Oral evidence: Managing Delivery of the Work Programme, HC 457-i
Oral evidence, 14 July 2014.
Witnesses
Robert Devereux, Permanent Secretary, Department for Work and Pensions; Matt Thurstan, Senior Responsible Officer for the Work Programme, DWP; and Mike Driver, Finance Director General, DWP, gave evidence.
Chair
Welcome. We are starting on time, and you are on time. You will probably find, unsurprisingly, that there are different views around the table, which may in a way reflect the different situations we face in our constituencies, but let us see how we go—this is quite an interesting issue. I am going to start by asking you, Mr Devereux, whether you stand by the aims and objectives of the Work programme, as set out in figure 1 on page 12.
Robert Devereux
Yes.
Chair
So when you see that the thrust of the Report—I do understand that it is not an agreed report, and we might come to that later—is that the programme is not working in any way better than previous programmes, are you disappointed?
Robert Devereux
That is precisely the thing which I have chosen to disagree the Report on, so if I may just explain briefly—I have only got six or seven sentences to run through. The Report deals with both what the NAO calls easier to help, and then harder to help, and then contractual. I am just going to deal with the bit to do with the JSA claimants, as the first piece that I want to dispute. When I was here in 2012 the NAO had published a Report that basically doubted the Government’s expectations for this programme, principally because, perfectly correctly, they observed that we had based it on the experience of the previous decade’s economy and we were now in the teeth of a recession. They characterised those doubts by estimating that 26% of older jobseekers would get a job outcome over the course of a two-year programme. The Report in front of you today says that for the last cohort that actually completed two years, which is right back, now, in March 2012, the percentage of job outcomes achieved is 32%, not the 26% which they were quoting.
Chair
Sorry, say that again—are you disputing the figures for those completed?
Robert Devereux
No, those numbers are accurate and in the Report.
Chair
Just explain to me, Max.
Max Tse
The difference, I think, is between the average performance of completed cohorts being around 26%, and the last completed cohort within that average being around 32%.
Robert Devereux
I am sorry, that is not the point I am making. In the 2012 National Audit Office Report, the best estimate that the independent audit could produce of what performance older jobseekers would see in this programme, in this economy, was 26%. What I was going on to say is that the most recent completed cohort—that is the March 2012 cohort, as per the figure in this table—shows a 32% figure. It goes on to say—
Chair
Again, I think Max has explained that. So, Max, for the record, explain it again. The 32% is based on what?
Max Tse
The 32% is the monthly cohort starting in March 2012 and finishing in March 2014.
Chair
Quite. You agree with that, don’t you?
Robert Devereux
I do.
Chair
Can I just tell you why I am—
Robert Devereux
May I finish the story, because otherwise you are going to interrupt me part way through. If you ask me what the difference is, let me explain. They estimated 26%. The most recent one that is completed—and that is only one of 10—
Chair
It is on one month.
Robert Devereux
I have not finished my story yet. The NAO goes on to say the performance is improving. Now, actually they have not done a lot of work on what the consequence of that is, but it has two effects, really. First of all, because of the performance we are already seeing, the Department is now projecting 38% for the cohorts that have not yet completed.
Chair
But we don’t know. You are projecting.
Robert Devereux
I am sorry—throughout the Report the NAO makes the projections by the Department sound as if they are crystal ball-gazing, and they have not taken any account of the fact that actually, I have got 23 months of information for the cohort immediately after March ’12; 22 months for the one two months after. If you use that information, then the central estimate we have got is 38% for the rest of the programme; and, what is more, every time we do this estimate, because we are basing it on a conservative methodology, our estimate increases.
Chair
Mr Devereux, can I just draw your attention to something, which is why we all too often end up with an argument over figures here. Since the general election the UK Statistics Authority has sent 47 letters criticising and recommending changes to the use of statistics by Government Departments or agencies. Sixteen of those letters have come to the DWP; so you are not using them properly. If you look, the next Department who upset the UKSA was Health, with five—
Robert Devereux
The last—
Chair
Let me go on; I let you finish your point. In February Sir Andrew Dilnot wrote to the Work and Pensions Committee saying specifically that officials should not quote unpublished data in public statements as this breached the guidelines set down by the national statistician.
Robert Devereux
Correct.
Chair
If you are right, we will welcome it, but what is so frustrating is to come to this Committee and see, I think, your using statistics in a way—
Robert Devereux
Nothing I have said, Chair, is not already published in the document which the National Audit Office produced. I have not invented any number this afternoon which the National Audit office has not reproduced themselves.
Chair
The National Audit Office concludes—Max, come back to us to just get this all absolutely clear—that the performance on this programme is no better, no worse, than the performance of previous programmes. We started this conversation by saying you disagree with that, and you quoted another set of statistics at me. That is why I will not have you quoting statistics by, whatever he called himself—
Robert Devereux
The last time the chair of the UK Statistics Authority criticised the Work programme statistics, they were the ones used by the Committee. When we—
Chair
I repeat to you that of 47 letters he has sent to Government Departments, 16 have gone to you—far more than to anybody else. His latest thing was a February letter to the Work and Pensions Committee, where it says you should not quote—
Robert Devereux
If you are interested in the Work programme, then we must stick to the numbers in front of us. I am not yet departing from any of those numbers.
Max Tse
Can I clarify our view of the 26 and 32 in this Report, not the 26 from previous Reports? The 32 is the latest in that average. The 26 is an average of a few numbers ranging from some numbers up to 32.
Robert Devereux
From 25.
Max Tse
From 25 up to 32. The 26 on the flexible new deal is also an average of a trajectory, so we think the 26 and 27 in figure 8 are comparable. The 32 would be comparable to something else within the flexible new deal trajectory, and we haven’t got that in the Report.
Chris Heaton-Harris
Were you able to dive into the figures? These are people who finished two years ago, so you would have been able to look at the figures for 23 months, 22 months and 21 months, going backwards.
Max Tse
Yes.
Chris Heaton-Harris
So in what direction is that heading?
Max Tse
That is encouraging, in the sense that that is the basis for the 38% that Matt and the team have estimated for the future cohort as they come through.
Matt Thurstan
I think it is worth looking at figure 9 in the Report.
Max Tse
Yes.
Chair
But figure 13 was the one you took us to. You were showing it to me across the room. Figure 13 talks about early performance: 11%, the orange thing there—
Robert Devereux
No, I’m sorry. I was talking about the JSA cohorts. I made that clear at the start. You’re on the ESA cohorts. You want to be on page 23.
Chair
Okay. Well, let’s look at that. Early Work programme: 27%. Early flexible new deal: 26%. Even on the statistics within this Report, it shows no massive improvement, which was an objective of this Report.
Robert Devereux
You must be really careful with the tense here. I am sorry to be a bit pedantic about this, but what it actually says is cohorts which have completed the Work programme. Those are 10 cohorts. This programme has now been running for over three years; that is 36 cohorts. The performance that I am reporting is already in the system. When they were asked by the National Audit Office—
Chair
They haven’t completed. Let’s be clear: they are not people who have completed the Work programme.
Robert Devereux
No, but you can see in the published official statistics that month after month after month, the same cohort—the June 2012 cohort—is tracking ahead of the June 2011 cohort, and getting further ahead every single month. That fact—
Chair
That is your assertion, Mr Devereux.
Robert Devereux
I’m sorry, it’s a fact. It’s in published data.
Chair
No, it’s not. I’m not having this.
Robert Devereux
Shall I read them out from the published data?
Chair
No.
Max Tse
If you turn to figure 9, which is on page 25, the 32, which is the percentage just mentioned as the last cohort, is the one in March 2012. There will be 23-month and 22-month as we step down towards the end. Our question about the future is around the 2013 cohorts of January, February and March. There is a little bit of an up-tick on the 12-month performance, which is a positive sign, but that is also the one with the least amount of data to help us understand what might happen.
Robert Devereux
It seems to me that the National Audit Office have indeed looked at those last three cohorts, with a little up-tick, and concluded from them that that is what—
Chair
Which last three cohorts? April, May and June 2012?
Max Tse
Page 25, figure 9.
Chair
April, May and June 2012?
Robert Devereux
No, January, February and March.
Chair
I’m sorry about this. There may be a real disagreement about this. You may be right. On the other hand, when we come to look at this over time and judge whether or not the Work programme has improved in performance, there are all sorts of factors, not least of which is a stronger labour market, which may be the impact. What we have to judge now—and the whole purpose of this Committee—is previous performances. With the greatest respect, Mr Devereux, just because you have another set of statistics that suit you better, that is not the way in which we are going to do business here in this Committee.
Robert Devereux
You introduced the stronger labour market. In all the decade for which we were preparing this paper, the unemployment rate was under 6%. In every year in which this programme has been running, it has been over 7.5%. The labour market is more difficult; that is the point the National Audit Office made back in 2012. It thought 26% would be a good score in those circumstances. I am telling you that we have already got 32%, and we are projecting 38%.
Chair
I am not prepared to look at incomplete data—others in the room may be for other reasons. I will look at it as and when we get the complete data.
Chris Heaton-Harris
Clerk, I beg to move that we meet in private. [Interruption.]
Chair
Okay. We are clearing the room and meeting in private.
Robert Devereux
Us as well?
Chair
Yes. The Committee sat in private. The public sitting resumed.
Chair
Okay. Chris is going to have a go this time.
Chris Heaton-Harris
We as a Committee understand completely: you looked at a previous NAO Report and saw the figure 26; and we can see in figure 9 the 32%. I guess the question we would like answered is: how can you give us confidence that that figure will stretch up to the 38% that you have predicted? Obviously you have less and less information about the cohorts that are working through the system.
Robert Devereux
Probably the easiest way to try to explain this is to imagine that you have the June 2011 cohort—the one that we started with. Month after month, a certain proportion of those get a job outcome, and we publish that in the statistics, which I have brought with me. If you write down after each month exactly the same curve for the June 2012 participants—in other words, one year later, so we have taken all the seasonality out and are just comparing it like for like—at every single point on that curve, the 2012 curve is better than the 2011 one for all the points I’ve got. More importantly—and absent from this Report—the gap between the 2012 curve and the 2011 curve is growing, so month after month, for each successive cohort, paired absolutely identically to leave out seasonality, the underlying performance is getting larger. All that my statistical colleagues have done is to take that snapshot of evidence and roll it forward across the rest of the programme as best they can. Every time they have done that—they have done it very cautiously—and every time a new statistical release comes out, which is every six months or so, in practice, their estimate rises, because they are then able to capture that extra divergence in the performance between later cohorts and earlier ones. It is not guaranteed, but it is by some way a robust estimate of the future.
Chair
By when—the 38%?
Robert Devereux
The 38% is the estimate of the performance for all the cohorts that have not yet completed, so you have—
Chair
By when?
Robert Devereux
Right up to the end of the programme.
Chris Heaton-Harris
Does that mean that some of the cohorts’ percentages will be in the 40s? The March 2013 cohort, for example, should be in the 40s if you are going to average out at 38%.
Robert Devereux
It does indeed.
Chris Heaton-Harris
So you are amazingly confident about that, even though you have very little information about the 2013 cohorts.
Robert Devereux
The information I have for the 2013 cohorts is 12 months. But, as I said, it is not simply a one-point estimate of 12 months to compare against the 12 months earlier. I have 12 individual months that have progressively told this story about month-on-month improvement on a like-for-like basis. All I am asking the Committee to say is that that information content is itself valuable. I am trying to distinguish between information that I already have and have already published and, literally, projections of what then happens. At the moment in this Report, both of those two factors are elided together under the heading of “the Department projects”.
Chair
Okay, we will come back to this before the election, Mr Devereux, on the basis of your projections.
Robert Devereux
I would be very happy to come back, perhaps in September.
Chair
We will have a very short note from the NAO to demonstrate whether what you are asserting today happens in reality.
Robert Devereux
I am happy to do that, and that pretty much replaces what we did in 2012, when I had the same conversation at that point with—
Chair
Okay. Let me talk—
Robert Devereux
May I just add one more thing? I promised I had seven things to say, and you have let me say only six. The seventh is simply this: all the figures we have reported here are before any adjustment for the new information that is available through the real-time information system. That is recorded in the Report as being worth another 10% on performance relative to what providers have already claimed. If I apply those 10% to these figures, my 38% figure for the balance of the cohorts would become 40%.
Chair
Max, do you want to comment on that assertion?
Max Tse
Paragraph 2.12 onwards, on page 26, covers the under-reporting of outcomes. Correct me if I get this wrong, but there will be people who have achieved job outcomes and the providers will not have had the information, or will not have been able to validate it and therefore submit it as a formal job outcome in the measurement. My understanding is that the Department has used real-time information data that have become recently available to estimate how many of these hidden jobs actually exist, and that estimate is around 26,000 jobs so far, compared with around 290,000—
Chair
You will be able to trace the ones where there have been no claims. That is really what you are telling us.
Robert Devereux
In effect, yes. To be clear, the National Audit Office estimates of past programmes already assume the full take-up of all possible information like that.
Max Tse
We don’t know how much under-reporting there would be in previous programmes, so we don’t know how much previous programmes would also need adjusting.
Chair
But we also know there is 11% over-reporting don’t we, Max?
Max Tse
Sorry, the 11 million invalid sustainment payments is a slightly separate issue.
Chair
There is an over-report of 7%.
Max Tse
But that is on sustainment payments, which are not measured as job outcomes.
Robert Devereux
The reason I raise it is simply because in order to compare previous schemes that are all based on job entries as opposed to job outcomes, the National Audit Office must itself make a calculation of how to turn a job entry into a job outcome. The assumption they have made to make that, which is footnoted in both the figures that you have here, is precisely the same figure that we used to set expectations for the programme. That is 100% of all possible jobs in the economy. It is not what providers may or may not choose to claim, so there is actual bias in favour of the Work programme. But let’s come back to it when we have more data; I shall be delighted to come back.
Chair
Let me move on to the budget. The forecast expenditure to 2020, accepting all the ifs and buts of the expenditure, is £2.8 billion. The saving anticipated now is about 2% of the equivalent similar levels of performance on previous welfare of £41 million. Can we agree on those facts?
Robert Devereux
I’m sorry; which page are you on?
Chair
I was looking at the key facts, but it comes up in the Report as well. The forecast expenditure is £2.8 billion by 2020 and the saving on the amount the Department will have spent between June 2011 and 2020 for similar levels of performance on previous welfare to work programmes is £41 million—2%.
Robert Devereux
Yes, and that is the number in small print. The number in bigger print further up says £450 million, and that is the actual saving of this programme.
Chair
No, that’s people coming off benefits. We are not looking at that; we are looking at the cost of the programme.
Robert Devereux
But that is quite an important concept, isn’t it?
Chair
But at this point we are looking—I know you like to bring in other extraneous facts—at the cost of the programme, are we not? That is what I want to look at.
Mike Driver
The £41 million is the NAO estimate of the amount the Department would have spent between June 2011 and March 2020 for similar levels of performance. We have asked the NAO for details of how it calculated that figure, and we haven’t received that.
Max Tse
We have replied to that.
Sir Amyas Morse
So you asked and you got it. That’s good.
Mike Driver
Well, we hadn’t seen it, certainly.
Mr Bacon
It might be like in the Department for Transport where the lawyers were told that what they were about to do was illegal, but they just didn’t tell anyone at the top of the Department. If you hunt around among your staff, you may find someone has got the e-mail.
Chair
When did you give it to the Department?
Max Tse
Why don’t we clarify—
Chair
No. I’d like to know—I am fed up with these little arguments.
Robert Devereux
I specifically asked this question myself of a large number of people, not just the people—
Chair
I cannot believe the NAO did not give it.
Max Tse
We sent it sent on 16 May.
Matt Thurstan
I think the figure did change quite a lot through the different drafts, so it was quite hard to keep track of how it was calculated.
Chair
So there was a discussion over the figure.
Robert Devereux
Let’s settle that it was £40 million and it’s positive. I am happy to move on, if you wish.
Chair
No, because I was going to ask whether you were surprised that the figure was so low, given your original hopes and aspirations for the programme, as laid out in the aims that I read out.
Robert Devereux
Yes. Figure 1 on page 12—the aims.
Chair
Does the NAO want to come in?
Max Tse
On the £41 million point, we have a trail of—
Chair
I’d like to hear it before the end because I don’t like having this disputed information at the Committee. It is very irritating. Are you disappointed that savings on similar programmes over time are as little as this? It is a big forecast; my experience suggests that the £41 million is likely to be less over time than more.
Robert Devereux
You correctly drew attention to the aims we established. They were all about getting more people into work and saving benefits. That is the number that comes with £450 million attached, as approved by the Treasury, on which we are currently claiming extra cash. That is a measure of the programme’s success: more people are in work than we had expected consequent upon this programme’s design being better than that of previous programmes. If I have saved £40 million and also saved £450 million on the benefits, I would regard that as a good afternoon’s work.
Chair
In your previous evidence to us, Mr Devereux, you have always said this is a better value for money programme—
Robert Devereux
The National Audit Office said as much last time.
Chair
I am just saying that the fact that you have managed to save—because it was based on payment by results—was the key issue: we always said you are not paying out unless you get a result. That is the argument always behind us. All I am asking is whether you are surprised that the figure is so low given those expectations you had for the programme.
Robert Devereux
I appear to be in a programme that is costing me £40 million less than I expected, yet saves £450 million more than all previous programmes. I regard that as value for money on any possible ground.
Chair
Is it more important to you to get the benefit bill down or to get people into work?
Robert Devereux
The larger number is far more important to the macro economy.
Chair
The benefit bill is more important to you.
Robert Devereux
Of course it is, and as it happens the £40 million is a saving, not a cost, so it has cost less than previous programmes, and there is £450 million.
Max Tse
There is probably another number that is worth considering. The £40 million is that if everything was exactly the same, the Work programme is slightly cheaper. Then there is the £450 million saved on benefit. Figure 17 on page 38 shows how much was spent compared with expectations, controlling for the fact that volumes were slightly different and performance has been slightly different. There is an additional factor here, which is that the Work programme de-risks some of the expenditure if performance is lower than expected—that is the £1.7 billion and the £1.4-ish billion in bold at the bottom. So from £1.702 billion to £1.375 billion is partly because of volume and partly because of performance.
Robert Devereux
Just in case there is any confusion on the Committee’s part, the figure of something close to £400 million in that table has nothing at all to do with the £450 million in the key facts.
Chair
In what?
Robert Devereux
It has nothing to do with the £450 million I have been quoting. That is a gross reduction in the administrative costs of the programme of the order of, by arithmetic, £325 million or so. The £450 million that I have been quoting is a saving to the benefit bill. For the moment, volumes are down and total costs to the Department are down £325 million. The NAO has said that that is partly volume which, seasonally adjusted, is only a £40 million real reduction. I am very happy with that because, at the same time, I have managed to deliver far more people into work.
Chair
Far more people into work, or far more people off benefits? There is a difference.
Robert Devereux
Well, it is absolutely correct—
Chair
I can tell you that, in my constituency, there is a difference.
Robert Devereux
Okay, but I can also tell you, because we have gone through the arithmetic, that I am achieving the levels of expectation that I was being told were impossible last time I came.
Austin Mitchell
It is surprising that you do not have better results given that the labour market has improved so dramatically. I see in paragraph 2.16 that “the Department estimates the Work Programme will reduce benefit spending by £450 million against the baseline agreed with HM Treasury.” Is that because more people are coming off benefit without work?
Robert Devereux
The preceding paragraph seeks to make that implication, and I would like to try to refute it. The paragraph says that our estimate of job outcomes has been reduced by 25%, yet the estimate of benefit savings has been reduced by only 9%, so the reader is left to understand that, somehow or other, people are leaving benefit without finding work. Of course, benefit data are way more accurate than almost anything else because they are data that I actually have in my own systems.
Chair
More accurate about what?
Robert Devereux
I can measure it much more straightforwardly—
Chair
Yes, but you don’t know whether it is people into jobs, do you?
Robert Devereux
No, I am talking about the benefit saving number. Let me make the point I made earlier: because I have access to this very rich data source of real-time information from the Revenue, if they find that a further 10% of job outcomes have not previously been scored, that minus 15% turns back into minus 6%. At that point, I have a bigger reduction in benefit savings that I have in job outcomes. In other words, there is no evidence on that basis that, somehow or other, these people leaving benefit are not going into work at the same rate.
Austin Mitchell
I am suspicious because there is clearly an increase in the use of sanctions. I get a whole series of complaints in Grimsby that sanctions are being used more. Can we put it this way: what proportion of time off benefit is due to sanctions?
Robert Devereux
On the sanctions, we have enabled Work programme providers, if they believe that something would actually assist somebody’s job outcomes, to mandate them to do it. In the event that the participant disagrees or thinks that is inappropriate, they can make a claim against it.
Justin Tomlinson
Does it make people take the help being offered more seriously—that if they don’t take it seriously, there is a threat of sanctions?
Robert Devereux
The penalties in the sanctions regime for the Work programme are not intrinsically different than for jobseekers routinely, so it is the underlying regime. The Government have chosen over the past two years or so to increase the sanctions significantly for persistently not keeping the conditionality. That regime is applying right across the piece, and it is not a Work programme issue. As far as the Work programme is concerned, it is not the case that Work programme providers are doing the sanctioning themselves. They are observing that Mr X didn’t do what they asked him to do. It is one of my decision makers who actually looks at the evidence and decides whether that sanction should be upheld, and they do not uphold all the recommended sanctions, in which case there is no change to the benefit status of the individual.
Austin Mitchell
Let me put it another way. The complaints I get from people in Grimsby is that sanctions have increased and are increasing, and in my view they ought to be diminished. Now, are you giving out quotas to officers to impose a certain number of sanctions?
Robert Devereux
No.
Austin Mitchell
Not at all.
Robert Devereux
No.
Austin Mitchell
Why is that being argued and claimed?
Robert Devereux
I don’t know, but it has been repeatedly argued and repeatedly denied.
Austin Mitchell
In that case, I will put it another way: can you give us an indication of the way in which sanctions are imposed, because it seems to me wrong that we should have so many sanctions in Grimsby, an area where it is difficult to get work, when we seem to have more sanctions than I hear of from southern towns?
Robert Devereux
Let us be very clear: you are not sanctioned for the failure to get work; you are sanctioned for the failure to take action to seek work. So the absence or presence of jobs in Grimsby, or anywhere else, is neither here nor there to the calculation on the part of an official—and it is my officials who do this—about whether the evidence substantiates that the conditions that Parliament has laid down for the safe receipt of this benefit are actually being met.
Austin Mitchell
But you must have sanctions office by office. Can these be published?
Robert Devereux
I can’t remember whether they’re published or not. We have had hearings in the Work and Pensions Committee around this; I know that my colleague who runs the jobcentres has given substantial amounts of evidence on it.
Austin Mitchell
But will you publish?
Robert Devereux
I will happily reproduce what he has given you.
Austin Mitchell
Will you publish them so that we can see how they relate to the unemployment in the area?
Robert Devereux
I am not aware there is any evidence that they relate to levels of unemployment. As I say, it is simply illegal to sanction somebody because they can’t find work—
Chair
It would be helpful if you published these sanctions. There is a lot of controversy around them—you have to accept that. Is there a reason why you’re not publishing sanctions?
Robert Devereux
I’m afraid I simply don’t know whether we don’t already do it, so—
Chair
Could you write to me about that?
Robert Devereux
We have given hours of evidence on this, both in this Parliament and in Scotland—
Chair
Can you write to me as to whether or not you publish? This is with a request that you publish on a “whatever makes sense” basis. Obviously, I can understand that doing it jobcentre by jobcentre might be a bit hard.
Chris Heaton-Harris
My constituency is Daventry. It’s in Northamptonshire, so therefore east Midlands, and I have spent quite a bit of time talking to the two providers in my patch—A4e and Ingeus— and going to visit them. I am very interested in the harder-to-help group of people, and both providers have given me examples of where they have helped people back into work. Paragraph 3.8 of the Report says: “The spending prime contractors allocate to harder-to-help payment groups has reduced by on average 54 per cent per person from their original bids.” That is an estimate of 20 contracts. How comfortable are you with that figure, because it is lower than the largest jobseeker’s allowance payment group. Are we doing enough to encourage contractors to work with that harder-to-help group?
Robert Devereux
At the risk of getting myself into yet more difficulty, this is a set of facts that, again, when I asked, “Can I see the evidence on which this has been based?”, I didn’t see it. As you probably know, the industry strongly disputes that this is correct.
Chair
I don’t believe the industry figures, but go on. I just don’t believe them; the industry is bound to put its own view. You can’t go on the industry figures—that is the sort of thing that gets the statisticians furious. You really can’t do that.
Max Tse
The figures were estimates of spending sent by providers to DWP on what they thought they would spend in these groups.
Robert Devereux
All I can say is that if these are the industry’s figures, the industry is then—
Chair
It is like asking a trade union to give its view. It is the trade union for the providers and to ask us to accept evidence on that basis, other people around the table would be furious—
Robert Devereux
Let me make you an offer: if it is clear that we know how this has been constructed, let me go away, find it and bring it back to you—
Chair
Can you just repeat, Max, the basis on which you put your stuff?
Max Tse
Providers are asked to submit what they expect to spend over the future periods. That data is collected by DWP and we have just averaged what they expect to spend for these groups.
Chris Heaton-Harris
If there is a question over the figures, maybe at some point you could help us out by sending us a note.
Robert Devereux
Let me write to you on those two—the £41 million and this number. Those were the two on which, despite my best endeavours in preparing for this—and I do a lot of preparation, as you know—I could not find the evidence. If this has been lost in the system somewhere, let me go away and look at it, and I will write to you—I am happy to do that.
Chris Heaton-Harris
But could you just answer the principal question behind it: how are you going to encourage contractors to target these harder-to-help groups?
Robert Devereux
The principal way we have done it, for which the National Audit Office did give us some credit, is that we have differentiated very strongly the payments available for success in this area. As the Report records in a table towards the front—in figure 3—up to £13,000 is the maximum payment for an ex-IB ESA person, which is significantly more than others. So we have made more money available. In terms of this part of the Work programme, like its predecessors, this is a difficult group to work with, and if it turns out that there are things to learn about how best to improve on it, let us go forward and learn them. You will see, again—this is in the Report, so I will be careful—that figure 14 shows very strong improvement most recently, even in this group. Some of that will be the economy but, even so, there is some learning going on.
Chris Heaton-Harris
You talk about learning about how to help different groups, and I have seen the evidence that has been given in the DWP Select Committee before, but I still have a bit of a concern about how you spread best practice between contractors that are competing. There are obvious examples where one contractor is doing a much better job—or seeming to get much better results; let’s put it that way—compared with another contractor in similar areas.
Robert Devereux
Perhaps I can ask Matt to explain this a bit more. I think you are on the cusp of quite a difficult choice there, because on the one hand, you want to run a system that gives people incentives such that if they behave well, they can do well, but a sort of entirely plain vanilla one where everybody shares becomes one in which there is no incentive to do that, but I will let Matt explain what we have done.
Matt Thurstan
In terms of ESA, that is a key strand of our new performance management regime where we are focusing. We have a number of providers that are on an accelerated performance regime. We have asked for specific ESA-tailored plans that are very tangible: how are you going to get your flight paths up to increase your performance and get to where you need to be? Within those plans, the common theme that is coming out of them is ESA-focused teams, ESA specialist advisers and ESA targets with smaller case loads. It is not the case across all providers, but in some providers, the focus previously was that you had a case load mixed between JSA and ESA, with a set number of targets and a set case load size. What we are seeing now is very much a shift focused on what the good providers are doing, which is ESA-specific advisers, expert teams, and lower targets, and they are also looking to address the whole strategy with ESA claimants in terms of being faster—so more pace and more contact. We are seeing that across a lot of our performance review discussions. In terms of how we get that knowledge and best practice shared, one of the big changes that I have looked to put in place since I started in this post is around the transparency of data. So we have much better, transparent data now rolling out to Work programme providers—
Chair
Not to us.
Matt Thurstan
—so that we can show them how they are performing, compared with others in their CPA or across the national picture. In terms of ESA claimants, you will see in this Report that we have now also started to refer 12-month prognosis claimants. We split those performance data out, so you can see the variance between the two, and that is another bit of good feedback on our performance management—you can speak to other providers to say, “Over here, they are doing these kinds of things. Have you thought about this?”, and so on and so forth. There are another couple of big areas and ways that we get to share best practice. We have a national provider forum once a quarter and an operations provider forum once a month. That is where we talk about best practice and how we can focus on driving up performance with a particular focus on ESA. We have also commissioned the building best practice group, and it has reported to the Department very recently on some options and ideas it believes we can have, both in terms of this programme and future programmes to increase that sharing of data and knowledge. We are considering which of those we can bring in for the Work programme and which we need to consider for future provision, but that is around things like transparency of subcontractor data, and the forum and networks across the different providers—to go back to the point about what works well. There is a whole lot going on in ESA. In terms of where my focus is on performance management, I am asking the teams now really to drill into ESA: show me the accelerated performance plans; show me something tangible; let’s talk about case loads; and so on and so forth.
Chair
I want to come back to ESA, but I am going to bring the others in. One thing on the competition that Chris raised, you have the power to take 5% away from one contractor and give it to another. From the stats, I cannot see where you are exercising that. Somebody else may want to raise the one where you are trying to close the contract, but I cannot see in the stats that there is any use of that as a mechanism.
Robert Devereux
In August 2013 we used that to move case loads between providers in the same contract package area.
Chair
If you look at the actual provider stats, they all get very much the same. I have stats here for one of your published statistics. I don’t know which one you want me to take. East of England: 54.51, 52.98, 53.13, 55.14. Those are the four; those are your stats.
Matt Thurstan
Yes, there was no shift in that CPA. In terms of the shift, there were shifts across 10 CPAs.
Chair
Say that again.
Matt Thurstan
Across 10 of the contract package areas there were shifts of market share.
Chair
Where? Show that to me. Why can’t I see that?
Matt Thurstan
CPA 1, 2, 3, 6, 7.
Chair
I can’t do 1, 2, 3, 6. I have got a table here that goes: east of England, west London, east London—
Matt Thurstan
If you take west London, there was a shift.
Robert Devereux
My guess is that if it is such a brief table, it has only cumulative data in. Is that correct?
Chair
West London, if I take that. You say you shifted it. There are three providers there. One got 31.51—I assume that is thousands, as it says attachments—that was Ingeus. Maximus got 30.91; Reed got 30.54. There is not a shift.
Matt Thurstan
It is only a 5% shift.
Robert Devereux
This looks like one of the published lists. Is that table 2.17 that you are looking at?
Chair
Supplementary table 2.15: Number of Referrals, Attachments. If you are going to use that competition, which was one of the purposes, you would have seen some movement.
Robert Devereux
I explained that we first did this in August 2013 for future referrals, and you are looking at a table.
Chair
June 2011 to March 2014.
Robert Devereux
Exactly. So the period over which we were making any changes was the best part of six months in a period of three years, so it may not be immediately apparent just by eye.
Chair
You do hide behind statistics. I want you to show me, rather than have me struggle with this. Your statistics should be open, Mr Devereux. I can’t get it here. The one table I look at, I can’t get it. Show me some stats that show competitions and send them to us. Send us those stats, with a table that demonstrates that.
Mr Burrowes
Could you follow through what you were referring to in terms of shifts, Mr Thurstan? The west London area is consistent with your CPA: could you just go through what demonstrates a 5% shift?
Matt Thurstan
Yes. The provider receiving the shift in CPA was Ingeus and the provider losing the shift was Reed, and it was on payment groups 1 and 2. As Robert has outlined, that has only played into a certain number of months of this table in the stats, which includes all referrals for the first three years. In that example there, we had three providers in the CPA, where the top provider received an extra 2.5% and the bottom provider lost 2.5%, so in total it was a 5% shift.
Robert Devereux
We can simply send you a table that shows the referrals since August 2013 when it occurred in the individual contract. That will show you, as night follows day, exactly how it is. It is a simple mathematical calculation. It will simply be in the rounding of this at the moment, but I can show you that. It has happened as we said in 10 of the CPA areas; we have moved shares on 17—
Chair
Okay. I am going to Anne first, then Guto.
Mrs McGuire
May I follow up on Chris’s points on the harder-to-help groups? Given, Mr Devereux, that you said that you had not had an opportunity to look at some of the stats identified in the NAO Report, paragraph 3.8, which was about the reduced spending, I wonder whether Mr Thurstan can track that reduced spending. I find it astonishing, frankly, that, given that that section is a significant part of the Work programme’s focus, we cannot get any definitive information about whether the actual financial support given to those who are harder to help has or has not been reduced. That is in spite of the fact that I understood from the nods from the NAO colleagues that that information was supplied to you. Did you have the information, Mr Thurstan?
Matt Thurstan
No.
Mrs McGuire
You haven’t had it?
Matt Thurstan
In terms of whether I have had a chance to look at the evidence that backs up the figures and the reductions here, I haven’t been able to see that. I have seen the trade press release, and I appreciate that that is a trade union release, as you put it.
Mrs McGuire
I seriously want to get to the bottom of this one—whether that information was actually given—because the focus of the Work programme was to narrow the gap between those who were the easier to help getting into the job market, and those who were the most difficult.
Max Tse
We will try to figure this out. It was sent to Mike Jones, who was looking at the providers, with DWP colleagues copied in.
Mrs McGuire
Could somebody tell me who Mike Jones is?
Robert Devereux
A member of our staff.
Sir Amyas Morse
We can produce copies of the e-mails and stuff as well, if that is helpful.
Mrs McGuire
My point is—I appreciate that you said earlier that you prepared thoroughly for this hearing, as you do for all hearings, and as did your predecessors. Having been in the Department, I remember the angst that some of the previous permanent secretaries used to go through before they appeared before the Public Accounts Committee.
Robert Devereux
I enjoy them.
Mrs McGuire
Maybe you do not have that sort of temperament. My point is that I find it astonishing that that information is not before us today, because it is a crucial part of the Work programme focus. If the aim of the Work programme is to reduce that gap, how can we justify the fact that spending on supporting those who are harder to help has been reduced significantly, as identified in the NAO Report? I just find it incredibly frustrating that at this meeting to discuss this Report—some of which is actually quite positive; it says that you are making progress—on this particular group, which has been a real issue for all Governments for about the past 20 years, you cannot provide us with the information on whether or not that spending has been reduced against expectations. Why not?
Robert Devereux
Let us just jog back over this. It is our—
Mrs McGuire
Just indulge me, Mr Devereux, and answer my question.
Robert Devereux
I am going to. The answer to the question is that we do look at what is being spent, and we do ask people. That is what Max has been saying about what comes in. What I am not able to explain to you is how that paragraph was substantiated in this Report. That is not the same as asking whether I have a view on what was being spent. If I can just loop back again, the point of this contract—it was a very firm design principle—was to set the prices that we thought best reflected the strike price for the taxpayer to make sure that this worked, in order to let people have some space to make some choices. Some of the choices that they are going to make are their choices. I am agreeing with you that transparency is appropriate, and that is exactly why Matt has been spending so much time going through this. Let us drop you a line about what we know about the costs, having a discussion with the NAO to make sure that we are all saying the same thing.
Mrs McGuire
Right. Would you, Mr Thurstan, be disappointed if there was less of a spend on those who are harder to help, given that there is a significant investment needed, often, in those who are furthest from the labour market?
Matt Thurstan
Yes.
Mrs McGuire
What would you do to deal with that issue?
Robert Devereux
Can I just—
Mrs McGuire
Can I speak to Mr Thurstan first?
Robert Devereux
Just one moment. The way in which this contract is set up, if somebody spends less, can I just alert you to the fact that they just might be doing something different? The idea that more is always best is not self-evident. The entire Government is running on less at the moment and getting more out.
Mrs McGuire
Could I also say, Mr Devereux, that in a previous existence, when I was a real person, I used to work managing government employment programmes, so I know that to spend more is not always the best way? Mr Thurstan, how would you move forward in supporting those who are harder to help in terms of the labour market if initially, those prime contractors came in and said: this is what they thought they would spend, but they are now only spending half that, or whatever, and the figures are pretty disappointing for that group?
Matt Thurstan
Would I be disappointed if they were spending significantly less? Yes. In terms of Robert’s point, if they have actually come up with an innovative way to do group sessions and so on, so they are spending less, I think that is fine as long as it is working and I can see that in the performance. In terms of how I would go about addressing that, it is exactly what we have already talked about, which is that we are looking to talk to providers around: have you got ESA-specific case loads? Have you got ESA-specific targets? Have you got ESA adviser teams and specialists in place?
Mrs McGuire
I heard all that. What exactly are they doing, though? At the coal face, at the front, what are they doing to engage with those people who are harder to help in terms of how you are monitoring their work load?
Matt Thurstan
In terms of how we monitor their service delivery?
Mrs McGuire
Yes. How are you doing it? The figures are really disappointing.
Matt Thurstan
We monitor their performance, and I appreciate that it is performance by results. We are monitoring their performance, and we have put the financial incentives in place for them to drive that performance. In terms of then how we monitor their service offering to the claimants, we are doing a huge amount of work in this area, which is around compliance monitoring officers. We go out and we have the minimum service offers that the providers put in within their bids; the NAO has highlighted here that there are 212 of those. We have also got generic service offers, which all providers need to comply with. I have a team that goes out to every single contract every single month and takes a sample of 25 and looks at those, goes through every single point in the generic measure and the minimum service offer from providers and checks whether it has been complied with. In terms of where we have gone with that approach, it is a huge improvement on where we were a year ago, which was a very qualitative approach.
Chair
Are these ESA clients you are talking about?
Matt Thurstan
It is ESA and JSA.
Chair
Yes, but we are focusing on ESA.
Matt Thurstan
But this includes ESA claimants.
Chair
No, but we are focusing on ESA.
Matt Thurstan
Okay, well—
Mrs McGuire
We are trying to concentrate on those people who are harder to help, given that the focus of the programme is to narrow the gap between those who are easier to get into the job market and those for whom it is more difficult. Just tell me what you are doing.
Matt Thurstan
In addition to what I have already pointed out—we have talked about the best practice group and sharing what works well and can be shared across the market—if you want me to talk about what I have seen individual providers doing—
Mrs McGuire
No, we can get that from the providers.
Matt Thurstan
Okay. Every provider has a different delivery model. If you are asking me what providers are doing to get claimants into work, it would depend on the provider model. In general, I have talked about moving to ESA-specific case loads and so on. If you want some more innovative approaches, without naming certain providers, one provider has done a kind of credit bank account, if you like, where each claimant gets £300 to spend on their own service delivery. Another provider is asking ESA claimants to help develop the courses and provisions they receive. Another provider has gone to Leeds university and asked for some analysis and information on the data on the different claimants that come to them and how they can best help remove those barriers. Another provider has got some psychologists in to work with front-line staff, to look at how they can change mindsets, and so on and so forth. I get a lot of these data from my different performance managers. There is lots of different innovation going on, but if you are asking me what will really drive ESA performance and ESA service levels and help claimants the most, it is the ESA-specific adviser case loads and so on, and our service offering checking through the compliance monitoring officer role.
Robert Devereux
Since there is no monopoly of wisdom, as you have observed, since several Governments have found this difficult, that is a long list of different things that people are trying. Part of why the earlier answer on sharing practice around the market, within a framework of transparency on actual outcomes, was important is that it is about trying to connect those people who are doing better than others—there is definitely performance variation in this—with some of the things they are doing. The Department is putting in place comparable metrics, so everybody can see who is doing well on an outcome basis, and then behind that saying, “What is the best practice that causes provider x to be doing better than provider y in region x?”
Chair
I want to raise something specific to my constituency. You will know that Lifeline, which was the organisation delivering for A4e, has terminated the contract. You will know that Tomorrow’s People, which was delivering, I think, for Seetec, has also terminated the contract.
Matt Thurstan
Okay.
Chair
You will know that they have done that because they felt that—Lifeline said that A4e asked them to focus on the low-hanging fruit. They were told not to focus on the ESA clients, the ones that Anne has been talking about, that are furthest from the labour market. That is true, is it not?
Robert Devereux
That—
Chair
I am asking Mr Thurstan, Mr Devereux.
Matt Thurstan
That is not entirely the story.
Chair
Well, I will read to you what Lifeline has said to me.
Matt Thurstan
I am not sure what I can and cannot share about Lifeline.
Robert Devereux
I think we may need to write to you privately, Chair, on Lifeline.
Mrs McGuire
Can I ask one further question on ESA?
Robert Devereux
There is information that is not appropriate for public disclosure, but I will happily write to you.
Chair
I am sure that A4e is trying to slag them off. I have worked with Lifeline for years and years. They came to see me. The reason they came out—
Chris Heaton-Harris
Just before you do, I have got the A4E thing here. If you read that one out, I will read the A4e thing out, and I do not think we will get very far. I just think that is not necessarily the appropriate way—
Chair
I am talking about my experience, Chris, in my constituency, where I have got unemployment levels that are probably three or four times the levels in your constituency. I have got people who are desperate to get a job and want to be helped by the Work programme.
Chris Heaton-Harris
I do not doubt that for one second.
Chair
One of the things that Lifeline told me is that the ratio of advisers to case load is 1:220. That was what they were working on, if you include in that, which they have to, those who are in work, whom they have to ensure have got the sustained payments. We are talking about 1:220. You drew breath, which will not be recorded in the transcript, as I said that. It is impossible, in that sort of ratio, to do the sort of work that you are talking about.
Matt Thurstan
Is that from Lifeline?
Chair
Yes.
Robert Devereux
I have offered to write to you about this particular subcontractor and I suggest that I do that, and then you read what I have to say.
Chair
Well, I always prefer things to be in the open. Like all these stats that you claim to be transparent, I have the hugest difficulty in getting any of the providers—like Chris, I meet my local providers regularly in Barking and Dagenham. They are always telling me they cannot give me the statistics, because you do not allow them to be given. Every ruddy time I get to them, I get a blank. Can I just quote you something? It is from a think-tank commenting on ESA, in a report called “Making the Work Programme work for ESA claimants”, published in March 2014. It suggests “a ‘vicious circle’ of lower…performance”, leading to fewer payments for job outcomes, leading to lower funding and then still “lower performance”. That was a report by the Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion, established by your Secretary of State. What is your view? The CESI goes on to say, “spending per participant is going to fall significantly as time goes on. This is a result of decreases in ‘attachment fees’ throughout the life of the programme—from £600 in the first year to zero for those joining now. For this latter group”—that is, ESA claimants—“we estimate that spending by Government will fall to on average £545 per participant.” Have you a got a comment on that?
Robert Devereux
Sorry, I missed the start of that: a long section of somebody’s projections of what might happen, by some providers at some future date.
Chair
You are always keen on projections, Mr Devereux. This is a report that the Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion published in 2014, basically asserting that the Work programme will not work for ESA claimants and confirming what Anne has been trying to question you on. They estimate that spending by Government on the ESA group will fall to an average of £545 per participant. I wondered what your comments on that were.
Robert Devereux
So—
Chair
I notice that you are not letting the expert answer.
Robert Devereux
Well, I am the accounting officer, so I think I am entitled to answer.
Chair
Well, I think that person is the one who is in touch with the providers, day to day.
Robert Devereux
But this is a general observation about the ESA performance. ESA performance is recorded in figure 13. Some things are happening with ESA—
Chair
Can you just answer the question? This is their view, which comes out in the report in the paragraph that Chris alluded to and that Anne has been trying to pursue.
Mrs McGuire
Paragraph 3.9, bullet point two.
Chair
It is so obvious that you get the low-hanging fruit first and then move to the harder to help. More of them are going to be harder to help and there is to be less money spent on that group.
Robert Devereux
I am delighted, in passing, that you regard people who have been out of work for over a year as low-hanging fruit—whom, by the way, the performance I was told I would get at 26%, I am not.
Chair
Can I just say to you, Mr Devereux, within the cohort of people with whom you are dealing, there are some who are going to be closer to the market? Probably 75% of those who have got a job under the programme would have got a job anyway. That is the usual dead-weight figure, which those of us who know about these programmes worked on. Can we get an answer—
Robert Devereux
They have not had work for a year.
Chair
Can we get an answer to the specific question? Can you stop diverting? The specific question is about a report by the CESI, which is your Secretary of State’s own think-tank, which asserts that there is “a ‘vicious circle’ of lower…performance”, leading to fewer payments for job outcomes, leading to lower funding and then still “lower performance”, and, “we estimate that spending by Government will fall to on average £545 per participant.” I am just asking you to comment.
Robert Devereux
I think my comment is going to be—let us come back and revisit this in another year’s time, because that is exactly the same argument you would not let me make earlier about the rest of the programme. All right?
Chair
Well, we will come back in six months’ time. Can I ask, if you do not want to comment, whether there is any truth at all, and some of us think there is, in the fact that, as we get to ESA claimants, you are not spending enough money—all my evidence from my constituency suggests that—simply because the arithmetic does not allow you to? What are you doing to drive up performance, so that you break what Iain Duncan Smith’s think-tank calls the “vicious circle”?
Robert Devereux
It would be a vicious circle if people simply reduced spending and got even less outcomes. I think I have already made the observation that figure 14 suggests that outcomes are currently going up. I do not know at what point CESI wrote the report; perhaps you could remind me, and of how it refers to—
Chair
Let’s look at your own interim report, which you have yet to publish. It says: “Participants”—[Interruption.] Honestly, you can keep denying it, but do you want me to read this to you? Your interim report to your Department says that “participants with health conditions and disabilities are being seen less often and being offered less support than other groups.” Furthermore, it says that there is “no clear relationship between an individual participant’s Work programme payment group and the nature and intensity of support that participant received, which suggested…that the differential payment regime was unlikely to have effectively mitigated creaming and parking.” That is your own interim report. I can quote it endlessly. Your own interim report shows that the providers have little confidence in the system. Of course, you have not published the interim report, but that is what it shows.
Robert Devereux
If providers have little confidence in the system, I am surprised that people are actually buying the contracts.
Chair
Everyone is saying that they are spending less time with them, Mr Devereux. You are just avoiding a key issue.
Robert Devereux
Right at the very start, I said that I wanted to make some remarks about what you call the “easier to help” group, but which I still call the “rather difficult to help because they have been out of work for a year” group. At no stage have I implied that dealing with the ESA cohort is not difficult, so please do not think that I am sitting here imagining that there is a fantastically rosy story about ESA. This is a hard group to work with. All I can observe is that we have made some steps, on which the NAO has congratulated us, by putting in further sums of money to be made available, and there would appear to be some performance improvement. I am sure that some of that is to do with the economy, but I am on a journey to try to make this better using the techniques that Matt has described in terms of transparency of comparable data together with the sharing of best practice. I am not sure what else I could usefully do.
Mr Bacon
May I ask a question that might have been asked while I was out? I had to go to a delegated legislation Committee, which I am happy to say was extremely quick.
Chair
I am sure your contribution was completely central.
Mr Bacon
It was invaluable and will doubtless be recorded as such in history. Earlier, we were discussing the question of the amount of money spent on harder-to-help groups. You, Mr Thurstan, were discussing the amount of money being spent, as was Mr Devereux, and you were unable to recognise the description in paragraph 3.8 of the way in which that amount had gone down. What is the view of the Department for Work and Pensions about the amount of money spent on harder-to-help groups—do you think it is going up or down?
Matt Thurstan
We don’t collect that level of information about how much the providers spend on different payment groups.
Mr Bacon
Hang on; I didn’t ask whether you collect it—I asked what the amount is. So the answer is “I don’t know”, is that correct?
Matt Thurstan
Yes.
Mr Bacon
Okay, you don’t know. Thank you.
Guto Bebb
I want to clarify the issue of low-hanging fruit and the easier to reach. Am I right in saying that the vast majority of people on the Work programme have been unemployed for a full year?
Robert Devereux
The majority of the people on the Work programme are in payment group 1 or 2. They get JSA and have typically been out of work for 12 months.
Guto Bebb
Just to clarify the concepts of easy to reach and easy to support, of the people who become unemployed, how many find a route back to the workplace before they would qualify for the Work programme?
Robert Devereux
Off-flow rates at 52 weeks are, from memory, of the order of 90%. About 90% of people who make a claim to benefit have gone within 12 months, so we are talking about the last 10% of people. I offered this thought to the NAO when it was writing the Report: “easier to help” conjures up the idea that they are easy to help. Strictly speaking, they are easier than the ESA group—I can buy that—but they are both difficult categories to help. I would go for difficult and very difficult, rather than easy and hard, but there you go.
Max Tse
We do apologise. It is, of course, a relative comparison.
Robert Devereux
Except not with the labels that everyone is using this afternoon.
Guto Bebb
I was making that point simply to ensure that that statistic is remembered, because examples from my constituency show that that is important. Other Committee members have gone into issues relating to their constituencies, so I want to ask something very quickly. I have worked very closely with the two Work programme providers in my constituency. Have there been any developments in terms of the inability of Welsh Work programme providers to have a full black box of options of support available to them? As you are aware, anyone who goes into the Work programme in England will be able to access ESF-funded training courses; is it still the case that that is not possible in Wales?
Matt Thurstan
Yes, it is still the case it is not possible at the moment.
Guto Bebb
So in terms of the performance in Wales, which tends to lag the performance in England, to what extent do you think that the hands of the providers in Wales are being tied by the decision of Welsh funding authorities not to allow Work programme clients to actually access the Work programme in a comparative manner to a similar individual in England?
Matt Thurstan
I would agree with you there in that there could potentially be some impact, but what I would say is in terms of when these contracts were let at the ITT stage, it was very clear that that funding would not be available in that CPA, and therefore I would expect providers to actually put in their bids at a price that would allow them to fund that kind of activity; so within the funding model, as you know, there was the option to discount the job outcome prices. I would expect in that CPA that if you had to fund that provision yourself you would have kept the job outcome price at the maximum.
Guto Bebb
Can you explain why the effort to try and access European-funded activity in a Welsh context has been unsuccessful?