Oral evidence: Administrative scheme for ‘on-the-runs’, HC 177Monday 8 September 2014

Oral evidence, 8 September 2014.

Witness

Jonathan Powell, Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Tony Blair (1997 – 2007), gave evidence.

Chair

Mr Powell, you are very welcome. Thank you very much for joining us here today. You know we are conducting an inquiry into the on-the-run scheme, which was really triggered by the case regarding Mr Downey[1], but since we have started the inquiry obviously we have discovered a lot more information, and we are very grateful to you for helping us with our inquiry. Would it be helpful if you gave us a brief opening statement about the scheme, your involvement and anything else you want to tell us?

Jonathan Powell

Yes, I will be very brief, really. I was an integral part of the negotiations on Northern Ireland as Tony Blair’s Chief of Staff from 1997 to 2007. I was an integral part of the scheme. Lady Justice Hallett deserves to be congratulated[2]. She has done a remarkable job in a very short period of time. She has a very clear understanding of what happened and I agree with all of her judgments. I very much doubt I will have much to add to it, but I will be happy to answer any questions.

Chair

Thank you very much. It might be useful to start at the beginning. We have been trying to define exactly when the scheme started. Presumably you can tell us.

Jonathan Powell

Actually, Lady Justice Hallett gets it just right: this scheme evolved. When the first names were put to us, we had no intention of a scheme; it was simply dealing with a few individual names. As she describes very accurately in this report, it gradually developed into a scheme.

Chair

How crucial was it to the peace process? We have heard various accounts of that. In your view, how crucial was it? I do not mean the scheme as such, because you are saying that evolved, but was dealing with some of the names which came to you originally very important? Because not all of them were dealt with in the way that Sinn Féin might have wished.

Jonathan Powell

It is important to try to separate out two issues here, again as Lady Justice Hallett very accurately does. There is the issue of dealing with the OTRs and, in addition, the issue of dealing with the administrative scheme. The administrative scheme was not an answer to the problem of the OTRs. We were approached in the negotiations in 1999-2000 by Sinn Féin, asking us to solve the problem of on-the-runs. This is a problem that arises in most negotiations like this. Once you have dealt with people in prison, there is the anomaly of people not in prison with the same sort of status. They asked us to try to deal with that problem. As you know from Lady Justice Hallett’s report, Tony Blair wrote to Gerry Adams[3], saying he would try to solve this problem. We then spent the next nine years trying to solve it, including by legislation, but failed to do so. When we left Government, we had not solved the problem of on-the-runs. The administrative scheme was trying to deal with people who were not wanted. The on-the-run scheme was to deal with people who were wanted. The administrative scheme was to allow people to come back who were not wanted. It is a very different thing.

Kate Hoey

Why had they gone away?

Jonathan Powell

Many people left for different reasons. No doubt they were suspicious that they were wanted; they thought they were going to be persecuted. I do not know. I cannot possibly answer for individuals.

Chair

One of the pieces of evidence we received that troubled us a little bit was from the then solicitor to Sinn Féin, Barra McGrory[4], who is now the most senior prosecuting officer in Northern Ireland. He said under normal circumstances the police may well have wanted to speak to those people who did receive letters. Is that not a little bit troubling?

Jonathan Powell

Could you say that again?

Chair

When I questioned him in Belfast, Mr McGrory said that in normal circumstances the police may well have wanted to speak to those who did receive letters. Is that not a little bit troubling? Does that not blur the line that you were attempting to draw?

Jonathan Powell

No, there is a clear distinction between people who are wanted and people who are not wanted.

Chair

The letters were saying to people, “You are not wanted”.

Jonathan Powell

Yes, exactly.

Chair

Mr McGrory’s view was that in normal circumstances—in other words, if there were not a peace process to be dealt with, which there was—they would want to speak to those people. That was his clear evidence to us.

Jonathan Powell

I am not a lawyer; I cannot speak for Mr McGrory. However, looking at Lady Justice Hallett’s report, she clearly thinks this was an entirely lawful thing. It strikes me that it was the right thing to do.

Oliver Colvile

Thank you very much for coming to see us. As you may know, I have some concerns about how this whole process has operated. I am sure you have read the thing. We met John Larkin[5], who, as you may know, is Attorney-General for Northern Ireland, on 10 June earlier this year. I just want to quote from Hansard to you. “I think … that one of the great concerns is the relative secrecy of the process. I think there are two elements, when one strips it down. There is firstly simply letting someone know that there are no active proceedings in contemplation on the basis of a certain corpus of knowledge at a particular time. But then this is the bit that, oddly enough, troubles me—I do not think it has received as much attention—which is saying to someone, ‘Look, you are wanted,’ with the implication, ‘Don’t come back.’ I think that gives rise to issues under section 4(1) of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 and also the common-law offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice. Obviously, on the one hand, if one is dealing with someone who has made it absolutely clear that they are not coming back and you happen to pass on to that person that it is not safe for them to come back, neither of those offences may be committed, but the issue, certainly it strikes me, is at large.” My understanding is you then wrote to Lord Williams of Mostyn, who was the Attorney-General at the time, on 23 June 2000[6]—this is about Rita O’Hare—saying, “I met her once on 12 April at a three‑way meeting between a British delegation, an Irish delegation and a Sinn Féin delegation. On the British side were myself, Bill Jeffrey and Jonathan Stephens. I know Bill Jeffrey is providing you with a record of that meeting.” I am delighted that we have got a copy here. “My recollection is that at the end of that meeting Gerry Adams suggested jocularly that Rita O’Hare should join us at the next meeting in Belfast. I said it would not be a good idea, as it was likely that she would be arrested.” My concern is that you actually said to Rita O’Hare, in effect, through some members of Sinn Féin, that she should not come back because she was going to be arrested. Frankly, why did you not say you actually wanted her to come back to face justice, which she had absconded from by breaking her bail and going off to Dublin and so on? Why should I not take this and give this to the PSNI to get them to investigate all of this? I am just a backbench member of Parliament and a member of the British public. I want to make sure that those people who are wanted by the police should face prosecution and justice as well.

Jonathan Powell

I was trying to conduct a peace negotiation and trying to get to an agreement on these things. O’Hare had not come back for 30 years in that period. We were trying to see if we could find a solution to her case. She was a strong supporter of the peace process. Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness made the case that she should come back, because she could contribute to the peace process very strongly if she came back and her father was about to die, as indeed he did. We were looking to see if we could find a solution to that. We could not have found a solution to it had she come back and been arrested, feeling she had fallen into a trap by me trapping her into coming back; the peace process would have been dead. It would have been a very bad idea.

Oliver Colvile

Surely, though, if someone is actually wanted for committing a felony murder or whatever, she should be encouraged to come back to this country, to meet with the police and actually give them that statement. Are you saying that the justice issue was less important, then, than the peace process?

Jonathan Powell

I am absolutely not saying that justice was less important, but you have to come up with a balance in a negotiation. In the Good Friday Agreement we had provisions on releasing prisoners. I find it extremely distasteful to release prisoners after only two years—people who have murdered people. It was a necessary part of the agreement. It was a balance in the agreement. You cannot have a peace agreement that is à la carte, where you choose one bit and not the other bit. You have to balance the things up, and that is what we were trying to do.

Oliver Colvile

You could not even encourage her to come back to this country, for her to do time in a British jail and then actually have the two years and come out after two years as well. There is a big issue here, and that is that we speak regularly to families, who say to us, “Excuse me, but whereabouts will we actually see justice for our loved ones and our families who have been killed during the course of it?” Frankly, we do not know what to say. It would be helpful if you could actually tell me what we should actually be saying to the families.

Jonathan Powell

If I were in your position and I were meeting a victim, what I would say is that in nearly all peace agreements—from Colombia to Spain to anywhere else—there are very difficult balances that have to be made between victims getting justice and trying to get to peace so there are no more victims. What we did in Northern Ireland was very difficult. We had to make decisions, as I say, with releasing prisoners, that were very distasteful. In the end, however, those are the balances you have to make if you want to make a lasting peace. If you want to destroy a peace process, you can do so if you try hard enough, but then you will end up with more victims, and you will have to answer to them as well as those who have already been made victims.

Oliver Colvile

Having warned Rita O’Hare, in effect, not to come back to this country, you then did meet with her, because you met with her in Dublin. It was some time in July, was it not? Do you think that was the right thing to go and do as well?

Jonathan Powell

Absolutely, yes. Rita O’Hare was part of the Sinn Féin delegation. She was negotiating with us on peace. I met a number of distasteful people in the course of making the peace process on both sides, but that is necessary if you are going to make peace. You cannot just meet nice people.

Oliver Colvile

She had run away from the courts system, however, and you felt it was alright to actually have a chat with someone who was wanted back in this country.

Jonathan Powell

As I say, a lot of people I dealt with had very chequered pasts. If you want to make peace, those are the people you are going to have to talk to.

David Simpson

You are very welcome, Mr Powell. As one who in effect implemented the process—Mr Blair may have come up with it, but you were the one who implemented it—would you agree with the Secretary of State last week in her comments[7] that the letters are now worthless—not worth the paper they are written on?

Jonathan Powell

As say, I am not a lawyer. I have absolutely no—

David Simpson

Would you agree with what she said: that they are worthless?

Jonathan Powell

I have absolutely no basis of knowing one way or the other. You would have to ask a lawyer to answer that question. I have no idea whether a court would uphold those or not.

David Simpson

You have mentioned there that in any peace process you have to talk to some murky people, difficult people or whatever the case; I cannot remember the exact words you used. However, in effect, this process was set up to placate the provos. There were no loyalists involved in this. This system was to set up a process for republicans at the behest of Gerry Adams. How close were you to Gerry Adams in all of this process and why was it that Rita O’Hare was so important to a lot of this?

Jonathan Powell

I did meet a number of loyalists in the course of the peace process. What we were trying to do at this stage was to persuade Sinn Féin and the IRA to hand over its weapons. That is what the negotiation was about, because we were trying to get the institutions up and running. The issue of OTRs was an issue in that, but it was the general issue of OTRs. It was the issue of, “Would we solve all of the problem?” That is the undertaking we gave and we never managed to solve that problem. I do not think I met Rita O’Hare again after those early incidents, but Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness made the case that she was a crucial person for the peace process, that she was a strong supporter of it and that she had strong support within the movement.

David Simpson

Maybe you cannot answer this, but what were the overall security concerns at that particular time that made Tony Blair give in to Gerry Adams and his request in relation to dealing with the OTRs? What was the overall concern?

Jonathan Powell

In a negotiation, you are trying to find compromises on both sides that allow things to happen. It is not a matter of giving in. We did not give in to the IRA demand for a united Ireland. We persuaded them to settle for the continuation of Northern Ireland. Sometimes in those negotiations you have to make concessions on both sides. We made concessions to unionists and we made concessions to republicans and nationalists to try to get the peace process in place. That was the process we were engaged in.

David Simpson

In this situation, the so‑called loyalists were not placated; it was the Provisional IRA that were placated in order to keep them on board, to keep the process going. If the OTR scheme had not been put in place, do you believe that Sinn Féin would have walked away from the political process?

Jonathan Powell

If we had not agreed to solve the problem of the OTRs, we would have found it much more difficult to get decommissioning in place and get weapons out of Northern Ireland. In terms of the loyalists, the loyalists were not asking for this. They were asking for other things and, yes, of course we met and negotiated with them, including the late and very much missed Davey Ervine.

David Simpson

You were involved in implementing the scheme, and I assume, maybe wrongly, that you have seen the list of names that went forward and the letters that were being issued, and that you would be aware of the names on the list.

Jonathan Powell

I certainly saw the first few lists that were handed to us. I very much doubt I saw the eventual list. If I did, I would not possibly be able to remember any of the names.

David Simpson

From the lists that you did see, can you remember those?

Jonathan Powell

No. I can honestly say I would not remember a single one of them.

David Simpson

If you did remember the names, would you be willing to give the names to the Committee?

Jonathan Powell

Not after what the Secretary of State told you, no.

David Simpson

I thought so. Lastly, in relation to victims, it was mentioned that the attitude of victims, as I am sure you are well aware, is that they are disgusted with this scheme. They think it was a dirty, murky deal that was done to placate republicans. In effect, the victims of the crimes that these individuals could have been guilty of will now not see justice. What is your feeling on that? Despite the fact that you say that in other countries—Colombia and different places—there are deals that have to be done, over 3,000 people died: security‑force members, people who went out to defend their country. Now, the implication of all of this could be, in effect, that they will never see justice.

Jonathan Powell

One of the things that Lady Justice Hallett brings out very clearly in her report is that there has been a lot of misunderstanding and misreporting about this scheme, which has been used to whip up sentiment and to upset victims. That is a terrible shame, because victims are the ones who we should actually be thinking about—those who really suffered in these cases. It is really regrettable that that has happened. There was no deal in this case, because we were never able to deliver on OTRs. What we had offered to do was to solve the problem of all the OTRs—i.e. those who were wanted, not those who were not wanted. We failed to do that. We tried to pass legislation; that legislation failed. There was no deal, murky or otherwise. It really is verging on irresponsible to use this to try to make victims, who have already suffered enough, suffer more.

David Simpson

Lastly, in relation to secrecy, while we have been told that the PSNI were aware of some sort of scheme that was in operation, in evidence that we have received from RUC senior officers they have made it very clear that they were not aware of any letters being issued to these individuals. Why would that be? Why would that information be held back from the security forces?

Jonathan Powell

I do not know. What Lady Justice Hallett says is that the scheme was not secret. It was actually administered, certainly in its later stages, by the police, by PSNI. I do not quite understand why the police would not know about it.

David Simpson

You would find that very strange, that senior chief constables and other detectives were not aware of the letters that were being issued to the so‑called individuals who were in fact responsible or whatever for many, many heinous crimes.

Jonathan Powell

Given that it was administered by the PSNI, I would have thought that a very large number of PSNI officers were aware of it. If they did not tell other PSNI officers—maybe there was some scheme to keep it separate from the rest of the police; I do not know. It is something I cannot really comment on, because I do not know.

David Simpson

You believe that some of the RUC or PSNI officers at that time would have been aware of the letters and did not tell anybody else. Is that what you are saying?

Jonathan Powell

No, I am saying the scheme was administered in its later stages by the PSNI, so the PSNI as an institution was aware of it. How the information was shared within the PSNI, I have simply no idea. I cannot know.

Oliver Colvile

Mr Powell, can I just make this point as well? You said you could not remember a single person who was on that list. There is John Downey, of course, who we all know about.

Jonathan Powell

That is true, but he would have been added at a stage when I was not looking at the list. It was very late 2007, just before we left office.

Kate Hoey

Had you ever heard of him before the court case?

Jonathan Powell

No.

Oliver Colvile

Not even on 19 May 2013, when he came back to this country saying, “I have these letters.”

Jonathan Powell

Sorry?

Kate Hoey

In 2013, when Downey came back to this country, he ended up saying, “At the end of the day, I have these letters that actually say that I am not going to be prosecuted.”

Jonathan Powell

No, I did not know anything about him until he was arrested and charged.

Oliver Colvile

Yes, when he was arrested, and he came back to this country, at Gatwick airport; it was all over the national news. Everybody knew about it. So there was one person you did actually know that was on the list.

Jonathan Powell

I knew when it became public that he was on the list. I did not know when he was arrested that he was an OTR. That became public later.

Ian Paisley

Jonathan, it is nice to see you. How would you characterise your relationship with Gerry Adams?

Jonathan Powell

I would say that my relationship with Gerry Adams was professional, as it was with everybody I negotiated with on both sides.

Ian Paisley

That was your professional activity with him. I would expect you to be a consummate professional, but your relationship might go slightly deeper than that. You were Gerry Adams’s go‑to man if he wanted to get anything done with the British Government. You have used the words “distasteful persons”. Does he fall into that category? Does he fall into “friend” category? Does he fall into “enemy” category? How would you describe that relationship?

Jonathan Powell

I have written about my relationships with all of the negotiating partners on the union side and the republican side in the book I wrote about the Northern Ireland peace process. You probably do not want me to dilate on this, because I have just finished another book on talking to terrorists more generally around the world. There is an interesting question—

Ian Paisley

No more advertising, please.

Jonathan Powell

You have very kindly given me the opportunity. However, a lot of it is about whether you should fall into the category of “friend” or whether you actually want to make progress. I tried, as best I could, to be neutral, independent and professional, and that was my ambition.

Lady Hermon

Do you still keep in touch with him?

Jonathan Powell

I run a charity that works on conflict around the world and we sometimes send people from Sinn Féin, people from the unionist parties and people from the loyalist parties to other parts of the world. We have not sent Gerry Adams, but we have sent other members of Sinn Féin.

Lady Hermon

But have you spoken to him recently? Have you spoken to Martin McGuinness or Gerry Adams?

Jonathan Powell

Yes, Martin McGuinness came with me on a visit to Spain in July.

Ian Paisley

In terms of that relationship with Gerry Adams, which you say is neutral and professional, that would probably not be reflected on the unionist side. They would regard you as being more on the Sinn Féin side, because of the proximity that you had with Sinn Féin during that whole period.

Jonathan Powell

No, to be honest, I would say the contrary. Before I came to work in Number 10, I had been a British diplomat working in the embassy in Washington trying to stop a visa for Gerry Adams to go to Washington. I worked very closely with unionists both from your own party and the Ulster Unionist Party, so, on the contrary, I would actually have been seen, particularly while Mo Mowlam was Secretary of State, as a person who was rather far over on the unionist side.

Ian Paisley

You think you were down-the-line professional at all points.

Jonathan Powell

One of the interesting things about the Northern Ireland peace process is that you risk ending up on one side or the other. Mo Mowlam was then seen as a republican and a nationalist sympathiser. Peter Mandelson was seen as a unionist sympathiser. It is very difficult to be in the middle. I did my best to be so.

Ian Paisley

Are you currently engaged in any peace work in Northern Ireland?

Jonathan Powell

No, not peace work. I have been to Northern Ireland a couple of times in the last six months.

Ian Paisley

But no work in terms of engagement with loyalist or republican communities or anything like that.

Jonathan Powell

No, I have met politicians but I am not engaged in peace work.

Ian Paisley

Yes, but are you engaged in any sort of work with regard to the process and the outworking of the process in a professional capacity?

Jonathan Powell

I am not engaged in any process at all. I have met politicians, both from the loyalist side and from the republican side in the last six months.

Ian Paisley

Is that just for the craic? Why are you meeting them?

Jonathan Powell

Because I still feel a sense of responsibility and loyalty to what I put a lot of my life into and making sure it does not collapse.

Ian Paisley

With that in mind, how do you feel about last week’s apology by the Secretary of State and Jonathan Stephens, given that you poured seven years of your life into this?

Jonathan Powell

It is entirely up to them what they feel about this process. As difficult as it was, the process of trying to get to peace in Northern Ireland and the difficult compromises that were required was the right thing to do, and this was part of it.

Ian Paisley

Were they right to apologise?

Jonathan Powell

It is entirely up to them.

Ian Paisley

Come on. Let me ask you this: was David Cameron right to apologise for Bloody Sunday?

Jonathan Powell

I thought David Cameron made a very good speech on Bloody Sunday. I thought it was one of the best things—

Ian Paisley

I am not talking about the technicalities of the speech. Was he right to apologise?

Jonathan Powell

Yes, because, as you know, we already apologised right back much earlier.

Ian Paisley

Was Theresa Villiers then wrong to apologise last week?

Jonathan Powell

I would not want to condemn her for apologising. It is entirely up to her.

Ian Paisley

She was right to apologise, then.

Jonathan Powell

I would not apologise for what we did; I think it was the right thing to do.

Ian Paisley

You do not think it was the right thing to do—to apologise.

Jonathan Powell

No, I think what we did was the right thing to do.

Ian Paisley

Just to be clear—there is no point dancing around it—you think she was wrong to apologise last week, because of what—

Jonathan Powell

No, she is entirely entitled to do what she thinks is right. She was not in Government at that time; I was in Government at that time. I think what we did was right.

Ian Paisley

Given that the current Government has apologised for this part of the process and given the fact that many victims—some reflected in the audience behind you—feel there has been a miscarriage of justice, in particular relating to the Hyde Park bombing, no matter what your motivations were and the professionalism of your motivations and your activity, is there any sense of shame that what happened has worked out in this way, that a miscarriage of justice has occurred?

Jonathan Powell

No, because, again as Lady Justice Hallett lays out very clearly, the reason a miscarriage of justice happened was that the police made a mistake. They did not mean to make a mistake, but they did. It was most unfortunate; it does not apply to the other cases. If you issue a letter saying to someone they are not wanted when they are wanted, it is likely to lead to a problem.

Kate Hoey

Sorry, Ian, can I just come in on one little thing? You then, personally, are blaming this whole saga on the PSNI or the RUC or a policeman.

Jonathan Powell

Absolutely not, no. It is quite wrong to blame the police, who were doing their very best to do a difficult job with a lot of names and a lot of papers they had to move around. I would not want to be in the position of blaming the police, who do a fantastic job in Northern Ireland. I am not blaming anyone: it was a mistake.

Ian Paisley

You were there right from the beginning, the genesis of this, where it was a few names and then 12 names and then 36 names and, today, hundreds of names. Do you believe that the whole process got out of hand?

Jonathan Powell

No. Certainly there were many more names than we anticipated at the beginning of the process, but, as you will see from the papers in Lady Justice Hallett’s report, that is why we were looking for a general scheme from the very beginning. We wanted to find a way of dealing with the problem—not with the problem of the people who were not wanted, but the people who were wanted. We tried many different solutions to it. At one stage David Trimble suggested a solution that we looked at quite seriously a number of times, but we could not find anything that worked other than legislation, which was indeed what the very first Attorney-General had told us would be necessary in the end. He proved to be right. We tried the legislation; the legislation failed. We were then left with no way of solving the problem and we left Government without solving it.

Ian Paisley

There was a lot of to‑ing and fro‑ing between yourself, Peter Mandelson, Bill Jeffrey and others within the NIO about these numbers. Was there not any sense of unease that Sinn Féin were, to use the vernacular, taking the mickey by putting so many names on this list?

Jonathan Powell

No, presumably the problem was they did not get the right number of people at the beginning. Once it got going, they then turned in a longer list of names. I simply do not know. We were surprised when we were told there would be a certain number of names and then there were more. It was one of the reasons we wanted a general solution.

Ian Paisley

You do not think there was any sense, Jonathan, that Sinn Féin saw a chink in the armour on this issue. It was clear that there were discussions about amnesty and all sorts of discussions that they decided to keep pushing. Inevitably, there was a rollover.

Jonathan Powell

It would have been very illogical if they had approached it in that way, because as a negotiator what you want to do is put it up front. What they should have done is come up with a full list right at the beginning and demanded that. I suspected much more it was inefficiency rather than anything else.

Ian Paisley

You do not think they could not believe their luck.

Jonathan Powell

No, I do not believe that. They wanted to have a general solution to OTRs. They were offered that and they never got it.

Ian Paisley

Shaun Woodward, when he gave evidence to us[8]—and, indeed, there is some evidence of this in your own notes, the Cabinet paper notes, it would seem—told us that this process was a necessary part of keeping the peace process alive, because, if they had not have done this, the whole process would have probably fallen apart at that point. Is that a fair reflection? Was it so critical that, if you had not sorted this out around 2000 or 2001—whenever you were in these discussions—the peace process would have fallen apart? Was Sinn Féin that close to walking away?

Jonathan Powell

One of the interesting things that happens in peace processes, again not just here, is the problem is always seen as insoluble until it is solved and then it is seen as inevitable that it was always going to be solved. It is neither insoluble nor inevitable. At any stage this process, like the Middle East process, could have tipped over into disaster and it was a very difficult balancing act to keep it going. Dealing with the issue of OTRs—not the administrative scheme, but the offer to solve the problem of OTRs—was critical at the time of Weston Park, before and after. If we had not had it there, we may have had real difficulties in trying to get to a solution, yes.

Ian Paisley

You do not think you maybe should have called Sinn Féin’s bluff on this one a bit earlier.

Jonathan Powell

Of course, at any stage we could have called Sinn Féin’s bluff. We could have called their bluff on the release of prisoners. We could have said, “No, we are not going to release prisoners after two years.” We could have said, “No, we are not going to do OTRs,” or, “No, we are not going to reform the RUC.” We could have done that at any stage. It is impossible to know in retrospect whether that was too much or too little, but if we had risked it and we had not got to a peace process, there would be a whole lot more victims.

Ian Paisley

You kept a contemporaneous diary at the time. Was there a feeling in your own view, then, that this was knife‑edge, and that if you did not get this right they would go back to war.

Jonathan Powell

Yes, and there were reasons for thinking that right through to really quite late in this process. Again, people like to write history backwards and say it was all solved after 9/11. It is just not true. At any stage you could have tipped this back into war if you had taken a misstep.

Ian Paisley

Is there not some strength in the argument that the British Government became weak at that point, because they conceded on the threat that they would go back to war? Is there not some strength in the argument that the British Government conceded to Sinn Féin because of the fear of going back to war?

Jonathan Powell

No. Again, it is an interesting point, because there is a very difficult balance you have to have as a Government between, on the one hand, absolutely not negotiating under violence or the threat of violence and, on the other hand, not tipping something back into violence by mistake—as for example happened with John Major when he was very nobly trying to get the peace process going, which he himself started, when he could not get Sinn Féin into talks. We then ended up with Canary Wharf and the campaign in Lisburn and elsewhere. You do not want to make a mistake to tip things back into war, but you cannot, as you quite rightly say, negotiate under violence or the threat of violence.

Ian Paisley

In your book, you say that the Democratic Unionist Party ultimately got a great deal out of this part of it, because they were able to use it as a weapon against David Trimble. With hindsight, do you regret sacrificing David Trimble for that?

Jonathan Powell

I write quite a lot about that in the book. As I say, Tony Blair was very keen not to sacrifice David Trimble. Even after the DUP had won the elections, Tony was still hoping there was some way to get David Trimble back, because he thought the DUP would not make peace. He really tried very hard indeed to do that, but did not succeed in doing it. In the end, however, your party did make peace and made a lasting peace, and that is something you can be very proud of.

Ian Paisley

I am very proud of it. Again, in your view, you indicate that the Democratic Unionist Party knew about the on-the-run scheme. From 2006 until February of this year, why did the Democratic Unionist Party never use it in any press release or any statement for their own political advantage throughout all of that period, if they had known about it and if, as you say, they used it to great political advantage against their political enemies in the unionist party?

Jonathan Powell

I cannot speak for the DUP, obviously, but the point was this letter that your colleagues asked us to produce from Number 10, not about the administrative scheme but about the OTR legislation and those other issues. That was the letter that was produced in 2004, which Lady Justice Hallett refers to. It was asked for by the DUP, I assume, to protect themselves against attacks by the UUP. Actually, I do not even know if they used it or did not use it, but that was the letter that was sought from us and we provided it.

Ian Paisley

Just for the record, it was never about the scheme.

Jonathan Powell

That is what I am saying: it was not about the scheme; it was about the issue of dealing with OTRs in legislation, as Lady Justice Hallett—

Ian Paisley

Because there was some confusion that, initially, you may have implied that it was actually—

Jonathan Powell

You are referring to a passage in my book, which says “OTRs”. People are jumping to conclusions from the OTRs. It was about OTRs and two other issues, which I forget.

Ian Paisley

Martin McGuinness said on 27 February this year that unionists did not know about the letters, but they knew something existed. Do you believe he is right?

Jonathan Powell

Again, I cannot really speak about what unionists did or did not know. Lady Justice Hallett sets out in some detail what was made public. She says it was not secret. If one had been paying attention to various answers to Parliamentary Questions and so on, and various newspaper articles, one would have known about it. Certainly by 2009 and the Eames‑Bradley report[9] it was very hard not to know about it.

Ian Paisley

This is my final question. I have asked every witness who is in the know this, and you are certainly in the know, Jonathan: has Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness or any senior elected Sinn Féin representative, whether they are a Member of Parliament, an MLA or a councillor in this jurisdiction or Republic of Ireland, got these letters?

Jonathan Powell

I cannot remember what the Secretary of State said to you and, as I said, I cannot remember the full list, so I could not give you a comprehensive answer, but I have certainly never seen their names on any of these lists. That is not a comprehensive answer, however, because I have not seen all of the lists.

Chair

Can I just clarify a point you have made a few times, Mr Powell? You said you were looking for a general scheme to cover people who had committed crimes and were on the run, plus people who received letters, who presumably, we are told, had not committed any crimes. How—

Jonathan Powell

I am sorry—in which case I have been unclear. I was saying we were looking for a scheme that solved the problem of on‑the‑runs in general, which is the problem of those who were wanted. Obviously, those who are not wanted would not be part of a scheme.

Lady Hermon

Jonathan, it is very nice to have you here this morning. Could I just come back to a question that I asked you a little bit earlier? When the Downey judgment was finally published, did you contact any member of Sinn Féin? Have you spoken to anyone within Sinn Féin since Downey?

Jonathan Powell

Since the Downey judgment I have certainly spoken to members of Sinn Féin. I do not think I have discussed Downey with them since the Downey judgment, no. I think that is correct. I cannot 100% remember. I may have had a sort of flippant discussion or whatever; I do not know. Someone may have said something, but I cannot remember—not flippant.

Lady Hermon

After the Hallett Report was published on 17 July, did you again contact or have any contact with Sinn Féin for their reaction?

Jonathan Powell

No. As I said, I travelled with Martin McGuinness to Spain, but we did not discuss the Hallett Report, which actually would have been after it, anyway.

Lady Hermon

When did you travel to Spain with Martin McGuinness?

Jonathan Powell

I am trying to remember. It was in late July. I cannot remember the precise date, but I think it might have been before the Hallett Report. Whether it is before or after, I do not remember discussing it.

Lady Hermon

You do not remember discussing it.

Jonathan Powell

No.

Lady Hermon

This very controversial scheme on OTRs was something that you had dedicated such an enormous amount of thought and energy to coming up with an arrangement for, and this is an issue that was not discussed between you and Martin McGuinness.

Jonathan Powell

No, not to the best of my memory, but I am afraid you have to remember that I am history. I am not—

Lady Hermon

Absolutely not. You have—

Jonathan Powell

I am not relevant any more, unfortunately.

Lady Hermon

I find you have a very, very, very acute sense of recall and detail. It would be unusual if you could not recall a conversation with Martin McGuinness in the last few months.

Jonathan Powell

I am not saying that. I am saying: why would they want to discuss it with someone who cannot do anything about it? I am not in Government anymore. I would have no problem discussing the scheme with members of Sinn Féin; I would have no issue about that.

Lady Hermon

Yes, which is why it is rather a surprise that, in fact, there was no discussion at all about it—your reaction to Downey, your reaction to the Hallett Report, the fact it was all out in the public domain.

Jonathan Powell

We rather focused on Spain, to be honest, and on the Basque country.

Lady Hermon

I am really very curious about the fact that, in reply to several of the points that were made by Ian, you repeated what Lady Justice Hallett said in her report, that this was not secret. You referred to Parliamentary Questions and, if care was taken, you would know about this scheme. Jonathan, you signed off the first two letters. Where is the public statement that you had signed off those two letters?

Jonathan Powell

There is no public statement saying that.

Lady Hermon

There is no public statement.

Jonathan Powell

No.

Lady Hermon

Was it kept secret that you had signed those first two letters?

Jonathan Powell

No. There is a distinction, as Lady Justice Hallett makes, between not going out of your way to publicise things and keeping things secret. Government is not actually transparent.

Lady Hermon

Can I just come back and ask you the question directly? Courtesy of the Downey judgment, we now know there were two letters that you signed, the first two letters that were signed by you—why were you selected, by the way?

Jonathan Powell

It was a matter of speed. The Attorney-General had provided these drafts. We were in the midst of the negotiation. We wanted to have confidence‑building measures. We wanted the letters out quickly.

Lady Hermon

Could I also suggest to you, because your recall is very good indeed, that these first two letters were for key republicans—key members of the republican movement who were on the run? I am sure you will remember. I am not asking you to name them; I am just asking you to confirm our suspicion and belief that in fact they must have been very important to keep the negotiations ongoing.

Jonathan Powell

No, I cannot remember their names, but I do remember they were people I had never heard of before and were not leaders of the republican movement, no. That is not the case.

Lady Hermon

Not leaders of the republican movement.

Jonathan Powell

As I said, since I cannot remember their names, I cannot remember what their positions were, but they were people who I had not heard of before the list was presented to us.

Lady Hermon

Yes, but they were obviously very significant indeed. Let us remember you were the Chief of Staff to Tony Blair, to the Prime Minister. You were his right‑hand man. It was not some minor official somewhere else; it was the Chief of Staff in Downing Street who signs off the two letters. That was very significant. Why not put that out into the public domain? I am really, really curious about the paragraph in Lady Justice Hallett’s report where Mr Adams said that it would run counter to Sinn Féin’s general approach, which was to demand public statements on how the issue of OTRs was to be resolved. If that is counter to what Mr Adams would wish normally, why do you think he not boast about the two letters signed by the Chief of Staff? Is that not odd?

Jonathan Powell

No, because, as I keep trying to say in this discussion, this was not a scheme to try to solve the problem of OTRs. The scheme to solve the problem of OTRs was what we wrote to party leaders about at the time in Weston Park—the subsequent negotiations we put out separate papers on. That is what they wanted to have in public. This issue of telling people that they were not wanted, as I say, did not start as an administrative scheme; it started as dealing with individuals, but it became an administrative scheme. There is no particular reason why that should be public, but, as Lady Justice Hallett says, it certainly was not a secret.

Lady Hermon

Let us distinguish, then, because Lady Justice Hallett carefully distinguishes, as you have very carefully distinguished, between the scheme and the OTR letters. The key and of course the secret factor was the fact that you, to begin with, and then officials within the Northern Ireland Office were sending out secret letters. We knew nothing about them until the Downey judgment. Could you just confirm, for the benefit of the Committee, that your letters were sent out in secret? I mean the letters. I am not talking about the scheme. The letters were secret.

Jonathan Powell

It would be a very odd word to use. I would have sent out scores of “secret” letters a day, in that sense, in that nearly every letter I was sending in Government would not be made public. It is a rather odd way to look at it, but it certainly was not put on the front page of a newspaper the next day, no.

Lady Hermon

No, it certainly was not. In the 14 years of this scheme and 228 letters—228 letters—which of them did Mr Adams or, indeed, Sinn Féin brag about in any public statement? You know the IRA statements; you know Sinn Féin’s statements. You were privy to them at an early point in the negotiations at every stage. I do not mean the scheme; I mean the letters. Where did they boast about any one of those 228 letters?

Jonathan Powell

To the best my knowledge, they did not boast about them anywhere.

Lady Hermon

They did not. Does that not lead to the conclusion that the letters were kept secret?

Jonathan Powell

No. If you look at John Reid’s answer to the PQ in 2001 or 2002—

Lady Hermon

It was in 2002[10]. He never refers to letters. Peter Hain never refers to letters having been sent out. That was, I have to say, deliberately omitted from the Parliamentary replies. That is not a criticism of the officials, who were doing their masters’ bidding, but the words “administrative letters” or “letters have been sent out” were not disclosed in any Parliamentary replies.

Jonathan Powell

A good deal of Government and a good deal of negotiation happens behind closed doors. That does not mean to say it is secret, otherwise you would not refer to it in a Parliamentary Question, a statement by Peter Hain[11] or in the Eames‑Bradley report. There is a distinction.

Lady Hermon

Yes, coming back to a paragraph in Lady Justice Hallett’s report that said that Mr Adams liked having public statements to let his faithful followers know how the OTRs issue was being dealt with, you would agree that Mr Adams and Sinn Féin’s statements did not disclose and did not brag to their supporters that there were letters being sent out to 228 people.

Jonathan Powell

As I have said, I do not know of them having publicised the letters or the administrative scheme. I imagine they had a bit of a problem with their followers, having told them that we had promised, as we had publicly, to resolve the issue of OTRs and then we failed to do so over the course of the subsequent eight years.

Lady Hermon

Yes, but the letters were kept secret.

Jonathan Powell

We disagree about the word “secret” and Lady Justice Hallett says it was not a secret scheme.

Lady Hermon

You are absolutely right: it was not a secret scheme, but the letters were kept secret. Could I just bring you back to passages in your book and, also, in response again to my colleague Ian Paisley, where you said this was part of a negotiation? Obviously, it was part of a negotiation. Would you describe the OTRs issue as a trade‑off for decommissioning? There is certainly a lot of emphasis that there was a trade-off in the relevant chapter of your book.

Jonathan Powell

Yes, certainly what we were trying to do in that phase of 1999 to 2001 was to get Sinn Féin to decommission—to get the IRA to decommission its weapons. That was what we—

Lady Hermon

Freudian slip there, yes.

Jonathan Powell

Sinn Féin and the IRA. We were trying to get them to give up their weapons, and we were therefore talking to them about all sorts of issues, trying to resolve all sorts of issues. Announcing that we were going to deal with the problem of OTRs was certainly part of the negotiation with them to get them to give up their weapons, yes. But not the administrative scheme—trying to promise to resolve the actual overall issue of people who were wanted, rather than people who were not wanted.

Lady Hermon

At any stage was there a hesitation or a pause in issuing letters to OTRs in order to bring more pressure on, at that stage, Sinn Féin/IRA to deal with decommissioning?

Jonathan Powell

No, although I strongly suspect Sinn Féin thought there was, because they spent their whole time complaining over the next six years that the issues were being dealt with very slowly. In fact, as we know from Lady Justice Hallett’s report, it was not some Machiavellian British plot to do it slowly; it was simply that the process was very time‑consuming and the police were trying to do it to the best of their ability in difficult circumstances. It certainly was slow, but it was not slow as part of a negotiating tactic.

Lady Hermon

It was slow, as you have described it, until December 2006. We know from the Downey judgment, because there is an extract from the letter, which you probably saw. Did you see the letter from Downing Street, from Tony Blair to Mr Adams, signed about three days after Christmas Day? After he had eaten his Christmas lunch and thought about the OTRs, the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, wrote to Gerry Adams and promised him that he would expedite the administrative scheme to deal with OTRs.

Jonathan Powell

Yes.

Lady Hermon

You were aware of that at the time. You must have been.

Jonathan Powell

Of course I was aware of it at the time; it was part of a very intense negotiation with the DUP and Sinn Féin over devolution of policing. The other matter was to try and put the St Andrews Agreement into place, where Tony Blair spent the entire period of Christmas talking to different people from his holiday trying to get the thing done. That was part of it, yes.

Lady Hermon

How was that translated into action in Northern Ireland? Who spoke to whom?

Jonathan Powell

That I am afraid I do not know the answer to.

Lady Hermon

The Prime Minister gives a promise to Mr Adams that he is going to expedite the administrative scheme, which has already run, as we now know, for at least seven years since 2000. The Prime Minister, then Tony Blair, probably knew or hoped he would be leaving office in six months at the end of June 2007. We know that Operation Rapid[12] came into being at the beginning of February 2007. In a very short space of about five weeks, between a letter being written after Christmas Day at the end of December 2006 and Operation Rapid about five weeks later, what was the sequence of events?

Jonathan Powell

I do not know. Even reading the Hallett Report I could not reconstruct the events exactly for you, but, clearly, if the Prime Minister writes a letter like that he does not just do it out of the blue. It is something that he has agreed and agreed with the Northern Ireland Office, who will then go about implementing it and making sure what he has promised happens, to the best of their ability. That is what would have happened, but I have no idea which individual was concerned.

Lady Hermon

What is interesting to me is, of course, the phrase “operational independence” of the Police Service of Northern Ireland or, indeed, the RUC, because they were involved at the very beginning of this. How is operational independence of the police service maintained when the decision had been made in Downing Street that this scheme was going to be expedited? How is that translated across to the Chief Constable?

Jonathan Powell

What Tony Blair was not asking them to do was to change their mind about individual cases; what he was asking them to do was to go faster; in other words, to put more resources into it, so these cases can be dealt with, i.e. apply more policemen to it, or whatever it might be. That is not a matter of operational independence. Trying to interfere with the answers would have been.

Lady Hermon

Would it have been the case that the Secretary of State at that time for Northern Ireland, who was still Peter Hain, would have spoken to the Chief Constable?

Jonathan Powell

No, it would have been a much more bureaucratic process than that. The original draft letter that will have gone to Adams will have been produced, probably, by the Northern Ireland Office. This had all been a continuous process, where the Northern Ireland Office had already been working with the PSNI on these letters. It would have been a part of that. How exactly the mechanics of that worked—

Lady Hermon

Sorry, just say that again. The Northern Ireland Office would have been working with the PSNI on these letters.

Jonathan Powell

The Northern Ireland Office were sending the letters, signing the letters that were sent to the individuals or to Sinn Féin, and they were passing the names to PSNI, so they were obviously working with them on the scheme.

Lady Hermon

Yes, the names were coming through to the PSNI, but you will know from the Hallett Report that the only evidence that the PSNI knew that letters were being sent out from the Northern Ireland Office appears at the end of December 2011. So the PSNI were not responsible for the letters that were being sent out by Northern Ireland Office. I have to say I share Kate Hoey’s concern that you seemed to indicate that the police were at fault here. Of course, they were not, because it was a Northern Ireland Office official who changed the letter that went out to Mr Downey in 2007[13].

Jonathan Powell

I want to be very clear—I think I was extremely clear—that I am not blaming the PSNI for this.

Lady Hermon

Who would you blame, then, for the mistake that was made in the letter that went out to Mr Downey? Who do you blame?

Jonathan Powell

That is the point: maybe different from you, I am not trying to blame anyone for this. Mistakes happen; it is clear that a mistake happened. Lady Justice Hallett describes how the mistake happened, but blaming the police for that, when they were operating to the best of their ability, is the wrong thing to do.

Lady Hermon

It clearly was, because of course the police did not know letters were going out until after December 2011, and the letter went out to Mr Downey in 2007. Clearly, it was not a mistake by the police officer involved.

Jonathan Powell

I really do not have anything to go on other than the report that I have read on this, so I would be misleading you if you thought I was giving you an answer based on my own experience, because I do not know how it worked. However, my understanding from the report is that it was a mistake made by the police—by error, not on purpose—in terms of whether Mr Downey was wanted or not. Beyond that, I really do not know, apart from what is written in Lady Justice Hallett’s report.

Lady Hermon

Coming back to 2007, Tony Blair’s wishes were expedited at an official level, through officials.

Jonathan Powell

Yes.

Lady Hermon

That is how this gets done.

Jonathan Powell

Yes, correctly. That is how Government works correctly. The Prime Minister will agree something with his Ministers. He will make a decision that is then implemented by civil servants and the Ministers in the Departments, yes.

Lady Hermon

Thank you so much. I am going to come back to Mr Bertie Ahern, but I will give you a copy of his letter at that stage. However, I am sure other colleagues would like to ask some questions.

Chair

You will have picked up from our previous sessions there was a letter written from the then Attorney-General to Mr Hain, warning him that Mr Downey was wanted[14]. The blame, wherever the blame lies, is probably not in one particular area anyway. You will be aware of that.

Jonathan Powell

I had not picked that up, no.

Chair

Yes, that was the case.

Naomi Long

You are very welcome to the Committee, Jonathan. Could I just ask a question? I just wanted to pick up on something you said during the questioning from Ian earlier. You basically said that you would not apologise for what the Government did at the time because you believe it was the right thing to do in terms of moving the peace process forward. However, the Hallett Report did indicate specifically that the scheme lacked design and, for that reason, errors occurred. Unlike you—you have said that you would not put the blame on the police or others—the Hallett Report actually indicated that it was the lack of design, if you like, within the scheme itself that led to errors being able to go unchecked. Are you sorry for that? Are you sorry that in terms of the scheme—you were in it at the beginning; you were signing letters at the start—there was not more oversight put in and that that was not something you prioritised in terms of your involvement with the scheme at that point in time?

Jonathan Powell

I am certainly sorry a mistake was made. Lady Justice Hallett—

Naomi Long

That is not what I have asked. I asked whether you were sorry that the scheme was not better designed in the first place, which is what the Hallett Report has said: that the scheme was not well designed. Are you sorry for that?

Jonathan Powell

No. Lady Justice Hallett explains what happened was an evolution. We did not start with a scheme; we were not intending to have a scheme. It was dealing with individual names and then a scheme grew up. If, in retrospect, I had realised that this was going to become—what is the right word for it?—not a very well organised scheme, obviously I would have given my attention to that instead of other issues, but my intention was actually spent on the negotiations, not on how to implement the scheme.

Naomi Long

You have no sense of regret whatsoever with respect to the scheme, which, as you say, started out as an ad-hoc arrangement for a small number of cases but clearly escalated quite dramatically as the numbers of people seeking the letters increased. There was no sense that that scheme needed to be more robust in terms of how it was organised and so on. You have no regret about that at all, given that the consequence of it was, effectively, that John Downey walked free without being tried for a very serious crime.

Jonathan Powell

There is a difference between wishing that something had been different and apologising for it. I do not think that me getting involved in designing the scheme would have been a sensible use of my time or skills. I would not be the sort of person who could draw up an effective scheme to do this kind of thing. That is something that people with some sort of legal experience and some sort of experience in how these sorts of schemes should work, would best be able to draw up. Do I wish that the scheme had been drawn up in a better, more legally robust way, as Lady Justice Hallett suggested? Yes, of course I do. However, you are then bending the word “apologise” if you then apologise for something that, looking back in retrospect, you could have done differently but, even if I had been involved, would not have been different.

Naomi Long

You paint the scheme as though it were something that was ad hoc, essentially, at the beginning, yet I asked questions of one of the previous witnesses about briefings and discussions that were had, for example, with the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, discussing the possibility of dealing with these issues through the use of Freedom of Information requests. It was not a scheme that simply arrived from nowhere. There was some thought given into the process by which people would be notified and by which people would make application for reassurances and so on and so forth. It would not be true to say that these were simply individual letters that were requested at individual points in time. It was very clear that these were key to the process. Their importance was very clear. I assume their sensitivity was also very clear in terms of victims of the Troubles. Perhaps you can confirm that.

Jonathan Powell

You mean the sensitivity about the letters.

Naomi Long

Yes, and the sensitivity about the communication that would be ongoing between those who were potential suspects and the Government of the day. Was it recognised that was sensitive?

Jonathan Powell

If they were suspects, they would be wanted.

Naomi Long

Potential suspects.

Jonathan Powell

Everyone is a potential suspect. Either you are a suspect or you are not a suspect. If they were a suspect, they should not have been allowed back in. If they were not a suspect, you could not start going to people and saying, “We think this guy might have had something to do with the crime that happened to you.” That would be a bonkers thing to try to do.

Naomi Long

To be very clear, no one has suggested—and I did not suggest in my question—that that ought to have happened.

Jonathan Powell

What are you suggesting, then?

Naomi Long

What I asked very specifically was: were you aware of the sensitivities of the scheme that was being implemented? When you signed the letters, were you aware of the sensitivity of what you were doing and, therefore, were you aware that there was a need for particular oversight and attention to detail with respect to those letters?

Jonathan Powell

The letters I signed were not part of a scheme. It was, as Lady Justice Hallett describes, the beginning, where we thought we were dealing with individual names. The scheme was then constructed to produce letters over the course of the next 10 years or whatever it was. I was not privy to how the scheme was drawn up; I was not part of the architecture nor would I be a particularly appropriate person to be involved in it. Was I aware of the sensitivity of letters? I was aware of the sensitivity of the letters in that they were about individuals, but I had no idea what crimes they were not wanted for, so, no, I did not have a thought from point of view.

Naomi Long

In terms of your earlier statements, you talked about the need for the peace process to be, if you like, comprehensive. The phrase you used—I hope I am not misquoting you—was that people could not choose one thing and not the other. That was the phrase that you used.

Jonathan Powell

I said “à la carte”.

Naomi Long

Yes, you referred to it as being à la carte. You said people could not choose one thing and not the other; it was part of a package. Surely the point of the Good Friday Agreement—and, indeed, even the St Andrews Agreement—was that it was indeed part of a package that was visible, that the public were informed about, that they could read and understand and that they could make a judgment on. For example, with the early‑release scheme of prisoners—you alluded to that as being similar in terms of its importance and so on—people were able to make a conscious decision whether or not that was a price that they were willing to pay in order to move to the next phase of the peace process. They were denied that opportunity in the case of the on‑the‑runs, in that this process was ongoing in the background without anyone having consented or, indeed, without anyone having known what the entire package looked like, because it was part of a series of side deals that were not immediately exposed to all of those who were involved as parties either in the discussions or, indeed, the wider public. Do you not think that that does set this apart, and that any illusion that it was in some way similar to the Good Friday Agreement and the arrangements made under that is really quite false?

Jonathan Powell

No, I do not. As Lady Justice Hallett describes, the negotiations to try to get the Good Friday Agreement actually implemented, which took a further nine years, were every bit as difficult, if not more difficult, than the negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement itself. They required difficult steps on both sides, which were conducted in private, because if you negotiate in public you will not succeed in getting to a deal, because people will not make compromises. In the case of OTRs, we made public very early on that we were trying to resolve the problem of OTRs. We were trying to allow people who had committed crimes to come back to the UK—not people who had not committed crimes. It is perfectly public. Your own party leader received a letter on this subject very early on.

Naomi Long

It was the other way around. Just for accuracy, you said those the other way around. You said, by accident, that people who were wanted for crimes could return and people who were not wanted for—

Jonathan Powell

No, I said what we were seeking to do was come up with an answer. We wrote to your party leader; we wrote to other party leaders; we produced a document on it to come up with a scheme on OTRs that would allow them to come back to the UK, even though they had committed crimes. This was perfectly public from 2000 onwards, so I really do not agree with you at all about the allegations you make.

Naomi Long

First of all, Chair, just to clarify, I was trying to be helpful to the witness, not to in any way try to interrupt his flow, because I thought he had inadvertently switched the two around by accident. The second thing is that it is true that all of the party leaders were canvassed on their views and, indeed, we submitted papers and suggested schemes that could, we believed, operate within the law in terms of trying to resolve the issue, so we were aware of those negotiations. It is not the case, however, that we were aware of the scheme that ended up being developed and rolled out, which is the one we are discussing and enquiring into now. That is a simple fact. Let us remember that in 2005 Parliament was essentially told that the scheme could not be implemented through legislation, which was the first attempt, if you like, to put a formal scheme into the public domain. For the majority of people observing this, they would have assumed that that meant the issue then was not being resolved in terms of people being able to return to Northern Ireland. I know my own presumption—I have stated it before—was that this would be resolved through the HET, that simply, as they worked chronologically through that period and people were either not served with an extradition warrant or other means, they assumed, then, that their case had been cleared and resolved. The point that I wish to pursue, simply, is this: do you not think that this was not part of a clear, defined package in the same way that the St Andrews Agreement and the Good Friday Agreement were? Did that not risk that people would not be comfortable with the decisions that were being made but were not being given the opportunity to express that discomfort at the time?

Jonathan Powell

The fact that you think I made a slip of the tongue shows I really have not got my point across at all, so I will try again.

Naomi Long

No, I am aware now of the point you made. I am clear.

Jonathan Powell

The point is that we were trying to come up with a scheme that would solve the problem of those people who were wanted. It would be analogous with the scheme we came up with for prisoners. We made that public from very early on. It was constantly debated. We came up with many different schemes to try to solve it, but none of them worked. In the end, we failed to deliver on the promise that we made to resolve that problem. That was the part of the negotiation. The administrative scheme was dealing with people who were not wanted, so it was not part of the negotiation from that point of view, in the way the scheme to solve the problem of the OTRs was. It was a way of saying to people who were not wanted that they could come back.

Naomi Long

Yes, I do understand the distinction. As I said, I had made an error in my original question. Can I ask one other thing? There was a concern throughout the process—and it was raised by my own party as well as by others—that side deals could risk destabilising the process at a later stage. As things emerged that were not entirely clear to all parties, which were not made known to everyone and were not part of a clear package, either in the public domain or indeed within the negotiations that were taking place, it could sour relationships and damage trust between parties. Are you at all concerned that the result of this OTR situation, as it has emerged through the John Downey case, has soured those relationships between Government and the Northern Ireland parties and, indeed, amongst the Northern Ireland parties, in a way that will make it more difficult to proceed with the next stages of the political peace process?

Jonathan Powell

Yes and no. I think you make a very fair point, as indeed SDLP has often made, about the danger of side deals. For example, the letter that we gave to David Trimble in the context of the Good Friday Agreement turned out, in the end, to have probably been a mistake but, if we had not done it, would we have got to an agreement? It is difficult, but that is a fair point to make in general. In the case of this, no, I do not. The reason this has caused a stir is really the way that Lady Justice Hallett said: it has been misreported and misrepresented, rather than the actual issue of the administrative scheme itself. If you think about the administrative scheme, it is allowing people to return who are not wanted and that should not be something that would disturb relations between parties and governments. Your general point on side deals is right and, again, applies very generally. Specifically on this, no; I do not think it should have been something that caused it. The reason it happened was the way that it was broached.

Naomi Long

As Oliver has already indicated in his questions, it not only gave assurances to those who were not wanted that they could return, but the corollary of that was that it also assured those who were wanted that they were indeed wanted. It was essentially implicit advice not to return.

Jonathan Powell

Yes, but of course the fact that they were not returning before asking suggests they were not about to return anyway.

Naomi Long

I think that is conjecture. Can I ask one other final question? In the evidence that we took from the victims of the Troubles[15], they drew a very clear distinction between their view of the early-release scheme, which many of them opposed—and they were very clear in saying that they opposed it—and this scheme. They felt that, with the early-release scheme, they had the opportunity to decide whether this was indeed a price worth paying, from their perspective. Some were in favour and some were not. Some agreed that it was and some thought that it was not. I was one of those who voted for the Good Friday Agreement; I believed that it was. For those who were victims, the issue here is not necessarily the one of the scheme, but the feeling of betrayal by their Government, in terms of being kept in the dark about what was going on with matters that pertained potentially to the cases affecting them and their loved ones. That sense of betrayal was quite strong and quite tangible when we spoke with victims. I understand that you are not apologising for what you did, but do you regret the pain that has been caused and do you regret the fact that those victims feel betrayed by their Government, and that that trust has been damaged and, indeed, their confidence and optimism in the peace process has been damaged by this whole episode?

Jonathan Powell

As I said at the beginning, I certainly regret any pain that has been caused to victims. In my view, it has largely been caused by people who have, as Lady Justice Hallett says, misrepresented what happened. If we had actually passed legislation on on‑the‑runs then there would have been a very difficult discussion to have with victims, because victims then would have known that people who had committed heinous crimes were not going to be brought to trial for those crimes. In those circumstances, it would be necessary absolutely to have a very full and frank discussion with victims about the consequences of that. In the end, we never were able to legislate, so we are dealing here with people who were not wanted, so they are not the ones who caused the crimes to their loved ones. It is other people who committed those crimes. In that case, if this had come out in the fullness of time, it would not have caused the kind of pain in the way that it was dealt with politically.

Ian Paisley

It was not about the problem of difficult legislation but, indeed, in the evidence bundle that you have, on page 134, when you put to them the notion of legislating in this, Gerry Kelly’s response to you was, and I am quoting him, “f off”.

Jonathan Powell

Sorry, I do not have the bundle of evidence.

Ian Paisley

It should have been supplied and we can certainly supply you with it but, basically in your notes, on 20 July 2000[16], you had a private meeting with Gerry Adams and Gerry Kelly, and you put this suggestion to them about a scheme and about putting in place legislation. Their response was “f off”.

Jonathan Powell

What year was that, sorry? Do you know what year it was? 2000. Yes, this is very early on when they said they did not want legislation. They wanted just a general—I think; I cannot remember.

Ian Paisley

But they held to that position; they did not want legislation.

Jonathan Powell

They held to it for a long time but, when they were told that legislation was the only option, they then went along with it. When the legislation was introduced and the House of Commons amended it to include soldiers and members of the security forces, that is when they then objected to it.

Ian Paisley

They objected to it from 2000, so there was a glimmer of hope and it says there was some glimmer from Gerry Adams.

Jonathan Powell

We would not have introduced the legislation if we had not thought it would succeed.

Ian Paisley

On page 1 of that, if you turn over the page, at the bottom line, Gerry Adams has asked about it and you indicate there was a glimmer that he may have gone for this, and then Gerry Kelly immediately interjected and told you to—

Jonathan Powell

They had colourful language.

Chair

Just before we move on, Mr Powell, you have said that the letters went to people who were not wanted, but you will be familiar with Drew Harris’s comment a few weeks ago, when he said that now it appeared that 95 of those who received letters were connected through intelligence—no more than that at this stage—with almost 300 murders[17]. Now that troubles us deeply, because writing letters to innocent people—you are quite right; what is there to get excited about? However, if that is true, or even if some of those are connected with murders, then that really does shame the scheme, does it not?

Jonathan Powell

I am hoping that, if there was evidence that people had committed such crimes, they would not have received such letters as mistakenly happened in the case of Mr Downey. We cannot go around suspecting people. The way our justice system works is you are innocent until proven guilty, and we cannot go around saying, “Well, there is some intelligence this guy did that or did the other”, and try to paint them as guilty on that basis. That is not the way our system works.

Chair

No, but you would be uncomfortable in writing a letter. You personally, when you wrote your letters, would have been uncomfortable writing them if there was intelligence against those people, surely.

Jonathan Powell

It would depend an awful lot on what that intelligence was. I am afraid to say that sometimes intelligence cannot be entirely accurate on everything. I would be very uncomfortable writing a letter to someone who was wanted for a crime and who the police thought should be charged for that crime. That would be quite wrong.

Chair

Do you not find Drew Harris’s comments rather worrying then?

Jonathan Powell

I am afraid I do not even know who Drew Harris is. Who is Drew Harris?

Chair

Assistant Chief Constable.

Jonathan Powell

I do not know him.

Chair

It must be a worry. Certainly it is a worry to us. I would suggest that neither Lady Justice Hallett, nor indeed this inquiry, can be fully completed until the police have looked into each and every one of those cases.

Jonathan Powell

You are asking if I think that. I am glad to say I am not in Government now and I do not have to make those kinds of decisions.

Lady Hermon

Can I follow on from the point that you have just made? It is the same theme as the Drew Harris comments. You have repeated on several occasions, in response to both Naomi and to the Chairman, that these letters have gone out to people who were not wanted. They were not wanted. If they were not wanted, why on earth would the PSNI have opened a new review of every single recipient of these letters? It is going to take years. We know from Lady Justice Hallett’s report it is going to take years. We know from the PSNI it is going to take at least two to three years. Every single case is being looked at again, because it may well be that these people are wanted. That is the problem. I am staggered that such an experienced diplomat is sitting telling us that they went out to people who were not wanted. They were clearly not wanted. They were not wanted.

Jonathan Powell

That was the basis of the scheme that we were seeking, which was to get letters to people who were not wanted. We did not want to send letters to people who were wanted, and that is where it went wrong in the case of Mr Downey.

Lady Hermon

You have also said that it is irresponsible for people to stir up this hue and cry, and criticism of this particular scheme, and you were surprised by that. It should actually be the opposite: we should be commending the PSNI for having set up a review of every single one of these particular cases, because the cases and the letters were only based on information that was available, limited information at that time, in addition to the intelligence that was there.

Jonathan Powell

I am certainly not criticising the police for setting up an inquiry. I am ashamed to admit I did not know they had set up an inquiry.

Lady Hermon

They have 19 experienced detectives reviewing every single case.

Jonathan Powell

That is going to be a lot of police work.

Kate Hoey

Thank you, Jonathan, for coming to see us. I wondered if you have any influence still on the former Prime Minister, because he has been very reluctant to come and see us.

Jonathan Powell

No, I would say I have very little influence on the former Prime Minister.

Kate Hoey

So you will not be able to go back and tell him that, actually, we are quite nice people and he would be very welcome to come along.

Jonathan Powell

I will tell you the answer to that at the end of the meeting.

Kate Hoey

Can I just get you to confirm then that really the reason, of course, as we all know, but just so you are saying it, the OTR scheme did not go through legislation was not because many of us here in this House and many of the political parties were against it, but, very simply, you withdrew it when Sinn Féin/IRA said they did not want it.

Jonathan Powell

I am simplifying, but basically the Bill was withdrawn because Sinn Féin said they would not allow anyone—“not allow” are the wrong words—it would not meet their needs. The point of this was a negotiation to get them to decommission in return for dealing with the issue of OTRs, not the administrative scheme, but the issue of dealing with OTRs. When they said it did not satisfy their problems and people in the House of Commons were opposed, there was no point in taking the political pain of trying to force the legislation through. It solved no problems.

Kate Hoey

They did not want it because there was a suggestion that armed forces would be involved.

Jonathan Powell

My memory may be wrong on this, but I remember it being amended to include armed forces and security members, as I recall it, but I could possibly be wrong on that.

Kate Hoey

They basically said that they were not going to surrender to British authorities.

Jonathan Powell

That was 2000. This is much later when we brought the legislation in.

Kate Hoey

I remember the debates here in Parliament, outside the Chamber, about whether we should have legislation, and then it was dropped. I do not think people really understood why it was dropped.

Jonathan Powell

I cannot for the life of me remember what sorts of statements were made at the time about it. I think I covered it in my report.

Chair

Perhaps if I could just help there—I was a shadow Minister at the time, dealing with the legislation from the Conservative point of view, and it was certainly going through Committee. There was nothing the Conservative Party could have done to stop it. The then Minister, David Hanson, phoned me one day and asked to see me. He said, “We’re pulling the legislation,” and it was basically because Sinn Féin had withdrawn their support. It was my understanding that it was because security services people would be involved in it. That is my recollection of it.

Jonathan Powell

Thank you

Kate Hoey

So Sinn Féin got their way again.

Jonathan Powell

They got their way because this was something we were supposed to be doing to help them, but yes.

Kate Hoey

Can I just ask you: have you had any involvement or do you know anything about, because very few people seem to know anything about, all the various royal prerogatives of mercy that have been given at various stages during your watch?

Jonathan Powell

Before I read Lady Justice Hallett’s report, I would have had some trouble recalling it at all. Having read the report, I think her understanding is correct: they were used for people who should have been covered by the early-release scheme but, for some reason, were not, if I understand it correctly.

Kate Hoey

In your knowledge, no name ever came up in front of you that this was going to be reported that they were going to be given a pardon.

Jonathan Powell

Not to the best of my memory, with the exception of the cases that she talks about, which were for people who should have had early release and did not, for some anomaly.

Kate Hoey

You definitely do not think that anyone within the senior ranks of the current Sinn Féin will have been given pardons.

Jonathan Powell

Not to the best of my memory, no.

Kate Hoey

You would remember if Gerry Kelly had been given a pardon.

Jonathan Powell

I would have thought I would remember but, knowing that it is 15 years ago, I want to put that caveat in because I have not looked back at the papers, but I have no memory of that at all.

Kate Hoey

It was interesting in all the evidence, when there were meetings where the British Government officials were meeting, the Irish Government officials were meeting and Sinn Féin was meeting. Now, the Irish Government on the whole were usually standing up for the nationalist side of the community. Did you never feel a slight feeling that you, as the British Government, should actually be supporting the union, as we are now very, very strongly fighting the Scottish union? What is the difference?

Jonathan Powell

I think Tony Blair writes about it in his book, and I certainly write about it in mine: I think that was a real misapprehension on the Irish side. They said to us, “Well, we’ll deliver Sinn Féin and you deliver the unionists.” That is not at all how we saw the negotiations working. We thought we were supposed to be a neutral facilitator between the unionists and republicans. We secured an agreement that kept the union going, but we did it as a neutral party. The Irish had this notion that they were on one side and we were on the other. We did not see ourselves in that position.

Kate Hoey

Exactly, but who then was meant to be speaking up at the higher echelons of the political level in Westminster for the pro‑union community? The Irish Government were sticking up for the nationalist community.

Jonathan Powell

The unionist leaders were speaking up very strongly for the unionist community and we were meeting with them almost constantly during that period, so we were very well aware of what their views were and we did our very best to get to an agreement between them and the republicans. I would add that the Irish Government were not able to deliver Sinn Féin any more than we would have been able to deliver the unionists. It was, effectively in the end, both Governments acting as neutral parties between the two.

Kate Hoey

You do agree that they would be seen as that the British Government was not actually supporting British citizens in Northern Ireland.

Jonathan Powell

We certainly supported British citizens in Northern Ireland, but British citizens of all stripes. What we did not want to be was on one side or the other. That would have been a mistake.

Kate Hoey

But it was okay for the Irish Government to be.

Jonathan Powell

The Irish Government really changed their position over the course of those 10 years and became, certainly in the period after Good Friday, a neutral facilitator like us, effectively.

Kate Hoey

I am sorry to go back to the very beginning here, but you did seem rather mysterious about your relationships with Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness and Gerry Kelly. Are you a friend of Gerry Kelly?