Oral evidence: An SDSR checklist of potential threats, HC 493Tuesday 3 November 2015
Oral evidence, 3 November 2015.
Witnesses
Edward Schwarck, Royal United Services Institute, Dr Igor Sutyagin, Royal United Services Institute and Peter Roberts, Royal United Services Institute, gave evidence.
Chair
Thank you. Once again, I ask witnesses to identify themselves for the record.
Peter Roberts
I am Peter Roberts, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.
Dr Sutyagin
I am Dr Igor Sutyagin, senior research fellow for Russian studies at the Royal United Services Institute.
Edward Schwarck
I am Edward Schwarck, a research fellow in Asian studies at the Royal United Services Institute.
Chair
We have a full set of RUSI experts here today. Richard Benyon will start us off.
Richard Benyon
I am keen to know your views on Russia, the threat that we face, and how we should be looking at this in view of our checklist of threats. Dr Sutyagin, you have been very vocal in recent months, saying that you believe conflict with NATO is now a realistic event, and that you feel the West should be more prepared for such a conflict. Could you identify for the benefit of the record what you feel the threats are, geographically and in terms of Russia’s capability?
Dr Sutyagin
If possible, I would like to concentrate on the types of threat, first of all, and then geographically. I see three different types of threat. One is military, another is a sort of influence or propaganda threat and the third is a cultural threat, which should not be overlooked. Militarily, Russia is at a stage where it needs to capitalise and get some results for the investments made in the armed forces. It has sunk money, and it needs to get some profit out of that. That is why it is inevitable that Russia and the Kremlin will be more proactive in using its armed forces, just for economic reasons. That is why you need to expect more Russian assertiveness and more open military actions on the Russian side. Secondly, the military threat is emanating purely from the fact that the Kremlin does not have too much leverage now. It is losing its competitiveness internationally and economic influence. The way to fix its influence in the UN Security Council is found on the British and American side; it is possible to block Russian initiatives there when you vote on an agenda. The military is actually its last remaining tool. That is why it is possible to see more assertive and aggressive, in the political sense, use of military forces, which is the perceived threat for the West. I do not think that we should expect a direct clash between Russian armed forces and, for instance, British or NATO member state armed forces. It probably could happen just by mistake. They are not planning to do that—they are cautious enough—but you will see more bombers flying around, figuratively speaking. That is the military dimension. In terms of influence, that is very important. The Kremlin will support every move that will weaken NATO and the UK. RT is just one example. The influence of those who promote views similar to the Kremlin’s, or favourable to it, is inevitable. That will happen. Everything that will diminish the British ability to react, to withstand pressure from the Russian side, will be welcomed. Unilateral disarmament—absolutely welcomed in the Kremlin; that is good. You will see more pressure in this sense—propaganda.
Richard Benyon
Britain leaving the EU, Scotland seceding from the United Kingdom?
Dr Sutyagin
That is absolutely welcomed, because divide and rule is the universal rule, universally applied by the Kremlin. It is the best and probably the only way which they know now. Divide and rule is absolutely perfect and everything which leads to division, leads to Russian rule, will be absolutely welcome. The third is a sort of cultural threat, which is economic influence. The problem is that corruption is the backbone in the model of Putinomics. It is inevitable to have corruption. It is estimated that between 10% and 12% to up to 30% of Russian GDP is due to corruption. It is being lost in corruption; which means that any contact with the Russian economy is to some extent poisonous, because Russia exports corruption, and that is damaging for the economy, culture and society with which it interacts—for British society. Even British companies that have wide experience working in Russia will bring some corruption, corrupt experience, back to British society, back to the British isles. That is another serious threat, because that destroys your society from inside.
Richard Benyon
Of course, if “Russia Today” were commenting on this, they might say that your experiences of being imprisoned by the Putin regime may have slurred your thinking on this, but I entirely agree with you and I feel that we have to judge Russia as a threat in terms of what is going on in Russia and inside the Putin regime. Would you agree with that?
Dr Sutyagin
Well, I think so, because—just one comment if possible: if “Russia Today” followed my statements, my public presentations, they would find that I try to be, and I think I am rather successful in being more or less objective. Explaining the driving forces behind Russian concerns is not, I think, anti-Russian. Secondly, what is happening in Russia is the danger, because after all Russia is the largest country in the world by territory. By its unique geographic and geopolitical situation it is the bridge between Europe and Asia, and if the current Russian rulers create a situation of inherent instability in society, it is a universal threat to the rest of the world, because to have a volcano—actually, it is not that, but a sort of swamp—in the middle of Eurasia is not the best for stability. A swamp is not stable.
Richard Benyon
Could you talk to us a little bit about what capabilities Russia has that the UK needs to counteract if we are to deter any future conflict, in terms of new weapons systems, and the money that Putin has spent on increasing defence capability?
Dr Sutyagin
Well, I think that the most important capability Russia has that the United Kingdom lacks now is not in terms of weapons systems, but the procedure and the political will to act, because the Russian procedure is more or less vertical. It is a wartime-style command structure, which you completely lack. You do not have that, and that is a serious inferiority on your side, and superiority on the Russian side. It is very difficult to match that, but probably it is possible to think about that—at least to keep that in mind. Streamlined procedure on the Russian side is very serious. As for other capabilities, well, the Russian forces are being rapidly modernised now. They have reached the end of the research and development cycle, so now they are re-arming, and, what is also interesting, they are learning in a very effective and fast way. For instance, the Ukrainian experience has shown that when they came to Ukraine in July last year, they attacked in a way that was like 1941. They did not know what to do or how to do it. They literally sent troops without even directions about where to go. Troops advanced on the sound of fire. It happened. A company of paratroopers was killed by mortar fire because they advanced under the sound of fire straight to the mortar battery. But they have learnt a lot. Now they are very effective in using electronic warfare and area denial equipment. They are very good at that. Probably one of the most impressive developments in Russian armed forces’ capabilities is electronic warfare and soft kill capabilities. That is very interesting. Also, there is a combination of soft and hard kill. Their staff culture is very high. They understand how to plan situations and how to play around international law. In Ukraine, for instance, they managed to deploy a huge number of troops—up to 91,000 to 100,000—near the Ukrainian border without violating a single letter of the Vienna document. They never exceeded the 8,000 or 9,000 troops limit that is established as the limit for exercises. They managed to locate and control them in a way that is effective, but absolutely permissible. That is another strong aspect on the Russian side. One more threat is cultural. Politicians and to a large extent the military understand your culture, whereas you do not understand the Russian political and military culture. That is a serious force multiplier on the Russian side. As for the rest, the armed forces and the weapons systems are not that much better than British or American ones. They are in a large sense inferior, but there is one difference in the traditional historical emphasis made by the Soviet Union and then Russia on the unmanned ballistic missiles: the cruise missiles are much better. It is absolutely clear that it is much more affordable for politicians to fire a salvo of ballistic missiles than for you to send a squadron of Tornados, risking pilots. So that is one more consideration. The rest of the weapons systems are not much different.
Richard Benyon
I suspect others want to come in.
Chair
Before I bring anyone in, do either of your colleagues have anything to add?
Peter Roberts
There is a distinct difference between how Russia is viewed as a threat in the UK and mainland Europe; how aggressive you feel Russia is being depends on your proximity to one of her borders. The Baltics feel they are in a state of war already, whereas those further away in Portugal, Spain and Italy see an entirely different threat, whether it is from migration or Daesh. There is a huge difference in how it is perceived, but if you speak to nations in the middling ground such as France and Germany, who are starting to really understand how Russia is playing against them, you see the announcements they are making in terms of remilitarising their strategies. There is an understanding from some pretty smart people that all their efforts and beliefs in the theory of soft power have absolutely no impact with Russia at all—all their plans for softer defence engagement and economic sanctions have no impact on the strategic culture and decision making in Russia. This is a very interesting dynamic on which to play back when you return to London and start to have some of these conversations. People look at you blankly and really fail to get how up close and personal Russian and NATO forces are being, particularly in places like the Baltics.
Chair
Edward, do you have any comment on this?
Edward Schwarck
No, I am happy to comment on east Asia, but not Russia.
Johnny Mercer
You had a really interesting point about the ballistic missiles and how it is easier for politicians in Russia to authorise them. But would you say there is a significant gap between the capabilities of those missiles, given the news over the last month when they hit the wrong country in the recent engagement? Do you think that that balance of their being easier to use is slightly lost with the effectiveness of them tactically?
Dr Sutyagin
We must not overestimate the effectiveness of ballistic and especially cruise missiles; after all, a cruise missile is just a bomb with wings. It has a very long range and precision guidance, but it is just one bomb. If you drop 26 half-ton bombs long distance, it is easier to send them there, but you cannot expect a larger effect than if you sent Tornados with 26 half-ton bombs. In this sense, it is necessary not to underestimate that—or overestimate it. A ballistic missile might be slightly different because it is part of the rapid reaction force—you do not expect to wait for two hours until you reach something. In the European theatre of military operations, it might be decisive, because it is also precise. If you hit a command post with a ballistic missile rapidly, you decapitate your opponent’s troops. In this sense, that is effective, and it is easier, because you do not wait until a pilot delivers the bomb and you do not risk that pilot.
Chair
Before I call James Gray, Madeleine has a brief point to make.
Mrs Moon
I wondered what your comments would be on a suggestion that was made to me recently: that Russia will test, probe and poke NATO countries, but will never come over the borders—it knows where to stop—and perhaps the greater risk is in places like Finland and Sweden, which do not have NATO membership. What is your comment on that?
Dr Sutyagin
To be honest, it might be a mistake for NATO not to send clear messages. There might be a misreading on where to stop—and there are already some misreadings on the Russian side. In Crimea, for example, NATO’s record—the western record—was that NATO and the West would swallow Crimea, as they swallowed Kosovo and Pristina. It was exactly like that as they swallowed Georgia, so it was a misreading. On advances into the NATO area, I think it necessary to read one more line in Russian policy—it is not that interested in grabbing another piece of land somewhere in the Baltic; it is more interested in ruling, or influencing, the whole of NATO. If you create a situation in which in some absolutely legal process a pro-Russian party gains a majority in one of the three Baltic states, the whole of NATO decision making will be blocked. That is much better than gaining 20 sq km of territory in the Baltics. That is a much larger danger and a much trickier plan than, literally, just military invasion. The possibility is very serious and many people overlook it. The Kremlin is specialist in fighting dissidents, so it is good at precisely that sort of action. As for probing Finland, Finland has a unique experience and a unique record. Historically, on one occasion in 1941 a single company of Finnish bicyclists stopped an advancing Soviet tank division, which retreated. In a sense, Finns are like Israelis; they know how to fight and they have the determination to fight—particularly Russians. That is why the threat to Finland is slightly overestimated and slightly over-exaggerated. But it might be dangerous to provoke Russia in Finland. If Finland joins NATO, the Russian side would perceive that to be a danger poised between the heart of Russia and the naval bases for its sea-based strategic deterrent forces. To cut the roads and railways to the north of Russia—the Kola peninsula—might be provocative.
Chair
Do you think that non-alignment has something to be said for it, if you are geographically located next door to Russia?
Dr Sutyagin
It seems to me, to be honest, that a neutral Finland and NATO with a neutral Finland might be a bit safer than having Finland within NATO.
Mr Gray
I would like to turn your attention to the Arctic, but before I do, I apologise as after this I have to push off elsewhere. I think Mr Roberts made this point, but there is increasing militarisation of the Arctic by the Russians. First, to what degree is that true? Secondly, why are they doing it? Is it military or commercial? Is it about the opening up of the northern sea route and all that? Thirdly, whichever it is, what threat is that to UK interests? I am sure it is not a threat to the UK militarily, but what threat is it to UK interests? Fourth, what can you do about it?
Peter Roberts
The Arctic is being increasingly militarised. Is that necessarily a change for Russia? No—the big change is in how the US and Canada are behaving in that manner, and, certainly, in the way that Norway is behaving as well. I will come to those in more detail when we talk about capabilities. In terms of why Russia is applying this, if we look at the northern sea route fallacy—the great belief that the route is going to open and ships are going to flow through there instead of through the Suez Canal—and at the figures provided recently by Clarksons shipping, it reached a height of 74 ships in 2013. It died off to 36 platforms in 2014 and this year fewer than 20 have made the route. That is hardly a massive explosion of shipping with the opening of the route. Clarksons, the shipping agents in London, stated that there is very little economic benefit to passing through the passage in terms of fuel, for example, given the risks, the hull stringencies and pilotage fees charged by the Russians.
Mr Gray
I do not want to interrupt, but that is probably true now—it would not be true if the ice retreats more.
Peter Roberts
Again, if you talk to major shipping owners, none of them says that the route through the northern passage would be one that they chose out of preference. There is very little economic benefit. In London Shipping Week, a couple of months ago, very few of the shipping owners I spoke to said that they would choose that route over the longer route through Suez. In terms of resources, yes, there are huge economic resources under the Arctic—that is a well-known fact. The Russians are laying claim to those, as are the Canadians and Americans. That is the basis for some of the militarisation on the Canadian front. There are then the concerns about climate change, and various nations and organisations are contributing to addressing that, most notably through the Arctic Council. It comes back to the military reason why Russia is interested. In the Arctic circle, outside the Russian submarine base, is the bastion in which they place their ballistic missile deterrent submarines. That is their operating area and their last line of defence. It is their absolutely vital ground—the critical ground that they must not lose. That constitutes a red line into which they would not wish to see American, British or NATO forces push. So it is definitely for military and security reasons. Russia is very keen to see this as continuing vital grounds—as a national interest that it will not give up. How is it being militarised in other ways? Well, it is primarily the American and Canadian responses to this and shipping routes that open in terms in building ice breakers, addressing the coast guard and opening new military bases—both on the Canadian and American side—in the Arctic circle. Then you have various capabilities that they are buying, notably in terms of ice breakers from the American continent and submarines in terms of some of the Baltic states. Norway is purchasing 12 new submarines, and it specifically has a requirement to have diesel-electric submarines with under-ice capability—a hugely unusual and unique capability, which will cost them a lot. That Arctic security for Norway sits at the heart of its security requirements. Norway really acts as a guardian of the Arctic, on behalf of NATO. That is where British interests come in. The Norwegians are underwriting NATO’s risk in the Arctic. The Americans might be backing an element of it; certainly, aside from the Russians, they are the best at under-ice operations—that is, how they operate their submarines under the ice—followed closely by the Norwegians and, some way down the list, the British.
Mr Gray
We have let that capability slip, haven’t we?
Peter Roberts
The capability for the Royal Navy has slipped. I think it is partly due to the number of hulls that are available to do it, but also the training for the navigators and the skill base required to get there. That is something which could be brought about—namely, if the UK did require capability to go back into it. But the UK interests arise through economic resources, a potential shipping route at some stage in the future, countering the Russian threat and holding or containing those ballistic nuclear submarines into the bastion basket in the north.
Mr James Gray
What about the contribution we make to land warfare through the Royal Marines training? Surely that is a unique capability.
Peter Roberts
The Royal Marines training is certainly useful. The cold-weather training of the Royal Marines is exercised to reinforce the Baltic states. It is not about Arctic warfare on the Arctic landmass; it is about the reinforcement of Norway per se. That training and those skills are transferable, but they are slightly different. They are resupplied by sea, are short in duration and aim for longer-term reinforcement. If you were looking to capabilities that the UK could use in the Arctic to bolster NATO’s security presence there, you would be looking at additional nuclear submarines, under-ice capability, persistent and long-range maritime patrols, extremely long-rage surveillance to contribute to surveillance over the Arctic, ISR and SIGINT capabilities, which have massive utility in the Arctic, and measures that Russia takes seriously militarily, such ballistic missile defence capabilities.
Chair
Thank you very much indeed. Before I call Jim Shannon, what are the current or future potential threats to the UK and its interests emanating from the Far East? What capabilities does the UK require to deter or contain those threats?
Edward Schwarck
The UK faces a number of threats from the Far East. Analytically, it is probably worth putting those threats into two distinct categories, namely first-order threats that affect British nationals or critical national interests, and second-order threats that may affect much broader British concerns, whether maritime law, regional stability, nuclear non-proliferation or the non-use of coercion or force among states. I would argue that the threats that we face are overwhelmingly from China in this regard, but they mostly lie in the second category that I mentioned. That does not necessarily mean that the challenge should be taken lightly, but rather that it will take a much greater degree of long-term strategic thought and perhaps a willingness by the UK to invest attention and resources in areas that do not necessarily yield a short-term pay-off. I don’t think that the UK is ever going to be a consequential strategic actor in the Asia Pacific. That is not a secret to anyone. The obvious problem is physical distance. There is also the problem of the growing sophistication of the capabilities and weapon systems of countries in the region. There is also the UK’s dwindling ability to project force far overseas. The UK still has a role, however. If we are looking particular at the field of defence engagement, the UK definitely has a role to play. If you are thinking about China, for example, it is only really over the past 10 years that China has discovered the value of military diplomacy, trust building, and military engagement. It is important that countries like the UK assist in the efforts of our allies such as the United States, Australia or other regional actors, to show that certain standards of behaviour and certain norms, whether transparency or the non-use of coercion, are shared by countries in a much broader global context than those strictly in the Asia Pacific.
Jim Shannon
Whenever we look at these issues, we are looking from a parochial point of view at what happens to the United Kingdom, but we sometimes have to look outside the UK and at where we get our assets from and so on. I’m thinking of Norway in this instance. Norway supplies almost 45% of our oil and gas, so our dependence on its oil and gas is great. Whenever it comes to protecting and ensuring that we have those assets and that energy resources come from such countries, we need to have a maritime presence in those areas. Last week, we had four members of the Australian Defence Committee here, who explained to us clearly what the issues were for them from an Australian point of view. They mentioned the threat of China, as you have said, and the importance of sea routes, which need to be kept open—China feels a wee bit threatened. Looking at the Arctic and defence engagement in the Far East, what sort of UK naval capabilities do you think would make a strategic difference in this region if they were available? I believe we must make them available. I do not know which of you would like to answer that—maybe all three of you. I would just like to get your ideas.
Peter Roberts
I am happy to start off. As has been said, I do not think that the UK is going to be the decisive power in this. If it wants to be a naval actor, it can do that in one of two ways. It can look to provide a niche capability that no one else does, and the UK traditionally has provided that in platforms that deliver signals intelligence, communications intelligence or specialist weapons capability, such as the Type 45 PAAMS—the principal air-to-air missile system—that they deliver. The UK can deliver that in niche capability or it can deliver it in what is increasingly being required: the sheer number of platforms. Even the cleverest platform in the world can only be in one place at a time, and the Pacific is a grand ocean on a scale unimaginable to a landlubber. Increasingly, it is the single platforms—two platforms—that are required. Nothing of the size of aircraft carriers and the like; it is about destroyers, frigates, submarines— particularly nuclear submarines—and re-supply vessels that can run around and keep all these surface combatants topped up. On top of that, there is a global shortage of maritime patrol aircraft; indeed, there is one in the UK as well. That is the sort of capability, along with SIGINT platforms, that is generally required.
Edward Schwarck
I defer to the expertise of my colleague on this point, but I would draw attention to recent reductions in platforms like destroyers, helicopter carriers and maritime patrol aircraft, which are all very relevant to the UK’s ability to contribute meaningfully to military exercises, whether it is the US-led “Rim of the Pacific” or the annual exercises that come as part of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. If you are talking about military engagement, there is also a lot to be had in terms of the various dialogues that we run currently with the Chinese, but also in our work with Japan and counter-piracy off the Gulf of Aden, or logistical support to operations in Afghanistan. Particularly in the case of Japan, those are very important in helping to draw some of those countries out of the region and make them stakeholders in the international system.
Phil Wilson
The UK and some of the western powers have declared that they have offensive cyber capabilities that might establish some degree of cyber-deterrence with Russia and China. Do you believe that the leadership in those countries are susceptible to deterrence thinking in this domain, or do they regard themselves as invulnerable?
Peter Roberts
Generally, most people are susceptible to deterrence thinking. I am sure Mr Schwarck could give some excellent examples of how the Chinese leadership—that is who we are talking about, not the Chinese people—are susceptible to deterrence. Some of their activities over the past decade have made that plainly evident. Are they susceptible to cyber-deterrence? It depends what you mean by cyber-deterrence. You are deterring them from undertaking an activity. You do not necessarily have to do that in the same domain. Deterring them from taking an action in cyberspace can be done another way. You can threaten or hold something else at risk. In terms of the Chinese, the most interesting thing to hold at risk is their energy supplies coming out of the Gulf, which you can do in a non-cyber way. You can delay and defer those through air or maritime activity on the long transit they have to get to the straits of Malacca and then through on to China itself. You do not have to do it in a single domain. Do not fight cyberspace in cyberspace. That is fairly clear. In terms of Chinese scale, the only people capable of countering China in cyberspace are the Americans. There is no big red button that the security services or the military have and are able to press and suddenly stop China doing anything in cyberspace; it is too big and powerful. But China also has shared values in cyberspace. As it becomes more sophisticated, its system is as reliant on cyberspace as we are. There are opportunities there for medium powers like the United Kingdom, to undertake action, but it is less about thinking about this in a single domain and more about broadening it out into exploiting horizontal and vertical leverage to apply power where we have power to apply and not necessarily to chase after power, to chase after these great capabilities that will come at huge cost and that might not be very effective in this domain. I don’t know, Ed, whether you want to draw anything out about the Chinese leadership.
Edward Schwarck
It is important to make the point that deterrence is not only about punishment. You can also have deterrence by denial. In the case of the threat posed by China, that would primarily come in the form of hardening our IT infrastructure—making it more secure and improving the cyber-knowhow of the UK commercial sector. I think measures like these would make the UK a much less desirable target, as China would see it, for cyber-espionage. Here one might use the analogy of a burglar considering which house to rob on a street. The house with strong locks and sophisticated alarms is much less likely to be targeted than the one without. I think the UK should be focusing most of its efforts here. That is particularly the case because if you are talking about deterrence by punishment, what are the options? If you are talking about a military response to cyber-attacks, that is obviously off the cards in the case of China. Economic retaliation, perhaps in the form of sanctions, which is being discussed in the United States at the moment, is clearly off the cards, given the emphasis that this Government has placed on its trade and commercial relationship with China. That leaves talking. This is not an ideal solution or a particularly exciting solution, but I do think that the UK needs to make a clearer case to China on what is unacceptable behaviour. Of course China, at the moment, does not distinguish between state secrets and commercial secrets. I think this is a point that the UK should be drilling home in all our engagements on those issues.
Phil Wilson
Can I ask one more question? The role to be played by China in the financial support of the UK’s infrastructure has caused alarm in some quarters. Is this warranted? What sort of threat might this pose? Do you think it is a threat?
Edward Schwarck
That is an extremely difficult question to answer. I would imagine that really only the intelligence services have an accurate assessment of that. Perhaps my colleague, Peter, has more to say on it. To me, it does sound like a highly risky investment. State-owned enterprises in China are inextricably linked to the party. They answer to the party first and foremost. They prioritise political concerns over commercial ones. In the context of China’s nuclear industry, that of course is linked very, very closely to the PLA, which has a less than stellar record when it comes to intellectual property and state secrets.
Peter Roberts
My colleague is absolutely right. Chinese investment in the UK is not done on behalf of the Chinese people. This is not the great shareholders of the Chinese villages buying into British energy and infrastructure. This is about the leadership of China, the CCP, buying British capabilities and infrastructure. As a Parliament, you might decide that that is absolutely acceptable. There are many states where it is acceptable; the threat can be mitigated; and it provides critical capital to provide updates that could in due course be nationalised on a whim. This is unrealistic. We are selling some really, really important bits of Britain, in terms of our infrastructure, our resilience and our ability to operate, and we are selling them to provide short-term income, with some very problematic issues to come in terms of loss of intellectual property, ownership and operating benefits.
Phil Wilson
So it’s not a good idea.
Peter Roberts
No.
Chair
Adding to that gloomy picture, while deterrence is effective in so many areas of defence and security, there is always the difficulty of attribution in the context of cyber, is there not? Doesn’t that make the prospect of deterrence through the threat of retaliation that much more difficult?
Peter Roberts
It can do. You will be aware that Professor Tom Rid, at King’s College in London, is the leading authority on cyber attribution and forensic attribution. The institute has done some work previously, and we are doing some research at the moment, on this very issue of cyber deterrence, and you could also take the view that forensic levels of attribution are not actually necessary. It has become the orthodoxy that you are required to know not just that the threat or the attack came from China, but which agency it came from—indeed, which individual it came from—and, therefore, if possible, where the order came from. You could extend that same level of forensic attribution into any domain—you could ask the same questions of a Daesh RPG attack—but we do not require it in those domains. This requirement—this orthodoxy—where we must demand forensic levels of attribution, is self-defeating. We are now applying moral, legal and ethical constraints to our own action that mean that we cannot, either as the UK or as NATO, beat an adversary. We are applying too many restrictions through our own liberal-society interpretation of what is required.
Chair
But I’m sure that you would accept that if we were to respond too hastily, we might find out afterwards that it was not actually some super-state that had launched the attack, but some 15-year-olds in their back bedrooms, as recently occurred with TalkTalk.
Peter Roberts
Indeed. I don’t think there was ever a postulation that there would be an immediate response on that one. However, because the nature of cyber is so classified, you don’t know certain things—for example, in response to the Office of Personnel Management attack and the stripping out of data that happened in the US, there may well have been immediate responses from the US Government that were not publicised. The level of forensic attribution might not have been available, but they certainly knew which state this came from, and they certainly were able, therefore, to make an immediate reaction that might well have, as others have said, taken the fingers from the archer.
Chair
Very interesting. We started with Russia, and we are going to finish with Russia. To what extent do we need to be concerned that NATO’s article 5 does not protect NATO members sufficiently against potential Russian asymmetric tactics?
Dr Sutyagin
You should be concerned about that, not because of the military application, but because of the political implications. The problem is that the majority of this asymmetric or non-obvious—the more common term in Russian parlance—warfare is sub-conventional. It is for the police to take responsibility for suppressing these sorts of actions; that is surely why article 5 does not have anything to deal with this. But because of the psychological impact of these sorts of actions, nations might be concerned about the credibility of NATO. That is why these sub-conventional actions might destroy NATO itself. If you destroy the credibility of NATO, that dissolves NATO as a whole, which means that you lose—that is exactly the divide and rule which we started with. That is how sub-article 5 actions might lead to the destruction of the structure which is supposed to provide your defence and security via article 5. That is why you should be concerned.
Chair
Any other comments? No? In that case, thank you all very much. This session is closed. Oral evidence: An SDSR checklist of potential threats, HC 493 2