Oral evidence: Western Balkans Summit, HC 1013
Oral evidence, 22 May 2018.
Witnesses
Sir Robert Cooper, Professor James Ker-Lindsay, Dr Cvete Koneska and Ms Tena Prelec.
Chair
Welcome to the Foreign Affairs Committee this afternoon. Thank you very much for coming and helping us to understand the position in the Western Balkans, and the UK’s work in that, in advance of the Western Balkans summit.
Priti Patel
I have quite a broad question to start the discussion this afternoon. What are the prospects and the likely timeline of the Western Balkans six becoming members of the EU? I would like a view from all of you on what you see as the main hurdles and obstacles. Alongside that, is it right that we treat them en bloc as six?
Sir Robert Cooper
The Commission has talked about 2025. Seeing that we started talking about enlargement to include the Western Balkans around 2000, that is a long time. On the other hand, the EU has become more wary of enlargement. The experiences have not always been positive, including with countries from the Western Balkans. This is an area which still has a lot of trouble, notably with the rule of law. The EU is a community of law, and that is central to it. I think I will leave it there, because there are others who know more, but the answer is that I would not hold your breath.
Professor Ker-Lindsay
Obviously, it is a really open question. If I might come at it from a slightly different angle on treating them as a bloc, I think that would be very problematic, because there is such disparity between the different countries. We know, for example, that Montenegro has opened up around 30 of its 35 chapters, so it is very far advanced, but they have not tackled the most difficult questions yet. Although it looks a lot further ahead than the rest of them, we still have some very big problems to deal with. Of course, Serbia is next in line, but a whole range of issues have to be dealt with in that case, not least Kosovo. Those are seen as the two front-runners. You then move to, for example, Macedonia. We know that that was held up in the past because of its problems with Greece. There is a hope that, if there is a way of breaking the name issue deadlock, once it can start on the accession process hopefully it would make fairly rapid progress and start to catch up. But then you are left with Kosovo, for example, which is very far behind on a whole range of problems, and also you have got the question of its not being recognised by all the members. And Bosnia is a perennial problem. So really what we are looking at is a vast spread of countries. There is a danger in trying and treat them as a bloc. I can see the argument that some would say, especially with Serbia and Kosovo and how you deal with that problem, that you actually take away the incentive for the leading countries to reform if they think, “Whatever we do, we will just get held up for a further 15 years while we wait for the stragglers.” I can see an argument for it, but I think it is problematic.
Dr Koneska
I agree with the previous speaker, so I would like to focus, if that is okay, a little bit more on the hurdles and the local perspective from the Western Balkan societies themselves. I would like to mention two issues. The first is how the local politicians, political elites and populations perceive the accession process. In this area the carrot is not as sweet anymore, especially when compared with previous rounds of enlargement in central and eastern Europe when Europe was held and seen credibly as a model of wealth and prosperity. In societies in the Western Balkans, people there can see that 15 years down the line after the last east European enlargement, the central east Europeans have not really caught up with their western European peers, not only in terms of economic performance, which is an important indicator, but in terms of the quality of governance and democracy. Because a lot of the reforms have proven unsustainable and in some cases we have seen the reforms being diluted or backsliding, the EU accession process does not figure as prominently as the path towards democratisation and economic prosperity. The second issue from the local perspective is that EU membership and the criteria for joining the EU are a moving target: a faster moving target than the pace of reform in these societies. The previous speakers mentioned that it has been 25 years since we started talking about accession of the Western Balkan countries, but the number of chapters has increased, and the volume of EU law that needs to be absorbed into these countries has increased as well, so catching up with the process is becoming ever more difficult and the capacity of these societies is not increasing at the same pace, so we are seeing significant hurdles on both sides.
Ms Prelec
In terms of the timeline, I agree with the previous speakers. To make it a bit more precise, the European Commission’s February paper has opened the door for Serbia and Montenegro, who are the frontrunners, to perhaps enter the European Union by 2025, provided that certain conditions are met. This is a very, very big “if”. If nothing else, I think it strikes the right balance from the European Commission side in terms of acknowledging their awareness of the fact that, as Cvete said, this enlargement fatigue, this progressive loss of interest, or a perceived loss of interest in enlargement from the EU side, has carried with it a lot of issues with the democratisation of the region. On the one hand it is very positive that there has been a signal that accession is possible, but on the other hand, the real problem remains in the very deep issues in terms of rule of law and democratisation and the deep-seated issues concerning crime and corruption and so on and so forth, so I think a balance needs to be struck. I think it is important not to perceive these countries as a bloc. They are not a monolithic bloc. The two countries that are going to be considered for the beginning of the accession negotiations in June are Macedonia and Albania, so it will be interesting to see what the EU countries’ reaction is when they open negotiations with these countries.
Priti Patel
I am getting the sense that EU membership is not universally thought of as appropriate for all six countries. Can I quickly ask if that is a general view among you all?
Professor Ker-Lindsay
No, I think all of them are very clear that they see an EU future and no alternative to that. This is where the future lies. It’s just a question of how we make sure that they’re best prepared to join. I think this has been the lesson from previous enlargements. The one that people will often point to is Bulgaria and Romania: when they were taken in, it was felt to be more of a political statement, and they weren’t ready. I think the EU has taken on a very, very important lesson in that, and it’s now saying so. We also see that in how the enlargement process is handled: now the focus is on those chapters which prepare the countries best for rule of law because, of course, we think of rule of law from a political perspective, but, in terms of the economic ideals of the European Union and integration, you need to make sure that, if you’re investing in these countries, your investments are going to be protected. It’s actually a fundamental principle, if you like, and that’s where the emphasis lies.
Sir Robert Cooper
Yes, you must have a reliable court system. Because we’ve all been rather pessimistic, maybe I should say there are some other examples, of which the Baltic states are notable—they just got down to it. They said, “What is it we’re supposed to do? Give us a list.” And they did it, and it was very fast, and actually—they have their ups and downs, but they’re doing pretty well.
Ms Prelec
Yes, and I would also like to highlight that the EU enlargement process and the EU accession process in the Western Balkans has been predominantly very positive for those countries. There is, I think, also measurable progress that can be felt in terms of transparency and access to information, for instance, and in terms of—if nothing else—the rhetoric that is being promulgated by the political elites. I think the focus needs to be on understanding that long-term stability—which is what is in the interest of the EU and the UK as well—cannot be achieved only by surface reforms, but that this needs to be a very long-term process that focuses on some deep-seated issues. But, on a whole, I think we can all agree that the EU enlargement process in those countries has been a very positive drive in many respects.
Stephen Gethins
I was interested in what you said about the commitment at the political level to membership of the EU. Can you please set out for us how much public support there is in the Western Balkans? I know that’ll vary from country to country, and maybe you could set out how that breaks down in the different states.
Dr Koneska
That was a point I was going to add on to the previous question. Overall, and compared with other parts of the European Union or previous accession rounds, support for EU membership—enthusiasm in the region—is still considerably high. Within that context we are seeing quite substantial levels of political support, but that’s not the only context in which this can be seen and interpreted. The other one is looking over time, and over time support for EU accession and EU membership across the region has declined. My impression is that it will continue to do so—not dramatically, but gradually it will continue to decline. Partly this is normal, and we’ve seen that elsewhere in the region: as societies get closer to the accession itself and to membership, the idealistic, romanticised version of what it means to be an EU member becomes more diluted as they realise what the reality of what being an EU member is. The other thing is, as I said, there is a growing and widespread impression among the populations, if not so clearly articulated at the political level yet, that EU membership is perhaps not as attractive as it seemed, especially in the ’90s. This is natural: if your next-door neighbours are Bulgaria and Romania and they have been EU member states for more than a decade, it changes the reality of what you know and what you see as being an EU member is, in comparison with when the EU was somewhere far away in the ’90s—that was a completely different impression. As for country by country, I don’t have the actual poll data and I’m not aware of any very recent polls done with the same methodology across the region. I think the latest that I was aware of was 2010-11. It was done across the region, and I think at that stage we were seeing EU support levels above or around 70% in favour of EU membership. Maybe the other witnesses have more information.
Ms Prelec
It is not very recent data, but broadly I concur with what Cvete said. Support in general is more or less declining, but it is still quite strong. Around 50% of people in each country are strongly in favour of the EU. Something that needs to be taken into account is possible backsliding after accession, which can be seen for instance in Croatia. Some very positive developments have happened and some very specific technical institutions have been created during the accession process, such as the committee on conflicts of interest, which has been keeping politicians in check quite effectively for the past five years, but we now see some backsliding because the political will to keep it up is not so high. That is just to emphasise that it is important to really work to build a long-standing basis, in terms of the political debate and the democratic culture in those countries. That is why chapters 23 and 24 on judicial reform and the rule of law are so key and are now, rightly, taken by the European Commission as those that need to be kept under very high scrutiny. I think there is still a lack of very concrete measurement on how we measure progress. The way that the monitoring is done is still very broad, without specific targets, and that might be an issue. In terms of priorities, that is definitely the overall No. 1.
Professor Ker-Lindsay
Cvete made a very good point about how the EU has come closer to them, so they can see it and have a more realistic view of it. We must also take on board that a certain degree of frustration has crept in in these countries. They feel that they have been pushed back and that it is not as straightforward a process as it was in the 2004 big bang enlargement. That has also shaped a lot of people’s perceptions. The one example we give of that, which is cited time and again in the region, was the statement in 2014 by Jean-Claude Juncker. When he was running for the European Commission presidency, he was asked about enlargement and he said that there would be no enlargement in the next five years. For all of us who work on the Western Balkans, that was just a clear statement of fact—none of the countries was going to be ready. However, that was read very badly in the region. They saw it as a lack of commitment from the European Union. When you are going through difficult times preparing, people hope that it is going to be for the good in the end, but it does still mean making quite significant changes, and then feeling that the EU isn’t sincere about taking them in is naturally going to have an effect on public opinion. The EU needs to be sure that it calibrates that message very carefully and is saying, “Look, you have got to be able to reform to be able to meet the requirements, but there is no question but that your future lies in Europe”, and is trying to get that message across accurately.
Stephen Gethins
To go back to the original question, are there any variations within that? Is support for EU membership particularly high in some areas, say Montenegro, which is a little bit further on along the road, or particularly low elsewhere? Is there any evidence of that?
Professor Ker-Lindsay
Kosovo consistently scores the highest and Serbia consistently scores the lowest. I think the point that was raised is that there isn’t a standard methodology for all the polls that have been done recently, so you have to go country by country. If I remember rightly the latest poll showed 54% support in Serbia. That is complicated, as was mentioned earlier, by Kosovo. That is the lowest. I think you are really talking 60% or 70%.
Sir Robert Cooper
Given that this is a pretty miserable process, and it has gone on for a very long time, I think 54% is pretty good.
Andrew Rosindell
What do you think drives those countries to want to join the EU today? What do they think they will get from becoming part of the EU? Clearly, they have to adapt, reform and change to what the EU requires to do that. Where does the impetus come from? Is it the same as for other countries that decided to join previously, or have things changed?
Dr Koneska
There are different factors that will be more important for different parts of the population or political elites. By and large, I would say there are the economic factors. Although I said initially that the EU is not so much seen as the model for wealth and prosperity, it is still a significantly wealthier place than the Western Balkans. People can see that; they can travel and see how people live elsewhere, and it is attractive—they want that for themselves and for their children. That is where they want to see their societies progress to. That is important not just at the personal level, but because a lot of what political elites tend to show the domestic public is how much access we get to EU pre-accession funds at this stage, and what that means in terms of investing in infrastructure projects, which the budgets of those countries cannot fund by themselves. There is quite a lot of focus on tangible benefits for you and your family and society from becoming an EU member. That is not the whole story; it is a very important element but it is not all there is to it. There is also the fact that this is about belonging to what is seen as a politically desirable club of members that are seen as democratic, liberal and progressive. They are not uniformly so, but even so, these countries by themselves are relatively small and relatively unimportant on the international scene. Belonging to Europe, seen as part of a much more influential club in international politics and in European politics, is important. Perhaps this is not as widespread, but for a small part of the population it is about adopting the right set of values—liberal, democratic and tolerant—and moving beyond the legacies of the conflict of the ’90s. These are societies that will not only be referred to as the places of the Yugoslav wars and war crimes and atrocities; they have managed to overcome that and are now transitioning towards what they see as a normal democratic and progressive place. I am not sure what the balance among those three factors is, but that is how I see it.
Chris Bryant
Can I just ask about Bosnia? The general impression I have is that things have got worse in Bosnia, in terms of the three religious and ethnic silos there. Whereas in the past the older generation in Yugoslavia at least had something bigger than their own ethnic grouping to belong to, now you go to school and university within your ethnic group and you live your whole life there. You are all nodding. Is that your common perception?
Sir Robert Cooper
I do not think it is 100% like that, but that has certainly been the tendency.
Chair
I know of one school in Mostar that is both Christian and Muslim, but I believe it is the only one.
Chris Bryant
Embracing the bridge thing.
Sir Robert Cooper
There are active and courageous people who try to overcome that, but the networks of corruption that function in Bosnia are very ethnic.
Professor Ker-Lindsay
I think what is most worrying about Bosnia is the sense that everyone has now given up on it. There have been so many initiatives—I think the most recent was the Anglo-German one, which was a few years ago. The hope was to be able to shift the debate away from certain constitutional reforms that would have made it more in line with commitments to the European Court of Human Rights, which obviously is a fundamental part of joining the European Union, and to try to look at more social and economic reforms. I stand to be corrected, but that seems to have completely dropped off the international agenda. It really does seem that at the moment the EU’s focus in the Western Balkans is on trying to achieve progress where progress looks feasible and achievable. The big three issues that I would identify in the Western Balkans would be Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Macedonia name issue and preparing for that. Macedonia is the highest profile at the moment and it would be seen as a big win. Then I think of Kosovo, which I know Sir Robert will have a lot to say about, but Bosnia barely seems to be spoken about these days, sadly.
Sir Robert Cooper
If I may add to that, one of the reasons that way back we launched the process that made some progress and has now stalled in Serbia/Kosovo was because we thought, “If this succeeds, and particularly if Serbia makes a big step forward towards Europe, this will really shake them up in Bosnia.” We saw what happened in Bosnia when Serbia got visa liberalisation before they did. It was a big shock. We got angry letters from Lord Ashdown about it. But the fact is that the Bosnians then suddenly woke up and realised that all you had to do was meet the criteria.
Ms Prelec
There have been some examples of schoolchildren in Bosnia who have rebelled against this system of two different schools under the same roof. There is not a lack of a civil society movement. The whole structure is so entrenched that it is very difficult for them to get the space and build something positive that unites the three ethnicities, but there are initiatives that could be fostered.
Royston Smith
Among the EU member states, who are the main supporters and who are the main opponents to the Western Balkans accession to the EU?
Ms Prelec
Angela Merkel has been a big champion of enlargement over the past four years or so. Since the previous Commission under Jean-Claude Juncker decided not to propose any further enlargement in those five years, there has been this parallel process set up by Germany, the Berlin process, which the London summit will be a part of. On the other side of the spectrum at the moment we have France. Emmanuel Macron made some cautious statements at the European Parliament first and then at the Sofia summit last week, in the presence of the EU enlargement countries, saying that in his opinion the EU needs to reform before any enlargement can be made possible. These statements have been taken as a cold shower by all Balkan watchers, and also by the part of the European Commission that wanted to give a bit more of a warmer message to the EU enlargement countries. So at the moment France stands as the country that is most cautious. The Netherlands as well is quite cautious, as far as I know.
Sir Robert Cooper
On the positive side, I think that the UK, although its position is rather less strong, deserves a mention, at least as a long-standing active supporter.
Royston Smith
May I just push you on that, Sir Robert? The UK is, as you say, quite a force for Western Balkans accession, but will that situation be more difficult now that the UK is coming out of the EU and at the same time is suggesting that six other countries come into it?
Sir Robert Cooper
Yes. On this issue, which is not going to take place within the timescale of the UK’s departure, the UK is not very relevant at the moment. Nevertheless, the UK has been an important supporter. It changes the balance of the EU if it is not there. The other country I should mention, which is also going through some difficulties at the moment, is Italy, which has also been rather positive.
Royston Smith
So the UK and Italy are positive. The UK is coming out of the EU, and Italy is not sure what its future is within the EU. How will that affect the accession of the western Balkans in general, especially now that France is saying that it is not as keen as perhaps Germany is?
Professor Ker-Lindsay
The UK is in a very interesting position. There is actually an interesting argument to be made that, if we were staying in the European Union, we would actually have become a greater obstacle for the countries of the Western Balkans to join. The reason I say that is because traditionally, yes, we have been very supportive of enlargement. It has all been tied up with the widening versus deepening debate—the more countries you take in, the more you stop political union taking place in the European Union. However, the way the immigration debate has overtaken that in probably the past six or seven years has been very interesting. I think that, given the mood that exists in this country, had we narrowly voted to remain in the European Union, any Government would have been very politically sensitive about being seen to be taking in new countries and about freedom of movement in that sense. We might have actually seen the British Government taking a much tougher position on making sure that these countries are prepared and perhaps introducing longer timeframes and transition periods for freedom of movement, and maybe also slowing that process down a bit for political reasons. We are dealing with counter-factuals here, but it is still something to take on board. In that sense, I have heard some people say in the region that, strange as it is, maybe it is better off not having the UK as involved in that process, because had they been in they might have had to take this tougher position.
Ann Clwyd
I chaired a pre-accession committee on Portugal in the European Parliament for three years. It was a very useful process. What happens now when a country wants membership? Are there any pre-accession meetings?
Professor Ker-Lindsay
Yes. The European Parliament continues to take a very close interest in, and has rapporteurs for, the various countries. As you know, enlargement has to come under the Parliament as well—it has oversight on this process. Essentially, as well you know, it is ultimately a member state-driven process. The way it is handled is very interesting. Everyone obviously wants to have their look-in. The Commission is responsible for producing the regular progress reports, which aren’t quite as regular as they once were. Nevertheless, the way the various arms are involved is very interesting. The Commission will look over it and say that they believe a country is meeting the conditions in an area or where there is a shortfall. Of course, member states at the Council will then decide the pace at which chapters are opened, and there is pre-screening. The Commission will also make judgments on which ones they feel are right, but then it becomes very political, as we have seen with Cyprus and opening chapters on Turkey, for example, and Greece has of course vetoed the opening of any chapters with Macedonia.
Sir Robert Cooper
The EU as a whole is very involved in all of these countries. There are large Commission programmes, there is a great deal of political activity and there are enormous numbers of embassies. I remember looking at 15 or 16 ambassadors in Bosnia and thinking to myself, “I wonder what they are all doing.”
Ms Prelec
The enlargement process has become much more demanding than it has been in the past, especially after the big bang enlargement in 2004. These countries are now held to a higher standard than those that acceded before them.
Ann Clwyd
Can I ask you, Tena, what you think the Berlin process has achieved so far?
Ms Prelec
That is an interesting question. Initially, the question was whether the Berlin process would become a surrogate for EU enlargement on the whole, since EU enlargement did not seem to be a realistic process. This year we had an unblocking from the EU side—at least from the EU Commission—on the EU perspective on enlargement. However, the Berlin process has been a very interesting venue to discuss certain issues, and those issues have become wider and wider year by year. It started as a way of fostering economic integration and connectivity within the region, as a way of making those countries closer to one another from an economic perspective—from a very pragmatic type of perspective—and also to foster in a lateral way reconciliation among them, and at the same time keep the policy attention on the Western Balkans. The one thing that I would say it has definitely achieved so far is RYCO—the Regional Youth Cooperation Office—which is an institution that has been set up in Tirana with combined funds from the six states of the Western Balkans and those EU states involved in the Berlin process. This seems to be a very positive story so far, in the sense that there is now a board made up of youth from all over those countries that is now promoting projects of youth co-operation among those countries. It is an interesting combination of a quick win, because it is something that has already been set up, and something that looks for a long-term process for the future, because youth co-operation is key if we are to achieve long-standing reconciliation and co-operation between the countries. It is also based on the experience of Franco-German youth co-operation. That is something that has been achieved. In other fields, it is less clear. Economic co-operation is definitely on the table. Something that has not been discussed in much detail so far is the issue of post-conflict reconciliation. There is an initiative called RECOM, a regional council that would look at gathering facts. The ambition is to get all the political leaders on board from the region that had been involved in the conflicts of the 1990s in order to get the last word on what happened in the 1990s. This might seem like a futile exercise, but it actually is not if you think of how important it is to make all those political leaders really gain ownership over what the reconciliation process is, and how important it is to get to some sort of truth that is recognised by all the people in those countries, not only by single leaders here and there. These are the aspects that I would highlight; there are more, of course.
Chair
Thank you very much for your incredibly full answers, but we are slightly time constrained, so can I ask you to restrict yourselves very much to the question? I do appreciate that it is not always an easy thing to do.
Mike Gapes
Professor Ker-Lindsay, you referred to immigration. Is it not a fact that there are already very large numbers of people from these countries in other European states? I have Albanian and Kosovan constituents, and there are many from other countries, such as Germany and Austria. Mr Ibrahimović and others have made international careers and moved to different places. Is not the reality that the level of migration would be significantly less than would be whipped up because the total populations in all these countries are not very large, and large numbers of young people are already out of the countries?
Professor Ker-Lindsay
This is absolutely the argument that those of us who look at the Western Balkans would try to get across, but at the moment we have a very febrile atmosphere here in Britain on questions on immigration. I would readily make the point that the entire population of the Western Balkans—it depends on who you ask—would fall between 17 million and 19 million. Romania is over 20 million. We have already seen the large waves—but again, it is about the perception of this. Interestingly enough, Britain is not that popular a destination for the countries of the Western Balkans. It is a little out of date now, but the last major public opinion poll I saw on this, which would have been from 2009, showed that Britain did not even feature in the top 10 of countries around the world that young people from the Western Balkans wanted to go to. Those were the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Sweden, Austria and Switzerland—they were all well ahead of us.
Mike Gapes
Can I follow that up? We are holding this summit in London on 9 and 10 July as part of the Berlin process. What is the logic of holding it in London? When was the decision actually taken? Was it taken before the referendum of after?
Sir Robert Cooper
After.
Mike Gapes
Why have the British Government decided to host it?
Sir Robert Cooper
I am only guessing, but I think that the intention was to demonstrate continued commitment to the Balkans. We are leaving the European Union, not leaving Europe. This is an area where we have been continuously involved—where we had peacekeepers in the war—and we are not planning to give up. I think that is a decent message, actually.
Mike Gapes
I don’t need answers from others, but perhaps you can answer the next question. What do the six Western Balkan countries and the European Union expect and want from the UK at this summit?
Dr Koneska
That is a difficult question to answer. My take on it would be that for the political leaders who attend the summit in London this July, the main prize they are looking for is EU accession. Although the Berlin process is not about EU accession, it clearly is about EU accession. The fact that it was created as a separate vehicle to stand in for the accession process when it was frozen—temporarily put on hold—just emphasises the fact that these countries ultimately joined the Berlin process so that they had another forum in which they could meet and work towards that goal. That will be the main prize, and that is what they are there to do—to convince their EU counterparts that they are ready to get more out of that. What else can be achieved, and what is there for the British Government to do? That is not for me to know, but there are smaller issues that are also quite important. I said that EU accession was the main prize, but foreign investment is very important to the Western Balkans, because these countries have not seen as much investment pre-accession as the central and eastern European countries did, and Britain is a country they would like to see more investment and more trade and commercial relations coming from. That is clearly one thing that the delegations will be working at—and other forms of assistance.
Ms Prelec
Indeed. There are some ways in which the summit could spearhead a better way of holding the Berlin process meetings. One is this feeling that at the end of the day it is a bit of a photo opportunity, at which political leaders gather and issues are discussed but nothing really concrete is achieved. There are side meetings on the side of the summit—there are civil society, business and youth meetings every time. Civil society has been meeting throughout the year, and they have produced recommendations. It would be useful to get this streamlined into the big meeting.
Mike Gapes
But that could happen anywhere. It does not need London to be the venue.
Ms Prelec
Yes, but if London gets a fresh perspective from the summit, I think that will be a big impetus for the future.
Professor Ker-Lindsay
Bear with me for a moment on this one, because this is incredibly important. As somebody who works on south-east Europe, I desperately want the United Kingdom to take a clear role in the region, especially in the context of Brexit, but I have some very serious questions—I find this the whole time speaking to people from other EU member states and from the region—about why we are doing this. There are four or five different elements of this that really have to be brought out. First, we have not shown much interest before now. We have not attended the previous meetings, whether those were in Berlin, Vienna, Paris or Trieste. It is almost as though we have said, “Right, okay, we’re leaving the European Union. We want to have some significance. Why don’t we do this?” The second big question—this is the real exam question, which we have not been able to answer—is: how are we credibly holding an event that is centred on EU membership when we are leaving? Our problem is not necessarily that we are leaving the European Union, but the rationale that we are using, which becomes very difficult. If we said, “Look, we have given the EU a go, but you know what? After 40 years, it is not for us. We have relationships with the Commonwealth,” we could credibly have said something. But the argument is that we are taking back control—it is about sovereignty. We have not been able tell those countries why our sovereignty matters more to us than theirs should to them. That becomes a big problem; we have not answered that and everyone is scratching their heads. The third element is that we focus very much on a security agenda, but as has been pointed out, relationships have been built more on economics, connectivity and building ties. We have almost no economic relations with the Western Balkans. We have now said, “Look, security is something we are interested in. Why don’t we make this more about security?” That does not seem to fit with the way that has gone before. The fourth element goes back to the point that Tena raised about the youth forum. That is an incredibly important part of this process. In previous meetings, you would have the Heads of Government coming to the capital city of the host country, but before that, you would have civil society events that would go on in the margins. We cannot do that. We cannot get visas for people from the region to come here. So we are not doing an integral part of the Western Balkans Berlin process here in London. As I said, we at LSE were thinking of trying to do something, but we have had to give up on that, simply because we know that we will not be able to get the voices from the region. You see that there is a whole range of problems tied up with this issue. I am a huge believer that we should remain engaged with the Western Balkans; I still do not quite know how we are doing that and whether we have chosen the right way to do that.
Mr Seely
To follow up, this is the umpteenth time that we have heard about visa issues. They have related to people from Russia, Ukraine and the Baltics. These are not just people trying to come here and work on the sly—whether that is good or bad—but officials, dignitaries and people taking part in conferences. It seems absurd that global Britain seems to be closed for business.
Chair
The point you make on visas is absolutely valid, but it is a wider point for a rather larger inquiry.
Andrew Rosindell
Professor Ker-Lindsay’s comments roll nicely into my next point. On how they see us leaving the European Union; clearly, the fundamental difference is that we have had nearly 1,000 years of sovereignty and independence. The countries we are talking about have a history of being occupied and walked over. Of course, our sovereignty is deeply precious to us, but in other countries it is a new concept. So I think we can answer that very easily, but it rolls nicely into the point about NATO. NATO has been the guardian of our defence, freedom and democracy since world war two. How can NATO play a bigger role? What does it do at the moment and how can it play a bigger role? Is it a sufficient mechanism for the UK to be engaged with the Western Balkans, or do we need to find other mechanisms?
Sir Robert Cooper
At present, the EU force in Bosnia, which is a very small force but nevertheless a good thing, is an EU force, not a NATO force. The reserves for that, which are almost more important than the force, because if there is trouble it is the reserves that you will need, are UK. I do not know what will happen to that after the UK leaves. The UK is not visible on the ground, but it is a component of the security function.
Andrew Rosindell
Are you talking about an EU force, not a NATO force? Presumably the UK is part of that EU force at the moment, but it will not be after.
Sir Robert Cooper
Actually, I do not think there are any British people in it. This is a very small force, whose function is to ring the alarm bell so that a larger force comes. The larger force behind that—the reserves—are UK.
Dr Koneska
I think NATO is important for preventing conflicts from recurring, and for being there on the ground to provide security. In terms of how people feel about it—it is not necessarily them intervening, because they have not intervened very much since troops were on the ground in Bosnia and in Kosovo. Also important, symbolically and geopolitically, is this region being considered as part of the west, which is why NATO membership for some countries in the Western Balkans is problematic both domestically and with countries such as Russia, which is opposed to further expansion of NATO. In that sense, it is not unimportant. It is not the top foreign policy issue in any of those countries—that is EU accession—but it does figure on that agenda, and it is seen as something of a precursor to EU accession. But if I may comment on your comment about sovereignty, as someone who comes from the region, I can assure you that no one in the region values their sovereignty any less than the average British person values theirs.
Mike Gapes
Can I ask you about the prospects for economic benefits to the UK from trade with the region, given that it is so low? Dr Koneska, perhaps you can take this question first. We have a very low economic presence. Realistically, given that the Western Balkans will presumably be looking to get into the EU single market and be part of the EU market, is there any great prospect for the UK to benefit from any increased trade with this region if we are outside the EU?
Dr Koneska
I think so, yes. Obviously, it may not be very efficient for the UK to invest additional resources in developing an external trade strategy right now, before these countries are members of the EU, but in terms of how much business there could be for British businesses, how much more trade and investment opportunity, the Western Balkans has definitely received less attention from Britain than it has from some other countries. The top investors in this region are Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, but given the size and nature of the British economy one would expect to see more of a British presence and more trade links. In that sense, there is unused potential, which it would be wise for any—
Mike Gapes
Will that be trade or services? Will it be more focused on exporting services, insurance, banking and those kinds of things?
Dr Koneska
Yes, those sectors.
Mike Gapes
And manufacturing less so?
Dr Koneska
Yes, probably less so. Given the structure of the British economy, services—especially in the insurance and financial sectors, which remain under development in the Western Balkans—would be the obvious area where British businesses could become more present in the region. Obviously, this is an area where the British Government could think about how it could not only support British businesses, but help these societies to become a bit more open to the sorts of investments that could come from British investors. For foreign policy, that is one clear area where the British Government can provide more support, whether through the embassies on the ground and the support and advice they give to British business, or through its other efforts, as was previously mentioned, to help Governments to reform the rule of law and reform the judiciary, so that contract risk and political risks are reduced and mitigated and it is easier for British businesses to go to this region.
Professor Ker-Lindsay
Our trading relationship with the Western Balkans is next to nowhere at the moment. If I remember rightly from the last set of figures I looked at, the highest placed country in the Western Balkans in our ranking of countries as destinations for exports was Macedonia, which came in 54th, and among import destinations it was Serbia, which was 88th. Most of the rest are languishing in the low 100s in the ranking of 200 countries around the world that we trade with. There is very little. This is one of the real concerns I have about Britain’s relationship with the region as we go ahead in the context of Brexit. We talk a lot about security, but we do not have much by way of a trading or an economic relationship. We have to prioritise where we put diplomatic resources into trying to build up trading relationships. A very mixed split market is the problem with the Western Balkans. You are really dealing with six countries that are very different from each other. It is just not worth the effort compared with trying to send diplomats and trade officials to China, India or the United States. This is a real concern that I have. Are we talking about a sustainable interest in the Western Balkans after Brexit beyond security? I am not sure if there is much room for us to do a lot more. Take British banks, for example. I have heard this from ambassadors in the region. They say that when they come here the first thing they do is want to drum up trade, but it goes nowhere, because British companies are not familiar with the region. They do not understand it.
Sir Robert Cooper
It is quite high maintenance. It would require quite a lot of time to get there if you were a bank. The Austrians and the Germans are well dug in and the markets are quite small. You have got a choice between opening in China or opening in Montenegro.
Ann Clwyd
You have partly answered the question, but does the UK still have the people, resources and expertise in the region to make a real difference in terms of supporting a free media, improving governance, or tackling corruption?
Sir Robert Cooper
From my experience, and this is now a little out of date, the UK had extremely well-staffed embassies with lots of very bright young people there. The Germans are normally quite good and the Austrians often have some good people, but I thought the UK embassies were easily among the best and there has been a lot of expertise there. If the UK wishes to maintain a continuing relationship in security and foreign policy with the EU, the Balkans is still a key EU project. Unlike most foreign policy projects, it is one where success is possible. The UK is right to ask itself, as in a way it is probably doing with the Berlin process, are there useful ways in which we can get engaged? Having good personnel on the ground is probably the most important thing because that is what you need to spot the opportunities and to say, “Yes, we can contribute something in this area.” So I think there are good reasons for doing all of the things. There is expertise and it would be a pity if it disappeared.
Dr Koneska
I think the footprint of the British Foreign Office in the region has reduced over the past few years. Again, I do not have the actual data, but, from being in the region and dealing with the embassies, it has reduced. That does not mean there is less expertise, but the presence on the ground is reduced: for example, the services that embassies are able to provide, whether it is to businesses or consular services and so on. Again, this is anecdotal, but a lot depends on individual ambassadors and their willingness to be active and to engage in various issues. There are examples of ambassadors who have been very vocal on media freedom and on all sorts of reforms and who are seen as influential in these societies, but that varies depending on the individual.
Ms Prelec
The presence of UK embassies has been generally perceived in a favourable way by civil society in the region. From conversations in Belgrade recently, I sense that what they think would be important is that the UK keeps crossing the same line as the EU countries. They say they are worried about the UK going its own way and pushing its own agenda, because that would give leeway for political elites or other foreign actors to come between the lines. They say that they would welcome a combined and co-ordinated approach from the UK side with EU partners.
Stephen Gethins
I want to ask about the FCO’s expertise, but I was really interested in that last comment. Does anyone think there is a danger of the UK and the EU taking a diverging message? Is there any evidence of that?
Ms Prelec
From the few statements I have been able to see from the UK, so far there have not been big divergences. Boris Johnson came to Trieste last year and succinctly said that the UK is not leaving Europe, even though it is leaving the EU, and it wants to keep on this line. So I am not sure if a very coherent and clear strategy already exists, but on the whole it seems that they are open to keeping on those lines. Something I would like to highlight is that the good work by UK embassies and people on the ground—the British Council also does very good things in the Balkans—is sometimes frustrated by some practices that the UK has in terms of export of, for instance, tools for surveillance. It came out during the Macedonian surveillance scandal that some tools from the UK were approved from the Department for International Trade and the Foreign Office. So I would like to highlight that it is important that the UK’s words and actions are on the same lines, because if on the one hand we preach democracy, the rule of law and media freedom, so on and so forth, and on the other hand there are not enough checks on possibly providing autocrats with the tools to repress their own civil society and media, there is a contradiction.
Stephen Gethins
Thank you for that. Based on that, a number of you referred to embassies in the region and the work done by the British Council and other actors. Does the FCO make effective use of the expertise that exists within the UK in its work?
Professor Ker-Lindsay
I am put a little bit on the spot. I have to declare an interest: I spent almost a year, until last summer, working at the Foreign Office, but across the way on Cyprus. Look, we have seen the squeeze on the Foreign Office in recent years. We all know about the cuts in its funding. I think there is a realisation that that is going to have to be reversed now, and very quickly. There is a very good team there. I absolutely agree that the role of the ambassadors in the region has been phenomenally good. We have got a fantastic line-up at the moment. When I have seen them in action, I have always been impressed by how very good they are at working out what is required in each different country, not a one-size-fits-all. For example, Charles Garrett in Macedonia has done a very good job in working with the European Union over the constitutional crisis there and shepherding the country towards a democratic regime. Denis Keefe in Belgrade has realised that Britain and Serbia have had a very difficult relationship over the past two decades but historically we have been a lot closer, especially in the context of the first and second world wars. He has put a lot of emphasis on trying to build up the relationship through that. Edward Ferguson in Sarajevo—he comes from a Ministry of Defence background, and he understands the security element. What I am trying to say is, it has been very clever how this has been dealt with. But in terms of the expertise, this is a huge question, and we know that the Americans have seen this as well: we have let area studies decline in British universities—this is my moment for a little rant—and it is a real problem. We do not value languages and we do not value regional studies and history in the way we once did. Again, that puts us in a very difficult position, because in the past we could recruit into the Foreign Office leading Germans, Austrians or Italians who knew the region, but that is probably not going to be possible anymore. And are there going to be those British people who are trained up to be able to step in and do those jobs not just in south-east Europe but around the world?
Dr Koneska
May I add to that? I agree completely with what James said on expertise. It is up to the British Government to decide where to invest its resources and how to build up different expertise. From my perspective, as someone who works in the private sector and gives advice to Government and businesses, there is expertise, and if the British Government cannot try those people, they can certainly refer to other private sector actors who have the expertise and who are always happy to help—for a fee. There is expertise, and there are various ways to go about consulting it, whether directly through the FCO or through the FCO gathering expertise in different ways or referring actors who need it to those who have the expertise.
Chair
We will look at Foreign Office expertise in a separate project that we are considering at the moment. However, I am interested in the point that you raise about regional specialisation. Could you briefly touch on language in the region, because that subject raises itself very clearly, in terms of the Foreign Office’s and business’ ability to interact?
Sir Robert Cooper
It used to be the case that there was a regular throughput of a couple of people every year learning Serbo-Croatian. I don’t know if that happens now. Besides, they now have many different languages.
Ms Prelec
Sorry, was the question about languages learned here in the UK or languages spoken in the region?
Chair
No, it is about the Foreign Office’s ability to deploy people with linguistic abilities to operate in the region, and specifically business’ ability to interact, because this is not just about the Foreign Office being able to do all the interaction, it is also about British businesses being able to interact.
Dr Koneska
I do not have data about their linguistic abilities. I know—this is anecdotal again—that some ambassadors and some staff in the embassies have those linguistic abilities, and I know that some have taken private lessons to learn some small languages, such as Macedonian, for which it is not easy to find lessons, even in London, as I know. That is certainly an issue. I don’t have to tell you that the credibility of anyone increases the moment they speak the local language and so on. From the perspective of the business community, and especially those of us who deal with regional expertise and give regional advice to businesses, language is equally crucial. I cannot say that, from my personal experience, we have trouble finding people the right people with the right linguistic skills just yet. My impression—again, this is not based on any data I have across the sector—is that, in the private sector, there is actually quite a lot of regional expertise and linguistic skills that can be used and are regularly are used. Part of my job role is to use my knowledge of the region, including the languages, to give advice and to understand what goes on in the region. How that expertise from the private sector is or can be used is really for the British Government to decide.
Ms Prelec
If I may add to that, language skills are definitely very important in business, but something that is also important in doing business in the region is understanding the culture of how business is done. There has been a huge increase in investment from the Emirates, but also from China, for instance, and other countries. You may argue that, with investment from Russia, there is a higher degree of understanding and definitely a higher degree of understanding the culture. However, there is no common language with the Emirati. Yet there is some sort of common language in terms of, perhaps, historical heritage, because there was the non-aligned movement that they were all part of, but also in terms of doing business at a pretty top-down level and in ways that are not so transparent and are more gregarious. That is an alarm bell that I would like to ring, because letting those practices flow actually creates a vicious circle that brings economic resources more and more into the hands of the economic elite, which fosters economic inequality that in turn fosters the need for young, educated people who do not feel comfortable playing under those kinds of rules to emigrate, as does the absence of a level playing field. I am telling you this just to highlight how important investments from the UK and other EU countries—but the UK specifically—would be, because that would also, at the same time, foster a healthier business culture, which would then be part of this partial solution to those very entrenched problems in the Balkans.
Dr Koneska
That is exactly an area where I imagine the British Government, the FCO, should be in a position to give advice when British businesses ask about the business culture: “If you want to invest in Macedonia, these are the sorts of practices you can expect to see.” That may be the expertise that’s lacking.
Mr Seely
On Russia, can you tell me a little bit about their role? One hears various bits of evidence. They are handing out passports to Serbs in Kosovo. The Russian role in Serbia more broadly is an aim to increase its influence. Recent articles state that they are arming Bosnian Serb groups. All of those can be seen to be destabilising factors. Are they trying to undermine more generally the accession process? If so, what do you think we, or, indeed, the Governments in the region, should be doing in response, if there is a malign Russian threat?
Sir Robert Cooper
I am not very current on this, but I can only say that Russia has always been a presence in the region. This is the bit of the world where three empires meet and Russia is one of them. In the past, Russia was seen as the defender of the Orthodox communities there. In Serbia in particular, there is a kind of nostalgia about Russia. I used to see opinion polls regularly asking, “Who is the principal aid donor in Serbia?” Russia always comes top of the list by a long way, but it has never been true. The EU is a thousand miles ahead of that, but the Russians contrive to make quite a lot of noise there. I don’t know about illicit arms supplies. They certainly supply quite a lot of illicit money to their friends.
Mr Seely
It should be said that they have a very close relationship, which is historic and very important to them, with the Serbians in particular, and that is a positive thing. Would the other three like to comment more broadly?
Professor Ker-Lindsay
We have to be very careful when we talk about Russian involvement in the region. It is obviously being discussed at great length at the moment. Like many others, I am a little wary of saying that Moscow has more influence than it does in the region. Let’s also be clear: Russian influence extends, essentially, to two or maybe three places. Those are Serbia, Republika Srpska in Bosnia, and, to a certain degree, Montenegro. Those are the real areas in which there is real concern about where Russian influence lies. It is interesting that, in many ways, any Russian influence in the region has been gifted to Moscow by the EU. It is actually the failures of the EU to offer credible perspectives to these countries that have left the door open for Moscow to get involved. One example, which is slightly different, is Kosovo. The fact that we haven’t managed to resolve Kosovo has given Russia inordinate influence in Serbia, because of its Security Council veto on Kosovo’s membership of the UN, which Serbia relies on to keep Kosovo out. It relies on Moscow and it can’t afford to go too far. Moscow exacted a very high price for that, for example getting involved in the Serbian energy industry. I remember a few years ago a senior Serbia official saying to me, “Look, Russia has this from us. It has appointed a whole bunch of directors. We have never met any of these people. They are being paid a fortune—€20,000 to €30,000 a month. They are robbing us blind. But they need the political payback over Kosovo.” That is just one example that highlights the point that much of what Russia is achieving in the region is because of failures. We are not achieving. We are not giving enough perspective—
Mr Seely
Not enough perspective or not enough money? Is this about money or about process?
Professor Ker-Lindsay
Both. For example, if I am right, the biggest investment in Serbia has been by Fiat. They make Fiats in Serbia. Any Serb would tell you that rather than Russia taking out the money in the energy industry and robbing the country over that, involvement from western European companies and other European companies in Serbia leads to jobs—it is real investment and real money coming into the country and it actually achieves results. I think most Serbs absolutely understand that. They know that Russia is not about wealth creation and that the EU is about wealth creation. That is why, underlying all of this, you really do see that.
Mr Seely
Do you see an agenda with the Russians that they want Serbia to be part of this sort of rehash of a 19th-century pan-Slavism?
Sir Robert Cooper
The Russians, as they do in other places, are very good at making a bad situation worse. That is one of their great skills. This is a place where there are quite a lot of bad situations, and they work on them.
Mr Seely
That is potentially dangerous then, isn’t it?
Ms Prelec
Russia plays a weak hand in the Balkans very well. The difference between the Russian approach and the western approach is that Russia does not have so many resources invested in the region but has a very clear goal, whereas the EU invests more resources on the whole but the goal is all over the place, so the communication is not as effective.
Mr Seely
What is that goal?
Ms Prelec
The goal is not to invade the Balkans and make a new Soviet Union; the goal is to keep the situation more or less as it is, in terms of instability and a grey area in which they can still assert some of their presence. I think the alarmism that sees Bosnia being divided in two because of the Russian presence, and some other reasons, is overblown. However, it is true that it is in their interests to keep some sort of instability, in order for NATO advancement, for instance, to be stopped.
Mr Seely
Specifically on that point, do you believe it to be true or possibly true that the Russians are seeking to import a sort of managed conflict model, or the potential of a managed conflict model, into Bosnian Srpska or Kosovo—or Montenegro, seeing as we had a coup there only a couple of years ago?
Ms Prelec
Personally, I think that is overblown. It is unclear what happened in Montenegro. Some people genuinely think that there was a coup that was sponsored by Russia. I don’t have proof of that, so I can’t say. Something I would like to highlight is that Russian interference is actually amplified by local outlets in some cases, so Russian influence finds very fertile ground. Some of the outlets that are close to the Serbian Government, for instance, amplify the fact—they play it up—that Russia has an important presence there. That’s also because, in a way, it plays well in the hands of local politicians to say, “Look, if you don’t support us—the pro-European, pro-western leaders—this is what’s gonna come”. We need to be aware of this strategy of playing one against the other. There is something behind it, as James mentioned specifically for the energy sector: the energy sector is used as a way of asserting a geopolitical presence, but on the other hand it’s used as a way of dividing—
Mr Seely
Does anyone else have an opinion on the managed conflict argument? Are they trying to do this, or is it overblown?
Dr Koneska
I don’t think they are. I agree with Tena. I just think, if there was a conflict, they might use an opportunity to keep it frozen or keep it ongoing. I have no evidence, but from looking at Russian foreign policy it doesn’t appear that there is a coherent strategy to start conflict or import it from somewhere else. The Western Balkans has its own conflict legacy and so it doesn’t really import conflicts—the potential for it is already there.
Sir Robert Cooper
If you go back to the 1990s—just to remember the good old days—the Russians were actually quite helpful in the Balkans. The contact group worked quite well, and I think the Russians played quite a part in bringing the Serbia-Kosovo conflict to an end.
Chair
Can I ask one final question, if I may, Dr Koneska? If a UK business were to ask you if it should do business in the Western Balkans in five, 10 or 20 years, what would you tell them?
Dr Koneska
I would tell them that it depends on their risk tolerance and risk appetite, and that they are definitely set to encounter a different business environment from the UK and most of western Europe, and really even from central and eastern Europe. The key issues I would highlight would probably be related to what we have already discussed in detail, but presented a bit easier for businesses to translate to their bottom lines. Contract risk, as was mentioned, is a key issue, because there is a lack of rule of law, legislation is not enforced properly and equally, and there are entrenched links between politically connected domestic businesses and politicians who sit in Government. That skews competition and the business environment a lot in favour of the domestically well connected and makes it more difficult for foreign businesses to do clean, proper business and investment in the region. An additional layer of difficulty comes up when, for example, British or other western businesses go into the region and receive legal advice and look at the legal systems, because those are very much now aligned to EU standards, but that is just the surface of it. How business operates in practice, and the enforcement and implementation of that legislation, is a very different story from how it looks on paper. Understanding these issues is crucial to successfully doing business. These risks are long standing. They come from structural issues in these economies, such as corruption and the rule of law, which have been mentioned, as well as organised crime legacies, which we haven’t mentioned so far. A lot of what the 1990s were about was smuggling and going around trade sanctions. Some of these organised crime groups have now evolved to become legitimate or semi-legitimate businesses, but they carry with them all the legacies and reputational issues from the ’90s. I would tell UK businesses that there is still quite a lot to learn about the Balkans, given that they lack the historical link that, say, Austrian, German or Italian businesses have in the region.
Chair
I thank you all very much indeed. It has been a very revealing session that has been very informative for us.