Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 1 December 2014
Oral evidence, 1 December 2014.
Witnesses
Rt Hon Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Jessica Hand, Head, Arms Export Policy Department, and Peter Jones, Director, Defence and International Security, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.
Chair
Secretary of State, I welcome you and your officials, Mr Peter Jones and Ms Jessica Hand. Thank you for joining us today. Foreign Secretary, we want to start with one of the key issues in the export policies that are being followed to countries of particular concern. I want to start with Russia. I wrote, as you know, to the Prime Minister on 23 July, and you replied with your letter to me of 19 August. In my letter to the Prime Minister, I specifically highlighted that there were no less than 285 extant British Government approved arms export licences to Russia. In addition, your parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Tobias Ellwood, in his letter to me of 13 November this year, revealed the scale of the open licences to Russia, as opposed to standard individual licences. He said: “In addition to this, Russia was removed”—that is following recent policy decisions—“as a permitted destination from 50 open-ended export licences and one open individual trade control licence, and was also removed as a permitted destination from the cryptography open-ended export licence, which affected 55 licences.” Foreign Secretary, given the well-established and deeply regrettable Russian track record of expanding its influence territorially, which we have seen in Moldova, Georgia and now Ukraine, plus the fact that Russia is one of the countries of top human rights concern—as designated by your own Department—it would seem that the Government’s arms export policy towards Russia has been extraordinarily lenient and, some might say, reckless. How do you respond to that?
Mr Hammond
I would respond by saying that our response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea has been pursued essentially through our EU engagement: trade sanctions and other measures, including restrictions on arms exports through the EU. The history is that, in March 2014, the UK introduced a series of national measures, including the suspension of extant licences and of consideration of new licences for goods for Russian military and military end users that could be used against Ukraine. The figures that you quoted from Mr Ellwood relate, I think, to that exercise. Once the EU imposed sanctions in July—an exercise in which we would claim no little part; we have been the protagonists throughout in seeking comprehensive EU sanctions against Russia—we then swung in behind those comprehensive sanction measures to make sure that our response aligned with our European partners. It is very clear to us that we deliver maximum effect against Russia by having solidarity across Europe in responding. Licences that are then covered by the EU measures have now been revoked. For those that were not covered by the EU measures, the suspension has been relaxed, so that we have symmetry across the European Union countries in their response.
Chair
But given the scale to which I referred of British Government-approved arms export licences to Russia, is not this yet another example of shutting the stable door after the arms have bolted?
Mr Hammond
No. Clearly, it is very easy to talk about arms licences to Russia, but, as you and members of the Committees will know very well, many of these licences are for components and dual-use items. It is not as if we are by and large exporting completed military systems to a country like Russia. It is important overall, in dealing with our response to Russia, that we calibrate that response. We needed to signal very clear disapproval of Russian behaviour. We needed to signal that Russia will pay a price for that unacceptable behaviour. We also needed to signal that if Russia starts to move into compliance, we will be able to recalibrate our response appropriately and that we have further steps we could take if Russia were to take further unacceptable measures and steps of aggression. That is very important. We have to be very careful that we do not play all the cards in our hand and leave ourselves in a position where further Russian escalation cannot be responded to within the scope of economic and trade sanctions of the type that we have already set out.
Chair
I hope, Foreign Secretary, that you would reflect further on the distinction you have made between a component of a lethal weapon and a complete lethal weapon. I would suggest that a critical component is every bit as much an arms export as a completed item.
Mr Hammond
Of course that is right, Chairman, but you will recognise that many such components will be dual use. It is often the case that components that are widely used in, for example, cellular telephone systems have military applications and may be subject to licensing because of those military applications. A significant volume of components exported will probably be used in civilian telecommunications, but because there is an application in military use, they will be controlled items none the less.
Mike Gapes
Secretary of State, can I take you to the actual words of your predecessor in a statement on 18 March? He said that this would apply to weaponry for “armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine.” Isn’t it a fact that virtually every weapon or component of a weapons system that we export to Russia, given the nature of the Russian state, could be used against Ukraine? Why was the revocation position so limited?
Mr Hammond
“Is likely to be” is probably—
Mike Gapes
I am quoting the exact words.
Mr Hammond
I am telling you the way I would look at it. It is a question of whether it is likely to be. We know what the Russians are doing in Ukraine, and we know how they are providing support to the separatists and the type of support that they are providing, the types of weapons systems involved and the types of Russian forces that have been involved in this conflict, and we can make a judgment on that basis. Again, the important thing to emphasise is that this is not now unilateral British action; this is action that we are taking together with our European Union partners in order to make it more effective. Sometimes, when we do things at 28 that have to be agreed at 28, there is an element of compromise in order to get agreement at 28.
Mike Gapes
Since March, and since the Russian aggression over the summer, there has been an increase in incursions of Russian aircraft or naval vessels into the territorial waters and airspace of our partners in NATO, of our own country and of European Union partners who are not in NATO such as Sweden. Given that increased Russian aggression in Ukraine and that other Russian behaviour, shouldn’t we be reviewing the whole policy with regards to arms exports to Russia? Over recent months, there has clearly been a significant change in the attitude of Putin and his Administration not only to the European Union but to NATO.
Mr Hammond
I understand the thrust of the question, but I imagine the Committees will jealously guard the principle that we should use the consolidated criteria when deciding how we should respond to arms export licensing questions. The extremely aggressive probing of our airspace by Russian aircraft is an issue that concerns us, but it does not, in my interpretation, engage any of the consolidated criteria, and therefore it would not be an appropriate use of the arms export licensing regime to respond to a behaviour that we didn’t like but that didn’t engage the consolidated criteria.
Mike Gapes
But, Secretary of State, virtually every country in the European Union is also in NATO. Isn’t the reality that we are facing a consolidated Russian offensive against Europe and its interests, the NATO European partners and the European Union countries? Isn’t it time that we had joined-up government internationally in terms of our collective response to that?
Mr Hammond
It is true that many of the European Union countries are in NATO, although of course Sweden—a country that has recently had a particular problem with unidentified foreign naval vessels in its waters—is not a NATO member. Of course it is entirely appropriate for NATO countries in particular to work together to respond to what is a change in the tone of Russia’s dealings with NATO and, indeed, the non-NATO European countries. You are absolutely right that there is a distinct sense of a resetting of the relationship, and we have to be prepared to respond to that. My point is simply that the application of the consolidated criteria to applications by British businesses for licences to export their products is an established mechanism. Applying it consistently is important, because failure to apply it consistently would almost certainly lead to judicial challenge by companies that feel they have been disadvantaged.
Mike Gapes
May I take you a step further? Last week, France announced that it is suspending until further notice the delivery of the two Mistral helicopter carriers that had been agreed with Russia. President Hollande said at the G20 summit, “I will take my decision without any pressure, wherever it may come from, and based on two criteria—the interests of France and the appreciation I have of the situation.” Shouldn’t there have been a third criterion in President Hollande’s remarks, which is precisely what you just said about the European Union’s consolidated criteria and the European Union regulation? Shouldn’t that also apply to France, as well as to the UK, given what you just said?
Mr Hammond
The complication in relation to the Mistral contract is that it is a historic contract—a contract already entered into. The European Union sanctions explicitly do not include contracts already extant. They are forward-looking, in terms of new engagements and commitments to supply to Russia.
Mike Gapes
So in future, the UK, France and every other country should adopt a policy on exports revocation and suspensions entirely based on the European Union criteria?
Mr Hammond
In the case of the UK, the European Union guidance is incorporated into our own consolidated criteria. The current set of European Union sanctions against Russia are a specific Foreign Affairs Council-mandated set of sanctions, which include restrictions on arms exports that were put in place specifically in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, and therefore they sit outside the routine evaluation of export licence applications against the criteria. So there is an overriding body of EU law that now applies.
Mike Gapes
But UK policy will be to consider the criteria and the EU’s common position before we make any decision.
Mr Hammond
The UK’s position now is that, first, we will apply the EU sanctions. If an application for licensing is not caught by the EU sanctions, we will then apply the consolidated criteria and make a decision on a case-by-case basis according to the consolidated criteria.
Dr Lewis
Very briefly, I want to be absolutely clear about the last point that Mr Gapes pursued. Am I right in saying that your position is that, as part of the specific sanctions we apply against Russia because of its behaviour in Ukraine, we might include extra restrictions on arms exports, but we would be doing that under the separate issue of Russian aggression, not under the mantle of our specific criteria for dealing with arms exports?
Mr Hammond
That’s right. We would apply the European sanctions first, and for anything that gets over that threshold, we would look at our own consolidated criteria.
Dr Lewis
So just because the consolidated criteria are not applied, that does not mean that we will not stop the particular arms export if it falls under the sanctions.
Mr Hammond
If it falls under the sanctions, it will be stopped. The sanctions effectively have the status of European law.
Chair
Foreign Secretary, can we now turn to Hong Kong? The Business Secretary, Vince Cable, in his letter to me of 28 October, said, “The Foreign Secretary has advised me that the use of tear gas by the Hong Kong Police was an uncharacteristic response at an early stage of the protests, the scale of which caught the police by surprise, and was not indicative of a wider pattern of behaviour that would cross the threshold of Criterion 2. It is his view that, since that incident, the Hong Kong Police have generally approached the protests carefully and proportionately. I have accepted this advice.” Foreign Secretary, what were your grounds for believing that the use of tear gas by the Hong Kong police against purely peaceful demonstrators was a one-off aberration?
Mr Hammond
First, if I may refer back to the session that you have just had with Dr Cable, which I was watching, I think that Mr Gapes suggested that tear gas has been used again in the past few days. Our assessment and understanding is that a different material—pepper spray—has been used over the past few days. We are aware of only one incident in which CS gas has been used, which is 28 September. We believe that that was a single use of CS gas. Since then, statements by the Hong Kong police and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government about how they intend to manage these processes have reassured us that we do not expect to see inappropriate use of CS gas by the Hong Kong police. However, I should say, Chairman, that CS gas is supplied as a public order policing tool. When we grant a licence for the supply of CS gas to a police force, we should expect that it may be deployed, in appropriate circumstances, in a public order policing situation. It is not the case that any use of CS gas would automatically lead to circumstances in which it would be appropriate to revoke or suspend a licence. It would be disingenuous of us to supply a product, the sole use of which is as a public order policing control tool, and then say that any use of it would be inappropriate. We would have to look at the circumstances of use to ensure that it was proportionate and appropriate. I have seen words used in the media and elsewhere that I do not think are appropriate, so I would draw a distinction between public order policing and internal repression. Public order policing is a legitimate activity. If it is carried out properly, with proper restraint and proportionality, it is something that we would expect Governments to do. Internal repression is clearly a different issue. If any materials that were supplied for the purpose of public order policing were diverted to be used in internal repression, that would clearly give rise to the need to review the licence under which they had been exported.
Chair
Would you agree, Foreign Secretary, that the critical issue is whether the demonstrators are demonstrating purely peacefully or engaging in activities that could cause harm to members of the police forces or others? If you accept that that is the critical issue, is the Government’s policy that British-exported tear gas should not be used against those who are exercising their right to demonstrate purely peacefully?
Mr Hammond
Our position on the demonstrations in Hong Kong is that it is very important that we preserve and protect the right of peaceful demonstration in Hong Kong. That is one of the characteristics of life in Hong Kong that is protected under the joint declaration to which we and the Government of the People’s Republic of China were signatories. We would certainly not condone the use of CS gas, British-supplied or otherwise, in inappropriate circumstances. It would depend entirely on the circumstances. As I have said, our understanding is that the use of CS gas on 28 September was an isolated incident. We have seen nothing to suggest that the Hong Kong police are going to make use of CS gas on a routine basis to deal with the current wave of demonstrations. If we were to see anything of that nature, we would obviously have to look very carefully at the circumstances of such use. At the moment, the question does not arise because we have seen nothing to indicate systematic use.
Mike Gapes
Secretary of State, are you saying that you are absolutely sure that tear gas has not been used? There were reports on Al Jazeera four hours ago and UPI—I am looking at the websites now—suggesting that pepper spray and tear gas have been used.
Mr Hammond
You may be ahead of me. I cannot claim to be studying this in real time.
Mike Gapes
The reports may not be true and the journalist may have written something inaccurate, but it is clear that the situation in Hong Kong is getting very tense. The Business Secretary referred to the possibility of a need to review urgently the position regarding the circumstances. Can you assure us that, if tear gas has been used, there will be a change of Government policy, because it will then become a systematic use rather than a one-off?
Mr Hammond
It would be inappropriate for me to give you that assurance in this forum. What I can assure you is that, if there is evidence that UK-sourced CS gas has been used, we will of course review again the extant licences. That would be entirely appropriate.
Chair
We now want to turn to Bahrain.
Ann Clwyd
Foreign Secretary, after 2011 the King set up a commission of inquiry. That commission made a number of recommendations, some of which have been followed but in the eyes of others, the most important ones have been ignored. We have heard frequently from Sir Nigel Rodley, who was on the commission of inquiry, about his disappointment at the slowness of reforms. Security forces have continued to arrest demonstrators arbitrarily on the streets. Some people have been given long prison sentences. Certainly, high-profile critics of the Government remain in jail on charges that relate solely to exercising their right of freedom of expression and assembly. Of course, the judicial system, headed by the royal family, has yet to hold to account any senior officials responsible for some of the events of 2011, particularly important violations such as torture-related deaths in detention. Elections have just taken place, which were boycotted by the opposition, who dismissed the elections as a farce. Given Bahrain’s continuing poor human rights record, why does it remain a priority arms export market for the UK?
Mr Hammond
I think those are two different questions. With respect, you would have to address the question about why it remains a priority arms export market to the DSO and perhaps the Business Secretary. That will relate, first, to opportunity. The Bahrainis have certain requirements for items such as sophisticated fighter jets—not something that we would judge likely to be used in internal repression. They are also an important partner is pursuing agendas that are strategically important to the UK, both against ISIL recently and longer term, ensuring freedom of navigation in the Gulf. I recognise that Bahrain still has a distance to go in creating a proper and satisfactory human rights environment, but my judgment is that it is moving in the right direction. Steps that were taken after 2011 were positive, in contrast to what we have seen in many other countries where similar events have occurred and the response has been for the regime to turn its back on criticisms of its human rights record. The regime in Bahrain has engaged; it set up the commission; it is responding and has implemented some of the measures recommended by the commission, not all of them. We are engaged with the Government of Bahrain in encouraging them to continue down that route, providing them where we can with technical support and assistance to implement recommendations. I see Bahrain as a country where we should be hopeful that, with continued engagement and encouragement from the UK, it is heading and will continue to head in the right direction. I am afraid I think that disengagement would be rather more likely to lead to the triumph of those elements that do not wish to see Bahrain addressing these challenges and engaging with its international critics in a constructive way.
Ann Clwyd
You gave your view earlier that certain arms exports to Hong Kong have not been used. In the same way, can we be assured that arms exports to Bahrain are not being used against protestors? If you are sure, exactly how are they being monitored?
Mr Hammond
In the immediate aftermath of the events of 2011, we did review all licences, and we revoked a number of licences that we felt were not being used in accordance with the consolidated criteria. Twenty-three single licences and seven open licences to Bahrain were revoked at that time. I was asked why Bahrain was a priority export market for the Defence Sales Organisation. I think I am right in saying—this is from my knowledge in my former role as Defence Secretary—that that relates to Bahrain’s interest in acquiring a new fleet of high-sophistication fighter jets. We would obviously have to look at any proposal to export fighter jets to Bahrain in the context in which such an application was made, but my initial judgment would be that this is equipment highly unlikely to be used in internal repression—it is not equipment of a type that would be appropriate to be used in internal repression.
Ann Clwyd
I also sit on a committee in the Inter-Parliamentary Union that looks at the human rights of parliamentarians, and Bahrain frequently comes up before our committee—in fact, we are doing something on this in about two months’ time. That is because a number of former Members of Parliament have had their nationality revoked. I think we are being too complacent towards Bahrain. As I said at the beginning, they have made progress, but not against high-level officials who are closely linked with the royal family and who were charged with the kind of behaviour that has been described and that is possibly linked to torture and other accusations. Lower-level officials have been charged, but not the higher ones, who presumably give the orders.
Mr Hammond
Bahrain remains a case study on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s annual human rights report and is reviewed bi-annually. There is an element of judgment involved in these calls, and I am simply expressing my judgment that, in a world in which there are very many regimes which are not compliant with what we would consider to be a full human rights regime, where countries are making an effort to move themselves to towards compliance, it is appropriate that we should support them and encourage that move. There are many, many countries which are making no discernable effort to move towards compliance with what is generally accepted as a universal set of human rights, and I think we should reserve our more aggressive response for those countries, while seeking to encourage those that are willing to move in the right direction to go further and faster. That is exactly what we are doing. I shall be in Bahrain this coming weekend for the Manama dialogue, and I shall, again, encourage everyone that I have the chance to talk to to continue down this road and remind them that the world is watching and that their status and reputation in the world depends on how quickly they are able to progress in implementing this agenda.
Chair
Foreign Secretary, we want now to move a little further down the Gulf to Qatar.
Dr Lewis
It is one thing to concentrate on whether weapons are being used for internal repression, but it is another to focus on whether they are being given to a country that is arming our deadliest enemies. In the case of Qatar, one is put in mind of Lenin’s famous dictum that the capitalists will sell us the rope with which we shall hang them. In September, the Telegraph did an in-depth report. Referring to Qatar, it stated: “The fabulously wealthy Gulf state, which owns an array of London landmarks and claims to be one of our best friends in the Middle East, is a prime sponsor of violent Islamists”. It went on to detail not only the payments, believed to run at over $2 million a month to al-Qaeda in Iraq from individuals within Qatar, but it referred to Qatari arms flights, which are landing in the city of Misrata where the Islamist militias have their stronghold, and this is long after the fall of the capital and the removal of Libya’s Government. So how can we be in a position to justify continuing to export arms to Qatar while it is directly arming Islamist militias and/or turning a blind eye to wealthy individuals who are funding ISIL?
Mr Hammond
Let us first deal with the funding question. We are of course aware of reports that individual citizens from the region—not just Qatar, but from the region—may be providing or may have provided support to not only ISIL, but other militant organisations as well. We have determined that there is no evidence to suggest that the Government of Qatar, or any of the Governments that we engage with in the Gulf, is involved in this regime. We welcome the fact that Qatar has recently legislated to prevent terrorist funding by regulating charities that are involved in political movements or that send money abroad, and we are working with the Qataris to encourage the swift implementation of this legislation. The Emir of Qatar was in London relatively recently. As we always do, we raised these issues and concerns with him, and he engaged very openly and frankly with us about the challenges of policing money flows. We know about those, because of course we have had to deal with them as well. But that confirmed his absolute determination to comply with the UN Security Council resolution that we were instrumental in bringing about, which seeks to cut off not only the flow of foreign fighters, but the flow of finance to ISIL in Iraq and Syria. On the question of supply of weapons to Qatar—
Dr Lewis
To Libya.
Mr Hammond
It was concerning the supply of weapons to Qatar. Our sales of defence exports to Qatar are relatively modest, as you will know, but of course, any application for a licence for export of arms to Qatar will be assessed against the consolidated criteria. That will involve a look at the intended end-use destination of those weapons, if there is any evidence of re-export.
Dr Lewis
But as we know—this was why I briefly referred to Libya again—flights are taking arms from Qatar to Libya. Are you really confident that we can have any assurance that arms that go from this country to Qatar will not end up strengthening the hands of Libyan Islamists, who are not acting in any way in democratic interests in post-Gaddafi Libya?
Mr Hammond
That is a very generic question. Obviously, the assessment on an individual export depends on what the item is and what the type of equipment or componentry is. I have seen no evidence to suggest that any equipment exported from the UK has been re-exported. This would be in contravention of the export licence if the end-user destination was Qatar and it has been re-exported to Libya. If we were to become aware of any such breach of the terms of a licence, clearly, we would have to respond to that.
Dr Lewis
Are you satisfied, then, that these reported Qatari arms flights to Libya are being done without the knowledge and approval of the Qatari Government?
Mr Hammond
No, sorry; that’s not what I was saying. I was saying that, in the case of any such flights, we have no evidence to suggest that any British-supplied equipment—the subject of an export licence with Qatar as the main destination—was involved in any such shipments.
Dr Lewis
Yes, but surely the point is that if the Qatari Government is providing arms to our Islamist enemies, that should have a bearing, should it not, on whether we permit arms exports to continue to that country?
Mr Hammond
Once again, I find myself being rather more purist than the Committees. My understanding is that the consolidated criteria are the test by which we must assess an application for an arms export licence. I think I can safely say that if we are confident that the UK supply in question is not going to be diverted, which would be in contravention of criterion 7, and is not going to be used in a way that is incompatible with or that triggers any of the other criteria, then, whether we like what that particular Government are doing elsewhere or with other equipment that it sources from other jurisdictions would not affect the way we apply the consolidated criteria. That is not to say that, in relation to any country, the UK Government could not decide to operate a more restrictive policy if they chose to do so for political reasons, but the application of the consolidated criteria to the arms export licensing regime is, I would suggest, quite straightforward and needs to be protected in the way it operates; otherwise, I think we will be subject to all sorts of legal challenge.
Chair
We now want to come to arms exports to Kurdish groups who are opposing ISIL.
Ann Clwyd
The Foreign Affairs Committee has recently been to Iraq and Kurdistan and saw some of those weapons which have been delivered to the Kurds. We saw them being trained in their use. The fear is that, after what happened in Mosul where the American-provided equipment was captured, something similar may happen to this equipment because of the involvement of Turkish and Syrian-based Kurdish groups now working in Iraq to try to defeat ISIL. What protection is there and what observation is being made to ensure that the same thing does not happen with the arms that are being gifted to the Kurds in Iraq?
Mr Hammond
First, I, too, went to Irbil and saw peshmerga training with the heavy machine guns that we had supplied. We have calibrated carefully the equipment that we have supplied to the peshmerga to respond to their operational needs, but with an awareness of the potential risk that inevitably exists. We have sought a series of assurances from the KRG that weapons will be used to meet urgent operational requirements, that they will remain in Iraq, that they will be used in fighting ISIL or for the defence of the civilian population only, that they will not be stockpiled for other purposes and that they will be used in accordance with international law including international humanitarian law. We have also satisfied ourselves that the peshmerga have a weapons management system in place that allows them to monitor compliance with those assurances, and that weapons are being used and stored securely. So a number of steps have been taken. It is also very important to note that all supplies of weapons to the Kurds have been at the request of the Government of Iraq. This delivery of weapons is at the request of the sovereign Government responsible for the territory to which the weapons have been delivered.
Chair
Foreign Secretary, we take a close interest not only in commercial exports from the UK, but also in equipment gifted by the British Government. We want to come now to gifted equipment going to opposition groups in Syria.
Fabian Hamilton
Your predecessor William Hague made a statement on 10 July 2013 in which he said that the UK Government, having “already provided more than £12 million in non-lethal assistance to the National Coalition, local councils and civil society” in Syria, would provide a further £20 million “in non-lethal assistance in the coming months, including communications support and training for the National Coalition”. Is it still Government policy to ship only non-lethal equipment to opposition groups that are opposing either the Syrian regime or ISIL—otherwise known as the Islamic State—in Syria?
Mr Hammond
It is.
Fabian Hamilton
You don’t want to expand on that at all?
Mr Hammond
No. That is the Government’s position. We have made it clear on multiple occasions in Parliament that our decision is that we will not at the present time supply lethal equipment to the Syrian opposition. We supply a range of non-lethal equipment, and we supply them with technical support. We have done quite a lot of work with them on civil policing and on civil defence response in areas of the country which are controlled by the moderate opposition, but we do not supply them with lethal equipment.
Fabian Hamilton
Given the onslaught against them by ISIL, is it not time to change that view?
Mr Hammond
The Government’s judgment at the moment is that we do not wish to change that position. There are many others supplying lethal equipment to Syrian opposition fighters. Our judgment at the moment is that the complexities of monitoring and managing the supply of such equipment in such a complex situation on the ground make it something that we would find challenging. We do not feel that there is a necessity for this, given the substantial amounts of lethal equipment that are getting through to the Syrian opposition.
Chair
We come now to the Arms Trade Treaty.
Ann McKechin
Foreign Secretary, the Arms Trade Treaty comes into effect on 24 December, as you know. Could you describe briefly to the Committees what you think the impact will be on UK arms exports?
Mr Hammond
Because we have an export control regime that is already very transparent and very rigorous, the impact for the UK will be relatively limited. As you know, we changed the regime as we needed to through secondary legislation before we ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, in order to ensure that our arms export licensing regime is now fully compliant with the treaty. This treaty is not going to have a major behaviour-changing impact in the UK, because we already have a very rigorous regime. The purpose of promoting the treaty was to ensure similar levels of transparency and rigour in countries across the world.
Ann McKechin
May I just confirm that the secondary legislation to which your official pointed you is now in force?
Mr Philip Hammond
I imagine it must be, yes.
Ann McKechin
It is, thank you. May I also ask what action the UK Government are currently taking to encourage the permanent members of the UN Security Council which have not yet signed or ratified the Arms Trade Treaty to do so? Clearly, the more countries that join the treaty, the more effective it will actually be in practice.
Mr Hammond
We agree with that. We think that it would be a powerful signal if all the P5 states were to accede. You will know that France and the UK have ratified the treaty. The US has signed the treaty but not ratified it, and the truth is that internal domestic political issues with the gun lobby in the US are going to present great difficulties for the US in moving forward with ratification. Russia and China have neither signed nor ratified the treaty. We continue to press all three non-ratifying P5 members to move forward with this, because we believe that there is significant benefit in universality. A common P5 position will send a very strong signal to other states who have not yet signed. For those other states, where we can, we are seeking to offer technical support and assistance to move to a position to sign the treaty. And where people have signed, we are seeking to offer technical support and assistance to introduce compliant regimes to honour their obligations under the treaty.
Ann McKechin
As you know, the Committees very much welcome the approach that the Government has taken to date, but there have been calls for it now to start to consider excluding countries, and companies from countries, that have not yet ratified the treaty or other arms control treaties from attending or exhibiting at UK-based arms fairs, for it not to promote arms sales in those countries and for open licences not to be issued to those countries. In effect, that would be a step-by-step process to increase pressure over a period of time. Has the Government considered how we can try to increase pressure if its diplomacy through polite inquiries and requests does not prove to be effective?
Mr Hammond
The Government will pursue this agenda by pointing its partners—potential signatories—to the benefits of the Arms Trade Treaty and, in particular, to the benefit that the Arms Trade Treaty-compliant regimes can deliver in terms of slowing or halting the proliferation of weapons into the hands of terrorist groups and others who seek to disrupt international good order. But we do not judge that using the Arms Trade Treaty as a stick to beat non-signatory powers with in terms of our trading activity would be appropriate, certainly not at this stage.
Ann McKechin
Has there been any discussion at EU level about whether there should be a common EU approach to encourage other countries to join and ratify the treaty?
Jessica Hand
Yes, there has. It has come up repeatedly within the context of COARM, and European partners are working together to provide assistance and to reach out and encourage more and more countries to sign and ratify the treaty. That will continue, even beyond it entering into force.
Chair
Foreign Secretary, we want to come on to the meeting on the human consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.
Mike Gapes
As you know, Foreign Secretary, there is a major conference in Vienna next week on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. One hundred and fifty countries will attend that conference and the United States recently announced that it would attend. So far, our Government has not committed to attend. I asked your predecessor last week in the business statement whether we were about to make any announcement, and he said that I would have to wait until this week. I ask you today: can we change our previous position and join the United States in attending this conference in Vienna?
Mr Hammond
It is clearly possible.
Mike Gapes
Is it likely?
Mr Hammond
This week has another four days left to run, but I can reconfirm that we will announce our decision during the course of this week. We are discussing it with our international partners. You have already said that the United States has broken with its previous practice in deciding to attend. France, another P5 power with whom we are closely aligned, has decided that it will not attend. Therefore, unfortunately, there will not be a united P5 position. So we now have to make a decision whether to attend or not, knowing that there will be a split position in the P5. We will make that position clear. I am going to Brussels tomorrow and I will be meeting with both the Americans and the French, and we will make our position clear imminently.
Mike Gapes
Are you going before Foreign Office questions or after?
Mr Hammond
I am going immediately after Foreign Office questions.
Mike Gapes
So we will not get an answer at Foreign Office questions either.
Mr Hammond
It doesn’t sound likely, does it? You never know. It is worth a try.
Mike Gapes
Yes. Maybe it will be the business statement on Thursday.
Mr Hammond
It will be you or Mr Robertson, no doubt.
Chair
Foreign Secretary, I want to come to your dimension on an issue that we raised with the Business Secretary on surveillance technologies.
Mike Crockart
Obviously, the growing area at the moment is the UK licensing of surveillance technologies to countries of human rights concern. It is an area that I know the Department is live to. In the report “Good Business: Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights”, which came out last year, you said that you intended to “develop guidance to address the risks posed by exports of information and communications technology that are not subject to export control but which might have impacts on human rights including freedom of expression on line.” Can you update the Committees on how that is going?
Mr Hammond
Yes, I am happy to do so. On 26 November, techUK, which is a technology trade association, published new guidance for companies entitled “Assessing Cyber Security Export Risks”. It covers cyber-security and cyber-surveillance products. It focuses on human rights issues and is designed to help companies improve their due diligence processes in line with the UK’s business and human rights action plan. The guidance is owned by techUK on behalf of the UK technology industry, and it was produced with the assistance of HMG—the Foreign Office—as well as companies, industrial players and the Institute for Human Rights and Business, an NGO which acted as a bridge to consult other NGOs, including Human Rights Watch and Privacy International, in developing this guidance. That is now published and is there for the use of companies operating in the sector.
Mike Crockart
To my embarrassment, I have not read that yet.
Mr Hammond
I am glad to be able to convey a piece of information.
Mike Crockart
It will be my reading for later on today. What implications does that have for Government? Those are recommendations for business as to how they conduct their business, but there is equally a licensing implication here in that the UK Government should have a view on whether particular technologies should be able to be exported to particular countries of concern. What is the next step for the UK Government?
Mr Hammond
The Government do, indeed, have such a view, and it is enshrined in the consolidated criteria. The question in relation to any surveillance technology being exported to any particular country is: does it engage any of the consolidated criteria? Where it does, we will deal with it in exactly the same way as if it was an application to export fighter jets, machine guns or land mines.
Mike Crockart
Are you happy that that is a significant enough test, given the particular difficulties with this technology? Of course, the argument is often made that this technology is merely used to back up the legal regime in the country. But in some of the countries that we are talking about, the legal regime itself is open to question as to whether it is significantly free of Government. With that in mind, do you think that—
Mr Hammond
You might be raising a question that is a bigger one for the future about whether the criteria need to be reviewed from time to time as technologies evolve. That may be something that the Committees want to think about and express a view on, but our position is that we will apply the consolidated criteria as they exist to these proposed transfers. What you are perhaps highlighting is something that is self-evidently true—that it is much more challenging to apply the export control regime to dual-use goods than to pure military exports, where the end use is always fairly clear. In this case, there may be end uses that are entirely beneficial and other end uses that would be much less acceptable. A judgment has to be made about how the technologies in question are likely to be used in practice.
Chair
Foreign Secretary, lastly a question about export policy towards Israel, which the Business Secretary generously passed across to you.
Richard Benyon
Following public concern about events in Gaza, the Government announced the possibility of suspending and revoking arms exports licences to Israel and, “in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities”. It has been put to the Committees that the words “significant hostilities” appear in no user guides or any existing transfer control criteria. I put it to Dr Cable that this is a possible shift in policy and he said, “Not me, guv.” He said that the Foreign Secretary makes the decisions and his Department just implements the policy.
Mr Hammond
The Foreign Secretary provides advice to the Business Secretary, who makes the decision—[Laughter.] That is the legal position.
Peter Jones
That is absolutely correct.
Mr Hammond
The Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary provide advice. Export licensing decisions are made by the Business Secretary; he is the Secretary of State as provided for in the legislation. However, I am not seeking to hide behind that. I provide advice, and I will tell you how we arrived at the expression of that advice. The question of this came in the aftermath of Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, when we reviewed the extant licences and identified 12 licences that relate to technology or items that we believe might give rise, in the circumstances of renewed conflict, to a concern about their use in contravention of criterion 2c—the international humanitarian law criterion. Unless and until there is a resumption of significant hostility, we do not judge that the items delivered under those 12 licences give rise to that concern. If there was a context of a significant hostility, we judge that the precautionary principle would apply and the licences should be suspended.
Richard Benyon
I am sorry to be a pedant, but the phrase “significant hostility” potentially then shifts in terms of how policy is decided in these areas.
Mr Hammond
No. The issue is, where licences are extant and there is only turbulence in the situation and changing facts on the ground, we would expect to regularly review whether any of the consolidated criteria were engaged. In this case, we were under pressure to set out our views about these 12 licences. We have, gratuitously—there is no obligation on us to do this—expressed in advance what we think the situation would be. We have identified 12 licences and said that if a set of circumstances on the ground were to arise—that is, there were to be a resumption of significant hostility—the advice that I would expect to give to the Business Secretary in those circumstances is that it would be appropriate to suspend those 12 licences. We have provided a forewarning of the advice that would likely be delivered in those circumstances.
Fabian Hamilton
A very simple question: can you reassure the Committees, Foreign Secretary, that that there is not one rule for Israel, which is often in the headlines about its conflicts, and another rule for everybody else? Will what you apply to them apply to everybody else?
Mr Hammond
Yes, we use the same consolidated criteria, and in this case we have a slightly unusual situation because there has been period of intensive conflict, which has ended. That conflict is not continuing. We have looked at the systems and components that are licensed for export in the light of whether there is a risk that they would be used in breach of international humanitarian law. In the case of these 12 licences, we have judged that there would be such a risk if significant hostilities were to resume. That is why we have made the announcement that we have.
Chair
Foreign Secretary, Ms Hand, Mr Jones, thank you very much indeed. Oral evidence: Scrutiny of Arms Exports 2015, HC 608 7