Oral evidence: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, HC 711Tuesday 4 November 2014
Oral evidence, 4 November 2014.
Witness
Michelle Stanistreet, General Secretary, National Union of Journalists, gave evidence.
Chair
Good afternoon, Ms Stanistreet. Thank you very much for coming to give evidence to this Committee. The Committee is having a look and we are going to produce a short report by the end of November on the subject of RIPA. The NUJ has concerns. You have stated, “The misuse of RIPA to snoop on journalists is not an isolated example of bad practice in the Met. The police clearly believe that they are above the law they are there to uphold”. Do you believe that the, as you put it, snooping on journalists is widespread and why do you think this is happening?
Michelle Stanistreet
One of the problems is that we don’t know just how widespread it is. The revelations that this has even happened only came about as a result of journalists realising it in the Met’s report on the so-called Plebgate affair. It was a throwaway line about the accessing of a political editor’s phone records in this way. We had no idea that this was taking place and it is only through the dogged journalism that has happened since that some examples of this happening have come to light. We believe it is only the tip of the iceberg. One of the problems is that the individual police forces who have been approached with Freedom of Information requests have been stalling and claiming that for cost reasons and time purposes they can’t provide answers. So many examples have been revealed in recent weeks that we believe this has been pretty much systemic and institutionalised, and it has not just happened in one police force. It has clearly been happening among many different police forces.
Chair
We will come on to the Freedom of Information requests by Press Gazette in a moment, but just in respect of the possible damage that this might do to the reputation of the profession, do you think it will cause damage to the public’s trust in dealing with journalists?
Michelle Stanistreet
I think the revelations as they stand have already had a major impact and have sent shockwaves through the journalistic industry. Journalists live and die by their sources. We ask people to come to us and we promise, we pledge to protect their confidentiality, their anonymity. It is often very brave people who take a decision that the information they are in receipt of should be placed before the public, and journalists are the route to do that. The knowledge that their identities and information about them has been accessed secretly in this way has done irreparable damage. We might not see the impact of this for many years, but without that relationship of trust between journalists and potential sources and whistleblowers the impact on journalism is potentially immense, and to investigative journalism particularly.
Chair
Do you think that this is an attempt to target individual journalists and newspapers, or do you think it is just something that has progressed because of the numbers of warrants that have been issued and if you go for a larger number then it is inevitable that you will find a journalist? We have just had evidence from the Interception Commissioner and he basically said to this Committee that sometimes these warrants are taken out and you don’t know it is a journalist. You check numbers, you are given a number, and at the end of the day you discover it is a journalist and then you destroy the information. Do you think it is something that is targeted or do you think it might just be accidental?
Michelle Stanistreet
It is quite clearly being targeted because in some of the cases that have already come to light individual journalists were targeted specifically because they had reported on these events. The police seem to be much more concerned about identifying what they might see as potential disloyal leakers in their own organisations and institutions than they have been about the damage being done to journalism and the relationship of trust between whistle-blowers and journalists. It is quite clear there are a number of examples where I think police have taken a decision to waste public money and resources on snooping on journalists in local newspapers, as well as in national newspapers, rather than concentrating on the many crimes that are out there to investigate.
Chair
You think it is happening. You don’t know the extent, but you would like it stopped?
Michelle Stanistreet
There have been a number of absolute cases where it has been clearly shown that different police forces have admitted that they have been doing this, but what we do not know is the scale of it. One of the problems is that they are not even logging information about the occupations of the people that they are snooping on.
Chair
Do you think they should? Do you think when a warrant is issued the occupation—should it just be the occupation or should it be other issues?
Michelle Stanistreet
They simply should not be doing it in the first place. This piece of legislation was never envisaged as a means of snooping on journalists and preventing journalism from thriving and flourishing. So it should not be happening in the first place. There should be transparency. The NUJ have campaigned a lot in recent years about what we have seen as the growing trend of the police using journalists and the information we gather in the course of our work and photographs that are taken as a shortcut to their investigations. It is vital that journalists are not seen as an extension, an instrument of the police or the state in that way. It comprises the ability for journalists to do their job independently and to be seen to do that fairly.
Tim Loughton
Could we come back to Press Gazette’s FOI that the Chairman referred to just now, which revealed that the Met does not keep records of monitoring cases of RIPA against journalists? I think you said that it is the tip the iceberg. How many cases are you aware of and how extensive is it?
Michelle Stanistreet
We know that there has been something like 54. I could double check that for you. There have been a number of reports about specific cases and a number of journalists who are trying to establish, as we speak, whether they have been investigated and their sources comprised in this way. It is a very rapidly moving story in this sense. The diversity of instances where this piece of legislation has been used is revealing enough. There have been cases where councils believe that there have been leaks about their business where they have obtained permission for a journalist, sitting in a coffee shop, meeting with potential sources and witnesses, to be covertly watched and their movements monitored. It is beyond ludicrous that this has been allowed to take place without any kind of assessment or transparency about doing it and with the journalist, and more critically their sources and whistle-blowers, none the wiser. It is an outrage that it has taken place.
Tim Loughton
You think it is a pretty big iceberg.
Michelle Stanistreet
I believe so.
Tim Loughton
You used the term systemic and institutionalised. Define systemic. Is this something where they get together and discuss how they can do it in different parts of the country, or what is it?
Michelle Stanistreet
Who knows? The first example that came to light was within the Metropolitan Police, but it is quite clearly not a problem that is confined to the Met, so it goes beyond one individual police force. There are many others, such as Kent, that have been implicated in the examples that have been revealed to date. We believe that there is such a geographic spread that it shows that many police forces, whether individually or somehow collectively, cottoned on to the fact that they could exploit this piece of legislation in this way. It was certainly never conceived of as being a mechanism to access journalistic material when it was first brought into being. I think the former Met chief, Ian Blair himself, concedes that if this had been anticipated as a potential consequence, it would never have been passed in the first place.
Tim Loughton
Do you think there are police forces that are “safer” or are you just not aware of that?
Michelle Stanistreet
I would very much doubt so, but it does not really matter whether it is every single police force doing it or whether just some are. The very fact that it has been brought to light now and there is public exposure about the fact that they can do this legitimately, it seems, would presumably, without any move to clamp down on this, mean that many more police forces would do it.
Tim Loughton
My point is that the fact that they apparently can on the basis of the high profile cases in London, Kent and others does not mean that they are all actually doing it and some police may have taken a much more cautionary approach so as not to become the subject of such allegations?
Michelle Stanistreet
You may find that out in the course of your investigation, but I don’t think that is particularly relevant. The fact that it is happening and on a broad scale is shocking and incredibly undermining of journalists. When whistleblowers are making a huge decision and wrestling with themselves about whether they should bring forward information into the public domain, I don’t think they should have to go through the process of trying to establish whether their local police force is more honourable than another local police force.
Tim Loughton
I am trying to establish whether there is a bad cop, good cop situation. You are suggesting to me it is all bad cop, bad cop.
Michelle Stanistreet
No, I didn’t say that. I said it is a problem that is quite clearly widespread; the facts speak for themselves. We shouldn’t be down to the position where journalism in the UK is dependent on whether there is a bad cop, good cop. In actual fact, the police are doing stuff that they can do within the law as it currently stands. It is wrong and it should never have been allowed to become established in this way. I am sure you will have witnesses from the police who absolutely defend their right to do it. I would wholeheartedly disagree with that, but frankly I don’t care about one superintendent’s perspective on press freedom or the way journalists do their jobs or the vital role of whistleblowers in our society. It is a much more important issue than one superintendent ticking a box and filling in a form or one particular police force’s approach to the critical role that journalism plays in society.
Chair
It is not a big ask, is it, to write down the profession of those that you are getting warrants for?
Michelle Stanistreet
You wouldn’t have thought so, but clearly it has been beyond the bureaucratic processes of some police forces, or so they claim. I think this is something that they should not be allowed to hide in bureaucracy. They should be forced to deliver up the information.
Dr Huppert
Many of us have campaigned for a long time on transparency in this whole space, so we know what is being done and how much of it is reasonable and how much of it is not. As I am sure you know, there are seven grounds on which communications data can be collected: national security, prevention of serious crime, disorder and a few others. Do you know which ones have been used to collect information on journalists?
Michelle Stanistreet
I would have to double check that for you, but the nature of the cases have been quite diverse. There seems to be a pattern in the police trying to investigate what they would see as their own bad apples who have leaked information to the press in some way. That seems to have been the overriding motivation for doing this.
Dr Huppert
It would be helpful, because there are seven clear reasons and I don’t see one of them being police leaking.
Michelle Stanistreet
No. I would have to double check what they have cited.
Dr Huppert
It would be very helpful to understand how they have tried to crowbar it into what Parliament decided were the things. National security is one thing and police officers talking out of turn is not the same thing at all.
Michelle Stanistreet
It is absolutely not.
Dr Huppert
If you do have any information on that, it would be very helpful for us to look at it. You asked for the Interception of Communications Commissioner to do an investigation into this. Do you have confidence in his inquiry?
Michelle Stanistreet
We called for an inquiry, so we are pleased that an inquiry is taking place and we will contribute to it fully.
Dr Huppert
That is not quite the question I asked.
Michelle Stanistreet
I think the reality is that it would be very easy for an inquiry to take place and then there to be some tweaking of a code as the final outcome of it. The NUJ does not believe that that is good enough; it would not go far enough. What is so important in the course of his inquiry is that we get to grips with the extent of what has been happening under this piece of legislation, the full scale, the extent and the real detail of the cases that have been pursued. I think the outcome of this investigation is the most important thing and we have concerns that it will not go far enough.
Dr Huppert
You have not quite answered whether you have confidence in the inquiry, I notice.
Michelle Stanistreet
We called for an inquiry. Until it has taken place and come to an outcome, I think it would be unfair to assume it is lacking in integrity.
Dr Huppert
What you would like to see is a clear analysis of how much of this has happened—so what has happened, how it has fitted in—but what else do you wish to see? Presumably you could not have a system that said that anybody who is a journalist is completely excluded from anything, if they are genuinely involved with a terrorism plot for example. What would you like it to actually say?
Michelle Stanistreet
The legislation was never brought in to deal with terrorism in that sense and journalists are obviously not terrorists.
Dr Huppert
Essentially it was specifically brought in to try to deal with things like terrorism. National security is the first on the list. What I am saying is that it is possible for somebody who is a journalist or a lawyer to also be involved in serious criminality, separate from their role as a journalist.
Michelle Stanistreet
Perhaps we will see in the course of this investigation whether there has been any example where that has happened. I very much doubt that that is the case. In terms of what we would like, there are already existing pieces of legislation in place, hoops that journalists have to go through if the police wish to serve a production order, the provisions within PACE for the protection of journalistic material, which is protected under European legislation. The NUJ has defended many of them and many individual members of the NUJ when they or a newspaper group have been served a production order. They are very stressful, difficult and expensive but at least they happen in the full glare of transparency, through a legal process and mechanism, and a judge takes a decision at the end of the day. At the moment what we have is a system whereby police superintendents can take that decision based on their own internal issues and interests rather than the broader ones of journalism. Journalistic material should be privileged and protected.
Dr Huppert
I am trying to be clear about what you are asking for. Are you saying that anybody who is a journalist should be completely excluded from this legislation? Are you saying that all use of this legislation should be subject to judicial oversight? What exactly are you asking for?
Michelle Stanistreet
At the very least there should be judicial oversight.
Dr Huppert
For everybody or only for journalists?
Michelle Stanistreet
Journalistic material should not be allowed to be accessed without judicial oversight. The consequences of allowing what has been happening over recent years to carry on is incalculable for journalists.
Chair
It is not just the system we have at the moment, the auditor after the event, which is what we have with the—
Michelle Stanistreet
No.
Chair
You want it as the process proceeds?
Michelle Stanistreet
Absolutely.
Chair
If you look at the number of investigations of Scotland Yard in relation to journalists, there are quite a lot. There is Weeting, Elveden, Pinetree, Golding, Sacha, Tuleta, Kalmyk, Sabinas, Carrizo—quite a lot.
Michelle Stanistreet
If the police want to access journalistic material and privileged source information they should transparently ask for it and go through a legal process and have the legal argument to assess whether it is an appropriate request or not. The journalists know about it, the sources know what is happening, the news groups know about it at the time, and that process can happen with full transparency and openness, not this backdoors route to get their hands on journalistic information secretly in the way that has been happening.
Chair
Thank you. I think we get the point.
Michael Ellis
Ms Stanistreet, if I could clarify a couple of things with you. The point that I think Dr Huppert was getting at is journalists are not above the law, in the same way that politicians are not above the law. Do you accept that? There must be a process whereby if there is due and proper cause for proceedings to be taken against journalists or politicians they can be taken. Do you accept that?
Michelle Stanistreet
Of course.
Michael Ellis
Sir Paul Kennedy was saying that the process as it currently stands means that they do not really ascertain the occupation of the person involved. He said it in relation to what is called the Wilson doctrine. They can’t even determine whether someone is a politician or not within their processes at the moment. Do you accept that as an explanation for—
Michelle Stanistreet
No. It seems a pretty basic flaw in their processes in that case, doesn’t it?
Michael Ellis
As far as the records are concerned, I understand police forces have been saying that because of the sheer volume of records in connection with metadata, for example, it would be prohibitively expensive for them to trawl through thousands of their records to ascertain who is and is not a journalist. Do you accept that as an explanation?
Michelle Stanistreet
I don’t accept it as an explanation. Obviously it is one that they have proffered. It does not react in any way with any cognisance of the seriousness of what we are doing. I think this is such a vital thing that I am afraid the expense involved, the bureaucratic difficulty is something that the police are going to have to contend with and do in order that the investigations taking place have all of that information at their fingertips.
Michael Ellis
Do you agree with me that the wrong legislation has been applied here, that what is called the RIPA proceedings are the wrong legislation for police to use in respect of journalists anyway? There are proper safeguards that are supposed to go through judicial oversight and if the police have used the RIPA legislation it was wrong in principle for them to do so.
Michelle Stanistreet
Absolutely. I believe it was a misuse of what that legislation was devised to do. There are safeguards in other pieces of legislation for journalistic material.
Michael Ellis
Do you think there has been a deliberate bypass of the safety procedures whereby a judge is supposed to be addressed with a particular issue concerning a journalist so that he or she can make an informed legal judgment as to whether it is appropriate and reasonable in all the circumstances for intercept to take place against a journalist? What they have done is used the RIPA legislation in order to bypass that judicial oversight because, quite frankly, they were scared a judge would say no.
Michelle Stanistreet
Absolutely. In some of the cases a judge has said no about revealing the identity of sources involved, so it is quite clear that there has been a bypassing in that way and that it has been deliberate and it has not been a one-off incident. It has happened many times.
Dr Huppert
I understand your desire to carve out an exception for journalists in much of this. How would you define a journalist?
Michelle Stanistreet
An individual who is engaged in news gathering. The NUJ has over 30,000 members of our union in the UK and Ireland who work in many different parts of the industry as journalists.
Dr Huppert
Would it include citizen journalists, people who report on local council meetings and say what is happening? How broad a line would you like to draw?
Michelle Stanistreet
It depends on the nature of their work. We have bloggers who are in NUJ membership. It could be devised in a way that reflects the trade union membership that individuals have, the places where they work, the places where they commission. We have freelance members in our membership. The very fact of journalism as being a diverse occupation and industry means that one person’s citizen journalist is somebody else who is providing local news because their local newspaper has just closed down. It is very diverse industry.
Chair
Thank you. That is very helpful. We will also consult the Oxford Dictionary, or the Cambridge Dictionary in Mr Huppert’s case, on what a journalist is.
Mr Winnick
You said and agreed that journalists should not be above the law, as indeed illustration was given that politicians are not above the law. Has it ever been suggested by the NUJ that journalists should be above the law?
Michelle Stanistreet
It has never been suggested that journalists are above the law and we operate within the law daily as journalists. There are many different pieces of legislation that cover journalistic activities in that sense.
Mr Winnick
There is a distinction, of course, when one talks about journalists being above the law, and you said that the union has never adopted that line, understandably, but do you take the view that the source of material that journalists receive should not be revealed under any circumstances?
Michelle Stanistreet
One of the overriding responsibilities of any journalist—and the NUJ has one of the oldest codes of conduct in the world—is to protect your sources. It is the fundamental tenet of what journalists stand for and journalists have very proudly defended that pledge over many years. We have fought legal cases that have lasted many years. The ability and right to protect your sources has been stripped away by the very existence of the activities that have been revealed in this way by Press Gazette and others. That is an incredibly disturbing thing because that is a central part of that relationship of trust between sources and journalists that has been undermined by what has been going on and by the reality, the news that it has been happening in this way for many years now. Sorting that out and acting to halt that is critical if the public are going to have trust in journalists going forward. You can think of so many major inquiries and investigations and scandals that have been broken because of people being brave enough to come forward with information that journalists have revealed to the broader public, and it would stymie the ability of journalists to carry on doing that vital work in future if this is not halted.
Mr Winnick
It is true to say that journalists have gone to prison for refusing to reveal—
Michelle Stanistreet
Absolutely.
Mr Winnick
Mulholland is a name that comes to mind, that occurred many years ago.
Michelle Stanistreet
Yes, there have been a number of different cases of that and journalists have been held in contempt because they have stood up for their sources and protected their identities. It is important that we are allowed to continue to do that in the future. The existence of digital communications and the way in which journalists rely on them and information is passed on should not be used somehow as a backdoor route to finding and accessing material that can be used to identify sources who have trusted journalists.
Mr Winnick
The allegation has been made by The Daily Mail that its sister paper, The Mail on Sunday, was the subject of the police using anti-terrorism powers to spy on the newspaper over the Chris Huhne investigations. Do you have any comment on that?
Michelle Stanistreet
After The Sun example that sparked all of this off, it was one of the instances that came out soon after in the Chris Huhne speeding points scandal—so this is an issue about speeding points; it is not a matter of state or terrorism—that they secretly obtained the phone records of the journalist involved at The Mail on Sunday, David Dillon, and his source who was a freelance journalist.
Mr Winnick
Are you accepting as a union that this actually happened?
Michelle Stanistreet
We absolutely believe it happened. I think the evidence is there to demonstrate that it did and the police have accepted that, as they have many other cases: a journalist at the Ipswich Star, so the Suffolk police; a journalist in Derby who was spied on while she was meeting with her contacts. These things have been happening for a number of years. The police very swiftly after this legislation was introduced saw the opportunity it gave them to do this, which is why it is not one-off, it is not accidental, it is not happening to journalists incidentally, regardless of their occupation. Journalists and their sources have clearly been targeted in this way.
Mr Winnick
North Kent Police have stated, as what they describe as part of this debate, that in their view, “Consideration has to be given to how material held by the media that might be relevant to a criminal investigation is shared with the police and the courts”. What are your comments on that?
Michelle Stanistreet
If they want to get hold of journalistic material they should be upfront about it and they should go through the existing procedures, whether they serve a production order, and there needs to be judicial oversight. It should not be down to one police superintendent who is carrying out an investigation to make up the rules on this and decide what should or should not be in his purloin. The journalist should know, the newspaper should know, the source should know, and there should be a legal argument about it.
Mr Winnick
If the police are of the view that this is essential to their investigation, instead of doing what apparently they have been doing, they should use the judicial process?
Michelle Stanistreet
Yes. They are using this piece of legislation as a secret means of getting their hands on something that they believe a judge would refuse, and that is the top and tail of it. They should not be allowed to do that.
Chair
Thank you very much. We are going to vote now. Thank you for giving evidence. We might write to you for further information but we are most grateful. I am adjourning the Committee for 15 minutes and then we will return. Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. On resuming- Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses
Maxine De Brunner, National Lead for Lawful Intercept, Richard Berry, National Policing Lead for Communications Data, and Chief Constable Mick Creedon, Derbyshire Police, gave evidence.
Chair
The proceedings have now recommenced. My apologies to our witnesses for having interrupted the proceedings but I am afraid items in the House take priority. Thank you very much for coming at short notice. The Committee is doing a very short look at RIPA and we thought that the three of you might be helpful. We did not actually want the three of you but we felt in the interests of getting everyone topped and tailed we should have the three of you. What the Committee did is it wrote to the chief constables to ask them for information which we felt was relevant to our inquiry. We received a letter back from Keith Bristow and Hugh Orde in which they said that the two key people to speak to were yourself, Mr Berry, and Maxine De Brunner, and then I had a call from Cressida Dick who said, “Do you really want Maxine De Brunner because she is not allowed to say anything?” and I said, “Well, this sounds even more interesting”. There is nothing like guaranteeing a slot at Home Affairs to be told that if you have a witness they cannot tell you anything. “Shouldn’t you also have Mick Creedon?” So with these kinds of recommendations the Committee could not say no. We are not looking at particular cases here today. We are trying to understand either what is good about RIPA or what we can improve about it, because the Committee has a position that we think this legislation should be reviewed. But we are concerned about public reports that are in the public domain about police forces using or misusing RIPA powers. So that is really what we want to talk about. It is more about process and numbers rather than the intimate details of any particular case. Perhaps, since you were recommended so highly, Maxine De Brunner, I should start with you. What exactly do you do in relation to RIPA?
Maxine De Brunner
Good afternoon, I am the National Lead for Lawful Interception, which is covered by RIPA 1 of the codes. So that is the interception of communication, being slightly separate from Richard in terms of comms data. I report in my portfolio to Mick Creedon who runs the prime business area. That is where you get the join up between the three of us. The type of matters we deal with are intrinsically linked, which is why the three of us together would probably give you the picture that you are after.
Chair
Indeed. So in respect of the practicalities—obviously we do not want you to break any secrets because we know section 19 is often thrown in front of us to say, “No, we can’t talk about this, that and other”—a superintendent would authorise the use of RIPA powers, is that right? At that kind of level, or is it lower or higher than that?
Maxine De Brunner
In terms of RIPA generally, yes. But in terms of RIPA 1, which is what I lead on—
Chair
Do the bit that you know about, RIPA 1.
Maxine De Brunner
Okay, the piece that I know about, my role—and it is slightly complicated inasmuch as the Home Office lead on the strategy for lawful interception, not policing, because there are so many agencies involved. The law enforcement is one voice in the RIPA 1 piece, in the lawful interception piece. That is my role, I hold that voice on behalf policing in England and Wales, Police Scotland hold their own independent voice, as do the police service for Northern Ireland. We all sit around the table with other agencies, which is why it is a slightly more complicated picture.
Chair
I understand the strategy, but tell me about the practicalities? Tell me about somebody who wants to go under part 1 and either get a warrant or not get a warrant. How do they do it and where do you fit in? Where is the oversight from senior officers?
Maxine De Brunner
In terms of where I fit in, very remotely in terms of individual cases. So it is my job to make sure that, as far as we can, there is some consistency across forces in how we manage warranting. So at the moment in England and Wales, the intercepting agency for England and Wales is dealt with by the National Crime Agency, hence Keith Bristow and Sir Hugh Orde replied to the letter that you originally wrote. So they intercept on behalf of other forces. Albeit that there are other agencies that also do carry out interception. So an application would come in and there are really robust safeguards, it has to be for serious crime, it has to be for the economic wellbeing of the country or it has be on grounds of national security—
Chair
That comes to you? You see it?
Maxine De Brunner
It does not come to me.
Chair
It does not come to you?
Maxine De Brunner
It does not come to me.
Chair
Who does it go to?
Maxine De Brunner
It will go to the force in the first instance that is asking for the interception. So, hypothetically, in London if they wanted to intercept something on a particular case, such as a kidnap, crime in action, that would go into the Met for that particular application if that was going on.
Chair
They would deal with that locally without you being involved?
Maxine De Brunner
I would not be involved in that. They would manage that. They would draw up the paperwork in terms of making sure that was proportionate and necessary, that it met the serious crime criteria and then that application would be forwarded, once it is properly processed, to the National Crime Agency who also have their own independent scrutiny of that application. Ultimately, of course, any application for RIPA 1 for interception of communications is authorised by the Home Secretary.
Chair
Who would it go to at the NCA? Mr Bristow himself or someone below him?
Maxine De Brunner
It would probably go to someone below him.
Chair
Right, and from there it would then go to the Home Secretary because she signs these off?
Maxine De Brunner
She signs these off, that is right.
Chair
Thank you, that is very clear. Much clearer than the letters, I have to tell you, which left me in some confusion. Mr Creedon, where do you fit in?
Chief Constable Creedon
If I could just take two minutes, the way we structure in policing, because it is so complicated, within the crime and business area and the portfolio I lead on serious and organised crime there are three relevant police leads: Maxine; Richard, who leads in terms of comms data, which is a complicated area; and we have a lead for RIPA, which that is an assistant chief constable. These people lead in terms of policy, development and standards. They work with the College of Policing and they speak on behalf of the service. They do not lead in any way in terms of the operational deployment, which is an individual issue for each force. So we are policy development, practice development and speaking on behalf of policing. I lead on serious and organised crime and the three individual groups of RIPA, LI and comms data sit within my portfolio. I speak, on a broader front, on behalf of all of these.
Chair
How would you know if police forces are misusing RIPA?
Chief Constable Creedon
What we do around RIPA, since it has been in—which is nearly 15 years now—there has been a huge amount of development. There are detailed codes, as you are well aware. We have a lead for it, each force has a RIPA lead, the working group under RIPA will look at how we are improving and so on, and fundamentally we look at things like the OSC inspection reports, we have a huge amount of professional development around it, we set standards, we develop forms. Undercover deployments are through RIPA. For example, all those forms have been reviewed and renewed and are constantly changing to meet the increased scrutiny. So we would not know about an individual failing on a force by force basis. That would be reported either by the force who realises the failing to the OSC or by the OSC through their inspection. That report is made available through the OSC to each Chief Constable and increasingly to their Police and Crime Commissioners.
Chair
If the commissioner only looks at 10% of the cases you are totally reliant on a local police force to say, “Something has gone wrong and therefore we need to put this right”?
Chief Constable Creedon
In the sense of the LI or much broader?
Chair
Either.
Chief Constable Creedon
Yes. When the OSC come and do their inspection they look intrusively at a whole range of activity but clearly they cannot possibly audit the entirety. There are some cases within RIPA that require the OSC’s pre-authorisation, but they are the more intrusive tactics. You were asking about superintendents, that tends to be for the more volume directed surveillance. Beyond that it will ramp up and there’s a number of areas where only the chief constable can authorise.
Chair
Can it be lower than chief superintendent?
Chief Constable Creedon
Yes, it can for an urgent reason. Life at risk, for example, it can be lower.
Chair
Down to what rank?
Chief Constable Creedon
Inspector. But as soon as possible that will be passed to the superintendent and each force has its own covert authorities’ bureau that keep all the documentation and they will be involved in that as soon as possible.
Chair
Mr Berry, where do you fit in? I was confused, I was clearer and now I am a little more confused. It seems very complicated this whole structure.
Richard Berry
Chair, thank you. I agree with you, first of all, in terms of the complexity of this structure. My role is National Policing Lead for Communications Data and in that role I deal with training, I deal with capability building, I liaise with industry because they clearly have a significant role to play. In terms of dealing with communications data, that is a separate chapter of RIPA. It has a separate code of practice that details the whole process, the standards, the oversight, the recording and reporting of errors purely for communications data that is separate to lawful interception. We both therefore report to IOCCO as the oversight board. In the wider RIPA regime that reports to the office of surveillance commissioner. So there are two separate oversights over these two tranches of RIPA itself. In terms of communications and interception, that reports to IOCCO.
Chair
I had a parliamentary question that has just been answered, I do not know if you have seen it. Since the enactment of RIPA in 2002 the number of communications data items processed just by the Home Office has gone up from 53 in 2002 to 6,056 in 2013. I was quite alarmed by that figure.
Richard Berry
In terms of communications data, yes.
Chair
That is just the Home Office.
Richard Berry
We—
Chair
Do you have any figures for me today about—
Richard Berry
Yes, they are all printed through annual reports of IOCCO. It sits around about 500,000 and it fluctuates on an annual basis. Last year was 514,000 communications data applications. There is some complexity beyond that process that I will go into in a second. It is generally sitting—I think for the last three years—at around 500,000.
Chair
How can you make it simpler for the public and Parliament? Where are layers of bureaucracy that currently exist that will allow this process to be simpler? You first, Mr Berry.
Richard Berry
Yes, certainly. From my perspective in terms of communication data, it is certainly mentioned in the IOCCO report, because of the complexity of legislation, because of the complexity of the processes and because of the rapidly changing environment in relation to communications data, new technology and everything that David Anderson is looking at in his RIPA review, there is a need to have a very clear public narrative. It is certainly something I am working on with ACPO’s communications department to start working out how we simplify that narrative so the public and key stakeholders really understand what is a very complex area.
Chief Constable Creedon
There are three simple key points I would make around that. Technology, Richard touched on. We need to make it clear this is absolutely the lifeblood of a whole range of investigations and also protecting the public. I hear a lot of talk about RIPA being around terrorism. Terrorism is only one part of it. If you look at the authority levels, it is as much for public protection, for CSE inquiries, for homicide investigations, terrorism and we need to understand that. The most important point is we must not confuse comms data, which you obtain through RIPA, with detail and content that you obtain through a post-production order. Having heard the last speaker, I think there is a real confusion. That issue about accessing the content under PACE is quite different to accessing the data through RIPA. I understand why people would get very jumpy when we start looking at content because it is much more intrusive but data is absolutely essential. Were any law enforcement agents to be here they would be telling you exactly the same. The figures are something like 100% of terrorist investigations, 95% of serious crime investigations, virtually every homicide investigation is reliant upon comms data for a whole range of reasons. I do not think we have managed to describe that to the public.
Chair
Maxine De Brunner, any improvements? How do we make it less complicated?
Maxine De Brunner
In terms of RIPA 1, I am not sure I would want to make it less complicated because the piece that I am overseeing is at the most serious end and the most intrusive. I am very satisfied that that is as robust and as complex, with as much oversight, as there can possibly be because it sits at the intrusive end of covert activity.
Chair
Thank you.
Dr Huppert
There is a lot that comes out of what you have said. If I could start off on the issue about interception, Ms De Brunner. We are always told these warrants are looked at very carefully, individually, there is a great deal of care. You would say that to this Committee, as well?
Maxine De Brunner
Yes.
Dr Huppert
Apart from the fact there have been 57 errors, which clearly raises questions, I am struck by the fact that in the letter from Keith Bristow and Hugh Orde when we asked questions that seemed fairly basic—like how many investigations were there with interceptions where somebody was ever arrested—the answer was, “This information is not recorded”. When we asked how many times were they charged with an offence? Don’t know. Convicted of an offence? Don’t know. It seems very odd that you have this incredibly careful process that you look at everything very carefully and then you do not look at what happens afterwards. Do you agree that is rather strange?
Maxine De Brunner
No, inasmuch as the use of interception is one part of a very long process within an investigation. The outcomes for the end of the investigation, they are collated and they are published, but in terms of individual activity they are not.
Dr Huppert
Sorry, but what we were told was that there isn’t any information on how many investigations have resulted in an arrest that use interception. Are you saying that is not right, what we were told in the letter by Keith Bristow?
Maxine De Brunner
No, that is right, we do not keep those particular figures but we do, in the wider sense in terms of the operations, record outcomes.
Dr Huppert
How do you assess whether these warrants were, in fact, useful, whether you are applying for ones that you do not need, if you have no idea what the outcomes are? It seems like a huge gaping hole in any policy making process.
Maxine De Brunner
In terms of outcomes, we know that the use of lawful interception saves lives. For us in policing, that is one of its primary purposes. We know that we have to do that really quickly.
Dr Huppert
But you do not know how many arrests it leads to? We are told you do not know how many investigations have led to an arrest.
Maxine De Brunner
Not from interception on its own.
Dr Huppert
It seems to me that are data that should be collected and you would find your case rather easier. There is lots more I could say on this but I suspect we have limited time. If the Chair allows, I will come back. Mr Berry, earlier you talked about communications data. Mr Bristow told us when he came to see us that the largest problem they have had with risk to life was to do with IP address matching. There is a disagreement about whether it is 90% of the cases they had a problem or 100%, but it is in that range. I do not want to focus on that bit. Would you agree the fact it is very hard to do IP address matching is a big problem for investigations?
Richard Berry
IP resolution is a challenge and there is a lot going on within technology around the sheer use of the internet, the sheer availability with the internet protocol version 4, and the way communication is dealt with with a limited number of IP addresses.
Dr Huppert
Indeed, and IPV6 may fix in the problem.
Richard Berry
It may do.
Dr Huppert
But in the meantime there is a problem. How many discussions have you had with the Home Office about implementing the statement in the Queen’s speech from two years ago that there would be a procedure to deal with this problem?
Richard Berry
That is a matter that is being dealt with within the communications capability development programme. The question in terms of that particular matter would have to be answered by written submission, if I may, to give you some more detail.
Dr Huppert
A letter would be very helpful but have you had direct conversations with the Home Office about IP matching?
Richard Berry
It is a constant subject of discussion around IP resolution and I have certainly had personal operational experience of that particular issue becoming problematic, yes.
Dr Huppert
But in terms of discussions with the Home Office about fixing it. I am very alarmed the Home Secretary does not seem to have made any progress on something that was agreed two years ago, which everybody agrees is critical. Perhaps you can write to us but you have specifically asked for this from the Home Office? Have they made any specific proposals to you?
Richard Berry
I would have to bring that into the written submission, if I may.
Dr Huppert
Fine. Just to complete the trio, Mr Creedon—I will not dwell on previous discussions about speeding and whether comms data is applicable to that—can I pick you up on this idea there is a clear distinction between communications data and content? You said, and I do not remember the exact words, that content is intrusive, generally yes, and communications data is not. I do not think anybody is saying there should be no communications data collected. I have never heard anybody make that case. Do you accept the communications data can be incredibly intrusive as, for example, if it reveals that somebody is phoning an abortion counselling line or a depression line, or whatever it might be?
Chief Constable Creedon
Absolutely. I did not mean to say not intrusive. I think there is a difference there between the content and the data, but the data now and data through a whole host of medium can tell a huge amount about what a person is doing. A huge amount. Increasingly so. Content is even more so, but I do not deny that data collection is intrusive.
Dr Huppert
So, for example, it could be the only thing that was needed to reveal who a journalist’s source was?
Chief Constable Creedon
It is an interesting discussion that. I have been acutely aware of this recently and I heard what was said earlier. I have to say, we are not interested in journalistic sources. I struggle to understand quite what the debate is. We would be interested, for example, in a police officer who was passing information to a range of individuals. In looking at that police officer and their call data, it may well be one of those is a journalist or we may even think at the start of the inquiry, “We believe officer A is giving information to the media”. But the issue about wanting to know who a journalistic source is, with one or two extreme exceptions, I really cannot understand why we would want to do that.
Dr Huppert
Would it be acceptable to use these powers as part of a leak inquiry?
Chief Constable Creedon
The powers to collect call data? Absolutely. Absolutely. I would imagine the public would expect us to do that. If we have corrupt officers who are passing information to the media, either for cash or other reasons, they would expect us to use it. The issue is not about the journalistic issue, this is about the corrupt individual who is passing information. I accept the corrupt individual could be the well-intentioned whistleblower, the honest whistleblower so we need to be careful of that, but we are not interested in journalistic sources.
Dr Huppert
You give an example of corruption of a police officer, would it be legitimate to use it in other areas where there was information being passed out to a journalist?
Chief Constable Creedon
I suppose if there was another organisation where there was a corrupt individual reported to us and we were investigating on behalf—
Dr Huppert
It would require a belief that there was criminality?
Chief Constable Creedon
Absolutely. The test for RIPA is about that level and it would be very unusual to use anything other than that test. The RIPA is much wider, as I said, than just terrorism. If you look at all the categories, it would need to fit one of them very firmly. Can I say one last thing? If we believe we are accessing data that could involve a journalist the test would move it from a superintendent upwards. It would go to a higher level because routinely we—
Chair
That is if you know, but if you do not know it is a journalist—
Chief Constable Creedon
If we know.
Maxine De Brunner
Yes.
Chair
—you cannot do that, can you?
Chief Constable Creedon
We do not at the start but if we did know, if we did suspect officer A and journalist A and we believed it was what it was, we should be going to a higher level.
Mr Winnick
So what you are saying, Chief Constable, if I understand you correctly, is that the concern expressed today by the General Secretary of the NUJ and various newspapers that the police are intruding on their sources is without any foundation at all?
Chief Constable Creedon
In my experience, which is relatively extensive, and being involved in a lot of the investigations and reviews into external forces, I have never known it. I have a lot of close friends who are journalists and I have this discussion with them. I cannot imagine why we are interested in a journalistic source unless that source is corrupt in the way that I described.
Mr Winnick
Therefore the concern expressed today, as I have said, you think it is, to put it bluntly, paranoia?
Chief Constable Creedon
No, I absolutely understand why journalists would want to protect sources. I agree with the sentiment and ethos behind it, but I do not know of any cases where we have sought to find a journalist’s source because we do not necessarily like what the journalist is saying. There are always times when there will be collateral intrusion through RIPA activity. Looking at one part of covert activity may give information that could be what we call collateral, but we would not routinely look to find out who a journalist was getting material from.
Mr Winnick
The story The Daily Mail had on 10 October about their sister paper, you know all about it because it came very much into the frame, would you say it was justified what the police did?
Chief Constable Creedon
It would be wrong for me to comment on another force’s investigation, of which I have basically read about in media. That is all I have seen so I would not know the detail, but in that case my assumption is the investigation was about perverting the course of justice and corruption by two individuals who both ultimately to prison. It was not about the journalistic aspect but the journalistic aspect came in as a consequence of it. But, as I say, I am answering hypothetically because I do not know the ins and outs of that case. You know more than I do.
Chair
I do not think Mr Winnick knows more than you do, I think he read it in the same newspaper.
Chief Constable Creedon
He probably read it more closely than I did.
Mr Winnick
I may or may not, but one thing is clear is that it has caused a great deal of concern and anxiety and has not been brushed off, if I may say so, Chief Constable, in the manner in which you have done so today. If we take, for example, the North Kent police, they have said that consideration should be given to how material held by the media might be relevant to a criminal investigation and share it with the police and courts. The view of the NUJ, as you may have heard if you were listening, is that if that is the case, if the police feel there is some aspect where criminality is involved then the police should go through the judicial process, not simply act accordingly on their own.
Chief Constable Creedon
I agree. No, I think the distinction is RIPA is about the covert activity to try and gain intelligence from a range of sources. For me, if that was the case and we believed the newspaper was holding information, it should be a PACE production order subject to the oversight that you heard talked about. I agree completely. If I as an investigator believe that material held by a newspaper, which I think is material to my investigation, absolutely PACE production order. RIPA is not the machinery by which to present evidence to courts. PACE is the right machine for that and the PACE production order allows for that judicial oversight and with safeguards.
Mr Winnick
Do you accept there is bound to be anxiety—it may not be justified and the Chief Constable does not believe it is—that the police are intruding into matters where the right of journalists to try and obtain stories, put them in the public frame and the rest of it, are considered essential by the journalist and hence the anxiety that has been expressed today by the head of the NUJ?
Richard Berry
If I may answer some further detail here. There is a huge difference between what is described as content, journalistic material, and a superintendent or designated person according to the codes of practice here authorising access to communications data. Communications data is essentially three things. It is traffic data, it is service use data and it is subscriber information. It is not journalistic material per se. The law is very complex in this area, it needs perhaps further work on interpretation, not that I can offer today, but it seems to be misreported in some respects in terms of making something reported very simple, very complex.
Chair
Mr Creedon, Mr Winnick obviously puts his question better than I could, but I am concerned about the way you reacted to what he said. He only has the same source as you do but you are the top man. If there was an article in The Mail on Sunday about the misuse of RIPA and the information being passed on to a third party—by the way I think it was Essex Police not Kent Police, I made the mistake in writing to Kent and they were very quick to say it was Essex—surely you, as the man right at the top of this very complicated tree, would want to know exactly what went on. The passing of information to third parties goes beyond looking for criminality, does it not?
Chief Constable Creedon
I was not passing it off lightly and I was referring the detail of the original prosecution case and following the case through the court. That is what I was referring to. The issue around the data, as I understand it—Kent and Essex have a joint unit that did the investigation, which maybe confused things—is a concern because of the various stuff that has been in the media. But I come back to my point a PACE production order—
Chair
Yes, I understand it is a concern so what have you done about it? When you found out that information has come out, lawfully in your view, from the police using RIPA and it has been passed to a third party—you have seen the newspaper article, it is a very bizarre article. The editor of the newspaper only discovered that his telephone number was included in the investigation when he was sitting next to a solicitor who was having coffee in the same cafe. You could not really make it up, could you? Even I, who do not necessarily read The Mail on Sunday every Sunday, was taken by this story. What have you done about it? About the passing on of this information to a third party to make sure it is a rare occurrence?
Chief Constable Creedon
I come back to the starting point that I tried to describe. I have no locus whatsoever in terms of how a force carries out its investigation, very well or very bad. That was an investigation that would be subject to any scrutiny and also subject to full CPI disclosure, including that detail. That was a matter that went through the CPS, through counsel to court and was scrutinised. The role we play through the way we are structured, and it is complicated, with the business area is to look at improvement, training and so on, as you heard. The RIPA lead for this matter is an assistant chief constable who is not here in front of you today, he is not trying to avoid the issue I promise you but it is a complicated world the crime world, and that is something that will be part of their plan to improve. I am not sure the failing is necessarily the failing as it is being played out in the media.
Chair
We will never know because no one has followed it up. This is the worry for this Committee, I write to one person, I get three obviously very senior people. I then ask the man who I have been told to have here by Cressida Dick—I do not know what you have done to upset her but she suggested you—
Chief Constable Creedon
I was going to say that.
Chair
—and you are telling me to go to the Assistant Chief Constable of Nottingham.
Chief Constable Creedon
No, no.
Chair
We then have the Interception Commissioner who says he only looks at 10% of the cases. No wonder people worry about the system.
Chief Constable Creedon
I do not know of any auditor that audits 100% as a matter of interest. All it is meant to be is looking at risk, isn’t it, rather than an entire overview of everything? That is for them not me. I think the issue around, again I am very happy to write and get some more details, me carrying out some operational review or investigation—
Chair
But who does that if you do not?
Chief Constable Creedon
The responsibility is with the chief constable and the oversight through the Interception Commissioners and the OSC.
Chair
Fine, so there are three other bodies involved. Do not worry, the Committee will write to the Chief Constable of Essex and get to the bottom of this. Mr Berry, you were going to say something before I close?
Richard Berry
If it would help, I have a copy of an inspection report here. There is also a senior responsible officer in each organisation responsible for the reporting in relation to communications data—making that point—and responsible for the oversight and the integrity of the applications.
Chair
Thank you. When I wrote to the chief constables they wrote back and they said they do not collect information on professions and indeed they do not store information. Then I received the letter back from Sir Hugh Orde and Mr Bristow. We have just heard in evidence today that the Interception Commissioner has written to the same chief constables that the Committee wrote to and he does have that information. So there is this information, is there?
Richard Berry
The information—
Chair
You have given it to him because he has powers.
Richard Berry
He has statutory powers.
Chair
So the information does exist?
Richard Berry
It takes a lot of work to work through and we are working with the interception commissioner’s office to work that through. The data is not readily available. There is not a field of data to say, “This person is a journalist” or, “This is a legal representative” if we were looking at legal privilege or indeed a Member of Parliament. We do not categorise that data during the application process.
Chair
I understand. Mr Bristow’s letter, I hope you have seen a copy—
Richard Berry
Indeed.
Chair
—in response to six of my questions he says, “This information is not routinely recorded”, “This information is not routinely recorded”, “We do not have this information, we do not record it”. Sorry, two of those questions. But you are now saying you do have that information but it just takes a long time to get it?
Richard Berry
We have to research. It takes a lot of effort and we are going to have to look at all of the applications to try and discern whether or not we consider that person may or may not be a journalist based upon the previous discussion of what is a journalist. Is it a card carrying member of the NUJ, is it someone who is a citizen journalist, and so on? It is all about getting that definition or clarity in relation to the data.
Chair
Of course. Has everyone now replied to the Commissioner?
Chief Constable Creedon
Mr Vaz, I would assume so. If I could just try and help, the RIPA forms are very complicated, I do not know if you have seen them.
Chair
No.
Chief Constable Creedon
They do not involve occupation. It is not one of the fields that is filled out.
Chair
But do you have an occupation field?
Chief Constable Creedon
No, there is not. It does not involve occupation, probably for good reason. There will be those, though, when we know at the start where they are subject to sensitive information collection, there will be a field where we would but that would not just be journalists. But to look backwards at occupation and look backwards at the reason would be pretty difficult. I think that was maybe why some forces did not feel able to comply. It is not routinely collected in the RIPA forms. If you know at the start of the investigation it was journalistic or legally privileged, you would be able to have that. That is a field that all forces would have very quickly.
Chair
One final question to each of you. Apart from Maxine De Brunner who says she is happy with section 19 and the way in which it has been dealt with, in other areas of RIPA do you all think that it does need to be refurbished and improved? Mr Berry?
Richard Berry
From a communications data perspective, we are working closely with Mr Anderson and his RIPA review.
Chair
No, we know all that. What do you think? You are here as an expert, are you not? Do you think it is too complicated and it needs to be looked at again?
Richard Berry
I think by its very nature it is complicated. Perhaps there are issues that will come out in due course, particularly around the ever increasing complexity of communications data that could be simplified and we would certainly work with Mr Anderson on that. In terms of does it need a complete overhaul? I think it is a robust piece of legislation and certainly from a communications data perspective, I can furnish the Committee with statistics, this is every day policing, this is not just counterterrorism, not just serious and organised crime, it is around protecting vulnerable people.
Chair
Mr Creedon, a question to you. I spoke to Lord Falconer who brought in this Act under the last Government and he said it has been used for purposes that he and the Government of the day never intended.
Chief Constable Creedon
I certainly agree. I remember being with Shami Chakrabarti talking about this and she was very clear the police are not misusing it, was the position she took at this conference. Maybe local authorities have been misusing it and cameras in bins and surveillance around things like school catchment areas, it is probably not appropriate. It was never intended for that, but, I think, in terms of serious crimes it was. I agree with Richard, I think it is robust. I am old enough to remember covert activity before RIPA when there was no statutory framework so there is something very powerful about having this. I will give you an example, if I may. If I authorise a fairly non-intrusive covert device that tracks where a car moves, for example, in Derbyshire and then that car moved to Staffordshire, to Birmingham and then to North Wales, that authority needs repeating four times. That whole sheet of paper, that whole consideration of proportionality and necessity needs repeating. That is the nonsense in today’s world. The most we can do is six forces but we do not know whether the criminals were going. There are some simple non-bureaucratic things that could change with RIPA to put policing on the same status as the NCA and others, where the authority runs across England and Wales. There are issues around data comms, it has become hugely more complicated, and there are issue around some of the more covert activity that sits at my level bizarrely is less intrusive than some of the activity that is authorised by lower down, if that makes sense. Undercover is one of them.
Chair
Yes, and we will have you in on that. Again, finally, the IMSI catchers, do you have many in Derbyshire?
Chief Constable Creedon
It would not be appropriate to talk about that. That is a tactic that has been reported in the media, it is a tactic we would not normally talk about because it would not be appropriate to.
Chair
You must know, do you have them or not?
Chief Constable Creedon
I know exactly what they are but I have never accessed them.
Chair
Can you perhaps tell the Committee?
Chief Constable Creedon
I do not think it would be appropriate to talk about such a covert activity in a public arena.
Chair
Right. It has been in The Times, you see. We may not want to talk about it, but it says that. “IMSI catchers hoover up the identity call and message data of mobile phones. It is very powerful” which is presumably on the market. You and I may not want to talk about it but is probably on the internet where you can buy one, “can intercept and listen to phone calls and collect and read text messages and emails and block phone signals in a specific area.”
Chief Constable Creedon
To reassure you, I did read all the article and I nearly thought about ringing the journalist.
Chair
So they do not exist, these machines?
Chief Constable Creedon
At the end you will see both the Metropolitan Police and the National Crime Agency neither confirm nor deny the existence or the use of this tactic.
Chair
Of these devices. Rather like the Daleks, we do not know whether they are there. Yes, Dr Huppert, a final question.
Dr Huppert
Just to follow up on this because it is quite an important question about what is authorised and what is not authorised. I understand the reluctance to talk about anything that collects whole ranges of data. Who would supervise this? Who would check whether this was being used proportionately, appropriately? The suggestions are that IMSI catcher could be used ultimately to send fake text messages. Who would authorise any of that? Who would scrutinise it? Who would make sure it was being done and who would make sure that Parliament was able to judge whether it was something we would like to take action on or not?
Chief Constable Creedon
The most intrusive covert activity is authorised by the chief constable and in extreme cases by their deputy—normally the only time that happens is when you are out of the country. They are subject to either prior approval or notification to the Interception Commissioners. The Interception Commissioners collect all that data and that is reported on a regular basis. The Interception Commissioners report to the force individually but they also report on national report to the OSC.
Dr Huppert
So that commissioner will have complete oversight of how IMSI catchers are being used and for what purposes?
Chief Constable Creedon
Absolutely. Every year they go to every force and they look intrusively on a three or four day inspection at a whole range of covert activity from the most intrusive down to surveillance, undercover and so on.
Chair
Mr Creedon, we will have you back in the future to talk about undercover policing as we promised to do. Maxine De Brunner, thank you very much for coming here. I hope you will reassure the Commissioner that you gave no secrets to this Committee; they are all safely with you. Mr Berry, thank you for calling in to see us today. We will write to you separately because I notice you have a particular interest in mental health and policing. Is that right?
Richard Berry
Yes.
Chair
We might drop you a line because we are doing an inquiry into this. I know it is not what you are doing at the moment and you did it many years ago but your thoughts on it would be of interest to this Committee. Perhaps you can tell us your M.Phil. thesis that I think you wrote on it.
Richard Berry
That is well researched, sir, if I may say so.
Chair
If you could write to us with that information, we would be very grateful.
Richard Berry
I did owe you some information on the bottom of this letter.
Chair
You did and you brought it here.
Richard Berry
I have brought an answer for you. The data of recordable errors in relation to communications data are available. Every error is inspected in a force report. I have spoken to the Interception Commissioner’s office and we could facilitate between us the delivery of that data.
Chair
Can you tell us now?
Richard Berry
I do not have it to hand, sorry.
Chair
I see. We look forward to your facilitations and we send you our felicitations for being here today. Thank you very much for coming.
Richard Berry
Thank you.
Maxine De Brunner
Thank you.
Chair
That concludes the Committee’s inquiry. Oral evidence: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, HC 711 40