Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 3 November 2014
Oral evidence, 4 November 2014.
Witnesses
Professor Niv Horesh, Professor of the Modern History of China and Director of the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, and Dr Malte Kaeding, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Surrey, gave evidence.
Chair
May I welcome the next two witnesses, Professor Niv Horesh, professor of the modern history of China and director of the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham; and Dr Malte Kaeding, lecturer in international relations at the University of Surrey? A warm welcome to you both; thank you very much for coming along today. Before I start the session, I will say to members of the public that taking photographs in here using your phone is not allowed, so I would be grateful if anyone doing that desists from doing so. Dr Kaeding, I understand that you would like to make a general statement to start with. Please do.
Dr Kaeding
Thank you, Chairman. This is of course an important inquiry and I believe that something like what we are seeing in Hong Kong with the Umbrella Movement could have been expected if we had paid closer attention to the political developments in Hong Kong. Lord Pattern has mentioned already some of these key issues over the past years in Hong Kong, such as: the rise of youth movements; the high level of dissatisfaction with the Government in Hong Kong and Beijing’s role in Hong Kong, as public opinion constantly shows; the rising inequalities; identity issues; problems of mainlandisation; and also structural problems of democratic progress. That is my observation and I think we will catch up on these issues later.
Chair
Thank you very much indeed. A question to you both. You will have read the six-monthly reports that the Foreign Office publishes, summarising its views on what is going on in Hong Kong. Do you think that those reports are an accurate representation?
Professor Horesh
If I may, I would suggest that a lot of what the report has raised in fact reflects concerns that are shared by many in Hong Kong. It is to my mind, and to that of those that I have consulted in preparation for this evidence, a well balanced statement that draws on both sides of politics in Hong Kong. I note in particular reference to concerns about: freedom of assembly; freedom of the press; and recent events that have occurred in Hong Kong. So, all in all, I would suggest that the report is quite well balanced.
Dr Kaeding
I think they provide a good overview, but there is very little analysis. There are no linkages between individual cases and overall democratic progress, no context is provided and I think there are several examples, as I think Lord Pattern mentioned already, that have been omitted, which I think is highly problematic. For example, in 2010, when we talk about the constitutional reform debate and all of those issues linked to it, why did the public react so negatively to the proposal put forward by the Government? Because basically it was a repackaging of a proposal of 2005 which was rejected by the LegCo. If this is not mentioned in the reports, how can we understand the reaction of pan-democratic parties, for example? Another example is that they did not even mention the anti high-speed rail link protests, which were the beginning of all these youth movements, linking social and political issues. It is problematic that some of these issues were not picked up. After 2012 the reports get much more comprehensive and last year and this year are quite good.
Chair
Professor Horesh, how does Beijing see the UK-Hong Kong relationship? What is their view of it?
Professor Horesh
It is fair to say that they are hypersensitive, in view of the fact that the UK used to run the former colony. Beijing at the moment, for example, is preoccupied with what they see as foreign black hands agitating and promoting the protest. There is some controversy as to how authentic the sentiments are, whether they reflect a genuine mindset, or it is simply a ploy. With that in mind, they observe things like British Council activities. We understand that there is great sensitivity about what the British Council might do or not do in the colony, because we know that the US agency, the National Endowment for Democracy, is on their radar screen and they often accuse it of manipulating students and public opinion. In view of the historical linkages between Hong Kong and the UK, through Beijing’s eyes, the UK cannot be considered as just another country commenting on the situation. It is extremely sensitive in particular to what is said about Hong Kong in this country.
Chair
Looking at it from the other side of the coin, how does China see its relationship with Hong Kong and what sovereignty do you think it has over Hong Kong?
Professor Horesh
It is difficult to psychoanalyse what goes through the minds of the leaders in Zhongnanhai. By and large many at the helm in the top echelons in Beijing see themselves as mission bound to assert Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong. Formally that is the case. Any development that might in their view suggest an erosion of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong will be seen as a great threat. One also needs to consider the historical baggage. The Chinese Communist party does not see itself purely as an embodiment of Marxist ideology. We know that China has drifted a long way away from Marxism. It is perhaps even more an embodiment of Chinese national aspirations. In that sense, reuniting with Taiwan, asserting sovereignty over all parts of China is very much on the minds of the leadership all the time.
Chair
Do you think that has implications for us in the UK?
Professor Horesh
As Hong Kong’s former colonial administrator, the UK does need to be aware of these sensitivities. Whether those are legitimised or not is a different question. Nevertheless I think that a lot of these sentiments are genuine. Of course they will often be manipulated. Using this country’s past as an oppressor, which Lord Patten pointed to, can be foregrounded in all sorts of ways, often manipulatively and not as matter of fact. Underlying all of that there is a certain historical mission that leaders feel and that translates into great sensitivity about what the UK says. In the realm of diplomacy that should be taken into consideration.
Sandra Osborne
How and why has Beijing’s attitude to the development in Hong Kong of political and constitutional rights changed since the Joint Declaration was signed?
Professor Horesh
To say that it has changed is open to debate, I might suggest. At the moment what is alarming Beijing is what they see as attempts to assert—not just to call for—a greater degree of democracy, of popular representation. Many among the leadership—perhaps not all—including some who are intimately in contact with Hong Kong or who are policy makers in that regard, see some elements within the student movement as trying to assert an identity that is separate from so-called Mother China. That is what they are concerned about. When this perception takes root, there is a real risk that they might overreact. So can we say that their attitude has changed over time? I might suggest that, had we had this discussion round about 1995, if we had attempted back then to predict the spirit of the nascent declaration—what at the time had not yet been signed—and what sort of issues might crop up later down the track, I think if we then had known the issues that we are dealing with now, we might have been pleasantly surprised. In about 1995, stalwarts like HSBC relocated their headquarters here because of great anxiety about the future of Hong Kong. We know how much fear there was at the time. If we look back at the headlines and the press reports, and the messages that went through diplomatic channels, I think that by and large, even though of course there is still great concern about Hong Kong’s future, the Joint Declaration has lived up to its purpose.
Sandra Osborne
Do you think that Beijing just thought they would continue on, as has been happening with the constitutional arrangements, and that they were not aware they would be challenged at some point along the line?
Professor Horesh
I think it is widely recognised that the Joint Declaration had been phrased in a way that was purposefully amorphous and vague, so as to allow Beijing to sign and give the much needed peace of mind to Hong Kong at a time when anxiety was going through the roof, and at times there was grave concern about the viability of Hong Kong as a financial hub. Considering the amorphous nature of the declaration, much has been achieved since, even though we would all of course like to see Beijing making more concessions. But in an atmosphere and a climate where Beijing might somehow get the impression that what is at stake is not the technicalities of universal suffrage, but a separate identity that may be budding in Hong Kong, then I think we would all have problems expecting concessions.
Sandra Osborne
In relation to the increased economic power of China over recent years, how has that affected the UK’s relationship with Hong Kong?
Professor Horesh
I think we need to bear in mind the relative significance of Hong Kong back in 1997 and the role that Hong Kong plays in Greater China’s economy at the moment. Much has changed since. I think policy makers in Beijing know that and try to make the most of it. I think policy makers in the west are aware of it, quite naturally. Back in 1997, Hong Kong was absolutely indispensable. I might even say that it was the lifeblood of China’s reform effort. That is no longer the case. There is a growing sense in Beijing—perhaps it is justified, if we look at the figures—that if push came to shove, the Chinese economy could continue to grow, perhaps not at breakneck pace, and China’s reform thrust might well continue, even in the absence of consensus in Hong Kong and even if there were many more divisions in the former colony. I think that the setting has changed to a great extent.
Chair
Dr Kaeding, did you want to comment on any of those points?
Dr Kaeding
I think I agree with Professor Horesh, largely on the Chinese perspective. I think, however, that we have to highlight that, when we talk about China’s role in Hong Kong after 1997, there are structural issues with the democratisation process. What we can see is a move towards more power or more importance being given, for example, to district councils through the democratisation process. That looks like the Chinese trying for some kind of Chinese-style democracy. What we can see is not only that democratisation is slow at best, but that it is somehow derailed and getting further and further from what we would consider fair and just elections. As you know, district councils are depoliticised bodies in Hong Kong. They have been given a stronger role after the 2010 constitutional reform package. We have to bear that in mind.
Mr Roy
Dr Kaeding, do the majority of Hong Kong citizens support the protesters, or do many think that political reform is going ahead at the right pace?
Dr Kaeding
When we looked at this before the protest—we do not have any current public opinion polls, because of the ongoing protest—after the NPC decision of 31 August and before the student strike, we had a large majority of citizens asking the legislators to reject the reform proposal given by China. We see 80% to 90% of people wanting genuine universal suffrage and wanting to get rid of the functional constituencies, as Lord Patten said. In early October, at the beginning of the demonstration, 59% of people supported the students in rejecting the Government proposals. There is a clear majority for the protests.
Mr Roy
Could you comment on the students or the protesters themselves? In what way are they different from the old guard—the pan-democrats of the past? What difference does that make for the future of the pro-democracy movement?
Dr Kaeding
What we can see, especially now with the so-called Umbrella Movement, is that although the Hong Kong Federation of Students and Scholarism are very much involved in this, we can see a lot of self-organisation on the ground. Groups such as the Civil Human Rights Front, which organises the 1 July rallies every year, are active there. The pan-democratic parties, as you know, have been largely sidelined by this protest, so that they are not involved or only a little involved. On tactics and aims, you are right. It is quite different from what we have known. That is why I mentioned the anti high-speed rail link protest. At that time, frustration over slow democratic progress—every year people just coming out to march and nothing really happening—led to more confrontational tactics by some parts of the pan-democrats, but also the student movement, especially the group Scholarism, which said, “We can’t continue like this.” For example, sit-ins—just staying in a venue after a march—were one of the tactics adopted. So we can see a shift in tactics, but also in aims. The youth movements have a more purist—I do not want to use the term radical—version of democracy in mind, and reject the moderate views, especially those of the Democratic party in 2010, that small incremental steps would be the way to go. They see what is happening on the ground: that on the grassroots level things are dominated by pro-establishment parties, because of their superior financial means.
Mr Roy
There is a separation from the pan-democrats. I understand that they stand back, but when they stand back do they encourage, discourage, or remain totally neutral?
Dr Kaeding
I think they encourage and try to get involved, but at the moment they cannot steer the agenda. It is firmly with the students.
Sir Menzies Campbell
Is the unpopularity of the Hong Kong Government related to constitutional issues or perceived and, indeed, actual economic inequality?
Dr Kaeding
I think both. First, you are right that constitutional arrangements are highly problematic. Even if we had a National Legislative Council fully, getting rid of all the functional constituencies, the role of Chief Executive would still be very odd. There are constraints, some of which are self-made: for example, the so-called accountability system introduced in 2002. Then there are rising inequalities and the demise of the Hong Kong dream—you work hard and then you can move up—which has died down with rising housing prices. But I would be very careful about saying that people are taking a stand just because of economic reasons. That is the discourse from China.
Sir Menzies Campbell
It is a combination of both.
Dr Kaeding
Yes. It is all the frustration over such a long time and all these promises, as Lord Patten said, over many years—now it is universal suffrage, then another reinterpretation, and then another recycled proposal.
Sir Menzies Campbell
Professor Horesh, do you agree?
Professor Horesh
To a large extent I do. I am not that intimately tied up or engaged with the activists, but as an observer, somebody who reads the data very carefully, and as an analyst, I think that there is probably a small gap in the press coverage in the West of what is going on. There are two narratives. One is the mainstream press narrative in the West that portrays this as a democracy versus Beijing kind of movement, but I think there is a lot more to the story than meets the eye. A lot of the sentiments that we see in Hong Kong are Russell Brand kind of sentiments, which have a lot more to do with issues that young people struggle with in different parts of the world, not necessary just in Greater China. The Chief Executives—all of them since the handover—are seen as political insiders who have cosy links with big business. That is where the youth animosity derives from to a great extent. It is not just universal suffrage per se.
Sir Menzies Campbell
Again, let me put a hypothetical question to both of you. Suppose the constitutional arrangements were resolved for the purpose of the 2013 election and that concessions were made: would that sweep away the unpopularity, or would it still have its basis in economic inequality? Dr Kaeding, you said that the two together create the present discontent, but if you were to siphon one off, would the discontent remain?
Dr Kaeding
I think—
Chair
Order. I am particularly interested in the answer to that question, but you are witnessing democracy at work—we have to go to vote. The sitting is suspended for 10 minutes or 20 minutes if there are two votes. Sitting suspended for Divisions in the House. On resuming—
Chair
Thank you both for your patience. We had two votes.
Sir Menzies Campbell
If we were in court, I would say that the shorthand writer will read the question to you again, but in these days of technical advance, we do not have shorthand writers. If a satisfactory or acceptable solution were found in relation to the constitutional issue of 2017, would the existing economic discontent be maintained? Would that, on its own, be a sufficient cause of a lack of settled approach in Hong Kong?
Dr Kaeding
That is a very important question. If we only focus on the 2017 election of the Chief Executive, that will not be enough. As I mentioned before, the key problem is the functional constituencies, where you have this narrow amount of people voting, with 150 voting for one person. Those have been identified for a long time now as the core of the economic system in Hong Kong being skewed towards one side. If that is not reformed, I think that this would continue. This is the core issue. If we resolve the functional constituencies, that will also help with the nomination committee and things like that.
Professor Horesh
I agree that functional constituencies embody a complication that is causing quite a bit of controversy, but I might also suggest that, had a more assertive Chief Executive been appointed—Lord Patten touched on this point—and had a more forceful image emerged, representing the popular voice, which is not yet fully represented given the technicalities of the current system, many in Hong Kong would have been relieved, and perhaps that might have defused student discontent. Whether this can be accommodated by Beijing is a completely different question.
Sir Menzies Campbell
Do you think Beijing’s attitude towards Hong Kong is in any way influenced by recent events in Taiwan and Macau?
Professor Horesh
Absolutely. Anything that might smack of secession or alternative identity—even events unfolding in far-flung corners of the planet, including the Arab spring—are cause of grave concern in China. It is no coincidence that when the Arab spring broke out, there was censorship of events across the Middle East. It was virtually impossible to read about those events on the internet for a long period of time. I would cast the net wider and suggest that, in the PRC mindset, the Beijing mindset, global events that lean towards secession or are seen as some kind of federalism breaking loose, degenerating into independence movements, are almost instinctively seen as a threat. Of course, closer to home in Taiwan, the Sunflower movement, being a vocal movement, is of grave concern.
Sir Menzies Campbell
May I turn the question around for Dr Kaeding? If instability anywhere in the world causes anxiety in Beijing, they are likely to be caused permanent anxiety because there is hardly ever an occasion when there isn’t somewhere in the world a movement for devolution or independence. I do not know whether what happened in Scotland on 18 September was of any significance in Beijing, but that seems to me to be an attitude that is bound to be challenged, albeit perhaps not daily. You certainly cannot rely on global stability.
Dr Kaeding
I agree with you, and I agree with what Professor Horesh said. These concerns about sovereignty are very centrist. Lord Patten also said these things about Chinese identity. The problem is that Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong achieve exactly the opposite, so what they achieve now is a model for Macau, which of course is much more constrained, but students look at Hong Kong very interestedly, learning about tactics and so on. A friend of mine at Macau university who talked to the democratic parties there says, “They said we can learn tactics and strategies from them,” and they are trying to mobilise people there. In Taiwan, of course, the student movements learned from Hong Kong starting from 2012. There are all these exchanges. If the Chinese Government’s idea is that the problem will go away if they just suppress it, it will not. As you can see, it is just getting worse.
Sir Menzies Campbell
So what happens in Freedom Square thousands of miles away can have an impact on the policy of the Beijing Government?
Professor Horesh
Potentially, yes. In that context, I might add that what happened in Scotland is more of a symbolic event. On the other hand China increasingly relies on oil from the Middle East—oil from the Middle East played a marginal role in their energy mix a decade ago, but not now. China is otherwise much more of a global player nowadays; hence its concerns are global.
Sir Menzies Campbell
I was being a little mischievous by referring to Scotland, but thank you both very much.
Nadhim Zahawi
How would you assess the UK Government’s response to developments in Hong Kong since the announcement of the decision on the 2017 electoral package?
Dr Kaeding
I largely agree with Lord Patten that it has been very restrained. I can see there are constraints, but on the other hand it is very important for the UK to take a clear stance if the UK wants to continue in its role as a normative power. It is very important, also, for the Hong Kong people, as we talked about before, that they have some recognition that we in the UK care. That was said in the session with Mrs Anson Chan and Mr Martin Lee. In terms of the responsibility of the UK, the core values of Hong Kong—the rule of law, freedom of speech and all these things—were all established under British rule, so if these are now getting people into trouble, it is the responsibility of the UK to come out and support of them.
Professor Horesh
I might argue, in addition, that the challenge is in bringing about a situation where Beijing is encouraged to make concessions. In a setting where the Prime Minister met with the Dalai Lama in 2012 and angered Beijing—one cannot ignore that meeting—and for the Deputy Prime Minister to then suggest that he might be inviting the Chinese ambassador to express dismay at what is happening in Beijing when the Prime Minister has not expressed himself along the same lines is, I would suggest, potentially a very effective way of expressing concern on the one hand, but also avoiding a situation where Beijing might overreact, because of its own sensitivities. Of course, this is quite complicated: how do you get the optimal response from Beijing?
Nadhim Zahawi
How is the UK perceived by different political and generational groups in Hong Kong? Can you shed some light on that for us?
Dr Kaeding
We have had, so far, a lot of qualitative data. We are trying to do some research on this right now; if the funding goes through, then we might have some more data on this. We can see, especially among young people— youngsters born after 1997—an imagined, golden colonial era, the Patten era, and a lot of people who identify themselves as a Hong Kong person only, not Chinese. They have a colonial nostalgia; that is a very strong element of this. Among older people, it depends on what side you were on. Of course, we know that leftists suffered to some extent under colonial rule, but especially middle-class people and people of middle age have a very positive view of the UK. Because Hong Kong always sees itself as an international city and an international society, it is always looking at Europe, always looking at the US, and in Europe, of course, the prime point is the UK.
Nadhim Zahawi
We have touched on this already, but can we have a final word from you on what the UK Government could be doing differently in handling relations with Hong Kong? Are there areas we have not tackled that you think we should be doing differently?
Dr Kaeding
One example would be looking more closely at different actors in Hong Kong. We have the established pro-democracy figures like Anson Chan and Martin Lee; they are very important, but as I said before when Mr Roy asked me about this, you can see that there are a lot of new actors and we have to look at them as well and try to get a broader view of different perspectives on developments in Hong Kong. That would be the one thing. I agree with Professor Horesh that it is very difficult in terms of actual statements in support.
Chair
Thank you very much for your time. That completes our questions. We always appreciate it when people who know what they are talking about come along and talk to us. Oral evidence: The UK’s relations with Hong Kong: 30 years after the Joint Declaration, HC 649 23