Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 15 July 2014
Oral evidence, 15 July 2014.
Witnesses
Peter Galbraith and Dr Ali Allawi, former Minister of Trade, of Defence and of Finance, Government of Iraq, gave evidence.
Chair
I welcome our next two witnesses, Peter Galbraith, who is a great expert on the region and a former diplomat, and Dr Allawi, who is a Cabinet Minister in Baghdad. Thank you both very much indeed for agreeing to appear together. Mr Galbraith, I understand you would like to make an opening statement.
Peter Galbraith
No. I have written something.
Chair
I have it. Can we treat it as evidence?
Peter Galbraith
Yes.
Chair
Well, Mr Galbraith first—I shall put the question to both of you. Are we witnessing the end of Iraq?
Peter Galbraith
As a single unified state within its current borders, yes. I was just in Erbil about 10 days ago, and there is great alarm about what has happened, in terms of Isis. They point out, as High Representative Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman said, that of the 1,050 km border that they have, 1,035 km are with ISIS and 15 km are with the Government in Baghdad. In my view there is no prospect that that is going to change. The Iraqi army had 17 divisions; 15 of them are gone. There is not a force that is going to enable the Iraqi Government to retake those areas. There may be internal conflicts in those areas that will change the composition of the Sunni region. The view in Erbil is that since the state cannot defend itself, Kurdistan must defend itself, and that is best done as an independent state; besides, that is what everybody has always wanted. The Parliament will decide on a referendum, the referendum will ask people whether they want to be independent and that vote will be 95% to 98% in favour of independence. I would guess that Kurdistan will declare itself independent some time in the next year, and you will have an Iraq that includes a Sunni region that does not accept rule from Baghdad, so the country that was cobbled together nearly 100 years ago has largely dissolved.
Chair
Dr Allawi, are we witnessing the end of Iraq?
Dr Allawi
Not so much the end of Iraq as the end of Iraq as a centralised state with power concentrated in Baghdad. It is highly improbable that we will go back to that kind of Iraq again. However, we are not yet at the point of having a separate Kurdish state in a form that is recognised internationally. It is the part of Iraq that is likely to break off to create the conditions of a failed unified state in Iraq, but there are other factors that must be considered before we can say the country cannot be cobbled together again. The main issue now is whether the authorities in Baghdad can reassert their control, in one way or another, over the parts of the country that have fallen under the control of ISIS. If there is a change in that power relationship, I think the Kurds may well step away from a formal declaration. The way that I see things unfolding, we are likely to get one of three outcomes, none of which includes the formal break-up of the country. The most probable outcome is the status quo, which is that the central Government will attempt to extend its reach into territories that have fallen under the control of ISIS, and ISIS will try to establish a foothold in Baghdad. The situation could be that over the next few months the central Government are able to recreate its security forces and take back most of the territory that has fallen under the control of ISIS. In which case, there will be an attempt to refashion the country as a federal state. The third outcome is a confederal arrangement, with a kind of state of Kurdistan, which, although not necessarily recognised as such internationally, has a formal relationship with Iraq. Certain aspects of the Government or the state, such as foreign representation, could be handed over to a larger confederal authority. That Bosnia-type solution is not really on the cards until the situation stabilises in the parts of the country that have fallen under the control of ISIS. I think the most likely outcome is the status quo, inasmuch as it is improbable that a formal declaration of independence by Kurdistan would be recognised internationally, so Iraq as a state will continue to function, albeit in a reduced fashion.
Chair
The United States and, to a degree, the UK are calling for a united Iraq. Is that a mistake?
Dr Allawi
Yes. I think that is rather wishful thinking, because it requires a compromise between all the major groups inside Iraq that have signally failed in the past 10 years to reach a common set of precepts that would allow them to operate a unified state. I think the attempt to create a national unity Government is, by and large, doomed to failure. The outcomes that we have are either the status quo or something that will be affected by changes on the battlefield.
Chair
Mr Galbraith, do you agree with that?
Peter Galbraith
Well, I certainly agree that it is a mistake. I reflect back on my experience as the first US ambassador to Croatia. The signal mistake that we made at the time of the break-up of Yugoslavia—that the United States made, that Europe made—was to focus on trying to hold the country together, which was impossible, because the people in Croatia and Slovenia absolutely wanted out, when instead we should have focused on avoiding the war, which was entirely preventable. The commitment that my country has to the integrity of every country that exists on the globe—in 1991, the first President Bush was opposed to the break-up of the Soviet Union, but are we worse off for not having it? We believe that the break-up of a country is destabilising, when in fact holding a country together can be destabilising. That is particularly true in Iraq: holding it together has required the use of force—to keep the Shi’ites down, up until 2003, and to keep the Kurds in. In a certain sense you can trace, from the Kurdish rebellion in 1970-74—the Algiers Accord, the Iran-Iraq war, the invasion of Kuwait—that they are linked events that have to do with, actually, dealing with the problem of the Kurdish rebellion. I would also say that, particularly here in Britain, there is also a moral question. In your country, which is democratic, prosperous, peaceful, this Parliament has gone ahead and allowed the people of Scotland to decide whether they wish to be a part of the United Kingdom or independent. It is a little inconsistent—I heard, Mr Gapes, the answer of the Government—for this Government to say, “Yes, the people of Scotland can decide, but no, we will not allow the people of Kurdistan to decide.” Whatever the outcome is in Scotland, I can assure you that it will be much more decisive in Kurdistan than it is in Scotland.
Chair
We won’t go down that road.
Mike Gapes
Just one question, but I first declare an interest in that I went to the Kurdistan region last November and it is in the Register. Can I ask you the same question I asked Bayan Abdul Rahman earlier? Is Sykes-Picot dead? Therefore what are the implications of the Kurdistan region for Syria?
Peter Galbraith
Sykes-Picot is dead. Actually, if you step back you have this interesting picture: you have a de facto independent Kurdistan region in Iraq that will have a vote on independence, and once you do that, then something has to follow, which is usually independence. In Syria, the Kurds have declared a region, or three cantons. In the middle you have the Sunni region, which is not under the control of Baghdad or Damascus, where ISIS has demolished the border. These conflicts are very much related. What actually happened? You had what started in Syria with ISIS, with some recruits from the Sunni parts of Iraq who then came into Iraq, and now have a larger number of recruits. On the military equipment, Ahmed Chalabi told me that ISIS now has 1,500 state of the art, armoured American Humvees in use—talk about “in use”; I do not think they got an in-use certificate for that—and they are now being seen as far west as Aleppo. That is a single event. Then you have a Shi’ite regime backed by Iran in Baghdad, in support of an Alawite regime in Damascus. So the divisions that were created by Sykes and Picot 100 years ago have dissolved, frankly, just as in 1989-91 the map that was drawn after the first world war dissolved. It is the same process.
Sir Menzies Campbell
I wonder if you relate the unwillingness of both Washington and London to recognise the present circumstances to the fact that both countries expended a great deal of blood and treasure, following upon the invasion of Iraq on the pretext of the existence of weapons of mass destruction. Do you think that that has left a legacy that is necessarily inhibiting the recognition of the points you have just made?
Peter Galbraith
In the case of Washington I don’t think that is the reason, for the simple reason that President Obama would not be President today, frankly, if Hillary Clinton had voted against the war. That was the centrepiece of what propelled him to the nomination. The Vice-President, Joe Biden, is an author of the notion that Iraq ought to be divided. Frankly, it is a kind of inertia. The way in which the United States looks at the world is very unimaginative. It does not recognise the power of nationalism. When we speak of Iraq, the Administration—both the previous one and this one—still speaks of Iraqis, which is a term that does not really help you analyse it. The same is true of Afghanistan: the discussion is always about Afghans when in fact you would have a better understanding if you discussed Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and so on. I think you would probably be better able to answer the question for the United Kingdom, but again I would note that it is odd that one standard is applied at home but not internationally.
Sir Menzies Campbell
So your view is that there is no legacy. Do you mean us to accept that there is a failure of imagination on the part of Washington?
Peter Galbraith
I would say that it is a legacy of the invasion, because that destroyed the force that had kept Iraq together in a very brutal way. I do not think that is a bad outcome at all—again, better to have people exercise the right of self-determination than to be kept as part of a state with extraordinary and brutal force, and, frankly, genocide against the Kurds and mass killings of Shi’ites.
Nadhim Zahawi
That is excellent clarity. Clearly, for the UK and the US there are decisions to be made about what the reaction would be to a Kurdish referendum on independence. Where do you think the regional powers would be? Can you canter around, very briefly—this is to both Dr Allawi and Dr Galbraith—Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia in terms of their response to such a move?
Peter Galbraith
The first point I would make is that the referendum will happen. Once the President of Kurdistan goes to the Parliament and asks it to set up a referendum, that referendum will happen, and we know what the result is going to be. It is a process that will be very hard to stop, if people want it to stop. But I think there is nobody who wants it to stop. There are really three things that inhibited Kurdistan independence until 10 June. The first was the disputed territories. That has been resolved. The second was financial needs; they now have the financial resources, through developing their own oil and with Kirkuk. The third was international recognition. The country that counts more than any other is Turkey, and Turkey is basically supportive. The spokesman for the AKP said that they would prefer Iraq to stay together but if Kurdistan becomes independent, that is their right. I would not expect Turkey to recognise on the day of declaration, but I think it is extremely likely—and Turkish officials have said this both publicly and privately—that everything that they are doing with Kurdistan would continue, in other words, what is really important—the flow of oil. Syria is not in a position to do anything about it at all, so it is hardly worth discussing what their reaction would be. As for Iran, the Iranian media are now beginning to realise that this may happen, and the reaction is quite strong. A lot of the media cites statements by the Israelis in support of Kurdistan’s independence, and therefore suggesting that an independent Kurdistan is really a Zionist plot and that sort of thing. Perhaps the comments were not entirely—were true but not helpful. Their ability to influence a situation—they can cause trouble but there is a range of mountains between the two countries so their ability to disrupt it is limited. Frankly, Iran, with Syria and southern Iraq, has its hands full.
Nadhim Zahawi
And Saudi Arabia.
Peter Galbraith
And Saudi Arabia will oppose it, of the Arab world, because they are opposed to the break-up of what they perceive as an Arab country, although part of the problem in Iraq is that the Arabs have always wanted to describe it as an Arab country when it isn’t. The one Arab country that was for Kurdistan’s independence was Libya under Gaddafi, but he is now gone.
Nadhim Zahawi
Dr Allawi, very briefly.
Dr Allawi
I would just put a gloss, as it were, on what Peter was saying. His analysis of the response of the other countries is right. What really matters here is Turkey. Turkey, in the sense that without other explicit support for an independent Kurdistan or accepting the arrangements as they are now, is absolutely essential because without it there is no way that the Kurds can export their oil. Therefore, they will be in very serious financial trouble shortly thereafter. I would not preclude that Iran has an important role to play, not because it has power over the Kurds of Iran but because it has some power over some major Kurdish groups, including those associated with the PUK. Inasmuch as it is now taking a firm stand against it, this calculation has to be taken into account before you move to a point of no return. Breaking up of states always takes place at the expense of somebody. Just go to the American experience, where the opposite has taken place and the idea of union at all costs justified a three-year civil war. I am not saying we should go to another civil war here, but there are cases in the past in Iraq’s history—it has not always been a failure in terms of the co-existence of its various components. It has been through periods where there was not only a great deal of openness in the society and the country, particularly with regard to the Kurds, perhaps even over-representation in certain periods—monarchical periods. Things went haywire in the last 20 or 30 years, primarily because of a dictatorship that created a mindset that seems to have continued into the current period, not necessarily with the same kind of bloody-mindedness, but still, I do not want to see that possibility of creating maybe even a confederal arrangement in Iraq dismissed out of hand—it should be given a chance. You are trying to read history backwards. History is not always a case of oppression and suppression of minority groups. In the case of Iraq, it has been a cycle. That cycle has been exacerbated to the point where it has reached unacceptable levels. But to jump from that to demanding the break-up of the state, for better or worse—in the case of most of Iraq, it has been for the worse—the opportunity to create representative structures that are accountable with a decent political class is a great opportunity that was lost in the last 10 years. For a variety of reasons, which I cannot get into now, I think that experiment should not be dismissed out of hand and you jump into the unknown. The idea that all of a sudden you are going to open a nirvana because you have reached—the Kurds themselves, within their own territories, there will be certain demands for autonomy on certain other groups that may not feel very comfortable to follow the Kurdish group. If you are able to transcend these in a confederal structure, I think it should be given the chance. This kind of momentum towards the ultimate break-up of Iraq, some very serious collateral damage is going to take place. It may not take place visibly. Some of it is taking place now: millions of people displaced, ethnic cleansing or sectarian cleansing. The next step will be a confrontation between the sectarian elements in the Middle East. Here we are talking about a war that can go on for 30 years, so before we solve somebody’s problem we have to contextualise it. The US or the UK take, as it were, a default position for protecting the status quo. The status quo sometimes has a lot going for it. Yugoslavia, in my mind, was probably a much better outcome than the subsequent ethnically based national states. The way the world is going, a confederal arrangement in Iraq, linked to a more assertive attempt to create a kind of common economic sphere for the Middle East, is the way that we should go, rather than this 19th-century ethnic nationalism, which can only lead to even greater forms of repression. You should not define states any more by pure ethnicity; states should transcend that. If states are defined that way, anybody of a different ethnic background should have no presence in these countries. Iraq has been ruled miserably in the past 30 years with Saddam, and even before that. There were periods of time, if you have a longer historical perspective, when the state could have transcended these issues and created the circumstances of a general Iraqi identity. Because they were attached to it, to a large extent against their will, the Kurdish elites were well represented in the Iraqi state before 1958. To talk about them being somehow marginalised is not true.
Peter Galbraith
May I make a comment on that? I agree with Dr Allawi in the sense that the kind of state he describes might be very desirable. Yugoslavia might have been a desirable project, but it was not what was wanted by the Slovenes or the Croatians. They were very strongly against it. In the end, to try to hold it together was impossible. On the same point, we could have a debate on whether the Kurds should want to be Iraqi and whether everyone should share in the richness of the Arab language and all that, but that is not what they want. The experience of Iraq since 1958 changes things. It is not possible to go back to 1958. Frankly, it is not possible to go back to 2005, when the constitution was adopted. You asked Bayan about the constitutional arrangements. At least based on my conversations in Erbil, if they just said, “We will just go back to the 2005 constitution, and this time we mean it,” everyone would say, “No.” Up until 10 June, there was some discussion of confederation, where Kurdistan would be completely self-governing, with its own army and military and no Iraqi presence. It might have had some confederal institutions where both parties would have had to agree—you could have two Foreign Ministers, and then a decision would be made at a defence council in a minimalist arrangement. I think that they now see that the best way to protect their country is as an independent state. Among other things, they could then get weaponry that they cannot get now. Finally, on legacy, the truth, from the point of view of the United States’ investment of nearly $2 trillion and a lot of lives, is that the project has been a big disappointment, except for one part of the country, Kurdistan, which is democratic and booming economically. One way to look at this is to look at what we can salvage from the whole venture. That is something that is salvageable.
Sir Menzies Campbell
An illustration of the theory of unintended consequences.
Peter Galbraith
It is.
Mike Gapes
May I come back on what you have just said, Mr Galbraith? Slovenia and Croatia did not have an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist putative state next to them. The problem we have to confront here is not just what happens in the KRG or in Syria, but the fact of this Sunni area that, potentially, given the weakness of the Baghdad Government, could last for a very long time. Can I have your assessments on whether this is a Sunni revolt in general, or whether it is a bargaining arrangement whereby some of the Sunni leaders will actually change if they can get rid of Maliki and have a different formulation in Baghdad, such that ISIL will no longer be as powerful as it appears to be at the moment?
Dr Allawi
It is really an alliance between groups. I do not want to employ percentages of this or that, but it is an alliance between former regime elements, so-called dissident tribal types and ISIS, with ISIS providing a kind of vanguard of shock troops. It is not a generalised Sunni revolt, but it is mainly a Sunni revolt. Again, if I was a betting man, I would say that something like 80% of the Sunni Arab population in those areas currently under ISIS are probably glad that the central Government is out of there—
Mike Gapes
Would they prefer the current situation?
Dr Allawi
They would prefer ISIS before ISIS shows its true nature, its true colours, but the way that it is happening now is that ISIS appears to be withdrawing from those areas that are heavily populated in favour of a kind of military council in which former Ba’athis and local area notables prevail. This is obviously a change, a major shift, in their strategy, but if that continues the alliance is firm, and it will be an important source of maintaining the stability of this proto-state. How that state relates to Sunnis outside its control—Arab Sunnis, especially in Baghdad—is another matter. I do not see the tribes turning against ISIS simply because of the absence of one major element, which is the United States. In 2007 and 2008, the Awakening movements, the so-called Sahwists, were able to turn against al-Qaeda as a result of immense American support, including military and financial support. This is now not available, and there is also a great deal of mistrust between large numbers of wavering Sunni Arab leaders and the present Iraqi Government. Until and unless ISIS behaves as the vicious force that it has proved itself to be in Syria, so far the alliance seems to be holding. To shift or break it requires great miscalculations on the part of ISIS or great duplicity on the part of its allies, because the alliance cannot really do without the ISIS military contribution—these people do the heavy fighting.
Peter Galbraith
I agree with what Dr Allawi has said. In fact, right from the start of the takeover of Mosul, they went and found a former Iraqi general to take control of the city, so they have been relatively shrewd, if you will. I would just add to what Dr Allawi said about the US not being there. It is also important that the fact that what happened in 2007 did not succeed over the long term will make people reluctant to go back to 2007. Finally, since the hearing on Kurdistan, if you wanted to think strategically, I would argue that accepting the reality of an independent Kurdistan might actually be a better instrument for being able to combat ISIS. Right now, what is the view of the people of the KRG and of Kurdistan? It is defensive—they worry about holding on to the gains that they have. If their gains are consolidated and if their statehood is recognised, they might be more willing to co-operate with Baghdad and the West in an operation against ISIS. In fact, it might even be a quid pro quo for providing that kind of co-operation, in return for diplomatic recognition and military assistance. It is a potential bargain that could be made, but they are unlikely to take any offensive action when their mindset is, “How do we defend Kurdistan?” or “How do we get to having Kurdistan?” Once they have it, it could be different.
Mike Gapes
What does this mean for the formation of an Iraqi Government with a President and Prime Minister? Is it in effect irrelevant, or could there be some kind of deal still to preserve Iraq, perhaps without the Kurdistan region or pending a referendum?
Peter Galbraith
I would say that the fundamental problem is—first, I do not know how many of the Sunni parliamentarians could go to their homes today. In short, you have people who are voting in the Parliament in Baghdad who may not actually represent the Sunnis. But if you take the people in the Sunni region, their position is not just that they want to be part of a more inclusive Iraq; they do not want the Shi’ites to be running Iraq, and if they are ISIS, they do not want the Shi’ites to exist. It is an existential conflict, and certainly among the extreme Shi’ite militias there is a parallel view. It is really hard to see how you find common ground. The Kurds may participate in the formation of the Government because they have been asked to by the United States and the west, but regardless of who emerges as Prime Minister, I do not think that that will change what they have planned. If they had someone in whom they have confidence, such as Ahmed Chalabi, I certainly think the divorce might be much easier and much more constructive than what might happen if Maliki continues.
Mike Gapes
Dr Allawi, would you agree?
Dr Allawi
Yes, up to a point. There is a glimmer of hope in terms of maintaining the integrity of the Iraqi state, which is the fact that the Kurds are still playing the political game in Baghdad. Just this morning there was a meeting of Parliament in which their vote was essential for voting in the new Speaker. There is now a kind of recognition that the presidency will be given to a Kurd. Inasmuch as they are still participating in the electoral regime in Iraq, I think that they will play a part in creating new governmental structures that might overcome some of the serious problems they have had with Mr Maliki. If that happens, I think it will stop or decelerate the process towards break-up. You can find a great deal of common ground between a revamped central Government, the security needs of Kurdistan and the need for a joint front against ISIS. If you are able to re-energise the integrity of the central Government—that is a big if—with Kurdish participation, a kind of alliance between the KRG and the central Government to face off the ISIS threat could be a workable arrangement, but it will be very difficult to accept that the central Government can do that while simultaneously having a Kurdish president who is no longer interested in maintaining the integrity of the state. I cannot see how you can participate in the political game without trying to preserve the forms and the institutions to which you have been elected.
Mike Gapes
My final question is about the Peshmerga taking Kirkuk and other areas that were not Kurdish from the Baghdad perspective, but which clearly are from the KRG’s perspective. Do you agree with what Bayan said—that there will be no going back on that—or will any Government in Baghdad want to reopen that question? Will there be future conflict?
Dr Allawi
As I have already said, you have to look at the collateral damage when you make some of these decisions. I cannot really say whether or not these territories belong to Kurdistan, because there has never been a referendum. Let us assume that they do and that this is part of the territorial gains. The fact that it was done without reference to any of the constitutional arrangements is a given. You can claim, and I would agree, that the Iraqi Government played no part in accelerating or even starting the process for implementing a referendum in these areas, but what has happened has really dangerous consequences. It has greatly aggravated anti-Kurdish opinion in the Shi’a south. Of course, Sunnis reject it out of hand, but from the Shi’a point of view—they had previously been historic allies with the Kurds against the authoritarian Governments in Baghdad and then against Saddam’s dictatorship—it is seen as a kind of stab in the back. You are creating the conditions where there will be a great deal of animosity held by a large number of Iraqis as to the way in which these territories were seized. There are two sides to every story. If you do not take this into account but just stand on your high horse and say, “This is ours, irrespective,” without taking into account the form in which it was done, you run the risk of creating really deep divisions between not only the Arabs and the Kurds, but the Shi’as and the Kurds. That is apart from the Sunnis and the Kurds, which is an entirely different prospect. Why would a country start its life in such a state of deep popular enmity? I do not understand it. Why should there not be a process that may very well lead to independence but whose halfway house is a confederation? Insufficient attention is paid to the effects of these decisions on the rest of the country who, irrespective of whether Shi’a or Sunni, still see Iraq as an integral state.
Peter Galbraith
May I perhaps offer a different perspective? In 2005, the Kurds—frankly reluctantly—rejoined Iraq. In January 2005 there was a referendum in Kurdistan on independence, organised by NGOs, which was just outside all the polling places so people could vote in the elections and then in the referendum, and almost everyone did. They voted 98%—more than 2 million votes—for independence. Fast forward to the negotiation of the constitution, which was a reluctant bargain that was premised on a couple of key deals. One was federalism: retaining the Peshmerga Kurdistan self-government. The second was the compromise that intended to allow Kurdistan to develop its own oil, because the central Government had control only over the “present fields”—those are the words in the constitution—so new fields, which clearly meant all the fields in Kurdistan except Kirkuk, would be under the authority of the Kurdistan Government. That was one essential element of the constitution. The other central element of this bargain was that, by 31 December 2007, article 140 would be implemented and a referendum would be held on the status of the disputed areas. The Government in Baghdad did not keep either bargain. It contested the language in the constitution as if the phrase “present fields” was a typo, spelt correctly in Arabic, and it did not implement the referendum. In June, the Kurds did not take over this area; the Iraqi army disappeared. I was with the governor of Kirkuk just a few days after all this happened. He was describing how the commander had come to see him and then basically fled. The Peshmerga were there and, if they had not kept their forces in Kirkuk, ISIS would be there. Would that have been a happier result? Would the Shi’ites in the south be happier if the Kirkuk oilfield and city were under ISIS and if they started blowing up the tomb of Daniel and all the other monuments there? This really does not make sense. I agree that they should hold a referendum, but I disagree with Bayan about United Nations involvement. I think that if the UN could be persuaded to conduct that referendum, it would be terrific. For all its flaws, I think a UN-sponsored referendum would have the most credibility with Arab Iraqis. I think the UN could do a perfectly fair one and, in any event, given the demographics of these areas, I do not think that the result would be in doubt. Furthermore, the leaders in Erbil have said to me, “If there is a district that does not want to be part of Kurdistan, we don’t want to have it. We are prepared to let that go.” Again, if you look the specifics, I do not think that there are such districts, but if there are—perhaps around Tuz Khurmatu or some of the parts of Diyala province—that is fine because they are not going to insist on that.
Chair
I am afraid that we have only a few minutes left, because we have another meeting starting shortly. Is it a mistake for the energy policy of Kurdistan to be based on the relationship with Turkey? Is that putting all our eggs into one basket?
Peter Galbraith
With the energy policy in Kurdistan?
Chair
Yes. The energy policy of Kurdistan, as you probably heard earlier, is dependent on a good relationship with Turkey and shipping oil and gas out via a landlocked country through Turkey. Is that a risky enterprise, or is it a safe thing for Kurdistan to be doing?
Peter Galbraith
It has an element of risk, but there is not much alternative if you are landlocked. It clearly cannot go through Iran. Perhaps if things ever stabilised in Iraq, and if you have, if you will, the Velvet force like Czechoslovakia, another route might be down to the Persian Gulf. But at the moment there is no choice.
Chair
Also at the moment Turkey does not really recognise a lot of the rights of the wider Kurdish region.
Peter Galbraith
There has been extraordinary change in Turkey. When I first visited south-east Turkey in 1988, it was illegal to speak Kurdish. The Government said there were no Kurds in Turkey; there were only mountain Turks who forgot their native language. Last year, Massoud Barzani went to Diyarbakır in south-east Turkey with Erdoğan. It was basically an election rally for the AK party with 100,000 people and he addressed them, and Erdoğan spoke some words of Kurdish. There has been a huge gain for Kurdish rights. The KRG has been playing a role in the peace process between Turkey and the PKK. Indeed, the PKK says quite clearly that it is not for separatism. The whole dynamic has changed. Thirty years ago—even 10 years ago—Ankara saw Kurds as a potential threat to the unity of Turkey. Now it sees Kurdistan as an ally and as a state that was really rather like Turkey: secular, democratic, with an Atatürk type of tradition. It is an ally and economic partner, and certainly a buffer against Iranian-dominated southern Iraq or ISIS and terrorism. When the Kurds think of confederation, there is discussion of confederation with Iraq, but also discussion of some kind of confederate arrangement with Turkey.
Chair
Dr Allawi, do you have a view on the relationship with Turkey?
Dr Allawi
Yes, I think it would be an overpowering state that would dominate Kurdistan economically. There is no way that Turkey is going to acknowledge the same right of secession for their own Kurds. If you take the clock back 20 or 30 years, you could have seen similar conditions in Turkey as you have today in Iraq, and you would have claimed the right of the Kurds seceding against the arbitrary violence of the guns. Tens of thousands of people were killed. The point I am trying to make is that since then there has been a sea change in the internal politics of Turkey. No decision was made then to secede, and the Kurds of Turkey are by and large prepared to give the state a chance under these new arrangements and new dispensation. We are now looking towards an independent Iraqi Kurdistan, not a Kurdistan. There is no way on earth that the Iranians are going to allow their Kurdistan to part. So you have a state that is a rump Kurdistan attached economically to Turkey and entirely dependent on it, because, unless and until it has acceptable arrangements for the Government in Baghdad, the economic route southwards is going to be impossible. A great deal of the economic prosperity in Kurdistan that Peter was referring to is to do with the fact that they have access to the Iraqi market. Hundreds or probably a thousand to 1,500 Turkish companies are now based in Kurdistan. They are not there only to sell to the 4 million Kurds or the 5 million people in the greater Kurdistan economic area. They are there because they can base themselves there to trade and deal with the rest of Iraq. Unless you have a free trade area, some kind of agreement on common tariffs, or some kind of transportation policy that takes into account the need to have a north-south access for your own petroleum exports, I think you are basically declaring a kind of independence in order to become a satrapy of Turkey. This thing, in my mind, has not been thought through to its logical conclusion. The logical conclusion, whether you want independence or not, is in fact a push for the maximum degree of autonomy, even through a confederal arrangement within Iraq and not to break up the state and become dependent on the good will of Turkey on the grounds that it is now a “modern European state”. The thing may very well turn against. To me, it seems to be rushing, to some extent, into the unknown. I am not a Kurd so I can’t be in a position to express the national sentiments there, but I think I would give the Iraqi state one more chance, probably not under the current Government, but a Government who are really willing to look at these issues and deal with them fairly. Then you can take the decision on whether you want to stay within a confederal Iraq where you have a great deal of political power, or whether you want to go and become a satrapy of Turkey. It is their decision. I have no problem with them holding a referendum to secede if that’s what they want. If they want to jump from a frying pan, where the heat is turning down, to the fire, that is their decision.
Chair
That’s one way of putting it. Mr Galbraith, this is the final question: if UK businesses want to do business in Kurdistan, is there anything they should be wary of?
Peter Galbraith
Kurdistan is—I was told, although this may have been last year—the fastest growing place in the world so obviously there are a lot of opportunities. They need to do more of the legal changes in terms of domesticating, if you will, the investment law and the banking systems, which depend on Baghdad. I think they are looking at doing that. Frankly, there could be greater transparency. It is not a part of the world that, shall we say, meets the Scandinavian standards and I think there is awareness that they need to address it, but I don’t think they have addressed it as much as they should.
Chair
Is corruption a problem?
Peter Galbraith
Yes, I think Kurdish leaders would say that it is a problem and is something that they have to address. Any UK business or any foreign business is going to read the headlines and has an idea of the place, but that said, it is a place that has enormous opportunity and the companies that have invested there have done extremely well. I would encourage British and foreign businesses to continue to invest, but obviously, with their eyes open.
Chair
Dr Allawi, as you are not a Kurd, you probably wouldn’t know the answer to that?
Dr Allawi
No, I think I would agree with Peter. It is obviously a much safer place to invest in than main Iraq, but one should not underestimate the economic problems inside Kurdistan, although they are less than they are in the rest of Iraq. There is high unemployment, there is a serious financial crisis right now, mainly because they have not received their funds from central Government, and unless or until they are able to export the oil from Kirkuk I think we are looking to a very serious economic crisis—it has already started. Unemployment and corruption are very serious—don’t ask me, ask the Kurds who have to face it on a daily basis. So it is not Scandinavian. It is probably not even—I don’t want to mention other countries. I will be cautious, apart from the resource area.
Chair
That completes our questions. Is there any point that you wanted to make that we haven’t covered?
Dr Allawi
No, I was just making a plea for a confederal Iraq.
Chair
In that case, I thank you both very much indeed. It is very much appreciated. Oral evidence: UK Government policy on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, HC 564 9