Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 3 September 2014

Oral evidence, 3 September 2014.

Witness

Dr Alex Pravda, Emeritus Fellow, St Antony’s College, Oxford University, gave evidence.

Chair

It is a great pleasure to welcome Dr Alex Pravda to speak to us today. In fact, I am welcoming back one of our own, as he is a former special adviser to the Committee back in the ’80s, when I am afraid to say most of us were not here—it must have been in your youth, Dr Pravda. He is now senior research fellow at the school of interdisciplinary area studies at the university of Oxford. More to the point, he is a renowned expert on Soviet and post-Soviet foreign policy. Dr Pravda, welcome, thank you very much for coming along today. Is there anything you would like to say by way of an opening statement, or shall we go to questions?

Dr Pravda

I will say something by way of a start, because I did not submit any written evidence. There are three narratives about Russia that are around at the moment and have been for some years. They are important, because as Edward Lucas said when making some fundamental points, you have certain assumptions from which follow certain patterns of actions to deal with Russia. First, the one that until recently was favoured by most Governments, certainly in the European Union and to some extent also in the US, sees Russia as an awkward partner, difficult to deal with, but nevertheless a partner and a convert in the post-cold war order, manageable with pragmatic policies and the exercise, mainly, of economic leverage and incentives. Since 2008 and the Georgian war, this view of the awkward partner has undergone change and now, with the Ukraine crisis, has been reassessed, to say the least. Counterposed to that for a number of years—as Edward Lucas reminded us, since at least 2003, ’04, ’05—there has been the new cold war narrative, which you heard about. I will not elaborate on that, except to say that it argues that Russia is, as Edward Lucas has argued, a deeply revisionist power. My only comment on that is that we probably do not have the time to take apart what we mean by revisionism, but the major difference between myself and what Edward Lucas was saying is perhaps that Russia is actually quite a conservative, 19th-century power, wanting rules that serve the interests of great powers exercising dominant influence within their own spheres. Those sorts of rules are not to the liking, quite rightly, of states at the moment. We have gone beyond that with international law and international organisations. Those rules, however, are still championed not only by Russia, but probably to some extent by China as well. Therefore, revision in terms of structural revision—creating something new—is incorrect. The other major flaw with or danger of the parallel—the situation that we now find ourselves in—or new cold war is that Russia does not present any competing system that it wishes to export globally. In fact, the efforts of Putin and his group to put together conservative nationalism and orthodoxy, a Russian civilisation basis for its great power status, has by definition only a very limited export value. Of course, if you are in Ukraine, Belarus, or other Slav state neighbours, it is a worry and an understandable concern. But it is not a new cold war in the sense that it is not a global export. There is a third narrative that I think is most accurate, given the pattern of behaviour of Russia not just in the last few years but in previous decades. It is belligerent-minded and resurgent at the moment, or attempting to be a resurgent great power. It is following the 19th century views of the world as a struggle, a Hobbesian conflict, a zero-sum game in which might is on the whole more effective than good will or any pretence to obey certain international rules. In Russia’s view, international rules are made to be used to further great power purposes, and it regularly lectures us, of course, on the way in which other powers—notably the United States—have done the same. In that way it is a conservative, counter-reactionary great power, and we need to bear that in mind when dealing with it. Its major concerns as far as Ukraine is involved are negative rather than a positive. No Ukrainian membership of NATO, no Ukrainian foreign policy that is hostile to Russia, and third and most difficult, and most problematic from Ukraine’s and our point of view, no domestic regional threat, or regime threat, to Russia. In other words, no colour revolution and no hostile counter-example that would destabilise Putin’s and other regimes of an authoritative kind in Russia. How do we deal with a resurgent great-power Russia using 19th-century hard power means and responding, I would argue, opportunistically and often impetuously to other policies and other sets of events? I do not see Putin as a masterly strategist who has had the partition of Ukraine in his mind perhaps since 2000 or 1992, or since 2007. He wants to exclude the possibilities that concern him—the security alignment and the political alignment. He does not really know how to do that and has I think improvised a great deal in the course of the crisis. I will be happy to answer questions on that. So in terms of dealing with Russia as a resurgent traditional Hobbesian-minded great power, there are certain dos and don’ts. I will start with the don’ts. I certainly take the view, from the history of the last two or three years and from previous decades, that taking a hard line with Russia—punitive sanctions, threats, hitting hard—usually elicits precisely similar behaviour, and in spades. We would be well advised to remember that where Ukraine is concerned, Russia’s stakes—security, cultural, historical and political stakes—in the business are far deeper than ours. Russia’s willingness to use hard force, as has been evidenced in the past year, is far greater than ours, and its determination to do so, despite the economic costs, is greater than ours. So the argument that Russia is ultimately a weak power in GDP terms does not address the question of its will and resolve to use resources in a concentrated fashion to defend what it sees—often not justifiably—as its national interest, and it has a long history, of which it is notably proud, of doing precisely that, with world war two being the best example from a Russian point of view. It concentrates resources in a weak unit to beat a much stronger unit. The way to manage this awkward, resurgent great power is to play a game that we are better at: political engagement; highly conditioned inclusion, rather than exclusion from institutions and organisations; and an insistence on being part of the regime, whether security or economic—certainly in the greater European region, but also globally. That is a game, or a dimension, in which the West has enormous advantages, a moral upper hand, a normative upper hand, and enormously greater experience and adeptness at manoeuvre. The West can also play to actors in Russia. We too often tend to see Russia as one unified actor; we may explore that. There are elements within the Russian leadership, even, and certainly within the Russian policy elite whose interests lie in playing more by the rules of the international game rather than those of Putin. I will stop there.

Chair

You have answered my question, so I will go to Mike Gapes. I would simply say that a number of us feel that we have been playing the political, diplomatic, highly conditioned approach, and it hasn’t worked, so we have to move on.

Mike Gapes

I want to explore your idea of a 19th-century power in the context of attitude to the European Union. What is your assessment of Putin’s overall strategy towards the European Union? Clearly, what he did in Ukraine and the reaction to that was preceded by his meeting last September with the Armenian President, Sargsyan, who, over a weekend, changed Armenia’s position on seeking an association agreement with the EU; he dropped it without any consultation internally because Russia effectively made him a better offer. Does Putin see the association with the European Union as a threat? Is it seen as a strategic threat to the power of the elite in Russia, is it an ideological threat or is it simply seen in terms of national interest?

Dr Pravda

I think it’s accurate to say that Moscow has difficulties in getting its head around what the EU is. Now, there’s a problem that many of us—including many recent members of the EU—share, but Moscow’s difficulties are particular. Because Moscow sees the international system in terms of differently sized states in a hierarchy according to economic and military clout and resolve, from the beginning of its association with the EC and the EU it has seen this purportedly supranational organisation as no more than the sum total of its nation state members. It sees the major decisions made by the EU largely as the result of the priorities of the major states—Germany, being the leading state, France, ourselves and possibly in some contexts Italy. It doesn’t really see Brussels as more than the spokesman for those larger state interests. Therefore, it has been increasingly surprised, and is still surprised, to see that those states sometimes allow small member states—particularly the more recent east European members of the EU—to shape policy, particularly in the east. Whether it merely attributes that to the oversight of large states that take their eye of the ball, or—more likely in the Kremlin’s conspiratorial view of the world—sees making Lithuania take something forward as a convenient way of fronting what actually is a policy favoured by Britain, I don’t know. Nevertheless, Russia has been surprised, because of its statist view of the EU, by the more aggressive Eastern Partnership policies, which were driven to a large extent by the east European states that were more knowledgeable of what Russia and the neighbourhood is about. Quite rightly, they added to and informed those policies. But those policies, by definition, did not take Russia into the kind of consideration that, say, Germany or even the UK, would give it, in terms of seeing it as a major state actor, perhaps with concerns about strategic interests, and so forth. Quite the opposite was true. The interests of the Baltic states, quite understandably, are to maintain as hard a border as possible and to extend that as far as possible into the former Soviet space not in the EU at the moment, in order to secure their own stability and security. So the notion of the EU has surprised Russia year by year. Secondly, it started out, because of its understanding that this was really Germany and the UK in another form, dealing bilaterally with Berlin, London and Paris and managing in that way. Therefore, it was less apprehensive about the influence of the EU compared to that of NATO. The EU was seen to be an acceptable kind of western alignment and club for eastern European states to belong to: first, because it was essentially economic; secondly, because it was poorly organised and co-ordinated; and thirdly because you could always go to Berlin and get things fixed. Again, with the more assertive and collective actions of the EU pushing forward enlargement to the east, it has been perceived, particularly since 2009, as a kind of quasi-security threat, which is more subtle, penetrative and lasting than perhaps the open threat presented by NATO. I think that the offer made to Ukraine—Ukraine being, from a Russian point of view, the most sensitive member of the non-EU neighbourhood—was seen as a way of weaning Ukraine away from Russia, whose hold over it before the crisis was mainly through the penetration of its economic oligarch business networks by various means, including highly corrupt practices. Regularising the economic activity of Ukraine and its relationship towards the west with the EU would take away and undermine those possibilities of influence, leverage and control.

Mike Gapes

On the question of Crimea, the response that we and other EU countries have taken—Edward Lucas referred to it earlier—was that it was not a legitimate referendum and was therefore not recognised. What is your assessment of the real position of the population of Crimea and its attitude to incorporation into Russia?

Dr Pravda

Let me state that this was clearly an illegitimate referendum, which broke the Ukraine constitution. There has to be a national referendum, you cannot have pop-up referendums. It was particularly illegitimate since it was clearly supported and facilitated, as Putin later admitted, by stationed military personnel. In terms of the population, the various polls show that there was only a minority of inhabitants of Crimea who contemplated or wanted any kind of unity or proximity to Russia more than they wanted a return to 1992. The 1992 option, in fact, would have been, from a strategic point of view, as useful for Putin—in fact, more so—and easier to manipulate than what he did, which was to annex and not have recognition of the annexation. One factor that has not been mentioned so far and is underestimated in the whole Ukraine story—particularly in Crimea, but it also applies to south-east Donbass—is economic interests. The pensions of Crimean pensioners will be doubled within a month or two from their previous pension levels because they are part of Russia. Certainly the economic factor of wishing to be closer to Russia has been very important, at least in the early stages of public opinion in Donbass. There is criticism of Kiev, and in many cases it is not so much a draw towards Russia—even in the case of Crimea, let alone in Donbass—as an antipathy to the way they were treated by the capital, Kiev, and is economically based. It is not just a matter of “Are you with Russia or with Kiev?” The whole economic dimension of public opinion and public allegiances and alignments has been underplayed and under-reported. Why should Ukraine be so different from anywhere else in Europe, where the economic matters we rehearse are the only things that really matter in elections—or the things that matter most of all? Of course, such matters have been overtaken by the tragic conflict, which has changed alignments and opinions. Nevertheless, in Crimea the economics had a lot to do with it. Of course, the Russians are going to have to show that they can convert Crimea—they are going to have to spend something like $20 billion in the next five or six years or so. It is a prestige project, and I think that there was also an awareness of that in people’s thinking.

Nadhim Zahawi

What would be the best outcome from the NATO summit if the UK and its allies are to have a productive relationship with Russia?

Dr Pravda

I think we have to pursue a two-handed policy: neither all punitive sanctions nor, of course, an accommodation overlooking the egregious violations of international law and norms of behaviour that Russia has committed. In terms of NATO’s role, to show the credibility of all the threats we have heard against Russia, or the actual counters to Russia’s show of force and demonstration of military capability on Ukrainian soil, I think—and one hopes—that NATO will follow up resolve and general rhetoric by providing Ukraine with, first, more non-lethal aid and support. Secondly, it should also follow up with promises that, unless the situation improves—we have heard the very good news that there is a ceasefire or truce—and unless the fighting ceases and Russia ceases to orchestrate conflict in Ukraine, it is not inconceivable that we would supply Ukraine with the hardware necessary to balance some of the gap dividing the capability of Ukraine from that of Russia and its client militias. So I think there should be a show of resolve, but not going beyond the rotation of forces within existing NATO states, and avoiding more statements about the permanent nature of bases, regardless of circumstances. Above all, alongside a short-term and immediate boosting of military capability in Ukraine and reassuring neighbours, NATO would do well—although I very much doubt that we will see anything like this—to say that there will be a process of reflection on and assessment of the long-term relationship between NATO and Russia. I hope we do not get any more statements like the one we heard from the Foreign Secretary about Russia being a pariah state, because that merely reinforces very strong opinions in Moscow—“That is exactly how the West regards us: as an outcast. The China pivot, the Eurasian union, is therefore the only answer because we are rejected.” I am not pleading this to be soft on Russians; I am saying that that is the reaction you get. So I hope that we do not get repetitions of “pariah”, but nor should there be any positive accommodation promises or pledges—just a marker that we will look urgently, both within NATO and then together with Russia, at how that relationship can go forward. What went wrong with the whole Russia-NATO council arrangements and with the work of 1997? Why did Russia feel—this is a fact—that it was always an associate member and never an equal member? Why did Russia always feel that NATO presented an adversarial military bloc? We want to get over that and start to see the crisis not only as a massive problem, which it is, but as an opportunity to reassess how NATO deals politically with Russia and its alliance systems, such as the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation arrangements with the Chinese. We must look at the whole security picture and stop pretending that, basically, we can incrementally expand the cold war structure. If you do that, you might well get—I do not think we have got it yet—another cold war. If you incrementally expand the structures that were the result and the product of the cold war, it is likely as not that you increase your chances of creating another situation of that kind.

Mr Baron

Dr Pravda, may I press you a little on how—you have given us a useful insight—better to engage with Russia? This is a country and, indeed, a region of the world where history runs deep. We have seen in Ukraine that the EU perhaps misjudged the situation, but the West can also point to developments where it did try to engage with President Putin and hit a brick wall. How would you, not just in Ukraine but more generally, try to develop a more positive relationship without showing weakness?

Dr Pravda

Thanks for that question, which goes back to the Chairman’s opening response, which I was going to come back to. It is all very well me sitting here, viewing things from Oxford and London—we are all full of policy advice on how better to do this and that—but we missed opportunities after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was seen from Moscow and is increasingly seen now as a major or tragic mismanagement of their own situation by the political elites at the time. From outside, with the exception of the Baltic states and Georgia, it is fairly seen as a movement produced by elite competition, rather than a massive and irresistible national uprising demanding a new structure and a new set of independent states. How do we engage with Russia? One thing is to stop thinking of Russia, as I mentioned before, as being totally embodied by whoever holds the top position, be it the President or, before that, the General Secretary of the Communist party. We know in great detail now, from archival evidence, the degree of differences that obtained within Politburos over time and among bureaucracies mainly within Moscow and Russia. We have some information on the differences within the Kremlin over the last years, even under Putin and even with the increasingly authoritative, confident statements that we get from Putin. In fact, I would say that there is a relationship between the two. The more assertive, brazen statements we get saying, “Don’t mess with us”, reflect not just some emotional impetuousness, which Putin has in spades, but the need to try to maintain unity in the face of a lot of differing opinions within his own circles about the wisdom and prudence of doing what has happened over Ukraine, particularly the recklessness of it. It is not that Russia is wrong in its wish to have droit de regard over Ukraine, because most people in the policy elite share that view. How do we go about that? Many disagree with what has happened, and they feel that the risks have been excessive, that the tactics have been improvised and not thought through and that the costs are far too high and the achievements far too low. Therefore, there is a constant blowing hot and cold and a constant changing of tactics. Shooting down the Malaysian Airlines plane was just something that pointed up problems of command and control and failures in the co-ordination and management of a fundamental order, which Putin would have derided, had it been committed by another actor. We should talk to the people who are more pragmatically minded; those who are no less concerned with Russia’s security, but who see security as sustainable stability. Also—this is about Russia—Ukraine is not a zero-sum game of either an insecure Ukraine and a happy Russia or a secure Ukraine and an unhappy, insecure Russia. Many people, including part of Putin—he is not uniform in his thinking—think that a stable, fairly prosperous Ukraine, trading with both sides, being the bridge that we have heard it has tried to be for 20 years and being not aligned initially, but being sufficiently self-confident to remain non-aligned, through its own wishes, is probably the best neighbour to have. They do not want a state that has been made more insecure by Russian military adventurism of the kind we have seen, which will lead, because there will be elections, whether in October or later, to a more anti-Russian Parliament—Rada—and which will make it more difficult for someone like Poroshenko, who is a dealer in the middle of the political spectrum, to compromise and accommodate because of the political pressures on him in Kiev. These people in Moscow are not ignorant of Ukrainian conditions. They know a lot about what happens in Ukrainian politics and their intelligence services give them very accurate information exactly on what is said by whom and to whom, and they know the line-up between the oligarchs and the political elites. We have not discussed that. Something that is under-discussed and under-reported is how Ukraine has to have more political stability and the dislocation between fiefdoms run by important businessmen or oligarchs, which have ceased to exist in Russia after Khodorkovsky but still exist in Ukraine, and how they are to be integrated into a stable system that has elections and is accountable.

Mr Baron

Very briefly, I obviously hear what you say and so does the Committee, but you indicated that there was an element of emotion here and a strong element of history. You have indicated that weaker forces accept the might of NATO, etc. but that the concentration of forces can have an effect. We have a NATO summit coming up and certain strong positions—not threats—have been maintained by the West. Do you feel that an increase in defence spending and more commitment for stronger defence partners will have any material effect in Ukraine or generally when it comes to Russian ambitions under President Putin?

Dr Pravda

Clearly, we will get the perennial call for burden sharing—2%—which will make some difference. I do not think that it makes a major impact on the situation around Ukraine or in Ukraine. Holding out the commitment of providing necessary materials to Ukraine should conflict break out again as a warning to Russia and as something to put into its calculations is important. Reassurance to the Baltic states and Poland is important. As I say, holding out the prospect of some reassessment of the overall relationship is important. What I am trying to point out is that this is not something that can be resolved militarily. In the immediate short term, we can hold the situation through certain military responses. I do not believe—this is just my particular view—that what is effectively containment of the old type or even a new anti, counter, hybrid, war kind is going to work with Russia, purely because it elicits the kind of responses that we have seen. A combination of having a credible stick to wield and an active political strategy with which to operate and leverage making sense in terms of stages of the process that we wish Russia to pursue would make sense. My point about Ukraine’s stabilisation is that there is an overlap of interests between Russia and ourselves and Ukraine’s population in having a self-confident, sustained, stable Ukraine, politically and economically. Incidentally, it will take large amounts of money. The latest IMF estimate is another $19 billion on top of the $17 billion, so it is a large-scale project. It is well worth doing, not just for the sake of our relations with Russia but for Ukraine. To end on a note that isn’t about great power politics, in the longer term, a stable, prosperous Ukraine has always been the most effective way of influencing—I do not believe in exporting democracy—the political trajectory of Russia. There’s no denying that if Ukraine manages to go some way towards a democratic, pluralist, accountable political system and a competitive economy, with SMEs operating and diversification, there is no excuse then for Russia to say, “We would like to go down that route but culturally and historically we are not able to do so.” If Ukraine has done it, Russia can do it, so ultimately Ukraine is very well worth paying a lot for.

Chair

Dr Pravda, may I interrupt? Today is a sitting day: the House is sitting in 10 minutes’ time, and we still have two or three groups of questions here, so could I ask you to keep your remarks brief as we conclude?

Mark Hendrick

Dr Pravda, I asked the Estonian Defence Minister yesterday whether there is anything that NATO could or should have done that might have meant that the current crisis in Ukraine would not have happened. Unsurprisingly, other commentators have also said that the problem is a political one, in that the EU made a mess of its discussions and negotiations with Ukraine, in terms of the EU association agreement. Do you think that the EU underestimated the strength of Russian objections to that, and also underestimated the lengths to which Russia would go to deter Yanukovych from signing the agreement? What do you think the EU should have done, and how do you think that the EU should have approached that, if you believe that thesis?

Dr Pravda

The EU was certainly deficient in not consulting Russia—not in the sense of making Russia a party to the agreement or giving it any kind of veto or leverage over what should be a totally bilateral relationship between the EU and Kiev in terms of the association agreement; but there was a lack of consultation about what sort of conditions and process Russia would find more or less acceptable, and particularly about what concerns Russia had about the timing and terms of the agreement. Consultation might have—one doesn’t know; it is a counterfactual—moderated Russian reaction. The other factor, which Brussels could not have anticipated—well, it might have done had it paid more attention to Ukrainian conditions—was the sheer underperformance of Yanukovych from a Moscow point of view, and the fact that Yanukovych managed his particular role extremely badly: he overplayed his hand, the family profits were excessive and the corruption was too great for the other oligarchs and for many in the Ukrainian population. The coincidence of the appalling performance of Yanukovych as President, both from the Ukrainian point of view and also in some senses from a Moscow point of view, and the lack of consultation of Russia by Brussels in the way in which it approached Ukraine and negotiated the association agreement combined to occasion that reaction.

Mark Hendrick

On the consultation side, do you think the Russians are interested in any consultation—do you think they would take any notice of anything that Brussels might say?

Dr Pravda

It is difficult to know. As I say, there is always a fine line and balance between appearing to make Russia an actor and have a say, which it should not have in any legitimate way, and making sure that you keep people informed. One of Russia’s grievances—at least as publicly and privately aired, and however unjustified—is that on a regular basis it is being kept outside major decision making. That has been a regular complaint about the whole NATO arrangement—you know, “In an outer room we were told, after decisions had been made, that this is what is being done.” That sensitivity has been there all along, and I think the EU should have paid attention to that—perhaps excessive—sensitivity.

Andrew Rosindell

Dr Pravda, is the importance of gas supplies to countries that depend on fuel from Russia something that you feel could be used as a weapon to blackmail countries and influence them? If so, how do we guard against that—what can we do to prevent it from happening?

Dr Pravda

There is no question. No one would gainsay the fact that Russia has seen gas pipelines—and oil, but particularly gas pipelines—as its major foreign policy and strategic asset. Up to recently, that has been the major resource that it has deployed to exercise leverage over its neighbourhood, to blackmail Ukraine in particular, by switching taps on and off as a coercive bargaining procedure, and to exercise a lot of influence in south-eastern Europe and over eastern European members of the EU and NATO, which are highly dependent on Russian energy, using it as a point of entry into the whole business community. There is no question at all that that is being used strategically by Russia as a national asset. The response to that, clearly, is to diversify, which we have all been trying to do. Efforts to do that continue to be under way. Edward Lucas talked in some detail about the kind of precautionary measures that one can take to reduce dependence on Russia—on any one supplier, in fact, but Russia in particular, which deploys this for political-strategic reasons. That will encourage—it is a good thing, probably—that movement to the east, much more to China, of deliveries of gas and oil, as we have seen in infrastructure projects and a very large deal signed. Given that gas is getting cheaper, rather than more expensive, and given the whole unconventional energy revolution, diversification and deliveries through alternative pipelines, those are precautionary measures. Clearly, it is something that takes time. Of course, the Poles and others are very keen, such as Radek Sikorski, on a pan-European diversification energy project, plus at the same time continuing to take action against Gazprom violations of the rules of the energy game. But diversification and recognition, it is no surprise—there is no come-back on that, except in terms of, “What are your interests in pricing terms?”— that Russia has made this an issue of national security for other countries, and therefore it has been counterproductive in that respect.

Chair

Dr Pravda, thank you very much indeed. You have been the perfect complement to Mr Lucas, so thank you, it has been very helpful. We very much appreciate you taking the time to come and see us. Oral evidence: Russia and Ukraine, HC 628 19