Oral evidence: Assessment of EU/Uk Environmental Policy, HC 537

Oral evidence, 16 December 2015.

Witnesses

Professor Hans Bruyninckx, Executive Director, European Environment Agency, Pieter de Pous, EU Policy Director, European Environmental Bureau, and Martin Nesbit, Senior Fellow and Head of Environment and Climate Governance Programme, Institute for European Environmental Policy, gave evidence.

Chair

Welcome to the second panel in this afternoon’s session of the Environmental Audit Committee on EU/UK environmental policy. My apologies for starting slightly late; it has been a little crazy today, because of some of our arrangements, and with votes going off as well. We will try to do your session justice, although I know that some individuals have, literally, to fly from us. Apologies for my pronunciation—it is partly because I am trying to interpret things as Welsh—but we have with us Professor Hans Bruyninckx, executive director, European Environment Agency, Mr Pieter de Pous, EU policy director, European Environmental Bureau, and Mr Martin Nesbit, senior fellow and head of environment and climate governance programme at the Institute for European Environmental Policy. You are all very welcome.

Rebecca Pow

Thank you and welcome, everybody. To what extent have member states been able to influence the EU environmental policy-making process and shape it so that our national interests are represented? I will put that to Professor Hans—that is what I am going to call you.

Professor Bruyninckx

I think the whole policy-making process in the EU is, in essence, a reflection of what the member states bring to the EU level. Of course, the initiative is often from the Commission, but the Commission does that based on working groups and working parties, and working with member states, civil society and business associations, and then they come with a proposal. Then it goes to the Parliament, where you, of course, have national and ideological representation. And it goes to the Council, and the Council is playing, probably, an increasingly important role in the shaping of the final result of this whole process. So I would say, throughout the whole process, it’s member states that jointly shape the EU policies—that is the essence. In our core business, which is the knowledge base that feeds into the climate and environment policies, but also into the implementation-type knowledge, it’s the same thing: we have a management board where all the countries—all the member states—are represented; we work with a scientific committee that is open for all member states; and we work with our core network, where all the member states come together in about 25 expert meetings. So also at that level—in an evidence-based policy-making system, it is important that you have a trustworthy, transparent system of where the knowledge is coming from—there is deep involvement of the member states.

Pieter de Pous

One of the things that is specific to environmental policy is that, in general, the Commission has the right of initiative and can decide what it wants to do. In the case of environmental policy, the Commission has the tradition of adopting environmental action programmes, in which it basically lays out what it is going to do. Since the last two environmental action programmes, it has done that in a way that it is a negotiated tax between member states, the European Parliament and the Commission, and it commits the three institutions to a joint agenda. There is already, at the strategic, general level, an exchange on how we are going to shape the environmental agenda. The current one is the seventh environmental action programme, which was agreed two years ago. Once the Commission starts getting on with making proposals—or not—the whole process kicks in. The Commission tends to consult extensively with the member states—in our view, sometimes so much that it starts to apply self-censorship to its proposals because it fears that they may not be adopted. There is a strong element of that. Once the Commission proposal is out, formally it is the European Parliament that should takes a position first, then the Council adopts its position, taking into account the Parliament’s position. The reality is that, when the Parliament takes a position, the Council actually goes further away from the position than it may otherwise have had, so the influence of member states on the outcome is considerable.

Rebecca Pow

Mr Nesbit, you are on the climate governance side. How much do member states get involved in that? Obviously it is very topical, given that Paris has just happened.

Martin Nesbit

Indeed. I should probably say a couple of words about my background, so that Members have the relevant context. Although I am posing as a think-tank expert, I spent 25 years working in the UK Government on environment and agriculture policy issues, including on negotiations in those areas. That is the experience on which I will draw in answering these questions. On the general question, as Professor Bruyninckx explained, member states essentially have to be in agreement with legislation for it to get a sufficient majority in Council and for it to be adopted. It is very much shaped by the process of member states being able to amend Commission proposals and being able to provide advice to the Commission before it tables proposals. I think the way in which you look at member state influence on proposals from the Commission is very much determined by your national perspective. We tend to be more aware of issues when it feels that something is being imposed on us without particular support from the UK. If you look, for example, at the evidence from Professor Andreas Kraemer from the Ecologic Institute in Berlin, he has got some very interesting examples of cases where the legislative direction is very much set by the UK and follows the UK’s priorities. One example of that is the introduction of the emissions trading approach to the delivery of climate targets—to get back to your specific climate question—which was very much a UK priority. The UK was able to influence the Commission in that direction. The ETS, as it exists, would not be there in that form without the UK’s influence. Whether the ETS is actually working adequately yet is an open question, but it is certainly a clear example of UK influence.

Rebecca Pow

That is interesting to hear. We often get the impression that the UK is the bad boy always trying to upset the apple cart. Are we seen that way, or are we seen as leaders in any of these environmental fields? You mentioned emissions, but is there anything else in which we play a really valuable role and bring our ideas to the table? I am thinking of greening in the agricultural sector.

Martin Nesbit

I think it is more relevant to hear from Hans and Pieter on that, rather than from someone who used to be in the UK Government. Certainly in agriculture negotiations, the UK is seen as an environmentally extremist outlier in Council discussions.

Rebecca Pow

Really? “An environmentally extremist outlier”—meaning?

Martin Nesbit

We tend to be much more in favour of focusing CAP expenditure on environmental outcomes than most other member states.

Chair

And the two other witnesses?

Professor Bruyninckx

I think the complexity of the current environment and climate policies do not allow us to make an overall ranking of where a country is. There is not a single country that is top in everything or bottom in everything. But we made a comparative analysis based on the latest data in our state and outlook of the environment report, which I will leave behind for the Committee. There are a number of elements where the UK is top: top two in NOx emission reductions under the NEC directive; top four in Europe in Natura 2000 designated areas; and top three in resource productivity—which, of course, under the circular economy package and also under global pressures of resource demand is extremely important. At the same time, you are also ranking near the bottom in other areas, if I might say so—for example, in organic farming, renewable energy share and nutrient concentrations in rivers. So it is a mixed picture, but overall we look at the UK as a country in our core business—the knowledge components, the evidence-based part—that is one of the pushers of solid evidence underlying the policy enterprise, which I think is very much in line with the strong tradition of knowledge institutions, both at the governmental and the private and public level.

Rebecca Pow

So you would be sad to see us leave on that ground, would you?

Professor Bruyninckx

Not only on that ground.

Pieter de Pous

Let me put it like this. I think is a very mixed picture. There are some cases where the UK has been leading, and CAP reform has been one. We have noticed, though, that when push came to shove and things went down the wire, that did not last until the moment that it really mattered, and countries like France or Germany just put their foot down. We have seen it in the debates around some of the unintended consequences of biofuel policies. The UK was in the forefront to try to address them. The general concern we would have as an environment NGO with the UK Government is more in the areas linked with governance and flexibility, where the UK Government generally tries to have as much flexibility—generally weak governance. On climate, yes, they are leaders on climate, provided that it is only one target and one instrument, ETS. We do not do renewables, and we do not do efficiency in a meaningful way. So it is a rather mixed picture. It would make a difference, though, if you left, because of the other countries that would take up that place.

Chair

Peter, you can usefully follow on from this, I think.

Peter Aldous

How good do you feel the EU is at ensuring that its legislation is both implemented and enforced?

Pieter de Pous

It really depends which legislation you are talking about. If you look at some of the headlines recently about Google, Gazprom and McDonalds being taken on by Vestager on competition charges, and if you look at the fact that the Commission can send inspectors to Brazil to a farm to check the farm hygiene of Brazilian beef producers, the Commission can be very serious and very effective in the enforcement of these policies. They are not doing this on the environment.

Peter Aldous

On something like that, when the EU sends its inspectors to Brazil, do you think that they have got the right scientific expertise in the Commission to do that, and the right evidence base?

Pieter de Pous

The Brazil example was taking place during the referendum in Ireland on the Lisbon treaty and it helped Irish beef producers, so there was a slight political motivation there. The capacity to do that was developed in response to crisis—the foot and mouth crisis at the time. Of course, very often in the case of crisis in the Commission we decide to step above our shadow and do something. The obvious question now is what is going to happen after the Volkswagen crisis. Are we going to look into how we are enforcing the kinds of emissions standards we ask our car industry to comply with?

Peter Aldous

Have you got the capacity and the expertise to do that?

Pieter de Pous

My organisation is an NGO, so obviously we do not. The Commission clearly does not. Providing the expertise and the capacity is a political decision that is a difficult one to take at this point in time.

Peter Aldous

How should they address that?

Pieter de Pous

Like I said, it is a political decision. We make our case, and we need to see where it goes.

Professor Bruyninckx

I would say that, as the European Environment Agency, we are responsible for a large part of the evidence base that can be linked to the implementation of policies and the evaluation of what is actually happening. We do that in several ways. First of all, of course, we look at the state of the environment, which shows the impact of the policies. I think the evidence base is rather solid there, because we work with all the member states in a binding way based on a number of indicator sets and data that we gather and compare, which are calibrated and discussed highly professionally. In those terms, the evidence base is rather solid. When you look at what is driving the pressures on the environment, you come to a different set of analyses. You need to make the link with agriculture, the energy system and the mobility system. It is a building exercise, where we work together with Eurostat and other institutions such as the OECD on some issues. So they are solid institutions. In terms of response to the policies, it is important to understand where implementation and performance are coming from. Sometimes there is a large time lag effect, because if you have policies on biodiversity that needs to rebound, that might be 10, 20 or 30 years down the road. So good implementation requires a sophisticated, well understood and evidence-based approach. In the agency, we are trying to do two things: on the one hand, responding with the evidence base for the immediate annual reporting of where we are, and on the other using the broader evidence base to have a better understanding of why we are where we are. When we look two decades into the future, we use that same evidence base to make more sophisticated analyses.

Martin Nesbit

I would just add that it is a process that is developing and improving as the years go by. I think the Commission has progressively moved from a focus on infringement proceedings against member states to a more co-operative approach. You can see that underpinning the current seventh environmental action programme to some extent, with its focus on implementation. Also—this is perhaps slightly more controversial—there is the letter that Commission President Juncker wrote to Commissioner Vella on his appointment as the Environment Commissioner, which essentially says to him, “Don’t bother coming forward with new legislative proposals. Let’s focus on what’s already there and getting that right.” That move away from a focus just on infringement responsibilities is slightly challenging for the Commission, because of its treaty obligations to take action where it sees failings, but there are a number of areas where that is being taken forward at working level. For example, the IMPEL network of environmental inspectorates across Europe is a very good forum for exchanging information on implementation challenges, and there is a joint UK, Netherlands and Germany programme of work called the “Make it Work” project, which is looking at sharing experience among member states on improving implementation.

Professor Bruyninckx

May I add that there is also a network of the heads of the EPAs of Europe? I think that is important for the UK, because the heads of the four EPAs are represented. It is important because implementation, and understanding how policies are shaped by more local components, is clearly represented there. It is the highest level of professional exchange on policy implementation and on better regulation—there is a working group on that that produces very good papers, primarily driven by the UK representatives. So there are all sorts of international, European-level exchanges on implementation and performance.

Chair

Geraint, you have a specific follow-up on this theme, I understand.

Geraint Davies

Just a very quick one. Professor Hans—if I can call him that too—mentioned the issue of NOx in Britain. We know that something like 32,000 people die each year from diesel emissions, and obviously we have had the problem of defeat devices in VW. I was wondering what the European Environment Agency was actually going to do about that, if anything at all.

Professor Bruyninckx

For years we have been reporting on transport and environment-related matters. That is to do with emissions of different chemicals, of course. What we have written for a number of years is that our estimate is that the real driving conditions and the lab conditions for CO2 emissions were about 20% to 35% off—the larger the car, the larger the difference. For other chemicals, like NOx, we have made estimates of five to eight times, but we are the knowledge institution; we are not the enforcers or the control body. We have our mandate. We have been writing about these things. I have given testimony in the European Parliament to both the Transport Committee and the Environment Committee on these issues, and we have been consulted by the Commission on these matters.

Geraint Davies

Before I bring Mr de Pous in, you will know that in 1998 the Environmental Protection Agency in America brought a case against the diesel lorry producers, which were found to have these devices in them then and were fined $1 billion. Why has Europe done nothing about this? It is absolutely preposterous. Do you want to make a comment or some sort of defence?

Pieter de Pous

Not in defence. One of the interesting things is that what happened was not actually secret. The scandal broke because Volkswagen wanted to go into the US market through diesel, and someone—a very small NGO, in fact—managed to buy a few cars, do some testing and send the results to the EPA. The EPA in the US has enforcement powers, which is the difference with the Environment Agency in Copenhagen. We, as the EU, have taken a political decision that their job is to do science, and we have taken a decision not to create a similar body to do the kind of work that the EPA does. There is a very good question: why was it the US regulators that discovered this? In the case of Germany, it is a very small body that reports to the Transport Ministry that would have been the one to discover this, and they just had no incentive to do that because Volkswagen is a national industrial champion, so they would not take that up. There is now a debate, at least, on this issue, to try to move forward. From what we have heard, the Commission is coming up a proposal to try to solve this.

Geraint Davies

On that point, there was some suggestion that Chancellor Merkel was saying to David Cameron, “Go easy on Volkswagen,” and all that sort of stuff. Does the Environment Agency have no power to do anything about this? This is criminal activity. In 1998, it was all discovered, but it’s all happening here again, and 30,000 people are dying, so what is happening?

Chair

To come back to the thing we started with, are we doing well enough on not only the monitoring but the enforcement? Is there something better that needs to be done?

Professor Bruyninckx

It is clear that for the national bodies that check on the car industry, there is no overarching European governance system to make sure that they are, indeed, functioning. Again, I say that from the knowledge I have. This is not part of our mandate. I would like to point out that we do not do science. We link knowledge to policy makers; we are not a scientific institution.

Chair

Mr Nesbit, did you want to come in on that?

Martin Nesbit

Just with an observation. In essence, we have here one of those cases where the intergovernmental nature of the implementation of legislation within the EU may not work as effectively, but whether that means there is sufficient political will to move to a much more centralised system, I rather doubt. Mr Aldous referred earlier to the EU sending its inspectors. By and large, the EU does not send inspectors. Its member states inspect the implementation of legislation or the implementation of agriculture policy.

Professor Bruyninckx

Which is what the member states wanted.

Chair

Interesting.

Rebecca Pow

I think it was mentioned that we were leaders on NOx emissions, yet I believe the UK has not met its air pollution targets. We are now coming to Europe and are going to have pay some massive fines. Would you say that that is working well, or would you say it is not constructive and that the money would be much better spent sorting out the problem?

Chair

Or is that a good example of where Europe does actually follow through with enforcement?

Rebecca Pow

We could be fined. We have targets set by Europe, basically.

Professor Bruyninckx

Air pollution is, of course, not one or two pollutants; it is a whole set of pollutants. In many urban environments, especially in Europe, it is fine particulate matter that is a big problem—ground-level ozone in some other parts, but not in the UK, because of climate and weather issues. Hardly any member states in Europe reach all of the targets. If you then link them to the World Health Organisation’s targets, there is quite a big distance. The one big issue there is, indeed, transport in urban environments. That is absolutely clear.

Chair

Okay. We won’t get bogged down in that sector for a moment.

Carolyn Harris

Do you think that the right balance has been struck in environmental policy between the objective of setting a common European framework and allowing for distinct national approaches?

Professor Bruyninckx

Yes, I do think that is the case. The EU sets policies at three different levels. On the one hand, there are overarching, broader policy packages. You can think of the circular economy package as the most recent, but there are also the climate and energy package and the energy union—those are the big three, you could almost say macro-societal, directions that are taken. Then you have the framework directives that often hang under them, and then you have the very concrete directives and regulations. I think the essence of the first two is that, indeed, member states are co-creators of those sorts of packages. There is quite a bit of leeway in how they are implemented, which is why on the waste directives, for example, there is a huge difference in implementation modalities, which is also normal. A rural area in northern Finland is not the same as a highly densely populated area in the southern part of England, so I think there is a need for that differentiation, and that scope is there.

Carolyn Harris

You talk about the framework criteria, but you are leaving the choice of implementation up to the member states. Is it flexible enough?

Professor Bruyninckx

I think in most of these directives and frameworks there is a lot of national discretion. In the climate and energy package, it is quite clear where the emphasis is on the choice for the energy mix, for example. That is completely in the hands of the member states, which is a crucial decision in the light of longer-term climate and energy objectives and the transition of an energy system. So yes, I do think that, in most cases, there is a lot of discretion at national level.

Chair

Do our other two guests have anything to add either in agreement or on points of difference with what we have heard?

Martin Nesbit

I would say that the difficulty is in addressing these questions across the whole of the environmental acquis. Quite often, I’m afraid my honest answer is, “By and large yes, but it depends.” European legislation does a number of different sorts of things. In some cases it sets environmental outcomes. So for example, on the total CO2 emissions for a member state and the effort-sharing decision, sometimes it sets product rules governing what is then tradeable within the internal market, and then it also sets point-source emissions requirements for things such as large combustion plants. The level of flexibility differs in those different pieces legislation. Generally, the legislation that sets overall outcome requirements for member states is pretty permissive and does allow a range of different policy approaches that are responsive to national circumstances. For product legislation, you don’t actually want that much flexibility for member states, because a product is a product and can move across borders. For point-source emissions, I would say that the record is mixed. From my point of view, I would say that you could potentially have more allowance for policy experimentation at national or regional level in different ways.

Chair

Can you give an example of the sort of policy area?

Martin Nesbit

For example, the large combustion plants directive was renegotiated at the beginning of the 21st century, and there was a debate about what requirements should be imposed on old coal-fired power plants. There might have been potentially greater flexibility allowed within that directive, within a limited scope, for emissions across a member state and whether you could allow more time for some of those plants to close down and end their process. There was a lot of discussion within Council about exactly what impact that had on competitiveness, and we didn’t end up with much flexibility.

Pieter de Pous

I was going to say that I agree with Mr Nesbit, except on the last point, so perhaps I will answer on that. It is correct that it depends on a case-by-case basis, but we really see the whole issue of experimentation as something that has to be done on top of the minimum requirements that we have all agreed to in Europe. The whole debate about gold-plating in that respect is quite dangerous, because you are basically referring to a right that member states secured for themselves when they negotiated the EU treaty—in certain cases, they are allowed to go beyond the minimum standards, even if that has implications for the single market. There are some conditions to that, but it is where the experimentation, innovation and new ideas can come from.

Chair

In going further?

Pieter de Pous

In going further. That is how we would like to see it, and we see that as a good thing. The fact that we are all discussing gold-plating as something that we shouldn’t be doing is seriously reducing that kind of thing. We were talking earlier about the leaders in environmental policy—the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark—but that is changing and they are moving away from that, which means that the room for experimentation, innovation and new ideas on governance is no longer there. That is a negative thing, in our view.

Mary Creagh

What do you fear most from a potential UK exit from the European Union? What detrimental effect do think that would have on the quality of environmental decision-making and thought leadership throughout the European Union?

Professor Bruyninckx

For the UK, or for the Union?

Mary Creagh

No, not for us; for the other member states.

Professor Bruyninckx

For the core business in which we are engaging, we would be lacking essential knowledge components for understanding the cross-border dynamics of most of these issues, because they are cross-border. At the same time, I believe that the UK would remain a member of most of the knowledge networks, so you would be contributing without defining the rules in the same way. I also think that the consequences of not being involved in the Union would come on both sides in the international sphere. If you look at the Paris COP, at the biodiversity negotiations, and all the negotiations that take place internationally, it would weaken the position of both the EU and the UK if the two were not linked. That would not be a good thing for Europe.

Mary Creagh

Can you expand on how the EU’s position would be weakened in, for example, the Nagoya process?

Professor Bruyninckx

I think in several ways. Of course, the UK is a big member state that historically has been a strong partner in, for example, multilateral negotiations. It is also clear that the UK is one of the greats at diplomacy on this planet, so if we do international negotiations, not having the support of UK diplomacy would weaken the EU position overall. As a big member state, the UK has a particular inroad and even an influence on parts of the world that perhaps other member states do not have, so on a global level I do think it would weaken the EU position, and the other way around.

Mary Creagh

Does anyone have anything to add?

Pieter de Pous

The question of course also depends very much on what the relationship would be like after you had left—for example, if you were to become like a Switzerland or a Norway and implement all the policies that we agree without deciding on them at all. A major source of concern is the precedent of fact, but that goes much broader than the environmental field. Once the UK leaves, there is a concern that lots of other countries will start to think, “Well, maybe that’s something for us as well.”

Mary Creagh

So you think we could start a chain reaction of other countries exiting.

Pieter de Pous

That is a concern that a lot of people have, but it is not specific to the environmental field. It is a more general concern.

Geraint Davies

Following directly on from that, if Britain’s ambition was to maximise the prospect of the Paris agreements being fulfilled globally, would you agree that the best strategy for doing that would be to take leadership in Europe so that, as a bigger player in the global environment, Europe can in turn influence the world? The alternative scenario would be us pulling out and perhaps leading to the disintegration of Europe, which would have the opposite effect. What would you see as our best strategy on delivering Paris through being in Europe or otherwise?

Professor Bruyninckx

It is clear that the EU, with 28 member states and in a binding fashion, has been by far the leader in climate policy instrument development and also delivery. Since 1990, the EU economy grew by 46% and the emissions are now at -23%, so we have demonstrated that decoupling in an absolute way is actually possible. We have been leaders in developing tools and technologies. A recent study illustrates quite nicely that where we are stronger than north America and Asia—in terms of patents, innovation and development of new technologies—is exactly in those sectors. Now that the playing field has been levelled on a global scale—because everybody now has to do climate policy—jointly in Europe we have by far the strongest network in knowledge, but also in policy instruments and in industrial and research capacity to make use of this global market that is opening up and the need for that type of technology.

Geraint Davies

And Britain is a driver in keeping EU leadership on a global scale?

Professor Bruyninckx

The UK, throughout this whole process on the climate negotiations, has been a solid partner, yes. You could go into the details of the different components of the climate policy, the energy debate and the renewables, and all of that, but on the fundamentals of binding it globally and in line with the science, the UK has been a solid partner in this.

Martin Nesbit

It is certainly true, as Hans Bruyninckx explained, that the UK has been one of the member states that has been most keen on climate ambition. That has been true since the politician after whom this room is named, and it remains more or less true now. Were you to have the UK departing, the balance of climate ambition amongst the remaining 27 member states would shift away from climate ambition and there would be more chance of blocking minorities on legislation to influence some of the Paris objectives. Certainly that would be a concern. I would say that the EU has been an interesting microcosm demonstrating the potential for economies to deliver together on environment ambitions. Moving away from climate, I would say that the UK tends to have a reputation as a rather scratchy, resistant, obstructive and awkward negotiator, usually focusing on how the legislation is going to be implemented, and sometimes genuinely helping to ensure that those implementation questions are addressed during the negotiation of the legislation—I have to say that, because that is what I was doing for much of my life. Were the UK to be outside the EU, you would end up in a situation where the UK was required to implement legislation without having that sometimes quite healthy influence of focusing on implementation during the writing of the legislation.

Chair

Mr Nesbit, I have to point out as a former negotiator—and I do recall your involvement as well—that we were never scratchy or awkward. We were gorgeous and lovely—or tidy, as they say in Wales.

Mr Lilley

There are two aspects of addressing any environmental policy. One is: is it a good policy in terms of its effectiveness and cost? The other is: who should make it? There is the principle of subsidiarity in Europe, which implies that environmental policy should be made at the European level only if there is a cross-border aspect. Are there any European environmental directives or regulations which, on that basis, could be returned—even though they are perfectly good policies—to member states?

Pieter de Pous

We almost had a soil policy, but we didn’t and one of the reasons was exactly the argument you made. We think that it could be seen in a bit more of a broader sense, looking at the function of an issue such as soil protection in the broader context of food security, biodiversity, ecosystem services, and there is a case for that. The question is debated on a case-by-case basis, and all the policies that finally saw the light of day and were agreed went through that debate. I couldn’t give you an example of—what sometimes happens is that policies develop further. In the waste field, there was a directive that dealt with a certain aspect of batteries, which is being addressed in a more general waste framework directive, so there are examples of where things move on and become obsolete and may be taken off the books.

Professor Bruyninckx

My view is that policy is usually a long, complex process of setting a norm and then implementation. The question is more relevant to the level at which part of a policy best takes place. That is why we speak about multi-level implementation and multi-level governance in the environment and in climate. For some issues, that is the urban setting; for others, it might be regional or Alpine. There are many approaches The same goes for multi-actor issues. There is a debate about public, private and civil society. A more sophisticated approach to what should happen at what level and with what combination of actors is definitely worth having, not only at the European level but in many national settings. I think we need a more sophisticated approach than a national or European dichotomy.

Martin Nesbit

I would say that there is a broad spectrum. There are certainly a number of areas that are clearly less well suited to European legislation. They tend to be those areas where European legislation has had least impact. There is some legislation on noise, but it tends not to be binding and constraining. There is also relatively little European intervention in the land use planning systems of individual member states. Although the cross-border context might not be particularly relevant to the environmental medium, I would suggest that competition concerns will be relevant in some cases. In order to be able to make progress towards the sorts of environmental standards that populations across the EU would like to see, it will be easier for member states to do that together rather than separately and individually. It is not necessarily an argument that will wash with everybody, but it is one of the reasons for a number of the areas in environmental legislation. The discussion that we were having earlier about gold-plating demonstrates some of the difficulties that member states face in making further environmental progress. In a sense, the opportunity to be more ambitious in environmental terms is precisely one of those flexibilities that the European system allows the UK, yet the UK voluntarily decides that it does not want to make use of that flexibility. Essentially, it is making that decision because it is concerned, I guess, about the impact on the competitiveness of its businesses. In a sense, that demonstrates that concerns about business competitiveness can hold back environmental progress.

Mr Lilley

You obviously know far more about what environmental legislation exists at a European level than I do. I am very ignorant about this, but I have heard of water standards. What is the cross-border reasoning for water standards being uniform across Europe, rather than each country deciding its own water standards? The same goes for beach standards. There are no British rivers that pass through other countries, so why should river quality be determined supra-nationally rather than nationally? What about the mineral waste directive—slag heaps and all that? I don’t want slag heaps, and I am sure the mineral waste directive is something we would transpose into British law even if it did not exist in European law, but I don’t see why we have any interest in other countries’ mineral waste directives. Those are just a few examples that spring to my mind where I can’t see any cross-border reason.

Chair

There’s your challenge.

Pieter de Pous

The rest of Europe is, of course, not an island, and most European countries do share cross-border river basins. A lot of these countries are the ones demanding the action. When, about 15 years ago, the Elbe river was flooding, the German Chancellor went to Brussels and said, “I want a floods directive to make sure the Czechs do their bit of the work in flood defences.”

Mr Lilley

I understand that.

Pieter de Pous

So the fact you can’t address water problems in a localised manner was one of the reasons. We have tried it, actually, before. We had the water—

Mr Lilley

But we could in the UK, couldn’t we?

Pieter de Pous

You could, as the UK.

Mary Creagh

Can I come in?

Mr Lilley

Sorry, I wasn’t asking you the question.

Mary Creagh

Sorry, okay.

Chair

Hold back.

Pieter de Pous

The other reason why a lot of things are being done Europe-wide is simply the single market and the fact that we are creating a single market whereby—

Mr Lilley

Water standards, the mineral waste directive, beaches?

Pieter de Pous

Pollutants, products. The pollution of beaches comes from everywhere. Plastic waste—a major pollutant of beaches—comes from everywhere, and if you want to start making a dent in that—

Mr Lilley

So how do we control it, then, if it comes from elsewhere?

Pieter de Pous

Well, that’s where, in the end, you need a global solution, but the EU has the economic weight and economies of scale so that it actually makes a difference already if the EU does something. Secondly, it has an impact on the rest of the world. The EU is a global standards setter, unlike, for example, the US. So 70% of the car industry in the world follows EU standards and rules, not the US. Now, that is before Volkswagen happened, and we will have to see how people react to that, but that is evidence for the fact that the EU’s policies and standards matter and make a difference. Individual member states—even Germany, or the UK of course—would not have that influence.

Mr Lilley

So you can’t really think of any cross-border reasons for most of these directives.

Chair

Maybe I can flip it around. Is there an area the EU is currently involved with that could actually be tackled simply on a member state basis?

Professor Bruyninckx

If you pose the question in that way, there could be many areas, but the question is, is that the smartest choice? Is it the smartest choice for the environment? Is it the smartest choice for the economy, in terms of creating a level playing field for products and services? Is it the smartest choice in terms of building a knowledge network in Europe? Does it position us in the best way in a globalising world, where Europe is increasingly a small portion of that world? You could make all sorts of choices, but you should frame the question as, where are the costs and where are the benefits of those choices? Those are terribly important. There is a reason why countries like Norway follow most of our legislation—because they see a lot of benefits. Actually, they are among the best implementers of our legislation. Could they do it in another way? Yes, they could, but they see the benefits of this.

Chair

Thank you. We are going to move on. Previously today, we have heard praise for the Picts and the Celts around the room. John, over to you.

John Mc Nally

Thanks for that, Chair. I have to say thanks very much to the two panels. Their information has been enlightening, and I have been very impressed with it. You probably didn’t know you had another job as a futurologist. As you heard, we mentioned how the Picts and the Celts are doing. As you are aware, in recent decades the UK has become a lot more devolved in its structure, with legislation and legislators in Scotland and Wales. How do you think this restructuring of the legislation in the UK has affected the implementation and evaluation of EU policies? What effect has it had or could it have? Mr Nesbit, would you like to go first?

Martin Nesbit

No, but I will.

Chair

You do have some experience of this from your previous background.

Martin Nesbit

Pre-devolution, there was an existing process where the Scotland Office, Wales Office and Northern Ireland Office were responsible for implementation. Clearly there was a fairly significant element of democratic deficit in that. We have now moved to a much more logical system. It is now easier to ensure that the challenges faced, particularly in the highlands and islands of Scotland, are addressed at an early stage in negotiations on legislation, because there is that level of political engagement from the devolved Administrations. To be honest, I have not seen that much evidence of a particular process of learning from the different approaches to implementation within the devolved Administrations, because in a sense it is simply adding to the number of examples of different approaches to implementation that you already have at member state level across the rest of the EU. The “Make it Work” project that I referred to earlier recently had an interesting meeting in Scotland hosted by SEPA. That was a valuable opportunity to hear about the Scottish approach to implementation of a range of environmental legislation. Authorities talking to each other and exchanging views is very much part of the normal process of implementation.

John Mc Nally

I do think that we can learn from each other, as was mentioned earlier. That is of great value. Last week we had a debate here on ancient trees and woodlands. We are doing some things in Scotland that are different from in England, and we are learning from one another.

Professor Bruyninckx

Of course, the UK is not the only country in which that is taking place. My own country, Belgium, is probably the strongest case of devolved competences, but Spain and Germany are other examples. The sort of general devolution was followed by the competences that came with it. There was not necessary an environmental reason for it to be devolved—it follows the political devolution overall. From working with different devolved entities in Europe, it is clear that this is partially seen as a response to more adapted approaches to implementation and policy setting. At the same time, we see a learning from that. If you look at the four entities of the UK that are part of the EPA network, it is clear that they come with rather different and inspiring examples, and that is enriching for the network. As a consequence of that, there is probably more innovation in UK policies overall.

John Mc Nally

Do you think the devolved Administrations can react more quickly to the relevant areas? Is that what you are saying?

Professor Bruyninckx

I would have to see serious research to answer the question of whether they do it more quickly. I have the impression that they focus on things that are probably more relevant, either on environment issues proper or on a sort of broader governmental approach. For example, the Welsh approach to wellbeing and sustainability in its environment policies is an overarching governmental choice that is reflected in the environment. Scotland has been paying a lot of attention to the evaluation of ecosystems in its approach. That is an overall approach to how you value public intervention and public capital. These different approaches are reflected in the environmental policies that we see. In a way, that is enriching to the debate.

Chair

I want to carry on, but Professor Bruyninckx, you have to leave. I am doing my best job of chairing.

Professor Bruyninckx

Okay. I hope that has to do with my flight.

Chair

Indeed; you have to leave, and you do so with our best wishes.

Professor Bruyninckx

I am very happy that you are the guardian of my time.

Chair

Thank you very much for your time. All the best for your journey back. If we do have anything else to ask you, we may follow up with you in some email correspondence.

Professor Bruyninckx

Absolutely, or video link—anything.

Chair

May I ask our other witnesses, are you okay to stay for another 15 or 20 minutes? Yes? Thank you. Pieter, was there anything you wanted to add to John’s point before I bring Geraint in briefly?

Pieter de Pous

The question of how you divide your competence, of course, is mostly a national issue. One complication it creates is that the authorities that implement policies are not the ones negotiating the policies, and one effect you see in Brussels is that the regions that are not at the negotiating table invest a lot in very big representations. The representation of Bavaria is in the biggest mini-castle, right next to the Parliaments, so they need to invest quite a bit in that. There are drawbacks there. The water framework directive is widely seen as a Scottish directive, because it seems to be working so well in Scotland.

Geraint Davies

A point was made previously about devolving power back to nation states. Do you agree that devolved Administrations and nation states have so much flexibility over how to implement things, or indeed how to show leadership or innovation in areas such as flood risk management, that that balances out the people who want to leave Europe so that we can decide our own way of doing things? In a way, we already have a great deal of flexibility on the ground to do things in our own way.

Pieter de Pous

If there would be more flexibility after you have—

Geraint Davies

No, I am just asking whether you agree that the variation in the way flood risk management, for example, is done between Scotland, England and Wales, let alone across Europe, shows that there is a lot of flexibility in the system and that people who say it is all imposed on us by the Commission are in fact getting the wrong idea.

Chair

Would you like to answer, Mr Nesbit?

Martin Nesbit

While Pieter is thinking, I will say that you had an interesting piece of written evidence from, I think, someone at Dundee University, whose name escapes me, pointing to the fact that you do have this different approach to implementation in different devolved Administrations, but that the underpinning of EU legislation is critical to ensuring that there is some commonality in the results aimed at by the different parts of the UK, and expressing concern about a situation where you did not have that underpinning at European level. That is one thing you might want to look at.

Chair

My observation is that there is indeed flexibility among devolved nations—not simply within the UK, but elsewhere with devolved governance—over the interpretation of various framework directives. That exists not only at national level—in our example, for the UK—but in terms of what Scotland does and what Wales does. Whether it involves our approach to uplands or the way in which we implement measures on air pollution in individual cities and regions, that flexibility does exist—some of that flexibility exists.

Martin Nesbit

It is not so much flexibility around interpretation; it is flexibility around the means to achieve a particular set of objectives and ensuring that that can be done in the way that makes most sense in the regional circumstances.

Chair

But you always have to track it back up to what the directive is stipulating you should be aiming for.

Pieter de Pous

Yes. I agree with you that there is a lot of flexibility. One difficulty is that most member states like to have a lot of flexibility for themselves, but not too much for the neighbours. Air pollution is a classic case: a lot of air pollution comes into the UK from France, but the UK sends a lot on to the Netherlands, and the Netherlands sends it on—it goes in both directions, depending on the way the wind blows. If you want to do something about that, you of course need some stringency in terms of outcome. I am Dutch myself and I know the Dutch situation reasonably well, and one difference between the Dutch system and the EU system is that in the Netherlands it is more about effort—as long as we all try, that is good enough—whereas in the EU system you do need to deliver at the end of the day. The debate is about whether you set very stringent outcome targets and then everyone can decide themselves how they will achieve them, or do you have more stringent procedural requirements, measures and so on? That is like two communicating barrels. If you have more stringency on the target, you can be more flexible on the measures. If you are very unclear about your targets, you might need to be more clear about the measures.

Chair

Which brings us quite neatly on to your point about implementation, Luke.

Luke Hall

Yes. You talked a bit earlier about how good the EU is at ensuring that legislation is in place and in force. Do you think there are any specific steps that can be taken here in the UK to improve implementation and enforcement of EU policies in the UK?

Martin Nesbit

I would certainly say that there is scope for doing that, and there is a lot of effort in DEFRA and DECC going into looking at how implementation can be improved—for example, how you can reduce the quantity of guidance that you expect businesses to read and digest before working out how to comply with legislation. The NFU was saying earlier that providing people with too much information can be a constraint on their making the sorts of decisions that you want them to reach. Certainly there is scope for improving how we go about implementation, and for continuing to try to find the best ways of doing that. There is also the potential for making much better use of the digitisation of Government services to deliver that, and making much better public use of the information contained within systems on compliance and enforcement at individual installation level. I know that there is some very interesting experience of the Irish Environmental Protection Agency introducing a new IT system bringing together all their environmental permitting, and making that information publicly available. That appears to have been successful. On the other hand, this stuff takes a lot of time, effort and often public investment, at a time of restraints within the UK and most other countries. [Interruption.] I hope that noise isn’t an indication of budgetary constraints affecting Parliaments.

Chair

My apologies for that noise on the speakers. You did well to keep your train of thought. Carry on.

Martin Nesbit

It takes time, people and money.

Pieter de Pous

Member states have the main responsibility for making sure that laws are enforced; the Commission needs to make sure it then does its part. As we discussed earlier, there is a lot more that needs to be done apart from putting resources in it, because there is no way around it: it doesn’t happen by itself. Laws are as effective as the chance of their being controlled. The farming sector is actually one of the sectors with the least controls, compared with most other sectors. One interesting thing is the role of new technologies. The kind of technologies you see in precision farming, for example, could be used for enforcement purposes as well, but also for other activities in other sectors. There is a lot to be improved. On whether we let member states or the Commission do it, we are open to both options as long as it gets done.

Chair

I will bring Mary in on a specific question.

Mary Creagh

The EU recently adopted a new circular economy package—that is what our brief says. Perhaps we are wrong. In your opinion, will the adoption of this package be a force for good—for better environmental protection? Can you say something about the timescales for implementation and any early indications that you have about how different member states may be choosing to implement it, or is it too early to tell?

Chair

And if we are missing a contribution from Professor Bruyninckx now, by all means tell us.

Martin Nesbit

Pieter probably knows much more about the package than I do, but at the moment it is a proposal that has been put on the table by the Commission.

Mary Creagh

Oh, so it hasn’t been adopted.

Martin Nesbit

It is now starting the process of negotiation in the Council of Ministers.

Mary Creagh

So it has got to go through all its stages?

Martin Nesbit

It will take some time before it is adopted, if it is adopted as a piece of legislation. I’m afraid I’m not the expert on the detail.

Pieter de Pous

I can say a couple of things about it. First, a structured economy package was proposed in 2014, and what happened with it—the fact that it was withdrawn and re-tabled—tells a very interesting story about the new Commission, its political priorities and how it has adjusted them to events. I think the Commission underestimated the general level of support for the package, not only from environment NGOs but sectors of business too. The bad news is that the Commission wasted a whole year in basically recycling a policy proposal. We are one year ahead, with not many fundamental differences between the two. That doesn’t look good; it is as simple as that. On the other hand, the Commission has looked very deeply into the matter now. This is one of the few areas in which the Commission has been changing its political priorities and moving them away from, “These are the 10 things we are going to do, and the rest we will stop.” The circular economy is an issue that has made its way into the Commission’s thinking. It now sees it as part of the solution, coming back to jobs and growth. There have been benefits from the whole exercise, even though it does not look very good for the EU as such. On the substance of the proposal, it is a proposal for new recycling targets in municipal solid waste and a number of other waste streams, which makes a lot of sense. It is slightly less than the original one, but it is at a level that is achievable that cities and regions have been able to achieve in the past. It will be subject to negotiations now. That is going to start now. There is a whole other element to the package, which is what they call the action plan. Again, it is a recycling of things that the Commission would have done anyway, including setting standards for water reuse, which is more of an industrial policy. Instead of putting your waste water into the river, taking it out and cleaning it, you shorten the circle by cleaning the waste water without putting it into the river and reusing it straight away, so you have gains in that respect. There are things linked to best available techniques, but the really interesting bit—this is sometimes another subject of controversy—is the whole eco-design set of measures, such as the work done around vacuum cleaners, shower heads, et cetera, and trying to use those kinds of instruments to look at aspects other than energy without changing the functionality and effectiveness of the products. It is particularly about looking at repairability and planned obsolescence. Those are the kinds of things that the Commission is looking into, but it is only looking into them. It still needs to come forward with new proposals, and, again, that will depend on what member states think about it.

Geraint Davies

What changes do you see in the environment in Europe, due to both climate change and changes in urban development, and how do you see them as drivers for new environmental policy? You have 10 seconds.

Pieter de Pous

There are a number of political drivers. There is the Paris agreement and the New York agenda—“Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”. There are a number of global commitments. Another driver is resource scarcity and the prices of certain commodities as competition gets more severe. There are more and more scientific insights into how the environment is influencing what is going on around the world. Finally, there is technology and the need to catch up with technological innovations. Every new technology brings in new risks that you don’t know about because the technology is new and does new things that we are not aware of. That requires new ways of risk assessment, risk management and, of course, regulatory measures. Nanotechnology is a clear example. We have been massively subsidising research into nano-materials. We have been very slow in figuring out whether there is a nice way of assessing any new risk coming from those materials, but the fact that there is technological development does mean that there is a need to look into these things.

Martin Nesbit

That’s a much better answer than I have. I think there is a reasonably mature body of legislation on environmental media, and the focus will now increasingly shift towards the quantum of our society’s impact on the environment and the quantum of our use of resources and our total greenhouse gas emissions. There will not be so much focus on specific local environmental outcomes but more on the overall impact of the European economy.

Chair

May I ask you to look ahead a little bit? Based on what has happened with environmental policy over the last decade within Europe, which includes pressures to do with better regulation, the streamlining of decision making, greater involvement of member states and all of that, and the wider context of pressures on the EU itself, where do you see environmental policy at EU level going five years or 10 years hence? What will be the role of member states within that? What is going to be different?

Pieter de Pous

This is back to being a futurologist. I think that one of the reasons for the way in which the Commission operated in the last year—effectively deprioritising the environment—was an immediate reaction, “Okay, we have to fix the economy,” so it went back to the old-fashioned idea that the economy and the environment are mutually exclusive: “It is mostly a drag and a liability, so let’s not do that.” I think there are some good reasons why it may not remain like that. The international commitments we talked about earlier are one reason, and the fact that a lot of the issues we are addressing are part of a bigger picture is another. The kinds of political instabilities that we have are very much linked to competition for resources and the impact of climate change. Syria suffered a record drought, which of course was not the only reason but was a factor that contributed to everything else that happened there. A realisation of the need still to keep a big picture perspective and to remain committed to the global agenda for change that we agreed to in New York can be a reason why things may change. It is not very clear that the Commission is going to do it. In fact, in early January my organisation will publish a revised set of priorities to sort of do it for them, but we hope to see a debate going in that direction. The main uncertainty in the next six months, of course, is what will come out of the renegotiations that Mr Cameron will have with the rest of the member states. My organisation reacted to a proposal from Chancellor Osborne to introduce EU-wide deregulation targets, cutting red tape. That has been in place in the UK for a number of years, but it doesn’t apply to the implementation of EU rules. It is the same in a number of other countries. The moment we introduce that at EU level, it will be a completely different story. Whether that proposal will be taken up, and in what form, will have huge implications, and not in a good way—I was trying to be a bit more optimistic.

Chair

Better regulation is not compatible with good environmental protection?

Pieter de Pous

It depends how you do it. I think there are some good intentions behind better regulation—the effort to be more evidence-based, to be doing stakeholder consultations, et cetera—but the way that the UK has gone about it, for example, raises issues and makes it go very far. The way that the agenda evolves matters enormously.

Chair

Right. It is the way you do it.

Geraint Davies

It is deregulation.

Chair

Deregulation. Mr Nesbit, what will EU environmental policy look like in five years or 10 years?

Martin Nesbit

I think that the intention within the current Commission to ensure that they take a very corporate approach to the development of new proposals, and to limit the number of proposals that are tabled, will continue to be interesting. I would say that a good impact assessment process can be enormously helpful, provided it is used as an aid to political decision making, rather than as a replacement for it. Cost-benefit assessment is an imperfect science, and it won’t get you to a tick or cross answer—you still need that process of political decision making. The other element in this that matters is that quite often in discussions, both at member state level and at European level, the people engaging most on the industry side of the debate are the largest incumbent players with potentially the most to lose. They often have very important and entirely justifiable points to make, but they are not the whole picture in terms of the impact on the European economy. You tend not to focus on the smaller players with new products and innovations that are attempting to change the way that the UK and the EU economy functions. I hope to see the Commission focus much more on facilitating and encouraging that innovation and on ensuring that the interests of those players are reflected in the decision-making process, too.

Chair

Very good. Thank you both very much. Before we close, is there anything that we haven’t covered on which you would like to add something? No. Thank you very much. I thank Committee members, too. This was a very interesting session. Thank you very much indeed. If there is anything else that you subsequently consider would be worth putting in front of us, please write to us and keep in touch. Oral evidence: Assessment of EU/Uk Environmental Policy, HC 537