Oral evidence: Administrative scheme for “on-the-runs”, HC 177Wednesday 2 July 2014
Oral evidence, 2 July 2014.
Witness
Rt Hon Dominic Grieve QC MP, Attorney-General, gave evidence.
Chair
Mr Grieve, thank you very much for joining us.
Mr Grieve
It is a pleasure.
Chair
Is there an opening statement you would like to make?
Mr Grieve
No, I do not have an opening statement to make. Obviously I responded to an urgent question in Parliament[7], I tabled a written ministerial statement[8] in respect of the Downey case at the time that the abuse-of-process argument succeeded, and we took the decision not to appeal it. I do not think there is very much more I can usefully say. I made clear at the time that I regarded this episode as an extremely unhappy one. The mistakes that led to this case taking place and the abuse‑of‑process argument should not have happened. That is quite clear. As a result, it is also quite clear that the relatives of the victims in this case will have a very justifiable sense of hurt as to what happened, as indeed, I suspect, would any right‑thinking person looking at the surrounding facts.
Chair
Before we get to the Downey judgment, this issue when it came out has led to this inquiry. It led to the Government setting up its own inquiry. It has led to an Assembly inquiry. It has led to an awful lot of hurt to a lot of people, one or two of whom we have questioned at this Committee. Can I ask why the Government did not volunteer an oral statement? Why was it necessary for me to put down an urgent question when this was such a big issue that led to the First Minister threatening to resign and, as I say, so much hurt? Why did the Government not feel it was necessary to do an oral statement to give the House of Commons chance to question either you or the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland?
Mr Grieve
I can only answer for myself. As you will appreciate, the role of my office in relation to the Downey case is a legal role, actually carried out essentially independently of Government, although it is a ministerial function of my superintendence of the Crown Prosecution Service. I was not then in any position to answer the wider public policy issues, which I think in many ways this Committee is trying to look at. The focus of my knowledge and of my Department’s responsibility is rather narrow. We tabled a written ministerial statement, which set out, very fully, I hope, the background from the point of view of the Crown Prosecution Service. That is what I would normally regard as the appropriate practice. What other Government Departments may or may not choose to do is a matter for them. You then tabled a UQ, and I went along and did my best to answer it. It is right that I remember saying when I opened my answers to your urgent question, that in terms of what I could say initially, that I was going to be, in a sense, repeating what I had put in the written ministerial statement. I was then asked a very large number of questions, perfectly pertinent ones, but in many cases ones, which, as I explained at the time, were not actually within my own direct remit in terms of being able to answer them. But there may well be other matters on which I can answer.
Chair
It was a Government decision that you should answer that urgent question. It was not my request that you did; it was the Government that decided to put you up, rather than another Minister.
Mr Grieve
The difficulty that arises in cases of this sort is that what had triggered this was the outcome of a prosecution. The only Minister who can answer in respect of the outcome of prosecutions is me. I think I made the point when I was answering the questions that there were wider issues of public concern and debate, which I wholly acknowledged at the time while I was answering were legitimate. They were doubtless going to be a subject of political debate in the House. Indeed, I suggested repeatedly that there were perfectly logical and good grounds why people would wish to pursue those lines of enquiry, but I myself could not answer them. I do not think it was the wrong decision to ask me to do it, because the decision centred round a court decision, and that did fall to me. I do not think I have ever had an experience where we have put two Ministers up to do a double act at the despatch box, and I think some choice has to be made somewhere. I do not feel that I, so to speak, had it parked on me when somebody else should have been answering, because the specific issue was the collapse of the case against Mr Downey.
Chair
Okay, thank you. Can I move on to that case then? Is it your opinion that a stay can be appealed?
Mr Grieve
Technically a stay can be appealed. The circumstances in which a stay can be appealed tend, in my experience, to be utterly and completely exceptional. I will have to go away and do some homework. The general rule is if a case has been stayed you would have to make an application to the Court of Appeal for the stay to be lifted. In my experience, it is a very unusual thing to occur. I am not saying it cannot happen, but most lawyers looking at a stay on a criminal prosecution imposed by a judge would say that that stay is not going to be lifted subsequently as a stay. Just to be quite clear, that is different from appealing the judge at first instance’s decision, just so that we should not be at cross-purposes on that. That it is a separate issue. Once the stay exists, as it does now, while it is possible that one could apply to have a stay lifted because of something quite extraordinary occurring, it would be utterly exceptional.
Chair
Could you give us an example of what might be considered to be “quite extraordinary”?
Mr Grieve
It would be very difficult to think of anything in this particular context. I suppose the sort of circumstance that might arise is if it subsequently turned out that all the parties in the case were utterly misled about the basis of the facts on which the stay had originally been granted to such a point that there was some quite extraordinary potential for miscarriage of justice. If I may say so, in the context of this case, nothing has suggested to me that such a thing arises. I would have to go away and trawl. I cannot think of any recent example—indeed at the moment I cannot think of any example of a stay being lifted.
Chair
Given the seriousness of these charges, though, do you accept that it seemed quite a flimsy reason, actually, not to proceed with the prosecution, on the basis of a letter that was only relevant at the time it was written, as we have heard from so many witnesses. It was a mistake, if we are generous about this, that the letter was sent at all. To most people we have interviewed, and probably everybody—in fact you will have heard Lord Goldsmith say a few moments ago that another judge may well take a different view. Did you not find it an extraordinary judgment?
Mr Grieve
No, I did not.
Chair
You brought the prosecution.
Mr Grieve
I did bring the prosecution, but I also read the judgment with great care. Indeed, I have re-read the judgment before I came here again this afternoon, as I had not looked at it for a while. I sat down with the most senior lawyer within the CPS dealing with terrorism crime, and I sat down with the prosecuting barrister, who was previously First Treasury Counsel at the Old Bailey before he moved onto other things, but he is still doing prosecuting work for us. We discussed this case in great detail before we took the decision not to appeal the judge’s judgment. All I can say is that whilst I have always been of the view that we were right to bring this prosecution and to attempt it, when I had read the judgement, and in particular the detail that only emerged in the course of the case as it went through—and we always thought this might happen because there was going to be more work to be done at the time the original charges were being brought. But not only had there been an initial mistake, but that mistake was compounded by, on at least two occasions, there being the possibility of it being rectified, but for reasons unexplained, that not happening. Therefore, the judge’s reasoning, as set out in his final paragraphs as his conclusion, seemed to me to be rather powerful and persuasive. Now, prosecutors should not go and appeal the decision unless they think they have good grounds for doing it. All I can say about that is that we looked at it very carefully, and the independent view that had been formed by the CPS, and indeed the view that I formed when I read it, which we then discussed, was that the judgment was unappealable.
Chair
I only heard this a few moments ago; you will know far more about it than I do—the Warren case; I understand a stay was refused, even though there was deliberate wrongdoing proven. Surely when there is no deliberate wrongdoing proven, this does make this an extraordinary judgment, given the seriousness of the cases or the charges.
Mr Grieve
It is an extremely serious case, but I can only go back to the reasoning set out by the judge, which is very comprehensive, very detailed, and goes into a wide range of issues about the circumstances in which Mr Downey found himself at Gatwick, the previous visits he had made to the United Kingdom on the back of the assurance that he had in this letter that he was not wanted, as against the process by which the mistakes were made and compounded, and he came to a conclusion. The Crown Prosecution Service and the lawyer prosecuting the case, who is extremely experienced, were very clear in their judgment that an appeal was not justified on the basis of these comprehensive finding. Having applied my mind, as an independent lawyer—although for part of it, it would not have been my decision, I had to give my consent to part of the prosecution on the Explosive Substances Act. So I had to be consulted, otherwise it would have been a CPS decision. Of course I am entitled to express a view, but it is the CPS’s decision on the other charge. I could not see any reason why I should fault the reasoning of the Crown Prosecution Service on this.
Lady Hermon
It is very good of you, as the current Attorney- General, to come and give us evidence this afternoon. We already know from evidence given to us by Mr McGinty, representing the Attorney-General’s office—and representing it very well; he was a very good witness indeed—that you were actually briefed in Opposition about the OTR scheme.
Mr Grieve
I am not sure that I would put it that I was briefed in Opposition.
Lady Hermon
You knew about the scheme when you were in Opposition.
Mr Grieve
I was asked a parliamentary question: when did I know that there was an OTR arrangement—I think that is the best way to describe it—in operation? Doing the best I could, and trying to remember as best I could my years in Opposition, I had to conclude that I knew that something was happening of this kind when I was in Opposition. I am afraid that I cannot tell you how I knew it. For the benefit of the Committee, many of you will know that I have had an interest in Northern Ireland matters that goes back even though I have never held a formal Opposition position. At times I have acted as an informal spokesman for the Opposition, and I was on the British-Irish parliamentary body, and I am a fairly regular attender at British-Irish Association annual conferences, which tend to bring together a very wide range of people in an Oxford or Cambridge college, when a lot of discussion takes place. I am also aware of what both John Reid[9] and Peter Hain[10] have said about statements made by them in the House. I have seen from your report and inquiry those statements, although I have to say to you that I do not remember being present in the House when those statements were made.
Lady Hermon
Those statements of course omitted any reference to Ministers.
Mr Grieve
All I can say is that at some point prior to 2010, I was aware that the Government had devised some way of providing reassurance, particularly in the context of Republicans or the IRA—some reassurance that they could come back into the jurisdiction without fear of being prosecuted. The details of that I was wholly unaware of; I should make that quite clear. The point I am simply making is I was not oblivious that something of this kind had gone on. Whether it was something that was said to me by somebody at a BIA conference, by one of my colleagues, who was indeed a spokesman on Northern Ireland matters, whether it was something that was said to me by one of the Government Ministers, with whom I actually enjoyed quite good and pleasant relationships because of the bi‑partisan approach that we had over Northern Ireland—all those things are possible, but I am afraid I just cannot remember.
Lady Hermon
Why on earth in 2010, when we have a new administration—the Labour Government has gone; the Labour Government had introduced this under Tony Blair. We know these letters have been going out since 2000, then they continued to go out in Prime Minister Brown’s time. We have a new Administration in 2010; the peace process was not in jeopardy in Northern Ireland. Why in heaven’s name did you, as the Attorney-General, continue with this scheme?
Mr Grieve
Would it be helpful if I explain what happened or happens when a new administration takes office?
Lady Hermon
Yes, I think that would be very helpful.
Mr Grieve
I was undoubtedly—I went off to find the briefing papers—briefed about the OTR scheme. Indeed, Mr McGinty confirmed that to you. I have been back to have a look because my recollection—recollection can be faulty—is that the understanding I derived from reading the briefing was of the OTR scheme in historic terms. I did not understand it to be a current issue requiring my attention. Having read that briefing, the first I knew that there was a current issue with OTRs was in 2012, when it was raised with me by the Northern Ireland Secretary.
Lady Hermon
Who was that at that stage?
Mr Grieve
Owen Paterson.
Lady Hermon
So Owen Paterson was well aware of the OTR scheme as Secretary of State.
Mr Grieve
If I may say so, you would have to ask him what he was aware of. In June 2012, he spoke to me on the fringes of a Cabinet meeting, and I remember it very well. He expressed concern about the scheme, about the propriety of its operation and continuance, and about its detail, and sought my advice. In due course I provided him with some advice. He came more formally, because when colleagues ask me things outside Cabinet it is usually quite wise to suggest that they go off and do it in a more formal way.
Lady Hermon
So why did you, Attorney-General, advise him that he could continue with this scheme? Because we know it did continue after 2012, did it not?
Mr Grieve
If I may say so, this brings us to the law officers’ convention, and I have to be just a little bit careful about what I may or may not say, although I am very conscious of the fact that I think Lady Justice Hallett has all the details. I provided the NIO and him with advice in 2012, and the advice was exactly in keeping with the advice that had been given by my predecessors, which was to express reservations about the operation of the scheme and its effect, particularly on prosecutorial decision-making; it was exactly in keeping with what others had said.
Lady Hermon
Attorney-General, I am not asking you to breach a convention; I know that you cannot tell the Committee the legal advice that you gave to Owen Paterson as the Secretary of State. That is really not what I am asking. I am asking why on earth the Coalition Government continued with this scheme, and when Owen Paterson had raised it with you, and raised his concerns in 2012, why the advice was not, “Well we were not saving the peace process in 2012; we certainly were not doing it in 2010.” Why did the Government continue with it at all?
Mr Grieve
Forgive me, because it may be that you have a factual basis that I do not necessarily have. I am aware, from what I have been told subsequently, that after 2010 the scheme continued. I have been told that the reason why the scheme continued was that there was some outstanding matters that had been put forward before 2010, which they wanted to see resolved.
Lady Hermon
By matters, you mean people’s names.
Mr Grieve
Yes, there were still outstanding names that had been fed into the system.
Lady Hermon
Yes. Not matters, but people’s names.
Mr Grieve
No, people’s names had been fed into the system on which they wanted the assurance. I understand those were partially or largely dealt with, although there may have been some outstanding ones. In 2012, Owen Paterson’s concern was that there was a suggestion that that the issue might be reopened yet again—that he was being asked to look yet again at more names, and he was troubled by that. That was when he came to ask for my view on the matter. I provided him with my view, and there were two issues. One was the question about the impact that such a process has on the prosecutors, where in fact, as you will be aware, on repeated occasions Attorneys-General have made the same comments that this is an uncomfortable system—not an unlawful one, but an uncomfortable system to operate from a prosecutor’s point of view. The second issue that arose was the question as to whether, in the light of devolution in 2010, this was an appropriate system to still be being run through the Northern Ireland Office.
Lady Hermon
Those were your two concerns at that particular time.
Mr Grieve
Those were the two issues. Those were his two concerns.
Lady Hermon
Can I just ask you then, had it not been for Mr Downey’s arrest at Gatwick Airport, and the OTR secret scheme coming to light, when would we have known about this scheme? Was it just hoped that nobody would have raised this in a court case? Did you just hope that by keeping quiet we would get through all of the other cases, all of the other names? What did you expect would happen?
Mr Grieve
If you will forgive me if I just come back to what I said at the outset. When I advised the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, or had a discussion with him in 2012, that brought to my notice that the OTR scheme still had life in it. But I have to say to you that, having fulfilled my duty over that, as I hope I did properly, the first time that I had to focus on what I would call the entire history of the OTRs, including what had been going on 10 years earlier, only arose when Mr Downey was arrested.
Lady Hermon
So forgive me for repeating the question: would the OTR scheme have continued, even to today, had it not been for Mr Downey’s case?
Mr Grieve
I cannot answer that question, because it is not for me. The OTR scheme is not the responsibility of myself as Attorney-General or indeed of any of my predecessors as Attorneys-General. As I hope I explained when I was asked one of the questions when I answered the urgent question—somebody said, “Well, who’s responsible?” and I said, “First, and I accept this, the Government has a collective responsibility for running any scheme, but this scheme was not directed or run, in practical Executive terms, by my office”. If it was run from anywhere, it was run from the Northern Ireland Office, although as indicated when you asked questions earlier, it would appear that, at much earlier stages, it had a high degree of involvement from Number 10 and the Prime Minister’s private office at a time when the political imperatives were of a higher order. My office, once the administrative scheme was running, operated a scheme of acting essentially as a channel of communication between the Northern Ireland Office and the police and the prosecutorial services in Northern Ireland. That is what it did, and that, I think, was fully explained by Mr McGinty when he gave his evidence, because I have seen what he said to you. I have no reason to disagree with that, although it is right that what I am telling you is what he has told me, because he is my source for most of the historic material about what actually was going on in the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010.
Lady Hermon
I would like to raise two technical points that will be within your remit. None of us on the Committee is a practising lawyer, so it would be very helpful to the Committee to know: when we took our first evidence session, it was with Mr Norman Baxter who, of course, has been named in the Downey judgment, and also ACC Sheridan, right at the very beginning of our inquiry. Both of them were extremely angry and annoyed that, in the course of the Downey case, which was conducted by written statements—it was not an open trial—neither Mr Baxter nor Mr Sheridan were asked for written statements. Why is it that the written statements that appear in the Downey judgment and that were asked for by defence counsel obviously—since the blame was going to be placed on the PSNI, why were no written statements asked for? It is a technical question because I have no idea why they were not asked for written statements to be submitted to the Downey trial?
Mr Grieve
If I may say so, I am not in a position to answer that. The Downey trial, once it moved into an abuse-of-process application, was managed by the judge in an adversarial system where counsel for Mr Downey would have requested information and disclosure, and the Crown Prosecution Service would have endeavoured to respond properly to the request for disclosure. I am aware that a lot of work went on to provide disclosure. People went backwards and forwards to Northern Ireland to look in archives; people went to check documents. In the course of that, I think it is right that more emerged than had been apparent at the beginning. That does not come as a great surprise to me. It was always clear to me when we started out on the process and took the decision to charge Mr Downey that that was a real possibility: that more would come out. Because we either had to charge him or release him; he either had to be charged or released. So it was quite apparent that this would all come out during the course of an abuse-of-process application if there was more to emerge, and more did emerge.
Lady Hermon
Forgive me, Attorney-General, but the one bit that did not emerge, of course, until we took evidence from Mr McGinty and the Attorney- General’s Office was the fact that Mr McGinty confirmed to this Committee that ACC Sheridan’s—the now retired Assistant Chief Constable—letter, which he sent in relation to the Downey case, was altered. It was altered by the Northern Ireland Office. Why did that fact not come out in the Downey case?
Mr Grieve
I have read what Mr McGinty said and, first, I am in no position to comment one way or the other on Mr McGinty’s evidence, except to say that I see nothing to suggest to me that the explanations that he provided in that evidence were inaccurate. However, I cannot answer the question; I am in no position to do so.
Lady Hermon
Let me rephrase the question then, and I certainly do not want to put the spotlight on Mr McGinty who was an excellent witnesses—a brilliant witness—in front of this Committee. Let me just concentrate on the Downey judgment. In the Downey judgment, we know that a catastrophic error was made by the PSNI and a particular police officer, who was named as Norman Baxter, and that has been refuted. Subsequently retired—very recently retired—chief constables of PSNI have apologised for what was allegedly a catastrophic error by Mr Baxter. However, Mr Baxter and Mr Sheridan have told this Committee that they did not know about administrative letters being sent out. When the Northern Ireland Office official telephoned and subsequently emailed PSNI headquarters and Mr Sheridan’s office to ask if the facts were correct—to ask if the details were correct and the checks had been carried out on Mr Downey—that Northern Ireland Office official did not, it seems, indicate that he was going to amend Mr Sheridan’s letter. It was altered, and that was the letter that was sent out. Why was that fact not made public in the Downey case?
Mr Grieve
I do not know why that fact was not made public in the Downey case. I did not have the handling of the running of the Downey case. All I can say is that looking at the overall evidence that you have been presented with from Sir Hugh Orde and others, I did not form the view that there was a suggestion within the PSNI that the responsibility for the mistake fell outside of them. Quite apart from your inquiry, we have asked Lady Justice Hallett to carry out a wide‑ranging review. I have to say to you that I would prefer that, rather than try to pontificate to you without any factual basis of being able to do so about this matter, we wait to see what Lady Justice Hallett has to say about how this problem arose. If it is right that there was something in that that was not put before the judge in the course of his judgment in Downey, then that will be something that we will have to take into account, but I am in no position to agree or disagree with this one way or another; I am just not.
Kate Hoey
By the way, did Lady Justice Hallett see Mr Baxter, or talk to Mr Baxter or Mr Sheridan, do you know?
Mr Grieve
I do not know.
Kate Hoey
Okay. I hope she did.
Mr Grieve
I have not an idea. I do not know if anybody has told you, but I am not privy to whom she may or may not have spoken to. She has spoken to me. I am quite happy to say that—to tell you that—but I am not aware of who else she may have spoken to.
Kate Hoey
Do you understand that there is a feeling that there is a whole almost establishment stitch‑up going on here, to make sure that any blame eventually, from whatever inquiry, will end up with the PSNI?
Mr Grieve
Yes, I have appreciated that from Lady Hermon’s questions; of course, I have. I appreciate that from the tenor of the discussion that you are having with me. But I am here to give evidence, not to engage in commentary, particularly commentary on matters that I actually am in no position to comment on from personal knowledge. The prosecution—conducted by the CPS, presented by Brian Altman as ex-Senior Treasury Counsel and helped by junior barristers, who went backwards and forwards looking at material that was held within the archives of the PSNI in response to disclosure applications—I very much hope was conducted correctly, brought before the judge and that it gave to the defence all the relevant documentation that they ought to have had for the judge to make a correct and informed decision on his judgment. If that did not happen, it is very unfortunate, although whose fault that would then be I have not the slightest idea. But, at the moment, I have no evidence to suggest that that is the case apart, obviously, from listening to Lady Hermon, who tells me that she has a concern that there may have been an error in showing the role of the Northern Ireland Office. I have read the transcripts and have also seen that some people, when this point has been put to them, have given you a reply suggesting that they do not think it is the Northern Ireland Office on whom blamed can be attributed in this context.
Kate Hoey
No, indeed. All the Secretaries of State spend their time saying how wonderful the Northern Ireland officials were. Can I ask you about when Downey was arrested in 2013? You knew that he had been given a comfort letter.
Mr Grieve
I knew very quickly that he had been given a comfort letter because I was told that he had a) been arrested, and b) had a comfort letter on him.
Kate Hoey
Right, so that did not influence in any way your agreement that he should be prosecuted? You did not think that—
Mr Grieve
It influenced this. It was a matter that required very careful consideration. Yes, of course it did. It was not a subject to just be saying, “Oh, we can ignore that”. We had to do some careful thinking about the propriety of prosecuting somebody who had produced such a letter of comfort. That was a role principally for the Crown Prosecution Service and for the barrister who was going to prosecute the case to give his view. However, it was also a matter that had to be, could be and, indeed, should be—particularly because I had to give my consent to the Explosive Substances Act charge—one I had to consider, with that hat on that I wear, which is non‑party political and is as lawyer in Government with the responsibility for superintendence. We did that.
Kate Hoey
Did you discuss with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland at the time, Owen Paterson, what was happening?
Mr Grieve
The fact that Downey had been arrested and the fact that he had a letter of comfort? Yes. That was a matter that had to be discussed in trying to ascertain, first, the circumstances in which he had got the letter of comfort.
Chair
If I could just interrupt again, we have been advised that there may be a Vote. We expected it at 4.00, but it could well come earlier. Again, I will have to suspend the Committee for 15 minutes and then continue.
Kate Hoey
He was arrested and you then discussed with the Secretary of State the difficulties—
Mr Grieve
Also we needed to make some preliminary investigations, although very quickly, about the circumstances in which this letter had been obtained. What emerged, even then, was that the letter had been issued to him mistakenly. You were asking the question earlier, “Was this a mistake?” Yes, it was a mistake. It was a very bad mistake. Of course, it was a mistake that was a two-edged sword. I suppose if no letter had ever been issued to him—this is the point, is it not?—he would never have been anywhere near Gatwick Airport. Indeed, he would never have come back from Donegal into the jurisdiction. But he had and he had, and he had this letter in his possession.
Kate Hoey
When you then decided, after all the advice, that you would actually allow the prosecution, did you warn the Secretary of State, and indeed the Prime Minister or anyone else, that this could potentially lead to a court case where abuse of process would lead to him being released?
Mr Grieve
Yes, it was quite clear to me that there was going to be an abuse‑of‑process application. It would have been astonishing if there had not been, in the circumstances.
Kate Hoey
But your feeling at that time was there was a 50-50 chance of it not being, with the judge?
Mr Grieve
My view was that, although it was a very arguable case for abuse of process, we thought that we could correctly argue that, in view of the fact that it was an innocent mistake, these were factors that would influence the judge to determine that, in fact, the trial should be allowed to proceed. I did not go ahead with the process on the basis that I thought it was going to fail. I say “I”, but I mean the Crown Prosecution Service. I want to emphasise this because I know it is a rather unusual relationship. I have a superintendence relationship. I work closely with them. In this case, there was no question but that we were completely of one mind about it. That included the view that the evidential tests being met—although the evidence in the Downey case was not unproblematic—and the public interest test being clear—namely, that it is very much in the public interest that somebody who has been charged with multiple murders should be brought to justice—there was no basis on which we should not proceed with this trial, whilst obviously being mindful that the surrounding circumstances meant that it was a matter that would have to be kept under review as we went along. That was the decision we took and that is how he was charged and that is how the prosecution was brought.
Kate Hoey
When that decision was being taken and you were coming to that judgment, did anyone in your office point out the Lord Goldsmith letter that had been written, some time ago admittedly—a number of years back—saying that Downey was wanted to be arrested on serious terrorist charges? It was written by Lord Goldsmith.
Mr Grieve
I may be wrong, but I do not remember the Lord Goldsmith letter of 2006, which is actually unrelated to the letter that he was waving around when he was arrested. I do not remember that detail being discussed.
Kate Hoey
No, I would not expect you to remember that because it was 2006. But, nevertheless, there was a letter that presumably was in the Attorney-General’s files not that long previously that had gone to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and it was very clear Downey’s name was on it.
Mr Grieve
Yes, I understand that. As I say, first, I do not remember that as being a key issue at the time that we proceeded with the prosecution because, in a sense, it was irrelevant to the prosecution. It may be relevant to the question of what the Northern Ireland Office may have known or not known about this matter—and I appreciate your line of questioning on that—but actually that was not the issue that we were having to consider. The issue that we were having to consider was: did the letter, which was undoubtedly given to Mr Downey via Sinn Féin, constitute effectively a bar on his being prosecuted for the offence because of the assurances contained within it.
Kate Hoey
Lord Goldsmith said very clearly that a different judge might have made a different decision. What I do not understand is: when did you actually get the telephone call or the notice of what the judge was going to say?
Mr Grieve
At or about the time he said it. I cannot remember exactly when I saw it, but—
Kate Hoey
It was probably the Sunday.
Mr Grieve
Kevin McGinty may know the answer. I just cannot remember. But I knew that there was, as sometimes happens in such cases, an embargoed judgment that was circulated to counsel before it was delivered in open court. That is a perfectly standard procedure, and I think I would have known very shortly before the judgment was heard in open court. It was to give the parties an opportunity to consider their position.
Kate Hoey
Then your first thought was: shall we appeal?
Mr Grieve
Obviously the first consideration that had to made was whether there should be an appeal. That was a matter on which I had a conference with the Crown Prosecution Service and prosecuting counsel. We considered all the aspects of the judgment, what had gone on during the abuse‑of‑process hearing, and the likely prospects of success of such an appeal being made.
Kate Hoey
Given what Lord Goldsmith said and given that another judge could have taken a different view—and he saw the judgment so he has read it all too—why would you, for the sake of the victims and for the sake of being seen to be open and public about justice, not think, “Well, it is actually worth appealing because this is too serious. We have a person here who has clearly evidence against him. He was involved in one of the worst atrocities on the mainland throughout the IRA period of terrorism and yet we are not going to seize this opportunity to at least try to get this sorted differently by an appeal judge”?
Mr Grieve
Lord Goldsmith did explain—because I was sitting here—that he has not had the benefit of studying the papers in this case or the judgment, or discussing the judgment with the counsel who did the case for the prosecution. Of course it is true—in a sense, it is a truism—that two judges on a matter may disagree reasonably in their approach to a case. Judges are not clones of each other; we are all human and judges are fallible as well. Some judges will take different views from others. But, in determining whether an appeal should be brought, you have to look at the totality of the judgment, bearing in mind that one judge has already given this the most minute examination and come down to a particular conclusion, and that in itself always carries some weight with the Court of Appeal, which is going to review it. You must then consider carefully what the bases are on which you are going to challenge the way the judge has approached it. An appeal is not just a re-hearing; an appeal is a process by which you fault the judge’s reasoning in the case and the way he has chosen to approach it.
Kate Hoey
I appreciate that you are a lawyer and I am not a lawyer, thank goodness, but to the layman it will seem that there was an opportunity to challenge what the judge had said. When we know that Mr Baxter was not even given the chance to give a statement to the judge—nor was Mr Sheridan or many other people—it seems to be a cosy conspiracy, almost, of people who were asked to give evidence. Surely that would have been the opportunity to get it looked at afresh by an appeal.
Mr Grieve
I have to say that I really do not see the smallest evidence of a cosy conspiracy in the way in which the case was presented or conducted in court at all. The case was conducted by the CPS using very skilled counsel as properly and as forthrightly as prosecutorial propriety demands. Prosecutors do have to act as ministers of justice, but they have also got to be pretty tough in furthering their cases. Everything I heard about the way in which this was conducted in court suggested to me that exactly that was done. But when you then face the fact that the judge has found against you, you have got to make an informed and careful decision about whether it is justified to appeal it. Quite apart from these cases, I have to make these decisions when people refer unduly lenient sentences to me. Just because it may be a case that has excited a lot of public anxiety, such as an unduly lenient sentence, does not mean that I should refer it unless I think there are good grounds for doing so. I have to say to you that when we looked at the judgment, looked at the surrounding facts and in particular what had emerged and had added to this case in the course of the abuse‑of‑process argument, the view that I was presented with—the unanimous view of those who were involved in this case—was that the judgment was not appealable. I took that same view. It is our decision. I cannot really amplify it more than that.
Kate Hoey
You do not think it was anything to do with just saying, “Look, let’s get this washed away; we do not want to raise all of this again”?
Mr Grieve
No, most certainly not. Just to make the position quite clear, no one in Government applied any suggestion or even a comment to me or to anybody else suggesting, “Oh well, we have had a go at this. Can we just quietly drop it?” Most certainly not.
Chair
Are you concerned, Mr Grieve, this could be the tip of iceberg. We heard Assistant Chief Constable Drew Harris tell us that, of those who had received letters, the police linked 95 of them—only through intelligence at this stage—to almost 300 murders[11]. Did that ring alarm bells when you heard that?
Mr Grieve
I am not sure it rings alarm bells with me. It highlights the fact that there are probably a large number of people in Northern Ireland who h ave committed heinous crimes who may never be brought to justice, or indeed even if they are not in Northern Ireland or are elsewhere. That may apply right across the board. I am afraid that we know that there are a large number of unsolved cases in the context of Northern Ireland, and there are many victims who have never seen and will probably never see justice. At the risk of repeating what has been said, but I will say again—I do not think I have said it so far, although I said it at the time of the urgent question—that in fairness to those who produced this scheme in the period of 2001 through to 2007, if the scheme had been operating properly so that no mistakes were made, it should have had no bearing on whether somebody against whom a prosecution could be brought would escape prosecution. It should and could have had no such bearing because, as has been said, it was a statement of existing fact that there was no basis on which somebody could be prosecuted. It always contained the caveat that if further evidence came to light, then the person was at risk at that stage of being arrested. All they could be told was, “As matters stand at the moment, you would not be prosecuted because there is no evidential basis for doing it”. That is quite important. Coming back to your original question, I am very troubled that there are many people who escape justice or may have escaped justice, but unless we can have the evidence against them, we cannot prosecute.
Chair
No, indeed. But the point is that they have letters and they may well come back into this country and use that letter as a protection. The police are saying that they are going to spend the next two to three years looking into 95 people who they are linking, through intelligence, to almost 300 murders. That is a terrible situation to find ourselves in. I am not blaming you for that situation, but it is a very worrying situation surely?
Mr Grieve
If I may say so, it becomes worrying if material is turned up as a result of this further work that could found a prosecution and it cannot because the letters were given to them mistakenly. But I do not know about that, and I do not know whether the Committee knows more about that. I am not in a position to say more about that. That could happen, but equally the further work being done by the police could unearth evidence on which it is perfectly possible to prosecute them, notwithstanding the fact that they have got letters. It would only be impossible if the letters had misled the individuals to doing something to their detriment, and even then it might not be. It all depends on the extent and degree to which that happened, which is why each of these cases has to be looked at in isolation. On the Downey case in that context, I do not know if it is exceptional. I hope very much that it is. But particular circumstances outlined in Mr Justice Sweeney’s judgment in Downey without doubt go beyond just a simple mistake; it is a compounded error. That, I think, made it particularly problematical.
Ian Paisley
Mr Grieve, mindful of what you have just said and, indeed, the importance of what you have just said and the public concern around this entire saga, could legislation be introduced that would annul, rescind, remove, withdraw or revoke all of the letters—their effect and purpose—so as we are in no doubt that none of this sorry saga would be repeated?
Mr Grieve
I do not actually think that legislation is needed. These letters do not constitute an amnesty. An amnesty would require legislation and, actually, revoking an amnesty after you have legislated for one might well raise some very difficult and complex issues indeed. I think I would steer away from that. The letters are capable of being rescinded, although it raises some difficult issues about whether one would then have to give somebody notice—if a letter were to be rescinded—to be able to leave the jurisdiction, seeing as they were attracted into it in the first place. If I may say so, it is precisely these sort of rather difficult points, which may not arise, that highlight why prosecutors were, I think, so cautious about this process in the first place.
Ian Paisley
Throw caution to the wind. You are a politician; you are like me; you are elected; you are answerable to the people. Should this Parliament revoke these letters?
Mr Grieve
It is a matter for the House, not for me. I have given you my best take on the significance of these letters and whether they need to be revoked. What Parliament chooses to do is a matter for Parliament. I simply point out that, as you will have heard from ex-Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland, they believe that the letters were very important in the context of taking forward the peace process, which undoubtedly required some very strange things to happen indeed. Indeed, Parliament, in cases, enacted legislation. Individuals who, on conviction, should have received whole life tariffs served two years’ imprisonment.
Ian Paisley
If legislation was to be introduced to have that effect, would that create an exceptional circumstance that would allow you to go back to the stay on the Downey case?
Mr Grieve
No.
Ian Paisley
Definitely not.
Mr Grieve
I am quite satisfied that we would be in very difficult and dangerous territory on retrospection and also on some basic issues of human rights. No. The Downey case, in terms of the judgment, unless, as I say, the stay were ever lifted, is done. That is not to say, if there were other matters that ever emerged—that is a different issue. This case, as it stands, has been dealt with unless there were grounds on which the stay could be lifted. We discussed earlier my explanation as to why I think that is a very unlikely thing to happen.
Ian Paisley
A civil prosecution, then ,you think would be—
Mr Grieve
There is nothing to prevent civil proceedings being brought by relatives of victims against anybody.
Kate Hoey
And will the state help pay for that?
Mr Grieve
That is a legal aid matter, is it not, if I may so? Legal aid is a devolved issue in Northern Ireland. Of course, in the case of Mr Downey, it is a matter that relates potentially to England and Wales, and that falls within the remit of the Lord Chancellor.
Ian Paisley
Do you agree that any lawyer worth his or her salt is going to make a case of abuse of process if a case were to arise in the future where a client of theirs has one of these letters?
Mr Grieve
There must be a very high probability that, if there is an attempt to prosecute somebody who has a letter, abuse of process will be run. However, that is a very different thing from saying that the abuse of process argument will succeed. I do stress this: you have to look at each case on its individual facts. The Downey case has a series of individual facts that are very particular to it. I have no idea—and I do not suppose anybody on this Committee has any idea—whether there are any other cases of this type. If there are other cases of people being wrongly given letters, is it an isolated error or a compounded error, as is the case here? I just do not know.
Ian Paisley
Last week, we did find out that a letter was issued mistakenly and then revoked.
Mr Grieve
That shows the process of a revocation working.
Ian Paisley
If there was—I stress if there was—legislation put in place to remove these letters, how likely would an abuse‑of‑process case then be, and how likely would it be to succeed?
Mr Grieve
You are asking me to answer a question that is probably unanswerable. Forget for a moment about the legislation. If a letter is revoked, then I would expect a prosecution to be possible, although if the consequence of the revocation is that the individual concerned is arrested before they have an opportunity of leaving the jurisdiction because of the revocation of the letter, then there will be an abuse of process argument that will be brought forward. It would be said that they had acted to their detriment and not been given the opportunity. But if somebody has their letter revoked, leaves the jurisdiction and comes back voluntarily 12 months later for some other reason and is arrested, then the letter cannot, for obvious reasons, in my judgment provide a protection for them anymore. Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. On resuming—
Ian Paisley
It was a very interesting session there. I noticed Gerry Adams just avoided going into the Division Lobby by about 10 yards, so who knows what progress is being made in this place? Anyway, Mr Grieve, I have one last question. I do not want to pre‑empt the outcome of the Hallett review on 17 July, but are you expecting any actions to flow from your Department as a result of that review?
Mr Grieve
I am not sure whether there are any actions from my Department that need to follow. It all depends on what the Hallett review says. Clearly, the Hallett review is going to look at both what happened and why it happened. My understanding has also been that the Hallett review is going to look at whether there are other instances in which this has happened. Clearly, if there were found to be other instances, it is going to have to be a view taken by Government, and particularly by the Northern Ireland Office, how one responds to that. You have been raising some of those points with me. My Department may have some involvement with this, but, as I and Lord Goldsmith have tried to explain, the reality is that my Department provides legal advice. It also provides a channel of communication between the prosecutors and the Executive, which otherwise would not exist. That is one of the constitutional roles of the Attorney-General. That is what we did in the course of these events. It is not departmentally for us to take a particular lead on anything, although, if we are asked to co-operate as a result of anything that arises out of Hallett, we will of course do so.
Oliver Colvile
First of all, thank you very much indeed, Dominic, for coming to see us. Can I ask you a number of questions? When did you sign off the proceedings for this to go to court?
Mr Grieve
Offhand, I do not know, but we can provide the date. I would have had to sign a fiat in respect of the Explosive Substances Act. We did it the next morning, Kevin McGinty reminds me. He was under arrest; we did it the next morning. It was done, obviously, because he was in custody. The custody time limits had to operate. We moved quite swiftly. I can give the Committee the date. The fiat is a matter of public record.
Oliver Colvile
That would be very helpful. He comes back to this country on 19 May 2013. He then says, “I do not know why you are arresting me, because I have got this letter.” Did you not think to yourself, “Well, I had better find out what we actually wrote to him in the first place”? Did you find out what was written to him?
Mr Grieve
I think that the letter was made available to us. I cannot remember. Again, you would have to ask Mr McGinty about that. I certainly was aware that he had a letter, and I was aware—we have already discussed it—about the OTR scheme, because I had been briefed about its historical existence at the time that I came into office. Fortunately, I had Mr McGinty in the office, able to come and give me details and chapter and verse about a great deal of it, so, certainly, at some point, we saw the letter.
Oliver Colvile
Despite the fact you had seen the letter, you made a judgment that that probably did not really count.
Mr Grieve
When a prosecutor is faced with possible challenges about abuse of process, you can make judgments. You also keep those judgments under review. You may think there are perfectly good grounds for charging this individual, and then we can look more into the background to see whether there is any justification. Of course, the alternative to charging him is that he goes, in which case you have lost your defendant and you may not be in a position to re‑arrest him. There are grounds on which he can be charged: public interest grounds; evidential test met because we have the evidence, which has been kept, so to speak, in cold storage for many years waiting to be used should he ever become available. We wished to go ahead, but of course we were also going to be doing more work. Indeed, we did more work, as I explained, right through the entirety of the abuse‑of‑process argument, which is exactly what I would have expected.
Oliver Colvile
I may have misunderstood what you said, but you said you were not surprised when the judge made the pronouncement he did.
Mr Grieve
I said two things. Firstly, I was not surprised that, as the process unfolded, we got more information about the background. What I had not been aware of at the beginning, for example, was it was clear there had been a mistake, but the compounding of the mistake by the fact that no action had been taken on it was not something I was aware of at the start. That only emerged as we started looking at the information available. It was always in our mind that there was a risk that an abuse‑of‑process argument would succeed, yes.
Oliver Colvile
The point is this, though. He arrives back here. You are aware about the letter. You press ahead with the court case. You know that the letter that he has been sent might be a potential issue as far as producing a successful prosecution, yet you continue to go ahead with it. How does that stack up?
Mr Grieve
I think it stacks up completely. We took a view that there were reasonable prospects, that the case met the evidential and public‑interest tests and that, in addition to that, there were good reasons for thinking that, while we could not be certain about the outcome of an abuse‑of‑process argument, nevertheless, we had a justified case to put to the court that would make the court conclude that an abuse‑of‑process argument was unjustified and therefore dismiss it, which would allow the trial to take place. That was our approach, but, clearly, you keep the matter under review. At no point is it more important to keep it under review than when the argument has taken place and the judge has crystallised the arguments and presented his own reasoning about it, including his view that it was an abuse of process. Then you have to review it again, and that is what we did.
Oliver Colvile
My understanding is that, by 2010, by the time the coalition came to power, a lot of these matters had been devolved back down to Northern Ireland, yet the Whitehall Government continues to express a very keen interest in what is going on. Certainly, David Ford, who is the Justice Minister, claims that he knew nothing about this at all. Surely he should have been told at a much earlier stage. Why is it that the Whitehall Government was continuing to take an interest in this issue when it was a devolved matter?
Mr Grieve
I will do my best to reply to that in just a second, but can I, first of all, ascertain that that is not linked to your earlier question? The two are completely unrelated, so I would just say that. They are two different matters. To come back, then, to your second question, the devolution process to Northern Ireland is an unusual one; that may be a fair way of describing it. The structures that were put in place as a result of the Good Friday Agreement, which were agreed by and follow on the referendum, devolved and eventually led to a devolution of power to Northern Ireland, but it is not as if the Northern Ireland Executive replicates, in devolved form, the systems of Westminster governance. For example, when you are looking at the prosecutorial or justice functions of the state, the powers of the Justice Minister in Northern Ireland are very different from those exercised by the Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State for Justice here. The relationship between the state, the police and the prosecutorial systems are entirely different. You heard from John Larkin, the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland. The Attorney-General for Northern Ireland has no superintendence responsibilities over the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland of any kind whatsoever. The DPP for Northern Ireland, in terms of prosecution, essentially combines my role with his, all rolled into one. On top of that, he is wholly independent of the structures of the Northern Ireland Executive, apart from the fact that he is appointed by the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland, although that is done, in fact, by an Appointments Commission, as I think John Larkin explained to you. He is, in that sense, an entirely independent entity. Of course, the PSNI has answerability to its board, but its relations with the devolved Executive are quite different. On top of that, you do not have collective responsibility of the Executive, which, in Westminster governance terms, is very unusual. It was set up to meet and respond to the peace process and to try to bring violence to an end. You are absolutely right that, in 2010, there was a devolution of justice to Northern Ireland, including the removal of my superintendence role, the independence of the Public Prosecution Service and, of course, the policing structures, so that those were operating independently. It can be argued, and perfectly clearly argued, that, if somebody wishes to get a letter of the type that we have been looking at, post‑2010, then the place to go is to write directly to the only two entities that could actually respond, because there is no filter channel through the Northern Ireland Executive, which would be the DPP and the police. How they wish to weigh the public interest and respond to that themselves would be a matter for them. That said, it is perfectly obvious that, for the purposes of government of Northern Ireland, particularly if there is a national security angle, I still have a role to play because I am still Advocate General for Northern Ireland. Of course, the DPP for Northern Ireland is free to consult with anyone he likes in terms of how to approach any particular problem that may come his way. The administrative scheme, as you have heard, had been operating for some time under the previous reserved system, and the method that was adopted post‑2010, which, as I have always understood it, mainly concerned matters that had been referred pre‑2010, was to follow the previous practice. I have to say I do not see anything particularly wrong about that, but it is right to point out that the structures of responsibility had undoubtedly changed post‑2010 and that, certainly initially, the systems, for whatever reason, were not reflective of that. That is not to say that the systems were wrong. Ultimately, however, that is a matter that has to be determined by the DPP for Northern Ireland and the police, because of their independent status.
Oliver Colvile
Forgive me, but how is he able to do that if he does not know anything about it?
Mr Grieve
I am not sure that is right. As I understand the matter, there is a historic memory within the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland that has been operating and playing a role in the administrative scheme for a long time.
Lady Hermon
What was the statutory authority for the coalition Government here, after 2010, after devolution of policing and justice, to have retained their involvement in the OTR scheme? I know that John Larkin, the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland, was unable to give us a straight answer. In fact, he just could not give us an answer to that at all. Maybe he had not thought of it. What is the answer?
Mr Grieve
Maybe he had thought of it a great deal; I do not know. The fact of the matter is that it is open to anyone to channel a communication through to the DPP for Northern Ireland and the PSNI to ask them whether they will cooperate in doing something. The status of the individuals doing it is rather irrelevant, which is why the point has been raised as to whether, in future, if this were to continue in any shape or form, it should be done directly to them.
Oliver Colvile
I rather agree with you; it seems to me there is some confusion in this. This may be a non sequitur as well, but have you had much correspondence or communication with Sinn Féin? Have they spoken to you at all?
Mr Grieve
No, never. I have never had any communication from Sinn Féin. I do not think I have had any communication from Sinn Féin, certainly in my official capacity as Attorney-General, since I took office in 2010. I am not aware of it, and certainly not over this. Kevin will correct me if I have got it wrong, but I am not aware of having had anything.
Oliver Colvile
The reason I ask that question is that I would be very interested to know whether or not the coalition Government or Ministers or representatives within it have since had representations from Sinn Féin. It appears, to my mind, that most certainly before 2010, they were quite regularly in touch, not only with Number 10, but Jonathan Powell, maybe Tony Blair and the Secretaries of State as well. I just wondered whether or not they felt they could continue to have what I would claim to be a slightly cosy relationship with the Government.
Mr Grieve
I do not think it is the case, and I would be a little bit surprised if the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has not had contact with the Deputy First Minister in the course of their periods in office since 2010.
Oliver Colvile
I mean on this specific issue, though, to do with on‑the‑runs.
Mr Grieve
You would need to ask the Secretaries of State.
Oliver Colvile
Do not worry; we will. When we met with John Larkin when we were in Belfast, one of the points that I asked him was whether or not he felt that some of these actions had ended up potentially perverting the course of justice in relation to the victims who now, from what we heard from them, feel rather let down. They got nowhere. He said, yes, he thought there was an argument for that. Would you agree with that, or do you think that is not the case?
Mr Grieve
I do not think that the process by which the letters to the OTRs were issued at any time has come anywhere remotely close to a perversion of the course of justice. A point has been made: if it was, then the letters would be unlawful. I have stated my view, and I have explained to you at the very outset. From a point of view of a prosecutor trying to keep a clear line on their work, the process by which these letters had been issued is not a comfortable one. Mr McGinty made his own comments before you, which I have no reason to disagree with, and, indeed, every reason to agree with, which is one of the reasons why, when I came to answer the urgent question, I was very conscious that this was a process that had gone wrong. There were risks inherent in it. It has been acknowledged by Lord Goldsmith, when he gave evidence to you, that there were risks inherent in it, which they tried to guard against. In this case, they had failed, but that does not amount to an attempt to pervert the course of justice, unless it were to be shown that somebody had deliberately, in some way, sought to engineer these letters in order to try to give somebody an ability to get off. It would be a very convoluted argument, and nobody has ever suggested it.
Oliver Colvile
The final question I would ask you is: what advice would you give to the victims’ families as to how they might proceed? At the moment, they feel they have no way in which to bring a course of action. It is rather similar to the question I asked Lord Goldsmith. What advice would you give them?
Mr Grieve
In the case of the Hyde Park bombing, I have had an opportunity to meet with the relatives of victims, which I did after we took the decision that we were not going to proceed to appeal. I had an opportunity talk to them. Obviously, as has been discussed previously, these letters are no bar on civil proceedings. In terms of criminal proceedings, in view of the judgment we now have, the letter is a bar on Mr Downey being prosecuted for the Hyde Park bombings, unless other offences were to come to light or there was some other very significant material change. I certainly did not attempt, when I saw them, to suggest that somehow there was some other avenue over this case, because, in my judgment at present, this case is at an end.
Kate Hoey
What further evidence would be needed? There is evidence. We know there is evidence. Everybody accepts there is evidence. What further evidence would be needed to get the case reopened?
Mr Grieve
As a prosecution has been attempted and has been stayed, we are in a rather different world from if no prosecution had been attempted. I am not sure there is any further evidence on this matter that would serve to transform the position, because there has been a stay granted. I come back to the point I made earlier about the difficulties of getting a stay lifted. I do not think it is useful for me to comment further on that.
Chair
Generally, though—not with Mr Downey, but with anybody else who has received a letter—what would you determine new evidence to be? What is the definition of “new evidence”?
Mr Grieve
New evidence can be almost anything. Remember that the purpose behind the writing of the letters was to provide an indication or not, as the case may be, that there was no current evidential basis on which a person could be prosecuted. The point has been made already to the Committee about where a person in reliance on that were to return to the jurisdiction, but subsequently some new evidence came to light. Remember, the letters, when they were written, were not about particular offences. They were generic. They were not saying, “We cannot prosecute you for a particular outrage”. They were just saying, “There is no evidential basis for prosecuting you in this jurisdiction at the present time on anything”. Should that position change, and any evidence comes to light, particularly in relation to terrorism offences, but anything, of course, in those circumstances—we have made the point—it would be possible to bring a prosecution, as long as you could show that that evidence was not available at the time the letter was written.
Chair
If it is in a police file when the letter is written and it is missed—
Mr Grieve
That could be different from a new witness coming forward and saying that they can identify a person as having committed a crime, yes.
Chair
If it is in the file when the letter is written but it is missed, is that not new evidence if it turns up a year later?
Mr Grieve
It all depends how and where it was missed. We have to be a bit careful, but, if it is within the knowledge of the prosecutor, then the prosecutor is fixed with that knowledge, and I do not think there is any way out of that. If is something that is not within the prosecutor’s knowledge, it is new evidence.
Chair
This is where the writing of the letter is risky, isn’t it, because it is not clear at all?
Mr Grieve
Lord Goldsmith made that point as clearly as I could have wished, but back then, if I may say so—I say this without acting as an advocate—that has to be weighed against the significance of these letters in terms of taking the peace process forward.
Kate Hoey
A form of blackmail.
Mr Grieve
That is an intensely political issue. When I read the evidence of Peter Hain or John Reid, I certainly am mindful, before I start passing judgment one way or the other, that they were having to take Northern Ireland from a position where hundreds of people, certainly over a decade nearly 1,000, were killed to a decade where under 100 were. These are very big differences
Nigel Mills
That last comment leaves us in the usual dilemma on these things, and whether these were essentially meaningless things that anyone could have got or were so critical to the peace process that they justified pushing the boundary a little. Naomi asked it earlier. It is very hard to square those two situations. Either these things were offering no new rights that were not already available or they were doing something that could move the peace process on.
Mr Grieve
They were of value, because they offered the prospect of individuals who had self‑exiled out of the jurisdiction because they believed or feared they would be prosecuted the reassurance that they could come back into the jurisdiction and pursue their private and family lives and careers, whereas otherwise they would not have done so, because they believed that they were at risk of prosecution. In one sense, the state that wrote the letters was losing nothing, because there was no possibility, at that time, of these individuals being prosecuted for anything, and the individuals were gaining something and, seeing that they appeared to be or were claimed to be active participants in and supporters of the peace process, it was part of the process of trying to bring a very bloody and very difficult chapter in Northern Ireland’s history to a close, and trying to bring about a situation in which violence abated and stopped. These are very difficult issues. I was elected in 1997 and watched the peace process, not in its entirety; those of you were here before 1997 will know even more about it, but you can see how difficult it has been. I used to attend British‑Irish Association conferences with people almost chucking things at each other and real vast levels of emotion, and watched how that has changed over a period into an ability for much greater dialogue and cooperation, but there are victims in this process; of course there are. There are very large numbers of people, both in Northern Ireland—I know some of them—and in this jurisdiction, in here, who have been left without children, parents, brothers, sisters. It is a tale of human folly.
Nigel Mills
The difficulty is the way you put that would lead someone to think perhaps the public‑interest test would therefore not have been satisfied and we should have said, “Well, we should just draw a line under all these and let them all back in to conduct the peace process”.
Mr Grieve
Parliament had been asked to consider some form of amnesty and had taken the clearest possible decision to reject it. Prosecutors are there to see that the rule of law is enforced. Of course, there may be public‑interest tests surrounding particular cases, and past attorneys general have had to exercise quite complex reasoning on public interest. Subject to that caveat, if there is no amnesty, then it is normally in the public interest for an individual to be prosecuted, and that is why this prosecution was attempted.
Nigel Mills
You have said that this arrangement was problematic for prosecuting authorities and attorneys general. I go back to the questions I asked Lord Goldsmith earlier, which I think you heard, about how robust the work behind producing these letters needed to be—some were issued in your time—for you to feel confident that this was the right side of being problematic rather than the wrong side of being unlawful.
Mr Grieve
It is clear that some of the letters were issued post‑2010. Until the Downey case came along, there had never been, as far as I am aware, a suggestion that letters had been wrongly issued. The risk was there. Lord Goldsmith acknowledged that in the evidence he gave to this Committee. That is something that I am sure was factored in at the time that this was originally considered. I have no reason to think that I differed from my predecessors in any way in seeking to highlight the problems that such a process can undoubtedly pose, when you want to keep the purity of the prosecutorial system. Against that has to be weighed the difficulties and convolutions of the Northern Ireland peace process. Those of you who are from Northern Ireland or know Northern Ireland intimately will know just how convoluted this has been.
Nigel Mills
The question I was trying to ask was, if the process was so superficial, it must be very hard to be confident that there would not be some evidence sat in a file somewhere that was going to be overlooked. Would that not make you think that the risk was too high that this would make the prosecution process so impure that the damage would be greater than the good that was trying to be done?
Mr Grieve
No one, before Mr Downey came along, had ever suggested to me that they thought that the process that was being followed before a letter was written to an OTR was not rigorous. Mr McGinty was able to explain to you in evidence how it was done. Obviously, we can only talk about the coordinating role because of the way it passed backwards and forwards through the Attorney-General’s office. I think you heard some evidence about how it was supposed to be done in the PSNI: looking at the records on computers; the fact it was checked through by the police; they were supposed to check not just Northern Ireland but also other police areas and jurisdictions within the United Kingdom; the fact that it went to the Public Prosecution Service, who checked their records to make sure they had nothing in their records about it, and so on. I have to say, then, that I do not think, from what I have seen, that it was, in any way, a casual process. Lord Goldsmith was commenting earlier about complaints that it was taking too long, which came from time to time.
Nigel Mills
In the first phase, rather than the Rapid phase.
Mr Grieve
As I say, because I had no direct involvement with the process, I cannot comment as to whether I think it was slapdash, but I have to say I have seen nothing to suggest to me that this was intended to be a slapdash process or, indeed, was being applied in a way that somebody would say, “This really is very slapdash”. It is, however, possible that I may be wrong about that, which is, in a sense, one of the things which Lady Justice Hallett may be able to help us on.
Nigel Mills
If it was all fine, why did the Government stop the scheme when the Downey case broke? Why would we not just continue issuing these things if there is no problem?
Mr Grieve
I think, if I may say so, you may wish to ask the Northern Ireland Office about the precise way in which the scheme ran down and stopped, because I was under the impression—but I may be mistaken about it—that, although there was a desire to finish the original names that had been put forward, there was a decision, as I understand it, and a view taken before Downey had come along that this was no longer a matter that should be handled by the Westminster Government and that, if it was to be continued, it would have to be done elsewhere.
Kate Hoey
When did the scheme actually finish?
Mr Grieve
I do not know. You will have to ask the Northern Ireland Office.
Kate Hoey
Sinn Féin said to us, in their written evidence—they are too frightened to come in front of this Committee and give verbal evidence—that three individuals were confirmed as cleared by the Northern Ireland Office on 3 March 2014. Did you know that?
Mr Grieve
No, I did not.
Nigel Mills
Just one last question: I was just reading the nine policies about the law and justice system that I think your office has. When you look at things like “creating a transparent justice system”, “protecting the UK against terrorism”, “making sentencing more effective” and “helping and supporting victims of crime”, this kind of secret process flies in the face of pretty much all of them, does it not? It does not feel like a very happy place to be, does it?
Mr Grieve
I am not sure I agree with you about that. To begin with, I cannot speak for my predecessors but I do not think that what was being done by—Whitehall cannot operate without cooperation within the Civil Service and, if the method by which there is a channel of communication between the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland and the police, and the Northern Ireland Office, has to be via the Attorney-General’s Office, or at least not directly, then, unless it was the case that what was happening was unlawful, there would have been no reason for my office not to do it. In those circumstances, it would be a proper thing for them to do, and I do not think it in any way detracts from the other things. I can only go back to saying what I said originally: that it was also done in the full knowledge that this process, when it has been running, had an undoubted impact on what I call the overall integrity of the prosecutorial services. This was highlighted over and over again, not because it prevented a prosecution taking place—that was not the intention—but because it asked prosecutors to do something which was undoubtedly unusual. If I were to go over to New York and ring up Bernard Hogan-Howe and say to him, “Can I fly back tomorrow? I am concerned I might be arrested at Heathrow Airport on arrival,” I think he might say, “You are the person who knows why that might be the case, not me. Goodbye.”
Nigel Mills
That is the point, is it not?
Lady Hermon
Could I just briefly take you back to a really important point, and that is—I am repeating myself here. I did mention that, when the question was asked of John Larkin, currently the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland—what statutory authority do the British Government and the Northern Ireland Office have? What is their statutory basis for continuing with this scheme post the devolution of justice and policing to Northern Ireland? In part of your response, after a long explanation—it was very interesting but it was a long explanation—you mentioned the words, “It was the practice”. You did not mention “custom and practice”, thank goodness, but you did say, ‘It was the practice, so we continued with it”. What statutory authority did you have for doing so? I ask that because it has been suggested at senior levels—I think the First Minister of Northern Ireland has certainly suggested it—that the letters that were sent out post the devolution of policing and justice were the British Government and the Northern Ireland Office acting ultra vires; that you had no statutory authority for doing so. Do you want to address those points?
Mr Grieve
I think that, in one way, I am not in a position to address it. If somebody thinks that the Government is acting ultra vires, they must act upon it. I would, however, simply say this: the United Kingdom is a country subject to parliamentary sovereignty here, and with a United Kingdom Government located here. The United Kingdom Government can devolve power elsewhere, if it chooses; it has done in the case of Scotland; it has done in the case of Northern Ireland; and it has done in the case of Wales, and all in different shapes and forms. I cannot think of anything that prohibits the United Kingdom Government from communicating with state organs around the United Kingdom unless there is something in statute that prohibits it. If I may say so, I do not think there is anything that prohibits it in this particular case. Moreover, I think that the other thing that may be relevant is that I do not think that there is any other mechanism for consultation provided. Because of the different role of the Northern Ireland Executive, there is no role provided for the Northern Ireland Executive to replace the United Kingdom Executive in its dealings with the Public Prosecution Service and the police.
Lady Hermon
Attorney-General, you are telling this Committee that it is proper, acceptable and right, even when we have devolution—we have a First Minister, we have the devolution of policing and justice and we have had the Justice Minister elected since 2010—that, behind their backs, because they were not aware of this administrative scheme, the British Government—
Mr Grieve
I cannot comment on whether or not they knew or they did not know.
Lady Hermon
We have taken evidence and I would not call into question the integrity or honesty of David Ford or, indeed, Peter Robinson.
Mr Grieve
I was not suggesting—
Lady Hermon
No, and they have told us quite clearly they were not aware of this administrative scheme. How can that be right? How can it be justified that the British Government and the Northern Ireland Office continued, behind the backs of the First Minister and the Justice Minister, post the devolution of policing and justice, on such a controversial and critical issue as dealing with OTRs? What was the authority for doing so?
Mr Grieve
What was the authority—
Lady Hermon
The legal authority.
Mr Grieve
What was the legal authority for not doing so? Forgive me for reversing the—
Lady Hermon
No, you are the Attorney-General; I am not.
Mr Grieve
Forgive me, because you are raising, if I may say so, a perfectly valid political point—and, doubtless, this may be of great interest to the Committee—about the way in which devolution has taken place to Northern Ireland. I am not seeking to prevent you from doing that. All I am saying is that, whilst I have not examined the subject closely—and somebody may persuade me otherwise—I would point out, just to dot the Is and cross the Ts, that, in 2012, the point was made that the involvement of the Westminster Government in this process, in the light of the way devolution has taken place, is, arguably, no longer valid and the requests should go straight to the PPS and the DPP for Northern Ireland, rather than come through the NIO. I have not seen anything to suggest that the NIO is forbidden from communicating with the DPP for Northern Ireland to pass on requests from Sinn Féin or anybody else for consideration as to whether a letter of comfort can be supplied through the PSNI and the Public Prosecution Service, any more, for that matter, than other people might be able to make such an approach as well. I just do not think that there is anything that says that that cannot be done.
Lady Hermon
You are not, however, able to give the Committee any legal authority for this practice to have continued post the devolution of policing and justice. I do not want to rehearse it but I am just summarising what you said.
Mr Grieve
Let us put this way: there is certainly nothing in the devolution statute that has been brought to my attention—but, again, somebody may prove me wrong—that says that this is a practice that will continue. Bear in mind, with one exception: that the issue of national security is reserved and, indeed, I keep express powers as the Advocate General for Northern Ireland in respect of matters concerning national security.
Lady Hermon
That is precisely the response that I had anticipated from you, Attorney-General, that you would have said—“We continued on the grounds of national security”—but, interestingly, that is not what you have said.
Mr Grieve
National security could come into it but I certainly would not want to mislead this Committee. Whilst national security could arise in these cases, in some cases it would not.
Lady Hermon
That is really very interesting, because I am just reading from the evidence that was given to us by the very recently retired Chief Constable for the Police Service of Northern Ireland, for whom I had enormous regard so I am not being critical; I am simply reading the evidence he gave to us as a Committee. That was in Stormont, when we took evidence in the Senate Chamber. He explained, “This was not a devolved matter when I became the Chief Constable. This was a matter relating to terrorism, which I think can be argued fits within the national security domain.”
Mr Grieve
Yes.
Lady Hermon
You have just told us, however, that not all of the cases of the OTRs were to deal with national security. That could not have been a blanket reason.
Mr Grieve
Some may have been related to national security but I am not suggesting that all of them necessarily would.
Lady Hermon
So we have a grey area. There was another point that you touched on and which I did directly ask your predecessor in terms of the witness here this afternoon, Lord Goldsmith. Again, there has been some speculation that the OTR scheme was open to anybody. Last week, Lord Reid mentioned a particular case which involved a senior member of the SDLP and suggested that it was open to anyone to phone up with a list of names and give their dates of birth, and they would go through the scheme. Is that, to your knowledge, correct?
Mr Grieve
I do not know. I do not have the slightest idea. The scheme is not reserved for alleged Republican terrorists; it is quite clear.
Kate Hoey
Gerry Kelly asked—
Mr Grieve
The system was initiated by Gerry Kelly. I will check but the information I have always been given is that, with one possible exception of somebody who put a name forward that was then dropped or not pursued, it has always been alleged IRA terrorists—it may have involved INLA as well; I do not know—who were the people whose names were put forward.
Lady Hermon
They were alleged Republicans, so this scheme was used exclusively by Republicans.
Mr Grieve
As far as I am aware, yes.
Lady Hermon
I will repeat the question, because I did say, if I could catch your eye, I would ask you if you would very kindly confirm this to the Committee, because the Attorney-General’s Office is one of the very few organisations that has the entire list. We as a Committee are most unlikely to see the entire list of the 228 recipients. May I just ask you, as the current Attorney-General, to confirm to this Committee that it was used exclusively by Republicans, and that British soldiers, for example—there has been some suggestion by Sinn Féin members—
Mr Grieve
No, my understanding is it has been used solely by Republicans.
Lady Hermon
Thank you. Could you double-check that for us?
Mr Grieve
Yes, we will, of course.
Lady Hermon
That is so kind, thank you.
Mr Grieve
That was the information. I have tried to check today with Mr McGinty, but that is always what I have been told. I am always cautious. You will remember what I said when I answered the urgent question: I expressed caution then because I am always prepared to be surprised and to find out that something exists that I do not know about. Doing my best for the Committee, however, that is the information I have.
Lady Hermon
I am very grateful to you.
Oliver Colvile
About 10 minutes ago, you said that, if you had gone to the United States of America or gone to New York, and you picked up the phone to the Chief Superintendent here in London and said, “Is it safe for me to come back?” he would have just turned around to you and said, “You must know that answer better than anybody”. Was it right, then, that the Northern Ireland Office wrote to Rita O’Hare saying, “If you come back to this country, you will be arrested”?
Mr Grieve
I have not seen the letter that was written to Rita O’Hare. Did the letter say to Rita O’Hare that she would be arrested or did the information just say that they were not prepared to provide a letter of comfort to her that she would not be arrested? Rita O’Hare has featured on a number of occasions in this process. What is quite clear, I think, is that nobody has been prepared to give a letter of comfort to Rita O’Hare.
Naomi Long
If I could briefly follow up on the point that Lady Sylvia was making with respect to devolution, just to clarify: the Secretary of State initially informed Parliament that the scheme was devolved. That was then corrected to say that the scheme was not devolved. Could you just be clear: did you give any advice at that time as to whether or not the scheme had been devolved? Were you involved in that process of being able to judge whether or not it was devolved?
Mr Grieve
No. Just to make the position clear, I will come back to what I said earlier, so that the Committee should understand. Between 2010 and 2012, I was not aware of the operation of the scheme under the current coalition Government. Maybe something was mentioned to me and I have forgotten, but it was never brought to my attention and I was not required to focus my mind on it. When it came to my attention in 2012, one of the issues that was raised—although, bear in mind there is the wind-up of the earlier cases, so there is a transitional issue here as well—was whether the Westminster Government should be doing this anyway. I think it is right to say—we have touched on it; Lady Hermon was asking me the questions earlier—I think it is a grey area. If I may say, this is not the first time that devolution chucks up grey areas. I spend rather a lot of my time as Attorney-General—not so much in the Northern Ireland context but certainly in the context of other parts of the United Kingdom and, in particular, more recently, Wales—noticing just how grey some of the areas are in respect of what is devolved and what is not. I do not see this, if I may say, as some sinister case-specific issue; I just happen to think that this does look to me to be slightly grey. National security is undoubtedly reserved, and national security is a very wide-ranging concept; equally, however, it should not be extended further than it ought to be. When you have devolution set up, the sorts of teething problems that it can produce, quite innocently, are likely to be quite complicated. In some ways, I am rather surprised that Northern Ireland’s devolution settlement has not produced more, but then Northern Ireland is rather different, for a variety of reasons, because the governmental structures that have been set up are so unusual.
Chair
We will perhaps not go there now, if you do not mind.
Naomi Long
That did not really answer my question, with all due respect.
Mr Grieve
I am sorry. Put it to me again.
Naomi Long
The question that I was asking was whether or not you were involved in the discussions as to whether or not this scheme specifically was or was not devolved to the Northern Ireland Executive and whether you gave advice on that specific point.
Mr Grieve
Sorry, I thought I had answered your question, which was that I expressed a view about whether it should be treated as being devolved or not, although that is influenced by the question as to whether national security comes in to an individual case or not.
Naomi Long
Yes, I understand that, and was your view that it was devolved or that it was not devolved?
Mr Grieve
I am not prepared to tell you that. I am sorry, but that is where the law officers’ convention is going to kick in. That is where I draw the bottom line. I have really pushed the elasticity of this as far as I can. The issue was raised and the issue was considered. I simply note that the Northern Ireland Office, as you have now told me, is no longer doing this.
Naomi Long
If I could, then, Chair, ask a different question: your office continued to be involved in the process after devolution of policing and justice. Is that correct?
Mr Grieve
Yes, my office continued, from 2010, certainly to 2012—and I can check with Mr McGinty; it may even have been beyond in the wind-up that followed—in continuing to act as the process point for the communication between the PSNI and the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland, and the NIO, to whom—and it was to the NIO—the letters of request were being sent.
Naomi Long
Your office continued to be in the process. Can you cite any other examples where your office has continued to be in involved in issues that were devolved since the devolution of policing and justice?
Mr Grieve
Yes, I think is the answer. Although I cannot give you chapter and verse because it is confidential, the devolution of policing and justice still leaves my office with work to do in respect of Northern Ireland. That is one of the reasons why I try to go over from time to time. It is also important to maintain channels of communication but, yes, unfortunately, there are still issues. It has to be said, I think, that my predecessors like Lord Goldsmith went over to Northern Ireland very frequently. There was a huge amount of work for them to do. Mr McGinty, I think, used to go over once a week. The big change for him and for me is that my arrival in 2010 coincided almost to the day with devolution, and it rapidly became apparent what a profound impact that was going to have on the workload of the Attorney-General’s Office and changed it quite radically. There are, however, still issues, particularly surrounding national security and legacy issues relating to the troubles, which do come to my office and have to be processed through it. It is not as if the processing of Northern Ireland issues is unheard of, and that is why I have the title of Advocate General for Northern Ireland.
Naomi Long
That was not the specific question. The question was on matters that have been devolved. I am talking about those elements of the justice system which have been devolved. Are there are examples of where you and your office continue to exercise any influence, interest or other activity on issues that have been devolved, not those which are reserved?
Mr Grieve
Yes, I understand your question. It is a slightly difficult question to answer because, if you were asking me a specific question such whether we were engaging in detailed micro-management of devolved issues on the judiciary or anything like that, the answer is no. We are just not. Do we take an interest in the justice system and policing system in Northern Ireland? Yes. Ultimately, the United Kingdom Government has a responsibility for Northern Ireland’s good governance, and devolution does not alter that. That is an absolute underpinning principle. There are reserved powers to the Westminster Government, and the Westminster Parliament is entitled to take an interest in Northern Ireland, just as precisely this Committee exists for that purpose. I would be failing in my duty if I did not take an interest in what was going on in Northern Ireland and if my office did not. I am ultimately an upholder of the rule of law and, in my post as Advocate General for Northern Ireland, the rule of law ought to be central to what I am trying to help facilitate.
Kate Hoey
As you just said, you take a great interest still. Can you just tell us what your understanding of this whole question of the royal prerogative of mercy, or pardons, has been? We have been getting different answers to questions from the Secretary of State, where files for 10 years were lost; we have your responses. How were you involved and how many times have you been involved with any royal prerogatives of mercy in Northern Ireland?
Mr Grieve
We are not.
Kate Hoey
You are not involved.
Mr Grieve
I have had no involvement with the royal prerogative of mercy in Northern Ireland since I took office. I can tell you that quite categorically. I am not saying it could never arise but I am not aware of ever having had any issues surrounding the royal prerogative of mercy in the Northern Ireland context brought to my attention.
Kate Hoey
Before devolution, would the Attorney-General’s Office have had an involvement?
Mr Grieve
It could potentially because, if somebody wished to exercise the royal prerogative of mercy, any exercise of the royal prerogative has to be done on a consistent legal basis and not capriciously. Somebody might have come along and asked the advice or opinion of a law officer, but I have no idea whether that ever happened or not.
Kate Hoey
You may have seen the answers to the questions that showed that literally hundreds of people have been given royal prerogatives of mercy in Northern Ireland.
Mr Grieve
Yes, I saw them.
Kate Hoey
Did that surprise you?
Mr Grieve
I do not think I am ever surprised.
Kate Hoey
The previous Secretary of State, John Reid, was very surprised, he said, when he saw the figures.
Mr Grieve
I do not know the circumstances in which those individuals benefited from the royal prerogative of mercy.
Kate Hoey
What is your understanding of who gets a royal prerogative of mercy? Presumably, it is the same in Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland.
Mr Grieve
It can vary enormously. It can vary from people who get the royal prerogative of mercy to enable them to be released from a sentence two days before Christmas, because otherwise, they could not be released until Boxing Day, to people who may get the benefit of the royal prerogative of mercy for high reasons of state.
Kate Hoey
You do not, then, think there is anything particularly important in these royal prerogatives of mercy and pardons.
Mr Grieve
I have no idea. It is not that it is necessarily well outside my remit but it is well outside my state of knowledge in coming before this Committee this afternoon.
Kate Hoey
You would, though, accept that it is just another area that, now that it is all out in the open, the Northern Ireland public—
Mr Grieve
Yes, but I think you will find the royal prerogative of mercy may also be used in England and Wales as well.
Kate Hoey
No, it has been used very—
Mr Grieve
It is unusual but I really cannot comment on why the royal prerogative of mercy may or may not have been used much more extensively in Northern Ireland, although it is not difficult, I would have thought, to have an idea as to some of the complexities that Northern Ireland has had.
Kate Hoey
Can you comment, though, on the feeling that that must give the public in Northern Ireland—that another whole area seems to have been kept hidden from them until all these things came out? The Irish Government knew about OTRs; the British Government knew about OTRs; Northern Ireland politicians leading the peace process from the pro-Union side did not know about any of this. Can you understand why a very large number of people in Northern Ireland feel that this whole process has been incredibly one-sided and that it is still potentially one-sided because of the alleged—and perhaps real—threat from Republican dissidents, and that justice will never be done while people can threaten and—
Mr Grieve
Yes, of course I can. Of course I can understand that but, in a sense, you answered your own question because you highlighted the very unusual conditions that prevailed in Northern Ireland between the late 1960s and the ceasefire—and even beyond—and which still colour and underpin some of the problems that Northern Ireland has. With the levels of violence that existed in Northern Ireland, at times I think it is almost miraculous that we succeeded, despite all the difficulties, in maintaining the rule of law and even the basic structures of a democratic and accountable society. That is the legacy of the violence. In a sense, the great aspiration for Northern Ireland, is it not, is that it can develop so that it not only puts the violent past behind it but builds state structures for self-governance that are more reflective of a society where people trust each other more and where violence is reduced to much lower levels? It remains a real problem.
Kate Hoey
Should there not be justice for victims?
Mr Grieve
Of course there should be justice for victims, and prosecutors and the police exist to try to deliver that. In the context of the Northern Ireland peace process, however, leaving aside all that we have discussed today, that has had to be influenced by a willingness to make some very difficult and painful adjustments to try to bring about an end to terrorist warfare and conflict. That is rather painful. As I said earlier, for those who are the relatives of the victims, it is very painful indeed.
Chair
We have had a very long session. It has been very useful, Mr Grieve. Thank you very much for joining us. Oral evidence: Administrative scheme for ‘on-the-runs’, HC 177 3 [1] Mr McGrory’s evidence to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee can be found here: http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/northern-ireland-affairs-committee/administrative-scheme-for-ontheruns/oral/10426.pdf [2] The letter from Lord Goldsmith to Peter Hain (February 2006) can be found here: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/northern-ireland-affairs/Letter-from-Lord-Goldsmith-to-Peter-Hain-February-2006.pdf [3] The Implementation Plan issued by the British and Irish Governments on 1 August 2001 (the “Weston Park Agreement”) can be found here: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/bi010801.htm [4] The Terms of Reference for Operation Rapid can be found here: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/northern-ireland-affairs/Operation-Rapid-Terms-of-Reference.pdf [5] The letter from Tony Blair to Gerry Adams is referred to in Paragraph 74 of the R -v- John Anthony Downey (24 February 2014) judgement, which is available here: http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/r-v-downey/ [6] The OTR letter sent to John Downey can be found here: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/northern-ireland-affairs/Cover-letter-from-NIO-to-Gerry-Kelly-and-John-Downey-OTR-Letter-July-2007.pdf [7] Mr Grieve’s response to Laurence Robertson MP’s urgent question on 26 February 2014 can be found here: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140226/debtext/140226-0001.htm#14022692000147 [8] Mr Grieve’s written ministerial statement to the House of Commons on 26 February 2014 can be found here: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-vote-office/February_2014/26%20February/1-AG-ProsecutionDecision.pdf [9] Dr Reid’s statement to the House of Commons on 2nd July 2002 can be found here: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020701/text/20701w35.htm#20701w35.html_sbhd2 [10] Mr Hain’s statement to the House of Commons on 11th January 2006 can be found here: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060111/debtext/60111-04.htm#60111-04_spmin0 [11] See Q696 of Mr Harris and Mr Baggott’s evidence to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, available here: http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/northern-ireland-affairs-committee/administrative-scheme-for-ontheruns/oral/9418.pdf