-OTR-Letter-July-2007.pdf [14] The letter from the Rt Hon Lord Goldsmith QC, Attorney General to the Rt Hon Peter Hain MP, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland dated February 2006 can be found here: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/northern-ireland-affairs/Letter-from-Lord-Goldsmith-to-Peter-Hain-February-2006.pdf [15] An email exchange between members of the Historical Enquiries Team (HET) and the PSNI (23 July 2008 to 4 August 2008) can be found here: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/northern-ireland-affairs/Email-exchange-between-members-of-the-Historical-Enquiries-Team-(HET)-and-the-PSNI-(23-July-2008-to-4-August-2008)%20.pdf [i] A link to the letter from the Northern Ireland office to Mr John Downey of July 2007 is provided here: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/northern-ireland-affairs/Cover-letter-from-NIO-to-Gerry-Kelly-and-John-Downey-OTR-Letter-July-2007.pdf